Moral Disengagement in Sport

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Abstract

Historically, theories of morality have focussed predominantly on moral cognition at the expense of moral action (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996). One theory that considers moral action as well as moral cognition is Bandura’s (1991) Social Cognitive Theory of Moral Thought and Action. One aspect of this theory that has recently proved particularly popular with researchers investigating sport morality is that of moral disengagement. Moral disengagement is a collective term for eight psychosocial mechanisms that selectively inhibit moral standards from preventing reprehensible conduct by disengaging self-reproof when one engages in conduct that contravenes one’s moral standards (Bandura, 2002). In this review, research examining moral disengagement in the sport context is discussed. Research in this area can be grouped into two broad categories: (a) moral disengagement and behaviours that occur during sport participation, and (b) moral disengagement and doping in sport. The present review considers work addressing both categories. Within each category, the main findings of pertinent studies are discussed, and strengths and weaknesses of these studies are identified. The review concludes with directions for future research.

Keywords: moral action, moral cognition, moral emotion.
Moral Disengagement in Sport

It could be argued that sport is a context that provides participants with opportunities for development of self-control, conflict resolution, and learning to work with others. Unfortunately, it is also a milieu in which individuals engage in transgressive acts such as rule breaking and deception. Moral issues in sport have attracted an abundance of research interest, and recently there has been a move towards a focus on behaviour in such research (see Kavussanu, 2007, 2008). Research in this area ultimately aims to increase understanding of what leads athletes to engage in transgressive acts and how the frequency of such acts can be reduced. One theory that is concerned with the regulation of moral behaviour is Bandura’s (1991) Social Cognitive Theory of Moral Thought and Action. As such, this theory represents an ideal framework for research investigating moral behaviour in sport.

Bandura (1991) details a process describing how moral action is regulated. One pertinent aspect of this process is moral disengagement, which involves the selective inhibition of moral standards that deter reprehensible conduct by disengaging self-reproof when one engages in conduct that breaches one’s moral standards (Bandura, 2002). Moral disengagement is volitional, that is individuals can choose to morally disengage or not. Finding ways to discourage moral disengagement may lead to less frequent transgressive behaviour in people with high moral standards as these standards are assumed to deter such conduct. Bandura’s (1991) theory is particularly applicable here because it describes specific mechanisms through which people can morally disengage.

A review of moral disengagement research in sport would provide an overview of
research findings and stimulate further interest in this area of research. The specific aims of the current review are to: (a) provide a clear and concise description of Bandura’s (1991) theory and how it applies to sport; (b) critically review moral disengagement research in sport; and (c) provide directions for future moral disengagement research in sport.

Bandura’s (1991) Theory

Bandura (1991) suggested that any comprehensive theory of morality must explain how moral reasoning combines with other psychosocial factors to direct moral action. In his theory of moral thought and action, Bandura (1991) presented such a theory. Key aspects of this theory describe the importance of self-regulation and moral disengagement in determining people’s moral conduct. The next section details these aspects of Bandura’s (1991) theory.

The self-regulatory process

According to Bandura (1991), moral behaviour is motivated and regulated by personal and social sanctions expected to result from such conduct. Regarding personal sanctions, people avoid engaging in harmful acts because they anticipate self-rebuke, and they engage in positive social acts because they expect self-satisfaction and self-respect. Similarly, detrimental conduct is controlled via social sanctions whereby people abstain from such conduct when they anticipate that they will be criticised by others as a result, and people engage in positive social acts when they expect others to praise such conduct. Although both personal and social sanctions are important, Bandura (1991) views personal sanctions as the predominant regulator of moral conduct once moral standards
have developed and been internalised. Social sanctions are considered relatively weak
deterrents to transgression because many acts occur in the absence of social censure. In
contrast, people preside over their conduct regardless of whether social sanction is
present or not. As such, Bandura (1991) purports that personal sanction plays a more
central role in regulating moral conduct in comparison to social sanction.

Bandura (1991) described how personal sanctions operate through three major
subfunctions: self-monitoring of conduct, judgement of conduct, and affective self-
reaction. People first monitor their behaviour, then make judgements regarding the moral
nature of the act, and finally experience affective reactions based on the judgements they
make. It is the anticipation of these affective reactions that regulates behaviour.

Behaviour corresponding to personal standards results in pleasant emotions (e.g., pride)
thereby promoting such acts whereas conduct that deviates from personal standards
results in negative self-condemning affect (e.g., guilt) thus deterring such behaviour.

*Moral disengagement*

The judgements made regarding the moral nature of behaviour are impacted by
psychosocial factors related to how one interprets the environmental conditions in which
a particular act takes place. The self-regulatory process details how antisocial conduct is
deterred by the anticipation of resultant negative affect. However, people still engage in
conduct that is harmful to others. Accordingly, Bandura (1991) describes eight
psychosocial mechanisms that allow people to act in ways normally considered immoral
without experiencing the negative affect usually associated with such conduct. Use of
these mechanisms is termed moral disengagement. The mechanisms operate on one or
more of three points in the process of moral control (Bandura, 1986), and can be grouped into four sets based on the point/s on which they act.

The first set of mechanisms operates on the detrimental conduct itself and includes moral justification, euphemistic labelling, and advantageous comparison. Moral justification entails the cognitive reconstrual of a harmful behaviour into a praiseworthy one, making it personally and socially acceptable by depicting it as facilitating a valued social or moral purpose (Bandura, 1991). In sport, injurious conduct can be justified as a means of upholding team honour. Euphemistic labelling involves the discerning use of language to cognitively disguise blameworthy behaviours as less harmful (Bandura, 1991). In sport, athletes describe how they “bend the rules” rather than break them. Advantageous comparison involves comparing detrimental acts with more harmful ones, making them appear benign in comparison (Bandura, 1991). For example, athletes are able to justify the use of abusive language by comparing it to the use of physical violence making the former appear benign in comparison.

The second set of mechanisms concerns one’s accountability for action, and includes displacement and diffusion of responsibility. Displacement of responsibility occurs when people view their behaviour as resulting from social pressure or instruction from an authority figure and not something for which they are personally accountable (Bandura, 1991). In sport, athletes may displace responsibility for unfair tactics to their coach. Diffusion of responsibility occurs through division of labour, group decision making, or group action (Bandura, 1991). In division of labour, group members perform subdivided tasks that are not harmful in isolation but are harmful when performed in
combination. Group decision making involves minimising individual responsibility for
decisions made (Bandura, 1991), and group action entails attribution of any harm to other
group members. In sport, diffusion of responsibility could occur through group decision
making or group action, for example, when players attribute their antisocial behaviour to
collective team decisions to engage in antisocial practices, or to the fact that most players
on their team behave antisocially. Although examples of division of labour are not
obvious in sport an example in non-sport contexts is seen when prison guards perform
subdivided tasks to achieve the collective task of executing convicts (cf. Bandura, 2002).

The third set of mechanisms targets the consequences of detrimental conduct and
consists of distortion of consequences. This mechanism involves the avoidance or
cognitive diminishment of the harm caused by pernicious conduct (Bandura, 1991).
Research on obedient aggression has shown that people are less likely to maintain
harmful conduct if the suffering of the victim is apparent (Milgram, 1974). Thus, if one is
able to avoid or minimize the harm caused, the continuation of harmful behaviour is more
likely. In sport, distortion of consequences occurs when athletes avoid finding out the
extent of injuries they have caused or when they deny the seriousness of such injuries.

The final set of mechanisms operates on the victim of the act and consists of
dehumanization and attribution of blame. Dehumanization involves cognitively divesting
victims of their human qualities or attributing animal-like qualities to them (Bandura,
1991). People find it easier to act badly towards others when they perceive less similarity
between themselves and their victim. This occurs in sport when athletes describe
opponents as animals or suggest that they lack human qualities. Finally, attribution of
blame occurs when people consider themselves forced to harm another due to perceived
provocation by their victim or the situation (Bandura, 1991). This occurs in sport when a
player is fouled by an opponent and then acts in a similar or even more gratuitous fashion
in retaliation. Through attribution of blame the player retaliating is able to misconstrue
the situation in such a way as to justify his or her transgressive act due to a perceived lack
of choice in reacting this way.

Moral disengagement was first investigated in non-sport contexts. Early research
demonstrated that moral disengagement was positively linked with delinquent conduct,
transgressive behaviour, and proneness to aggression, and negatively related to prosocial
behaviour in samples of Italian school children (Bandura et al., 1996; Bandura, Caprara,
Barabanelli, Pastorelli, & Regalia, 2001). Subsequently, moral disengagement has also
been linked to the implementation of the death penalty (Osofsky, Bandura, & Zimbardo,
2005), transgression of civic duties (Caprara & Capanna, 2005), support of military force
(McAlister, Bandura, & Owen, 2006), and bullying in schools (Menesini, Sanchez, Fonzi,
Ortega, Constabile, & Lo Feudo, 2003) and prisons (South & Wood, 2006).

More recently, researchers have started to investigate moral disengagement in the
context of sport. In the research conducted to date moral disengagement has been
positively linked with transgressive and antisocial behaviour and negatively associated
with prosocial behaviour (e.g., Boardley & Kavussanu, 2007; Long, Pantaléon, Bruant, &
d’Arripe-Longueville, 2006; Boardley & Roleston, 2010; Lucidi, Grano, Leone,
Lombardo, & Pesce, 2004). The purpose of the sections that follow is to provide a
detailed review of moral disengagement research in sport.
Research in Sport

Sport moral disengagement research can be categorised into two broad groups: (a) moral disengagement and behaviours that occur during sport participation, and (b) moral disengagement and doping (i.e., intention to dope or actual doping) in sport. The purpose of this section is to review work conducted in each of these categories. The review first focuses on work concerning moral disengagement and behaviours that occur during sport participation before covering research investigating moral disengagement and doping in sport. In each subsection the main research findings are discussed, followed by an evaluation of their main strengths and weaknesses. Qualitative and quantitative studies are discussed separately.

Moral disengagement and behaviours occurring during sport participation

Qualitative research. Long et al. (2006) conducted the first qualitative study to provide evidence of moral disengagement in sport. One particularly interesting aspect of this study was that the researchers did not specifically set out to investigate moral disengagement. The study purpose was to determine young elite athletes’ perceptions of reasons for rule compliance and transgression in competitive settings. However, when articulating reasons for transgressive acts the athletes demonstrated moral disengagement. The sample consisted of ten male athletes enrolled in national and international sports competition, who were aged 15 to 18 years (M = 16.5) and participated in the sports of football, rugby, or judo. The researchers employed semi-structured interviews to investigate athletes’ reasons for sports rules violations.

The largely inductive analysis (i.e., the search for patterns in data to develop
explanations/theories; Bernard & Ryan, 2010) of the data relating to sports rules violations provided evidence of moral disengagement. For example, a football player was quoted as saying:

“We are told to break the rules sometimes, you have to...and simulating is part of the game too. The coach tells you this; when you are in the penalty area, you dribble, if you are hit, you must fall down.”

Long et al. (2006) described how this quote is consistent with displacement of responsibility as the player is absolving himself of responsibility by suggesting he has no choice but to act this way when instructed to do so by an authority figure such as a coach. However, use of a second mechanism is also apparent. Describing faking a foul as “simulating” is an example of euphemistic labelling as it uses sanitising language to mask the true nature of the action.

A further example quote from a rugby player provides evidence of other moral disengagement mechanisms:

“An opponent hurts a team-mate. The referee doesn’t punish him as he should...well, I’ll kill the opponent during the next play.”

Long et al. (2006) identified the use of moral justification here as the transgressive act is construed as morally acceptable because it serves the socially laudable purpose of defending a team-mate. However, two other mechanisms that Long et al. (2006) did not discuss may also be apparent. First, as the player is acting in response to something the other player has done, the perpetrator may be viewing his action as a forced response to the victim’s own action thus demonstrating attribution of blame. Second, by saying he
acts this way when the referee does not punish the opposing player as he should the player is displacing responsibility to the referee as the player believes the situation created by the referee is causing him to act this way.

Long et al. (2006) also provided evidence of diffusion of responsibility (e.g., everyone does it therefore it is part of the game), as well as demonstrating that moral disengagement occurred in all three sports (i.e., football, rugby, and judo). However, identification of all instances of moral disengagement was not a study purpose and therefore Long et al. (2006) did not specifically report which mechanisms were or were not represented in their data. Although five mechanisms could be identified from the quotes provided, it is not known whether the remaining three mechanisms were not used by the athletes or that their use was merely not reported. This study provided initial evidence of moral disengagement in sport, and highlighted the need for a purposeful qualitative investigation of moral disengagement in sport.

The second qualitative study was conducted to specifically investigate moral disengagement in male and female adult elite basketball \((n = 12)\) and taekwondo \((n = 12)\) athletes (Corrion et al., 2009). Corrion et al. (2009) applied both inductive and deductive (i.e., using existing theory to analyse data and confirm/disconfirm theory; Bernard & Ryan, 2010) techniques when analysing the data from the interview transcripts, resulting in the identification of two streams of Meaning Units (MU; i.e., sections of text comprising words, phrases, or entire paragraphs communicating the same idea and related to the same topic; Tesch, 1990). The first MU stream related to the behaviour type, and the second to the moral disengagement mechanism used. In total, the
researchers identified 256 MU for the behaviour type and 502 MU for the moral disengagement mechanisms associated with the behaviours.

The MU corresponding to the reasons given for engaging in transgressive acts represented all eight moral disengagement mechanisms. Frequency counts for each were reported in two ways. First, the total number of MU for each mechanism was presented, and second the number of athletes who used each mechanism was shown. The most frequently used mechanism was displacement of responsibility (152 MU) and the least frequent was dehumanisation (4 MU); displacement of responsibility, attribution of blame, distortion of consequences, and diffusion of responsibility were used far more frequently than the other three mechanisms. All 24 athletes used displacement of responsibility, attribution of blame, distortion of consequences, and diffusion of responsibility, whereas euphemistic labelling ($n = 23$), moral justification ($n = 11$), advantageous comparison ($n = 5$), and dehumanisation ($n = 3$) were not used by all.

Although Corrion et al. (2009) reported interesting findings, there are some important caveats that should be considered when interpreting these findings. First, participants selected which transgressive acts to recount, thus, they may have chosen not to disclose other behaviours that they were not willing to discuss. This disclosure may also have been influenced by the relationship established between the interviewer and interviewee. Different moral disengagement mechanisms may have been apparent if participants had discussed behaviours that they chose not to disclose. Also, the reliability of frequency data based on qualitative data is dependent on the correct identification of all categories and codes present in the data as well as the subsequent identification of all
instances of these within the data. Although Corrion and colleagues went to great lengths to maximise the reliability of their data analysis, the subjective nature of such analysis means the frequency data reported in this study should be interpreted with the inherent limitations of qualitative data analysis in mind.

The third qualitative study investigated: (a) the moral disengagement mechanisms used when football players engage in antisocial conduct, and (b) whether the frequency with which particular mechanisms were used differed as a function of behaviour type (Traclet, Romand, Moret, & Kavussanu, in press). Cheating, instrumental aggression, hostile aggression against an opponent, and hostile aggression against the referee were examined. The sample consisted of 30 regional-level French male football players aged 16 to 22 \((M = 19.23)\). The researchers employed stimulated recall interviews which consisted of participants first viewing a video showing their engagement in one antisocial act for each behaviour type and then articulating the reasons that underpinned their engagement in the act.

The researchers identified 162 MU representing moral disengagement for the 120 transgressive acts and reported the frequency with which each of the four behaviour types was associated with each mechanism. Cheating acts were the most-common behaviour for displacement of responsibility (22 of 45 MU) and distortion of consequences (9 of 19 MU). Instrumental aggression was the most frequent act for diffusion of responsibility (6 of 13 MU), moral justification (19 of 38 MU), and euphemistic labelling (8 of 17 MU). For attribution of blame, hostile aggression towards opponents was the most common act (21 of 30 MU). No occurrences of advantageous comparison and dehumanisation were
evident and hostile aggression towards referees was not the most frequently reported act for any of the mechanisms. The data were also analysed within each of the behaviour types to determine how frequently each mechanism was used for each behaviour type. The most frequently used mechanism for cheating acts was displacement of responsibility (17 of 30 acts), whereas for instrumental aggression it was moral justification (9 of 30 acts). For hostile aggression towards opponents attribution of blame was most frequent (23 of 30 acts) and for hostile aggression towards referees displacement of responsibility and moral justification were equally (11 of 30 acts for each) most common.

Traclet et al. (in press) utilised stimulated recall in their study of moral disengagement. The way in which the technique was applied meant that the relative frequency of each behaviour type may not have been represented in the study data. More specifically, the researchers controlled the number of times each behaviour type was viewed by participants (i.e., one for each type). However, in reality certain behaviours (i.e., instrumental aggression and cheating behaviours) are likely to occur more often than others (i.e., hostile behaviours against the referee). As a consequence, the frequency with which each mechanism was used may have been affected. Also, no distinction was made between perceived and actual bad officiating. It is possible that some athletes were displacing responsibility or attributing blame to referees when no officiating error had taken place. Future researchers are encouraged to assess whether moral disengagement occurs as a result of real or merely perceived impartiality and inconsistency of officiating. In relation to this point, researchers should take care when identifying specific mechanisms when officials are held accountable for transgressions. In such cases, if the
victim is someone other than the official then the offender is displacing responsibility to the official because attribution of blame only occurs when the victim is targeted (see Bandura, 1986). However, when the official is the victim attribution of blame is apparent.

The findings of the studies reviewed above contribute to our understanding of how athletes actually morally disengage by offering real-world examples of its use. One strength of these studies is the identification and analysis of individual mechanisms of moral disengagement and the frequency with which each mechanism is used for specific behaviour types and sports. Further, we now have evidence that moral disengagement occurs in both sexes, at elite and regional levels, and in a variety of sports. In addition, collectively these studies suggest displacement of responsibility is a particularly pertinent mechanism in sport. Whether responding to implicit or explicit instructions from their coach, or feeling compelled to act in response to perceived officiating errors, athletes from a variety of sports appear able to reduce their feelings of accountability through use of this mechanism.

The findings of these studies support Bandura’s (1991) theory. First, they established a strong link between moral disengagement and transgressive behaviour. Athletes provided justification that often resonated with one or more moral disengagement mechanisms. The findings of the studies also support the conjoint operation of moral disengagement mechanisms. Bandura (2002) describes how moral disengagement mechanisms operate together to facilitate harmful conduct. The findings show such combined use of moral disengagement mechanisms in sport.

**Quantitative research.** Quantitative approaches have been applied to the
investigation of moral disengagement during sport participation in a number of studies. In this section we detail the main characteristics of quantitative sport-specific moral disengagement instruments and review the main findings of studies that have used quantitative techniques to investigate moral disengagement in sport.

Boardley and Kavussanu (2007) developed the Moral Disengagement in Sport Scale (MDSS). The MDSS is a 32-item measure of moral disengagement in sport developed across two studies ($n_{\text{total}} = 613; M_{\text{age}} = 21.77$ years). The scale consists of six dimensions (rather than eight) because two pairs of mechanisms were empirically indistinct. Specifically, moral justification and euphemistic labelling items collectively formed a *conduct reconstrual* dimension, and diffusion and displacement of responsibility items formed a *nonresponsibility* dimension. Convergence of these mechanisms has theoretical support (see Bandura, 1991). Regarding conduct reconstrual, moral justification and euphemistic labelling both permit the reconstrual of transgressive behaviour as less harmful. With respect to nonresponsibility, diffusion of responsibility and displacement of responsibility both minimise personal liability for engagement in, or the consequences of, transgressive acts. The convergence was also consistent with moral-disengagement scales developed for other contexts which have shown convergence of mechanisms (e.g., Bandura et al., 1996; Osofsky et al., 2005). Evidence for the content, concurrent, convergent, and discriminant validity and internal consistency ($\alpha = .73$ to .95) of the MDSS was also provided (see Boardley & Kavussanu, 2007). As part of the evidence for the construct validity of the scale, Boardley and Kavussanu (2007) demonstrated strong positive associations between moral disengagement and reported
antisocial behaviour (i.e., behaviour intended to harm or disadvantage another
individual), and moderate negative correlations with reported prosocial behaviour (i.e.,
behaviour intended to help or benefit another individual).

Comparable with research in other contexts (e.g., Bandura et al., 1996), Boardley
and Kavussanu (2007) found that moral disengagement was higher in males than in
females, with effect sizes for this difference being moderate to large in the two studies
conducted (Study 1 \( \eta^2 = .21 \); Study 2 \( \eta^2 = .18 \)). Researchers have found that male players
in the sports of football and handball engage more often in transgressive (i.e.,
antisocial/aggressive) acts than female players in these sports (Coulomb-Cabagno &
Rascle, 2006; Coulomb-Cabagno, Rascle, & Souchon, 2005; Kavussanu, Stamp, Slade, &
Ring, 2009). Engagement in these acts may require moral disengagement to prevent
aversive affective responses and over time more frequent engagement in such conduct
may develop a greater propensity for moral disengagement in males compared to
females. It has been suggested that greater reinforcement of harmful behaviour in males
compared to females due to established views of masculinity may explain why males
transgress more often than females in sport (Coulomb-Cabagno et al., 2005). It is also
possible that the people who reinforce transgressive behaviour in males morally
disengage during this process and therefore model its use. This too may explain higher
levels of moral disengagement in males compared to females.

Subsequent work by Boardley and Kavussanu (2008) resulted in a short version of
the MDSS: the Moral Disengagement in Sport Scale – Short (MDSS-S). The MDSS-S
consists of a subset of eight items (i.e., one for each mechanism) from the MDSS selected
through analysis of MDSS data from 992 team-sport players ($M_{age} = 21.92$ years).

Example MDSS/MDSS-S items are ‘Insults among players do not really hurt anyone’ (i.e., distortion of consequences) and ‘Players who are mistreated have usually done something to deserve it’ (i.e., attribution of blame). The unidimensionality of the MDSS-S was determined through exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. Further, the measurement invariance of the MDSS-S was demonstrated among the sports of rugby, basketball, hockey, and netball, and between football and rugby. The partial measurement invariance of the scale was evidenced between football and hockey and netball. Evidence was also provided for the scale’s concurrent and convergent validity, and its internal consistency ($\alpha = .80-.85$). Aspects of the psychometric properties of both scales still remain to be tested though. Specifically, the measurement invariance of the MDSS has not be shown across any groups, and the reasons for the MDSS-S having only partial measurement invariance among certain groups needs to be investigated further. Finally, the test-retest reliability of the scales is currently unknown.

Boardley and Kavussanu (2009) investigated whether moral disengagement mediated the effects of athletes’ perceptions of their coach’s character-building competency (i.e., a coach’s ability to influence their athletes’ personal development and positive attitudes towards sport; Myers, Feltz, Maier, Wolfe, & Reckase, 2006) on prosocial and antisocial behaviour toward teammates and opponents. Participants were 379 field hockey and netball players (59.1% female; $M_{age} = 22.2$ years) competing at club to international levels. Athletes who perceived that their coach was high in character building competency reported engaging more frequently in prosocial behaviour towards
opponents (e.g., helping an injured opponent), and less frequently in antisocial behaviour
toward both opponents (e.g., trying to injure an opponent) and team-mates (e.g., verbally
abusing a teammate). Importantly, moral disengagement mediated fully the effect of
character-building competency on prosocial and antisocial behaviours toward opponents
and partially its effects on antisocial behaviour toward team-mates. The path coefficients
for the prediction of antisocial teammate behaviour, antisocial opponent behaviour, and
prosocial opponent behaviour by more disengagement were .26, .74, and -.19,
respectively. Overall, these results suggest that moral disengagement may be an
important mechanism through which coaches influence players’ prosocial and antisocial
behaviour in sport.

In further research, Boardley and Kavussanu (2010) investigated whether moral
disengagement mediates the effects of ego orientation (i.e., tendency to use normative
criteria to evaluate competence; Nicholls, 1989) and perceived value of toughness (i.e.,
importance attached to dominating others to gain acceptance and status; South & Wood,
2006) on male football players’ (N = 307; M_{age} = 21.39 years) antisocial behaviour
toward opponents and teammates. Perceived value of toughness and ego orientation had
positive effects on both types of antisocial behaviour, which were mediated by moral
disengagement. The path coefficients from perceived value of toughness and ego
orientation to moral disengagement were .37 and .14, respectively, and .63 and .33,
respectively, from moral disengagement to antisocial opponent behaviour and antisocial
teammate behaviour. Thus, moral disengagement may be important in explaining any
effects of ego orientation and perceived value of toughness on antisocial behaviour.
Finally, d’Arripe-Longueville, Corrion, Scoffier, Roussel, and Chalabaev (2010) investigated moral disengagement as part of an investigation of the self-regulatory mechanisms governing prosocial behaviour and the acceptability and likelihood of cheating in male and female adolescents ($n = 804; M_{\text{age}} = 17.2$ years). d’Arripe-Longueville et al. (2010) found moral disengagement mediated the moderate negative prediction of the acceptability and likelihood of cheating by Negative Affective Self-Regulatory Efficacy (NASRE; i.e., perceived efficacy to regulate negative affect). The path coefficient from NASRE to moral disengagement was -.42 for females and -.38 for males, and .20 for females and .31 for males from moral disengagement to likelihood of cheating. They also found moral disengagement mediated the moderate positive prediction of prosocial behaviour by NASRE. The path coefficient from moral disengagement to prosocial behaviour was -.30 for both sexes. Thus, confidence in the ability to regulate negative emotion may be influential in regulating positive and negative social behaviours, and moral disengagement may be a key mediating variable explaining this effect. One weakness of this study is that the authors did not provide specific information relating to the sport experiences (e.g., type, level) of the study participants. Such information would have allowed greater understanding of which populations the study findings apply to.

The studies reviewed in this subsection share certain strengths and weaknesses. The first strength is the consistently impressive samples sizes which permit confidence in the reliability of the study findings. The second strength is the theoretical background that underpinned these studies as they all tested theory-driven hypotheses. One caveat to the
findings of these studies is that the behaviour measures utilised were all self-report and therefore potentially influenced by social desirability. In addition, all studies were cross-sectional which limits assertions about cause and effect relationships.

The findings of these studies provide some support for Bandura’s (1991) theory. First, the studies provide quantitative evidence of a moderate-to-strong positive relationship between moral disengagement and transgressive behaviour. These findings are in agreement with Bandura’s (1991) suggestion that moral disengagement promotes transgressive conduct. A unique contribution of a number of the studies was their investigation of prosocial behaviour. The findings of Boardley and Kavussanu (2007, 2008, 2009) and of d’Arripe-Longueville et al. (2010) are consistent with Bandura’s (1991) contention that moral disengagement leads to less frequent prosocial behaviour.

Whilst not as strong as the relationship between moral disengagement and antisocial behaviour, the links between moral disengagement and prosocial conduct have still largely been moderate in strength and are therefore worthy of further investigation.

*Moral disengagement and doping in sport*

The only sport-relevant transgressive behaviour occurring outside of sport that has been investigated in moral disengagement research is doping. Doping refers to the use of illicit performance-enhancing substances to improve performance. In this section, we review the findings of qualitative and quantitative research that has investigated moral disengagement in relation to doping and/or the intention to dope.

*Qualitative research.* To date, just one study has taken a qualitative approach to the investigation of moral disengagement and doping in sport. Boardley and Roleston
(2010) conducted semi-structured interviews with nine doping male body builders from a gym in central England. Inductive followed by deductive data analyses provided evidence of moral disengagement in all nine athletes. Three mechanisms were used by all nine athletes: distortion of consequences (e.g., playing down the health consequences of doping), advantageous comparison (e.g., comparing doping to stealing/alcohol abuse), and diffusion of responsibility (e.g., suggesting most bodybuilders dope).

Use of other moral disengagement mechanisms was also apparent. Displacement of responsibility (e.g., knowing the strongest athletes dope encourages doping) was used by eight of the nine athletes and six showed evidence of euphemistic labelling (e.g., use of sanitising terms such as gear or juice when referring to doping substances). Although less common (n = 2), moral justification (e.g., doping helps you to advise others on safe doping) was also evident. There was however, no evidence of dehumanisation or attribution of blame. The absence of dehumanisation was consistent with other qualitative studies of moral disengagement in sport, which have either reported no evidence (Long et al., 2006; Traclet et al., in press) or very low frequency (Corrion et al., 2009) of this mechanism. For attribution of blame, it is possible that this mechanism was not used because the primary victim of doping here was the athlete himself, and use of this mechanism would therefore have involved athletes attributing blame inwardly. Overall, Boardley and Roleston (2010) provide initial evidence that bodybuilders morally disengage when discussing their doping.

There is evidence of greater prevalence of doping in athletes from sports that require high levels of physical strength such as bodybuilding (e.g., Thiblin & Petersson,
What is less well known is how such athletes rationalise doping. Boardley and Roleston (2010) contribute understanding in this area by showing how moral disengagement may be an important facilitator of doping in bodybuilders. Previous work in such populations found evidence that dopers and ex-dopers believed a greater number of others doped than did non-dopers (Wiefferink, Detmar, Coumans, Vogels, & Paulussen, 2008). By showing evidence of displacement and diffusion of responsibility in doping bodybuilders, Boardley and Roleston (2010) demonstrate how such perceptions may facilitate doping through use of these mechanisms.

The primary weakness in the Boardley and Roleston (2010) study was the nature of the sample as participants were male only, and sampled from just one sport and one gym. Thus, it is possible that the results of the study are specific to bodybuilders, and that moral disengagement may not be apparent in, or be used differently by, doping athletes from other sports. Further, the results may even be specific to athletes from this particular gym. Due to the social nature of moral disengagement, it is likely that how athletes actually morally disengage may be quite specific to particular environments. Finally, due to the male-only sample in this study, there is currently no qualitative evidence of moral disengagement in female doping athletes. Clearly, although this study provides initial evidence of moral disengagement in doping athletes, further research is required with male and female athletes from a variety of gyms and sports before we fully understand the qualitative nature of moral disengagement in doping athletes.

Quantitative research. The first study of moral disengagement and intentions to dope was conducted by Lucidi et al. (2004). The study sample consisted of 952 Italian
students (50.1% male) involved in sport at various levels, 3.1% of whom reported
doping. Moral disengagement was a weak-to-moderate positive predictor of intention to
dope with a path coefficient of .16. One of this study’s weaknesses was the use of
Bandura et al.’s (1996) moral disengagement measure which is not doping specific.
Ensuing work by Lucidi, Zelli, Mallia, Grano, Russo, and Violani (2008) rectified this
weakness.

Lucidi and colleagues (2008) progressed their investigation of adolescents’
intentions to dope by also assessing reported doping as an outcome variable. This
longitudinal study utilised a sample of 1232 Italian adolescents (51% female), 54.8% of
whom had engaged in sport activity in the past three months. Participants were assigned
to either a “psychometric” (n = 218) or a “longitudinal” (n = 1014) condition. Those in
the psychometric condition provided data to help develop a measure of doping moral
disengagement. Although this was a welcome progression from the previous study, the 35
athletes who helped develop the items for this scale were selected because they practised
sports on a regular basis and not because they had experience of doping. Ideally,
instruments designed to measure doping-specific cognitions should be developed using
athletes with experience of doping. Athletes assigned to the longitudinal condition were
asked to provide data on two occasions three months apart (75.1% completed on both
occasions). Of the 762 participants who completed the measures at the second time point,
2.1% reported doping in the past 3 months. Moral disengagement at Time 1 moderately
and positively predicted intention to dope at Time 1 (path coefficient = .21), and intention
to dope and moral disengagement at Time 1 moderately and positively predicted doping
at Time 2 (path coefficient = .31). Thus, moral disengagement was positively linked with Italian adolescents’ intention to dope and reported doping.

Lucidi and colleagues conducted another study in which they investigated moral disengagement, intentions to dope, and reported doping (Zelli, Mallia, & Lucidi, 2010). Novel contributions of this study was that reported doping was assessed at two time points and that appraisals of interpersonal encounters encouraging doping were examined as a moderator of the relationships between moral disengagement and doping intentions. The sample consisted of 1022 (50.6% male) Italian high-school students ($M_{age} = 16$ years), 84.5% of whom provided data at two time points four to five months apart. Of these, only a small number reported doping (Time 1 = 1%; Time 2 = 2.1%). Moral disengagement was a weak positive predictor of Time 1 doping intentions (path coefficient = .08) which in turn was a moderate positive predictor of Time 2 doping (path coefficient = .19).

Students’ appraisals of eight interpersonal encounters encouraging doping (e.g., a peer or coach advising or encouraging the use of doping substances) were also assessed. Scenarios depicting such encounters were rated on four dimensions: (a) the likelihood the counterpart acted in the protagonist's interest and welfare (positive appraisal), (b) for his own personal interest (instrumental appraisal), (c) to harm the protagonist (negative appraisal), and (d) the likelihood they would do what they were encouraged to do (behavioural appraisal). Ratings were used to calculate an appraisal index for each individual ranging from zero to four, with higher scores indicating a greater tendency to make appraisals favouring or possibly leading to doping use (see Zelli et al. for a full
Using the appraisal index score participants were categorised into those with: (a) no problematic appraisals (index = 0; \( n = 148 \)); (b) moderately problematic appraisals (index = 1 or 2; \( n = 400 \)); or (c) highly problematic appraisals (index = 3 or 4; \( n = 316 \)). Multi-group analysis showed that moral disengagement was a moderate positive predictor of doping intentions (path coefficient = .18) only for the highly problematic appraisals group and did not predict doping intentions in the other two groups. It should be noted that this analysis did not include reported doping use because none of the students who showed no problematic appraisals at Time 1 reported doping at Time 2. Thus, moral disengagement may only facilitate intention to dope in athletes who prophesise greater personal benefits or less risk in interpersonal situations soliciting doping use.

Whilst large in size, the samples used in the three quantitative studies of Lucidi and colleagues were not ideal. Specifically, they largely consisted of non-doping athletes, with only between one and three percent of the participants reporting doping. As a result, it is not known whether the relationships identified in these studies would be replicated in a sample that included greater representation of doping athletes. Clearly, there is great difficulty in sourcing samples of athletes who actually dope, but this is a challenge that will need to be met if we are to fully understand the cognitions that facilitate doping in athletes who actually dope.

Although the three studies reviewed in this subsection advanced knowledge on moral disengagement in sport, their contribution to Bandura’s (1991) theory was limited. This is because the researchers drew from more than one theoretical perspective when
investigating social-cognitive mechanisms that regulate adolescents’ doping. Specifically, they investigated moral disengagement alongside constructs drawn from Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behaviour. Thus, although the studies added support for Bandura’s (1991) theory by establishing an empirical link between moral disengagement and a novel transgressive behaviour (i.e., doping), research incorporating other aspects of Bandura’s theory may have made a greater contribution to our understanding of Bandura’s (1991) theory.

Future Directions

Although research into moral disengagement in sport has increased over the past decade, several research avenues remain unexplored. The first of these relates to the role of emotion in the self-regulatory process. Bandura (1991) suggests that moral disengagement operates by reducing or negating the anticipation of unpleasant emotions (e.g., guilt) that normally result from harmful acts. However, research to date has focussed on the link between moral disengagement and behaviour and not investigated the effect of moral disengagement on anticipation of emotion. Thus, researchers are encouraged to test the affective aspects of Bandura’s (1991) theory. Such research would help determine the relative importance of emotion compared to cognition in regulating antisocial behaviour in sport.

Another potential area for future work relates to the developmental precursors of moral disengagement. Recent prospective research with males from low-income families demonstrated that factors such as early rejecting parenting, neighbourhood impoverishment, and child empathy were associated with later moral disengagement
(e.g., Hyde, Shaw, & Moilanen, 2010). Similar research investigating precursors of moral disengagement in athletic populations is strongly encouraged. This would help determine how use of moral disengagement develops through athletes’ formative years and provide guidance on whether early intervention could reduce the likelihood of its use.

The investigation of moral disengagement in two other areas would make an important contribution to research in this area. First, quantitative investigation of the link between individual moral disengagement mechanisms and different kinds of transgressive behaviour (e.g., cheating, instrumental aggression) is needed. Qualitative findings to date (Corrion et al., 2009; Traclet et al., in press) suggest that it is likely that different mechanisms are more important for certain behaviours compared to others. Quantitative research in this area would help us to understand whether different mechanisms predict different behaviour types with equal strength. Finally, quantitative moral disengagement research to date has utilised either cross-sectional or longitudinal designs. Future experimental research would help determine whether moral disengagement can be manipulated as well as whether it has a causal effect on moral behaviour in sport. Such research would be critical in determining the nature and efficacy of interventions aimed at reducing antisocial behaviour in sport through reductions in moral disengagement.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, although the findings of the studies reviewed here have made an important contribution to research on moral disengagement in sport, considerable work remains to be done. To date, research has seen application of qualitative and quantitative
techniques in research investigating moral disengagement and behaviours occurring during sport participation as well as in doping. Finally, future sport moral disengagement research centred on the self-regulatory role of emotion, developmental influences, the roles of individual mechanisms, and experimental research would make important contributions to the existing literature in this area.
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