Intra-crisis learning and prospective policy transfer in the Covid-19 pandemic

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Intra-crisis learning and Prospective Policy Transfer in the Covid-19 Pandemic

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Intra-crisis learning and Prospective Policy Transfer in the Covid-19 Pandemic

Abstract

Purpose

This article brings together the literatures on policy learning and lesson drawing with the intra-crisis learning literature in order to assess ‘learning lessons’ in the Covid-19 Pandemic.

Design

It carries out a structured review of articles that seek to provide lessons for the Pandemic. It examines these articles using Interpretative Content Analysis to apply the criteria of Prospective Policy Transfer to the material.

Findings

Application of the criteria of Prospective Policy Transfer suggests that lesson drawing was fairly limited. It is often not fully clear why nations were selected. Many articles were brief and provided limited detail, meaning that there was little depth on issues such as problems and goals, and on policy performance or policy success or failure. There was limited discussion of transferability of lessons, and few clear lessons could be drawn. Finally, the extent to which it was possible to learn lessons in a non-routine’ or ‘less routine’ crisis, under conditions of threat, uncertainty, and urgency was generally not discussed.

Research limitations/implications (if applicable)

Practical implications (if applicable)

The criteria within the framework of Prospective Policy Transfer provides a template for policy-makers to assess lessons.

Social implications (if applicable)

Originality/value (mandatory)

This article indicates the problems of attempting to draw lessons from the past or from other nations to an unprecedented crisis, where decision-making is characterised by elements of threat, urgency and uncertainty.

Keywords

COVID-19; Lesson drawing; Prospective Policy Transfer; Crisis decision-making; Literature Review;

Research Article
Introduction

This article brings together the literatures on policy learning and lesson drawing with the intra-crisis learning literature in order to assess ‘learning lessons’ in the Covid 19 Pandemic. It examines the problems of ‘lessons’ within a crisis, focusing on the supply of lessons that seek to provide information of learning from the past (e.g. previous Pandemics) or from abroad. It draws together elements from the Mossberger and Wolman (2003) framework of Prospective Policy Transfer, the learning perspective (the type and source of lessons) and the crisis perspective (threat, uncertainty, and urgency in a non-routine and intra-crisis situation).

Governments in many nations stressed the importance of evidence-based policy making (EBPM), including learning from abroad, but policy making documents advocating this often do not consider how policy makers can incorporate evidence into policy (Legrand 2012). Governments have often lacked a practical evaluation framework for selecting policy measures and then appraising the feasibility and transferability of such measures (Williams and Dzhekova 2014). Few studies have combined the EBPM and learning from abroad literatures (but see e.g. Ingold and Monaghan 2016; Legrand 2012). Moreover, most of the learning from abroad literature focuses on ‘normal’ rather than ‘crisis’ policy making, and so does not recognise the huge problems of crisis decision making (e.g. Boin et al 2018; Moynihan 2008, 2009).

The structure of the article is as follows. It first discusses policy learning and lesson drawing, including the notion of Prospective Policy Transfer (Mossberger and Wolman 2003). It then uses Interpretative Content Analysis to examine the articles, before applying the criteria of
the Prospective Policy Transfer framework to the material. It then brings the material together with sections of Discussion and Conclusions.

**Learning from Abroad**

Reviews of policy learning over many years (eg Bennett and Howlett 1992; Vagionaki and Trein 2019) focused on a set of broadly similar topics and questions. For example, Bennett and Howlett (1992) discussed the subject of learning (who learns?); the object of learning (learns what?); and the results of learning (to what effect?). The reviews also generally discussed a category of ‘lesson drawing’ which included the work of Rose (1991, 1993), known as the author who coined the concept ‘lesson-drawing’ for public policy. Rose points out that lessons can be sought by searching across time and/or across space, with the critical question of whether a programme that is successful in one setting can be transferred to another. This means attention to both evaluating its initial effect in situ and the probability of transfer, which can be placed on a spectrum from perfect or total transferability (or ‘fungibility’) to total blockage.

Much of the ‘lesson drawing’ and ‘policy transfer’ literatures paid limited attention to learning (eg Legrand 2012). From the learning perspective, Heikkila and Gerlak (2013) argued that information acquisition, translation, and dissemination phases of learning are largely ignored in the policy literature. Wolman and Page (2002) examined policy transfer as an instance of policy learning, adopting a communications and information framework that focuses on information networks, including producers, senders, and facilitators of information we are as well as recipients. In particular, they pointed out that virtually all
policy-transfer studies focus almost entirely on the receivers of information and the use they make of it, rather than on senders and providers.

Williams and Dzhekova (2014) review the literature on cross-national policy transfer, focusing on the main approaches associated with policy transfer, and obstacles and factors for success of policy transfer. They argue that the extensive literature on policy transfer and lesson-drawing recognizes a number of problems associated with the process of extrapolating “lessons” and best practices and applying them to a different context. They discuss Prospective Policy Transfer (below), before suggesting a practical framework for the rapid appraisal of prospective policy measures, including criteria/questions to be asked when assessing the applicability (generalizability) and transferability (feasibility) of policy.

Mossberger and Wolman (2003) focused on policy makers’ attempts to assess the effect of a policy or program before it is put in place, which is called prospective policy evaluation, a term coined by Rose (1991, 1993). They proposed criteria for assessing policy transfer as a form of prospective policy evaluation: awareness (scope of information; adequacy and accuracy of information); assessment (similarity of problems and goals; policy performance; differences in setting); and application (whether information about the policy in another country is actually used in the decision process). They then reviewed 17 case studies of cross-national policy transfer (mainly academic journal articles and texts) to ask to what extent they meet their “rational” criteria (see below). They then proceeded to a set of recommendations based on recognizing problems and coping through bounded rationality: information sources (mixed scanning as a heuristic; multiple sources); ‘awareness of problems and criticism;
consideration of potential conflicts with new goals; limited learning or prediction; awareness of supporting policies and institutions; and uncertainty in prospective evaluation’ (see below).

Learning and Crisis


It is broadly argued that lesson-drawing was one of the most underdeveloped aspects of crisis management (eg Boin et al 2018). The literature distinguished learning across crises and learning within a crisis, or inter-crisis and inter-crisis management (Moynihan 2009). Moynihan (2008, 2009) wrote that we know less about intra-crisis learning, which may be more difficult than, inter-crisis learning. Brändström et al (2004) explored cases where decision-makers draw on history in managing a current crisis or ‘coping with crisis by searching the past’. They differentiated learning in crises (the use of historical analogies during crisis decision-making) and learning from crises (the extent to which crises provide opportunities for policy-oriented learning). It is important to take into account the additional problems of intra-crisis learning with its constituent elements of threat, uncertainty, and urgency (eg Moynihan 2008, 2009; Boin et al 2018; Weible et al 2020). Lessons must be
learnt quickly in real time and based on evidence with large confidence limits and subject to change. Moynihan (2008, 2009) also differentiated between ‘routine’ and ‘non-routine’ or ‘less routine’ crises. In routine crises, standard procedures that work well in one setting can usually be applied to another, such as in forest fires or earthquakes. In such a setting, successful inter-crisis learning reduced the need for intra-crisis learning. However, less familiar crises with non-routine tasks were more difficult to manage.

**Method**

We searched Web of Science for 2020 using the terms ‘Covid AND lessons’ on 13 July 2020, resulting in 429 articles. Many of the vast number of articles on Covid-19 suggest at least implicit lessons, but we focused on explicit ‘lessons’ in the Title, Abstract, or Keywords. This brought up lessons from other nations and from previous Pandemics. With the lag-time associated with academic publishing, most articles were written during the growth and peak of the Pandemic in the nations of origin of most of the authors (Europe and the USA).

Inclusion criteria included: lessons learned from both time and space in relation to policy. In other words, the article had to produce a lesson from either the past or from another nation. Applying the inclusion criteria through reading Titles and Abstracts left a final list of 20 articles.

This study uses Interpretive Content Analysis (ICA) (Drisko and Maschi 2016). It uses a deductive approach that focuses on both manifest and latent content. A deductive approach is useful if the general aim is to test a previous theory, and keywords are derived from the interest of researchers or review of literature. CA may also be focused on manifest or latent content. Manifest CA involves analyzing for the appearance of a particular word or content,
while latent CA refers to the process of interpretation of content, or discovering underlying meanings of the words or the content. In addition to key words, it drew on connotative codes, which are based not on explicit words but on the overall or symbolic meaning of phrases or passages.

Prospective Policy Evaluation for Covid-19

This section examines the material from the sources cited by the reports drawing on the Mossberger and Wolman (2003) criteria of prospective policy transfer.

Awareness: Scope of Information.

This section examines the sources of lessons, and the justification for that choice. Mossberger and Wolman (2003) suggested that policies selected for emulation would be those that have proven successful (see below), have been implemented in countries with important similarities, or have addressed a similar problem (see below).

de Bruin et al (2020) examined the initial impacts of global risk mitigation measures taken during the COVID-19 pandemic. In particular, they reviewed early signs of effectiveness under the categories of Mobility Restrictions (China); socio-economic restrictions (reduced mobility in most European countries); physical distancing; hygiene measures (temporary prohibited of wild life markets in China; encouragement of wearing face masks in public in some Asian and EU nations); communication (trustworthy and well-coordinated communication channels to create community trust and compliance in Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan and Korea) and international support mechanisms.
Chen et al (2020) presented four key lessons (effective surveillance, reporting, and contact tracing; multi-sectoral efforts; sustained and routine prevention efforts; and a strong public health system) learned from efforts to address the pandemic in China and the US. Duong et al (2020) presented lessons from the ‘limited resource country’ of Vietnam. They pointed out that despite being one of the earliest countries influenced by the pandemic, Vietnam has received the world’s acclaim for its low-cost and effective strategy in their fight against COVID-19. The lessons learned from what Vietnam has done so far could stand out as an example of how to do more with less.

Edelman et al (2020) explored how lessons from HIV can inform the response to COVID-19. Forman et al (2020) provided 12 Lessons learned from the management of the coronavirus pandemic, seemingly drawn from ‘vignettes’ of international evidence. They mentioned nations such as China, USA, Brazil, UK, Korea, New Zealand, Germany, Finland, Iceland and Taiwan, France, and international organisations such as the EU, WB, and WHO. Ha (2020) suggested that Korea is in urgent need of moving away from a divided community approach and adopting a total community approach.

Hasselgren (2020) explored lessons from the Smallpox Epidemics in America in the 1700s, as the ‘many similarities between events during the 1700s and today’s onslaught by the coronavirus are remarkable’. However, most of the article focused on inoculation, although there is no effective COVID-19 vaccine. Islam et al (2020) carried out a review of articles focusing on human coronaviruses, including SARS, MERS, and COVID-19 virus with their epidemiology, transmission dynamics, and current situation of the outbreak, and prevention
and control measures. They focused on the three phases undertaken by China that could be
adopted by other countries, because China was the country where the first epidemic started,
and was also the first success story too. They argued that basic approaches quite similar to
China, primarily focusing on test, isolation, and quarantine, largely controlled the virus in
Korea, Japan, and Norway. However, according to studies in their review (Table 3), nations
that failed to control the virus were France, Iran, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland,
Turkey, UK and USA, mainly for reasons such as limited testing and tracing, and being late
in enforcing lockdowns.

According to Jaiswal et al (2020), disinformation, misinformation and inequality-driven
mistrust were ‘lessons unlearned from AIDS denialism’. Jhaveri (2020) examined ‘echoes of
2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic in the COVID Pandemic’ Jones (2020) outlined lessons
from previous Pandemics. Lee et al (2020) suggested that although Singapore was one of the
first countries to be affected by COVID-19, and for a while was the country with the highest
case numbers outside China, its comprehensive surveillance system strategy, coupled with
community-based measures proportionate to the transmission risk, has been effective in
containing spread. Marshall et al (2020) considered if lessons could be learned from the
response to Florida’s Zika outbreak in 2016-2018.

Moon (2020) claimed that unlike many Western countries, Korea has been able to contain the
spread of COVID-19 without a harsh forced lockdown of the epicentre of the virus, arguing
that an agile-adaptive approach, a policy of transparency in communicating risk, and citizens’
voluntary cooperation were critical factors. Oh et al (2020) examined the ‘strong national
response’ in Korea. Olagnier and Mogensen (2020) presented ’big lessons from a small
country’ of Denmark. They discussed whether geographical, demographical, and
governmental factors can explain the Danish success in fighting Covid-19, before arguing
that trust and Danish culture were critical factors. They concluded that overall, it is probably
not a single factor, but the sum of different factors, that together have contributed to the
effective management of the coronavirus crisis.

Rahimi and Abadi (2020) noted that different countries affected by the COVID-19 outbreak
have responded discrepantly, but a uniform strategy is required to tackle this pandemic. They
then proposed five mandatory measures to efficiently control and tackle any present or future
outbreaks of COVID-19. However, the evidence appeared rather loose, and only mentions
More specifically, they contrast the testing strategy of the two regions of Lombardy and
Veneto, concluding that the latter was more successful than the former. Ruiu (2020) pointed
to lessons learned from the ‘mismanagement’ of Covid-19 in Italy, which was one of the
most affected countries in the world. Wilson (2020) focused on the leadership approach and
practices of the New Zealand government, notably adopting the ambitious goal of achieving
rapid and complete control over the COVID-19 outbreak, rather than just ‘flattening the
curve’.

Awareness: Adequacy and Accuracy of Information
Mossberger and Wolman (2003) focused on the accuracy of information about the goals,
design, and actual operation of policies. However, as they discuss similarity of problems and
goals, and policy performance in other criteria (below), this section examines the level of
detail. They wrote that in most cases, borrowing countries appeared to have reasonably
accurate and detailed knowledge about the mechanics of the programme. However, this
tended to be gathered through study visits and conferences, and programme evaluations and material from critics were sometimes lacking.

There is inevitably some trade-off between breadth and depth, with articles focusing on one nation able to provide greater detail. de Bruin et al (2020) examined early signs of effectiveness across nations for their six categories in a page or so, making it difficult to provide much detail. Chen et al (2020) discussed four key lessons (effective surveillance, reporting, and contact tracing; multi-sectoral efforts; sustained and routine prevention efforts; and a strong public health system) for China and the US in a three page article. Duong et al (2020) was unable to provide much detail in a two page letter, but set out key interventions chronologically in a Table. Edelman et al (2020) covered seven ‘critical observations and lessons to be learned’ in some three pages. Forman et al (2020) discussed 12 Lessons within a short article, and so details on each are necessarily thin. Ha (2020) was unable to provide much detail in an article of some two pages. Hasselgren (2020) focused mainly on smallpox inoculation, although there is no effective COVID-19 vaccine. Islam et al (2020) provided some detail on China, but international evidence from their review was briefly summarised in a Table. Jaiswal et al (2020) provide limited detail in some three pages of text. Jhaveri (2020) examined the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic, with just over one page devoted to ‘Lessons from 2009 that are relevant to the Covid-19 Public Health response’.

In a brief article of some three pages, Jones (2020) focused most attention on past Pandemics. Lee et al (2020) provided some detail on Singapore’s approach, including surveillance and containment, healthcare, community and social, and border control measures, comparing them with selected other nations (their Table 1). Marshall et al (2020) mainly contained a
descriptive qualitative case study of Florida’s response to Zika, with the section on ‘Insights into COVID-19 Response’ taking up just over one page. Moon (2020) provided some detail on the Korean strategy. Oh et al (2020) provided a detailed account of Korea’s response. Olagnier and Mogensen (2020) discussed the Danish “Act fast and act with force” approach, in the context of geographical, demographical, and governmental factors, as well as trust and Danish culture. Rahimi and Abadi (2020) were unable to provide much detail on their ‘five mandatory measures’ in an article of some three pages. Romagnani et al (2020) focused on lessons from the Italian experience of Covid-19. More specifically, they contrasted the testing strategy of the two regions of Lombardy and Veneto, concluding that the latter was more successful than the former. Ruiu (2020) discussed political, scientific, media and public responses, stressing five communication weaknesses of outbreak management in Italy. Wilson (2020) set New Zealand’s ‘go hard, and go early’ approach within the broader national context and leadership style.

**Assessment: Similarity of Problems and Goals**

According to Mossberger and Wolman (2003), potential adopters must identify which problem(s) the policy has been used to address and the associated goals, and then determine the extent to which these are similar to the problems they face and the goals they wish to pursue. They pointed out that one frequently cited reason for unsuccessful policy transfer is the effort to transplant a policy that was intended to serve one purpose in the originating country to serve other ends in the borrowing country.

de Bruin et al (2020) noted that at the time of writing, the Italian health care remains on the brink of collapse experiencing innumerable numbers of hospitalised patients, a scarcity of
intensive care beds, medical staff), PPEs, ventilators and medicines. Moreover, other
countries, including Spain and the United States, also experienced similar challenges in
different degrees. They focused on ‘risk mitigation’: controlling the infection to prevent the
spread of COVID-19 is regarded as the only intervention that could be used. Chen et al
(2020) regarded Covid-19 as an ‘unprecedented global public health challenge’, with the
growing number of deaths, and has placed millions of people in full or partial quarantine,
disrupted commerce, and caused meltdowns of the global financial market, but do not seem
to provide much explicit precision on goals. Duong et al (2020) provided little explicit detail
on problems or goals, beyond stating that for Vietnam the major challenge is now to
control potential community transmission clusters. Edelman et al (2020) said little about
problems or goals. Forman et al (2020) pointed to the ‘tremendous economic and social costs
of this pandemic.’ Ha (2020) said little about problems or goals, but is one of the few studies
that regard Korea as a negative lesson of ‘a divided community approach.’ It regarded the
ultimate goal as eliminating the virus from the country.

Hasselgren (2020) discussed problems associated with smallpox, but says little about goals.
Islam et al (2020) stated that controlling COVID-19 in the future and points to goals of
controlling the current outbreak and prevention strategies. Jaiswal et al (2020) pointed to
goals of understanding the impact on and importance of the Public Health response of
disinformation, misinformation and mistrust.

Jhaveri (2020) discussed ‘goals’ of social distancing in order to ‘blunt the first wave’ and to
manage health system surge capacity. Jones (2020) discussed risks, but with little on detailed
goals. Lee et al (2020) outlined goals of containing the spread early of the virus. Marshall et
al (2020) gave little mention of specific goals. Moon (2020) outlined the goals of mitigating
the initial surge of COVID-19. Oh et al (2020) pointed to the ‘intentions and goals’ of lowering the incidence of new cases and sustaining a low mortality rate. According to Olagnier and Mogensen (2020), the goals were low rates of infections and low death rates. While Rahimi and Abadi (2020) gave some mention to managing the present and future outbreaks, there seem to be no more specific goals related to this. Romagnani et al (2020) pointed to the overall goals of controlling the spread of the virus and mitigating the epidemic impacts. Ruiu (2020) discussed goals of limiting the spread of the virus and limiting the spread of ‘both chaos and panic’. Wilson (2020) was more specific, pointing to New Zealand’s goals of ‘achieving rapid and complete control over the COVID-19 outbreak – not just ‘flattening the curve’ as other countries are struggling to do.

Assessment: Policy performance

Mossberger and Wolman (2003) stressed that policy makers should assess the extent to which the policy they wish to emulate was successful, or the respects in which it was successful. However, this was in many ways the most difficult dilemma in the policy transfer process, with problems of selection bias (more information from programme advocates than critics; and few evaluations). The unsystematic and un-structured means of information gathering about policies can lead to policy making by anecdote rather than by analysis.

De Bruin et al (2020) discussed early signs of effectiveness for each category of mitigation. In particular they state that early analysis of the Wuhan COVID-19 outbreak suggest that the effects of travel limitations are important for national and international agencies dealing with public health response planning (mobility restrictions) and that individual behaviour is crucial
in controlling the spread of COVID-19. They cited Anderson et al (2020) that the application of a combination of mitigation measures such as physical distancing in combination with the ban of mass gatherings, good diagnostic facilities and remotely accessed health advice, together with specialised treatment for people with severe COVID-19 infections, was suggested to lead to a 60% reduction in transmission. They concluded that the highest effect is obtained by applying a combination of measures representing different aims. However, it seemed that policy performance is not good as in Europe, in the current major hotspots in Italy and Spain, and recently in the US, in New York, hospitals were being overwhelmed.

Chen et al (2020) stated that China appears to be more successful in contact tracing than the USA. Duong et al (2020) pointed out that to date (April 10, 2020), Vietnam has had 255 confirmed cases and no deaths due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and has received acclaim for its management of the virus.

It was not fully clear if Edelman et al (2020) regarded policy performance associated with HIV as a success. Forman et al (2020) noted that although it would be many months or even years before the final verdict can be reached, ‘we believe that it is already possible to identify 12 key lessons’. They pointed out that while some nations have performed well, in global terms the Pandemic has close to five million cases and over 300,000 deaths. As noted above, Ha (2020) claimed that Korea is in urgent need of moving away from a divided community approach. Hasselgren (2020) noted that, despite opposition in some quarters, inoculation against smallpox was successful. Islam et al (2020) stated that China demonstrated success as a ‘role model for the world’ with a three phase rapid approach, prevention, reduction of new cases, reduction of clusters. Jaiswal et al (2020) discussed the lack of success of the lack of communication had upon certain groups in society in relation to COVID-19. This was similar to the AIDS crisis, suggesting that lessons had not been learned.
Jhaveri (2020) pointed to a lack of success as action was not taken quickly enough and plans were not in place for a major outbreak such as Covid-19. Jones (2020) stated that diseases are unpredictable and hard to plan for, but provides some mention of the successes of quarantine, testing and social distancing of previous Pandemics, but also of the failures as a result of poor planning and stigma. Lee et al (2020) argued that Singapore was successful, which was dependent upon concise government action, coupled with a combination of measures such as surveillance, containment, healthcare and border control.

Marshall et al (2020) focused on failures in relation to Zika on rapid results, and public knowledge about transmission. The discussion of COVID-19 was more speculative, but indicative of failure again in these areas. Moon (2020) linked the success of Korea to learning and preparedness from the previous MERS outbreak. Oh et al (2020) pointed to success associated with hospital capacity, TTT, rapid response and mobilisation. They stated that this was due in part to past learning from MERS.

Olagnier and Mogensen (2020) argued that the Danish ‘Act fast and act with force’ policies were successful and performed well, alongside public cooperation and clear communication. There was little mention of overall success or failure of approaches in Rahimi and Abadi (2020) as the discussion was global. However, they claimed that more preparation internationally was required and measures needed to be put in place in relation to movement, quarantine, livestock and resources where existing policies have failed. Romagnani et al (2020) pointed to policy failure in Italy, which performed poorly due to a lack of streamlined protocols and procedures. Ruiu (2020) highlighted a failure of policies from lack of
coordination and rapid response, coupled with poor PPE resources, which meant that the approaches taken performed poorly. Wilson (2020) discussed successful policy based upon the leadership, and linked to rapid response, science led and trust in government.

**Assessment: Differences in Setting**

An assessment should be made of the extent to which particular features of the new policy environment differ from the policy’s original setting, and whether these differences matter for implementation or outcomes (Mosberger and Wolman 2003). For their literature review, they questioned whether policy makers in the borrowing unit identify important differences in the policy or programme setting.

de Bruin et al (2020) noted that settings and type of governments impact upon how the policies are introduced, the communication and how rapidly they can be implemented, which was dependent upon resources and compliance. The rules and policies adopted by many countries differed as well as societal and population structure, and healthcare systems. They concluded that success is dependent upon how rapidly the risk mitigation strategies can be applied and are reliant upon citizen’s trust, resources and clear multi-agency, national and international communication. Chen et al (2020) noted differences between USA and China, but it is less clear how these relate to policy transfer. Duong et al (2020) showed that a nation can do ‘more with less’, with a low-cost and effective strategy in their fight against COVID-19. Edelman et al (2020) stated that while HIV/AIDS and COVID-19 are entirely different diseases with different modes of transmission and natural history, both require confronting denial of their danger and similar and specific clinical and public health approaches.
Forman et al (2020) did not seem to consider that context is important, as their 12 lessons appear to be universally applicable. Ha (2020) said little about settings, beyond the claim of a divided community approach. Hasselgren (2020) argued that the COVID-19 pandemic offers many similarities with previous pandemics hitting our country. In particular, the smallpox epidemics during the 1700s threatened the lives of multitudes and created panic and fear in the society, similar to the situation caused by the coronavirus. However, much of his article concerned inoculation, but there is no vaccine for Covid-19. Islam et al (2020) implied that transferability is dependent upon the governments’ abilities and whether they can move quickly and decisively. Comparators with other countries demonstrate where failures were evident in comparison to the approach by China due to slow action and less stringent measures.

Jaiswal et al (2020) appeared to assume that suggestions can be made without a large consideration of time contexts. They noted that the timeframes and the nature of the disease is different, but issues of transferability are not directly explored. Jhaveri (2020) noted major differences relating to the nature of H1N1 and COVID-19, but transferability issues with the actions taken with H1N1 and COVID-19 measures are not explored in detail. Jones (2020) gave little in depth consideration to different spatial or time contexts and transferability of the approaches discussed. Lee et al (2020) offered comparisons to measures in other countries measures, but no detailed discussion of issues with context and transferability issues is provided. Marshall et al (2020) discussed only the Florida context, without much consideration of transferability. Moon (2020) argued that adapting and transferring Korean policies to Western countries may be difficult due to the lack of public trust, lack of past experience (SARs/MERs), and the ability to act quickly.
Oh et al (2020) discussed that transferability may be difficult as other countries have not had the experience of SARs/MERs and that ‘decisive central leadership and a strong decentralized system open to the repurposing and flexible reallocation of resources and depended on political leadership and a commitment and willingness to try innovative responses’ need to be present and considered when transferring the polices discussed.

Olagnier and Mogensen (2020) outlined that transferability may be difficult due to demographical differences which are key in prevention alongside rapid action. They also outlined the uniqueness of the cultural position with widespread trust in the government that may not be present elsewhere. Rahimi and Abadi (2020) discussed that differences in settings may make international working difficult due to demographical and cultural differences but did not give any in depth consideration to issues of transferability across nations. Romagnani et al (2020) discussed protocols and strategies, but with little attention to issues of transferability. Ruiu (2020) did not discuss how the measures implemented and suggested can be transferred across settings and contexts. Wilson (2020) offered little consideration or discussion on issues of transferability across contexts.

Application

The final criterion of Mossberger and Wolman (2003) was whether information about the policy in another country is actually used in the decision process, with application premised on adequate information about and assessment of the nature of the problem, policy goals, policy performance, and the policy environment. Clearly, these documents were not produced by government, and so this section examines if the documents made a clear recommendation based on lessons from other nations or from the past.
De Bruin et al (2020) concluded that it is too early to detect the impact of different mitigation strategies, making it is not yet possible to give quantitative advice. Chen et al (2020) implied that the USA could learn from China on issues such as surveillance, reporting, and contact tracing. Duong et al (2020) provided four clear lessons: a strong political commitment and prompt actions with the engagement of stakeholders; best risk communication practice; Intensive surveillance, case management, contact tracing, and large-scale health quarantine; and series of suspension for flights, shutting schools, and closing all public places. However, the Table of Key COVID-19 Interventions suggested the importance of early and decisive action. Edelman et al (2020) concluded that the decades of experiences with HIV can serve as a guidepost as for the Covid-19 Pandemic. Forman et al’s (2020) 12 lessons did not seem to be closely drawn from national experience, apart from ‘decisive leadership’ in nations such as China (slightly belatedly), Korea, New Zealand, Germany, Finland, Iceland and Taiwan. Ha (2020) implied that Korea must learn from its mistakes. Given that there is no vaccine for Covid-19, Hasselgren’s (2020) recommendation of smallpox inoculation was of limited relevance.

Islam et al (2020) recommended a three phase approach: prevention/isolation/surveillance; restrictions/treatments; and reduce clusters/enhance evidence/use data. Jaiswal et al (2020) recommended that the following lessons be adapted from the AIDS crisis to COVID-19: recognition of misinformation and mistrust; and better understanding by public health of how to communicate clear and transparent information to marginal groups. Jhaveri (2020) suggested that being prepared and also taking action quickly is key (i.e social distancing/school closures) and that preparation for a second wave of infections should be underway. Jones (2020) argued that we learn from the past in context, referring to hindsight
with stigma and health professional deaths and exaggerated fears as risk factors. Lee et al (2020) advocated that governments adopt joined up rapid strategies to negate a large outbreak utilising a range of methods gained from SARS. i.e containment/surveillance, healthcare, border control, social/community measures. Marshall et al (2020) suggested that strategies and failures from Zika can be applied in the instance of Covid-19 and mistakes made can be learned from ‘coordination of resources, essential services and treatment, data collection, communication among public health and healthcare systems, and dissemination of information, community education, testing accuracy and turnaround time, financing, and continuity of health services’.

Moon (2020) argued for a focus on public cooperation, preparation and rapid responses to an outbreak. Oh et al (2020) advocated preparedness and rapid action based upon robust planning and communication strategies. Olagnier and Mogensen (2020) stated that successful application comes from trust in government and rapid action, communication and cooperation. Rahimi and Abadi (2020) recommended that joined up, international responses are required to a number of elements rather than applicability to just one setting. i.e livestock trading, vaccine projects, rapid quarantine measures, PPE supply, regulation and provision. Romagnani et al (2020) advocated a joined up international response to the outbreak and further outbreaks. Ruiu (2020) advised a coordinated approach by all agencies involved, quick action and planning and resource availability. Wilson (2020) advised measures including trust in the government and the ability of the government to be led by expertise and the mobilisation of the population.

Discussion
Table 1 sums up how the articles fared according to the criteria of Prospective Policy Transfer (Mossberger and Wolman 2003). A wide variety of nations are covered under ‘Scope of Information’, with some articles covering a range of nations (eg review) while others focused on single nations. The criteria for selection were not always clear. Reviews presented the results of their search, while it was sometimes clear that a single nation presented either a positive (eg Korea, New Zealand) or negative lesson (eg Italy). Most positive lessons came from nations that had seen fewer cases and deaths (see eg Worldometer). Many of these have been covered in other sources such as news media (Author Ref). It was good to see lessons from some nations that have not been extensively covered such as Vietnam, but surprising not to see more focus on Germany. On the other hand, there were some ‘dogs that did not bark’ in that nations such as Greece, and some East European nations with low case numbers and deaths were not mentioned. Moreover, it was not clear that nations had been chosen on the basis of important similarities or similar problems (Mossberger and Wolman 2003). This was particularly the case for lessons from the past.

The criterion of ‘adequacy and accuracy of information’ was limited by the brevity of many of the articles, making providing much detail problematic, especially if they attempted to cover more than one nation. There were very few long articles that focused on one nation (but see Olagnier and Mogensen (2020) on Denmark).

Similarly, there was limited detail on problems and goals. The ‘rational policy process’ approach clearly links problems and goals. For example, if lack of hospital capacity is seen as a problem, then the associated goal may be to rapidly increase that capacity, as in the
construction of the ‘Nightingale’ hospitals in the UK. Problems broadly included health systems being overwhelmed, and issues such as lack of PPE. Goals were often vague. For example, it was unclear if the goal was mitigation ‘(flattening the curve) or eradication (eg New Zealand).

Similarly, as goals tended to be unclear, policy performance or policy success or failure was often also not clear. Drawing on the policy success literature, Weible et al (2020) argue that success or failure can be judged as part of decisions, processes, and politics, containing multiple narratives and versions For example, it might be argued that the UK succeeded on rapidly increasing hospital capacity, but failed on just about every other possible criterion.

Relatively limited attention was paid to ‘Settings’, with some studies appearing to assume perfect transferability or ‘fungibility’ of lessons (Rose 1991). A few articles did note that transfer may be problematic (eg Moon 2020; Oh et al 2020; Olagnier and Mogensen 2020; Rahimi and Abadi 2020), particularly with respect to factors such as national culture and trust in the government. Moreover, lessons must be related to ‘real time’. Stressing preparedness is similar to the old story of ‘I wouldn’t start from here’: while they are wise words for any future Pandemic, it is difficult for any nation to build the infrastructure that (eg Korea took some years to do after SARS in a matter of weeks, although Germany increased its testing capacity very quickly. Even when there was some discussion of settings, it was often unclear how these related to transferability.
Finally, for ‘Application’, few clear recommendations were made. Some lessons were suggested (eg Duong 2020; Forman et al 2020). The main lessons seemed to be on surveillance and contact tracing (eg Chen et al 2020; Duong et al 2020; Lee et al 2020); early and decisive leadership (eg Forman et al 2020; Jhaveri 2020; Marshall et al 2020; Moon 2020; Olagnier and Mogensen 2020; Ruiu 2020); communication (Duong et al 2020; Olagnier and Mogensen 2020); border control (eg Duong et al 2020); joined up strategies and co-operation (Lee et al 2020; Marshall et al 2020; Moon 2020; .Rahimi and Abadi 2020; Romagnani et al 2020); trust in government (Olagnier and Mogensen 2020; Wilson 2020); and preparedness (eg Moon 2020; Oh et al 2020). However, partly associated with the lack of detail (above), lessons were often fairly broad. For example, ‘lockdown’ may have many different elements such as speed (relative to time of first case or death), harshness (eg stay at home apart from essentials such as food and medicine), and compliance and enforcement. For example, Dergiades et al (2020) found that for 32 nations, the greater the strength of government interventions at an early stage, the more effective these are in slowing down or reversing the growth rate of deaths. Similarly, for the lessons from the past, some form of ‘Quarantine’ has been practiced to combat infectious disease since the 1370s.

Williams and Dzhekova (2014) point to the need to strike a balance between de-contextualization and over-contextualization of potential foreign policies. It seems that most of the studies above tend towards de-contextualizing potential policies for transfer, as they focus too much on outputs, results and impacts, which result in a blending out of the contextual variables. In other words, they tend to pay insufficient attention to contextualizing factors or applicability (feasibility) assessment, whether it is possible to provide the intervention in the local setting, such as the political climate/leverage; political barriers; social acceptability; locally tailored intervention; available essential resources and identified
organization(s) to provide intervention; organizational expertise; and capacity.

Few of the articles discuss the crisis literature, and perhaps underplay the problems of learning in a crisis situation, with its elements of threat, uncertainty, and urgency (eg Moynihan 2008, 2009; Boin et al 2018). This is even more so for a ‘non-routine’ or ‘less routine’ crisis (Moynihan 2008, 2009), where drawing historical analogies (cf Brändström et al 2004) from very different previous Pandemics was of limited value. As noted above, some of the articles stressed the need for urgency, but few stressed the significant level of uncertainty associated with a novel Pandemic.

Conclusions

Application of the criteria of Prospective Policy Transfer (Mossberger and Wolman 2003) suggests that the extent of lesson drawing is fairly limited. It is often not fully clear why nations were selected. Many articles were brief and provided limited detail, meaning that there was little depth on issues such as problems and goals, and on policy performance or policy success or failure. There was limited discussion of transferability or ‘fungibility’ of lessons (Rose 1991), and few clear and specific lessons could be drawn. Finally, the extent to which it was possible to learn lessons in a non-routine’ or ‘less routine’ crisis, under conditions of threat, uncertainty, and urgency was generally not discussed. Future lessons need to be less international or historical analogies (cf Brändström et al 2004), but rather to fit with the criteria of Prospective Policy Transfer (Mossberger and Wolman 2003). Williams and Dzhekova (2014) conclude that successful policy transfer and cross-national policy learning must be informed by prospective policy analysis. This article has suggested that studies generally do not closely match the criteria of prospective policy transfer (Mossberger
and Wolman 2003). With the additional problems of crisis-decision making under conditions of threat, uncertainty, and urgency, it is clear that lessons are unlikely to be learned.

References


Search References


