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RESEARCH REPORT

The Time Course of Familiar Metonymy

AQ: au

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Metonymic words have multiple related meanings, such as *college*, as in the building (“John walked into the college”) or the educational institution (“John was promoted by the college”). Most researchers have found support for direct access models of metonymy but one recent study, Lowder and Gordon (2013), found delayed reading times for metonymic sentences relative to literal controls, in support of an indirect access account. We conducted a speed-accuracy-tradeoff experiment to test whether their result was caused by lower retrieval probabilities, consistent with direct or indirect access models of metonymy, or slower retrieval dynamics, consistent only with indirect access accounts. We found lower retrieval probabilities for the metonymic sentences but no difference in the dynamics parameters. These results therefore suggest that literal senses do not have priority during processing and that established metonymic senses can be accessed directly.

Keywords: metonymy, pragmatics, sentence comprehension

Most words have multiple but related senses. For example, one can refer to a *hospital* to mean a building in which people are medically treated, as in “Dave was taken to the hospital,” but also to an institution that governs the people who work in the building, as in “Dave sued the hospital.” People are remarkably proficient at understanding the intended sense of such sense-ambiguous words, but it is not clear how. Here, we consider a particular category of sense ambiguity, classed as *metonymy*, which is a form of figurative language in which people refer to an entity (e.g., the institution governing a hospital) by a salient property of the entity (e.g., a hospital). More specifically, we tested how the processor accesses the intended sense of a metonymic expression relative to its literal alternative.

There are two broad classes of psycholinguistic models proposed to explain comprehension of figurative language. We refer to the first group as *indirect* access. In these models, the literal sense is retrieved prior to the retrieval of the metonymic sense. For example, in the literal-first model (Grice, 1975; Searle, 1975), the figurative sense is derived only after the literal sense has proved to be a poor fit with the general context. The second group can be classified as *direct* access models.¹ These assume that neither the metonymic nor the literal sense takes priority, but instead, contextual and lexical information combine to determine the intended meaning rapidly (e.g., Frisson & Pickering, 1999; Gibbs, 1994; Gibbs & Gerrig, 1989; Glucksberg, 2001, 2003). For our purposes,

the fundamental difference between the two categories of models is that under an indirect account, the figurative sense requires more serial processing stages than the literal sense, whereas under a direct account it does not.

The majority of research has found evidence in favor of some form of direct access model (e.g., Gerrig & Healy, 1983; Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983; Glucksberg, Gildea & Bookin, 1982; Inhoff, Lima & Carroll, 1984; Keysar, 1989; McElree & Nordlie, 1999). However, these experiments have been conducted using metaphor rather than metonymy and processing of metaphor may differ from processing of metonymy in important ways. Indeed, experiments testing metonymy are far less consistent in their conclusions. In particular, Frisson and Pickering (1999) and McElree, Frisson, and Pickering (2006), using eye-tracking, found evidence that familiar metonymies were processed just as quickly as literal meanings—thereby supporting direct access models of metonymy—whereas Lowder and Gordon (2013) found that familiar metonymies were processed more slowly than literal meanings—thereby supporting indirect models. In this study we seek to identify why Lowder and Gordon found slower reading times for metonymic sentences and consequently to resolve the apparent conflict about how metonymy is processed.

Lowder and Gordon (2013) conducted an eye-tracking while reading study. The relevant conditions are the familiar metonymy and literal sentences from their Experiment 1:

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¹ This is not to be confused with Gibbs’s direct access model (e.g., Gibbs, 1994), according to which a specific figurative sense can be accessed directly in appropriate contexts. In addition to this view, we also include models such as the underspecification hypothesis (Frisson & Pickering, 1999) that do not distinguish between literal and figurative senses in early processing (for a discussion, see Frisson & Pickering, 2001).

Ia. Sometime in August, the journalist photographed the college after he had received an official invitation. (literal-familiar)

Ib. Sometime in August, the journalist offended the college after he had bribed some crooked officials. (metonymic-familiar)

In (1a), *college* is used literally to refer to a building in which education occurs, whereas in (1b), it is used metonymically to refer to the governing body associated with an education establishment. Lowder and Gordon (2013) observed longer reading times (gaze duration, right-bounded reading time and regression-path duration) when the critical noun phrase (*college* in [1]) was used metonymically compared to when it was used literally, consistent with indirect access models. Lowder and Gordon explained the difference between their results and those of Frisson and Pickering (1999), who did not observe delayed metonymic reading times with similar items, as being due to an interaction between the sentence structure and the positioning of the metonymy.

Our experiment was conducted to explain what caused the increased reading times in the metonymic condition of Lowder and Gordon (2013). One possibility, favored by Lowder and Gordon, was that participants needed to reject the literal meaning in the metonymic condition but not in the literal condition. Thus, there were additional processing stages for the metonymic interpretation compared to the literal interpretation. There are other explanations for this delay, however. One of these is that participants made more errors of interpretation in the metonymic condition than the literal condition. This would have meant more repair work, such as backtracking to reread earlier words in the metonymic condition, and consequently more regressions or longer fixations. Some support for this hypothesis is given by the results of Lowder and Gordon's (Experiment 1) norming study: They demonstrated significantly lower plausibility ratings for the metonymic sentences than the literal sentences.

The distinction between these explanations is important because an account based on additional serial processing supports an indirect model of figurative language processing, whereas an account based on overall accuracy rates does not (which will be explained in more detail). In our experiment we measured the time course profile of metonymy by using a speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT) design (developed for psycholinguistics by McElree and colleagues, e.g., McElree, 1993; McElree & Nordlie, 1999; Martin & McElree, 2008). The SAT is capable of distinguishing between slower processing caused by additional processing stages or slower processing caused by lower accuracy, and hence is well suited to distinguish between the direct and indirect model explanations for Lowder and Gordon's (2013) findings.

Experiment Overview

Participants made binary sensicality judgments to literal and metonymic sentences and to nonsense sentences. However, instead of a single response per trial, they made 16 successive responses, timed so that they coincided with 16 deadlines (beeps) spaced at 250-ms intervals (the multiple response SAT,

see, e.g., McElree, 1993; Martin & McElree, 2008). We then combined responses to sense and nonsense stimuli to obtain a d' measure for each of the 16 time points. The resulting sequence indicates how accuracy varies as a function of time and can be converted into separate retrieval dynamics and probability measures, as we will describe.

Following standard SAT procedure (e.g., Bott, Bailey, & Grodner, 2012; McElree, 1993; McElree & Nordlie, 1999), we optimized the SAT function in Equation 1 to each participant's responses and the averaged data.

$$d'(t) = \lambda(1 - e^{\beta(t-\delta)}), \text{ for } t > \delta, \text{ else } 0. \quad (1)$$

Equation 1 contains three parameters. The asymptote, λ , reflects the overall accuracy of responses with maximum processing time (3.75 s, in our experiment). The intercept, δ , identifies the earliest point at which accuracy departs from chance. The rate, β , determines the steepness of the accuracy curve and indexes the rate at which information is accrued. The asymptote measures the *retrieval probability*, because it measures the probability of accurately retrieving an interpretation on any given trial, and the intercept and rate measure the *retrieval dynamics*, because they determine how quickly a given interpretation can be retrieved.

Indirect access models predict that participants cannot derive a sensible metonymic interpretation until an anomalous literal interpretation has been computed (see Figure 1, upper panel). This means that the earliest time at which metonymic interpretations can be derived will be later than the earliest time that literal sentences can be derived. In other words, the intercept will be delayed for metonymic sentences. In contrast, direct access models predict that participants can directly access metonymic interpretations (see Figure 1, lower panel). Because there is no extra processing stage for the metonymic interpretations, these models do not predict different intercepts across conditions. Both direct and indirect models can explain differences in retrieval probability (asymptotic accuracy), however. For example, both models are consistent with a metonymic retrieval process that has a higher error rate than the literal retrieval process, predicting lower asymptotic accuracy for metonymic sentences. Similarly, both models predict that if the metonymic sentences were less meaningful than the literal sentences, such as if they were less plausible, metonymic sentences would also have a lower asymptotic accuracy than literal sentences. Importantly, the retrieval probability (asymptotic accuracy) and the retrieval dynamics (intercept and rate) are orthogonal parameters of the SAT function and so predictions about retrieval dynamics can be assessed independently of the contribution of retrieval probability.

We used a combination of Lowder and Gordon's (2013) sentences (themselves based on Frisson & Pickering, 1999) and those we constructed ourselves. The sentences were formed by combining a target word with either a literal, metonymic, or nonsense sentence frame (see Table 1). We used the frames from Lowder and Gordon (2013) and constructed novel frames for our own target words, but made no attempt to control for plausibility, cloze probability, or other factors that might affect

Fn2 asymptotic accuracy.² All of the sentences were eight words long. The target word was always in the argument of the verb and was always the last word of the sentence. The sentence frame for the nonsense sentences were chosen so that the target word was semantically incongruent with the main verb (see Method for more details).

According to [Lowder and Gordon \(2013\)](#) and indirect models of metonymy, placing the metonymy in the argument should engender slower retrieval dynamics for the metonymic sentences relative to the literal controls. Although retrieval probability does not distinguish between direct and indirect models, differences between literal and metonymic conditions might explain why Lowder and Gordon observed reaction time differences in their study. We therefore analyzed retrieval probability (asymptotic accuracy) as well as retrieval dynamics (the rate and intercept).

Method

Participants

Thirty-two Cardiff University students participated for course credit.

Stimuli and Design

We used the same 16 target words as [Lowder and Gordon \(2013\)](#) as well as 24 novel target words, to make 40 in total (see [Appendix](#)). Six experimental sentences were generated from each target: two metonymic, two literal, and two nonsense versions (see [Table 1](#)). All sentences were eight words long and ended with the target word. The target word was always in the argument of the verb. Our versions of Lowder and Gordon's sentences were identical to the originals except that they were cut short to end with the target word.

The target word in the nonsense sentences violated the subcategorization constraints of the main verb but made sense up until the target word. More specifically, the nonsense strings were unacceptable because of the incompatibility between the thematic role associated with the verb and the thematic role of the target word. For example, "One Friday morning, the students downloaded the garage," was unacceptable because "garage" does not fit the thematic role associated with "download."

All participants saw each target word in the literal and the metonymic condition, but different frames were used for a single participant. Participants also saw each target word in the two nonsense conditions. Participants thus saw each target word four times, once in a literal sense, once in a metonymic sense and twice in the nonsense form. The assignment of item to frame was counterbalanced across participants in two lists.

The sentences were presented in a different random order for each participant with the constraint that they saw a sense and a nonsense version of each target within each half of the experiment. For half the items, the literal sentence appeared first and the metonymic sentence second, and for the other half, the metonymic sentence appeared first and the literal sentence second. The assignment of item to order of appearance was counterbalanced so that across participants, the literal and the metonymic version of each item appeared in the first half of the experiment equally often.

In addition to the 160 experimental sentences, there were 180 filler sentences, half of which were sensical and half nonsensical, randomly interspersed with the experimental sentences. These were from an unrelated experiment. Finally, there were 200 practice sentences that participants completed before progressing onto the main experiment. The practice sentences were needed to familiarize the participant with the SAT procedure.

Procedure

Sentences were presented one word at a time at a rate of 300 ms per word. Starting at 250 ms prior to the onset of the final word, 16 consecutive beeps were played, 250 ms apart. Participants had to respond to each of the beeps by pressing either a sense key or a nonsense key on a standard keyboard. This generated a sequence of 16 responses per trial. If a participant failed to respond enough times on a given trial, or if they did not respond before the second beep of the series, they received feedback instructing them to change their behavior. Otherwise they received a message saying, "Perfect timing." Trials were separated by a fixation cross lasting 1 s. **AQ: 3**

Participants were instructed to start by pressing either the sense key or the nonsense key before the presentation of each sentence (see, e.g., [Foraker & McElree, 2007](#)). The assignment of sentence to start key was randomized. If participants started with the incorrect key they received corrective feedback.

Participants completed a practice phase and a test phase. In the practice phase (45 min), they received feedback on their accuracy and their timing. In the subsequent test phase (1 h 15 min), the accuracy feedback was removed.

Results

Data Cleaning

Two participants were removed because their asymptotic d' scores were lower than 1. We also removed one item for the same reasons (closer inspection revealed that this was because of a typographic error, as shown in Item 15, [Appendix](#)).

² One of the advantages of SAT is that it is not necessary to equate sentence meaningfulness across conditions in order to make claims about retrieval dynamics, and so we did not try to do so here (see [McElree & Nordlie, 1999](#), Footnote 2, for a similar point). In SAT, differences in meaningfulness would be reflected in retrieval probability and not in the retrieval dynamics. To see this, consider the following two scenarios. In the first, assume that metonymic sentences are 10% less plausible than literal controls but there are no other processing differences. This would mean that interpretation judgments would be 10% less accurate for the metonymic sentences than the literal sentences at the maximum time delay, say $d' = 4.5$ versus $d' = 5$ (λ would be 10% lower). At smaller time intervals, there would still be a 10% difference in plausibility but the absolute difference in d' would drop, say to $d' = 2.7$ versus $d' = 3$ at half the maximum time delay, and continue dropping until the curve hits the x -axis, at which point there would be no absolute difference between the two conditions (because 10% of zero is zero). Even though there is a 10% difference in asymptotic accuracy, there would be no difference at the intercept. Thus, the drop in accuracy between conditions would be proportional with time. In the second scenario, assume that metonymic sentences are also 10% less plausible, but moreover, assume that there is an extra processing stage for metonymic sentences lasting 200 ms. In this situation, there would still be 10% lower accuracy rates at the maximum time delay but the intercept would be 200 ms earlier in the literal condition.

Figure 1. Model predictions. Indirect access models (upper panel) predict an earlier intercept for literal sentences than metonymic sentences regardless of whether asymptotic accuracy is higher (+ λ) or lower (− λ). Direct access models (lower panel) do not predict intercept differences but are similarly agnostic about asymptotic accuracy.

Analysis Overview

Hits for the d' measure were calculated using sense responses to the sensical experimental items for each condition. False alarms were calculated using the sense responses to the nonsensical experimental items. The same false alarm measure was used in both conditions. The d' by participant used all responses per participant and the d' by item used all responses for a given item.

We analyzed the data in three ways. (a) We compared the d' responses on the final lag across conditions using t tests. This gave an empirical measure of overall meaningfulness independent of model fitting procedures. (b) We analyzed the d' averaged across participants by optimizing different forms of Equation 1. This involved testing whether separate parameter values across conditions signifi-

cantly reduced the summed squared error compared to using the same parameter values across conditions.³ (c) We analyzed model fits to

³ We used a likelihood ratio test to establish this. If the summed square error (SSE) between model and observations is used as a measure of goodness of fit, the likelihood ratio can be expressed as

$$\chi^2 = -2\ln \left[\frac{SSE(\text{general})}{SSE(\text{restricted})} \right]^{n/2}$$

with n corresponding to the number of data points, SSE (general) to the error for the general model and SSE (restricted) to the error for the restricted model. χ^2 will be distributed on degrees of freedom equal to the difference in free parameters between models. Note that this test is only applicable when comparing nested models.

Table 1
Example Stimuli

Frame	Condition	Sensality	Sentence
Frame 1	Literal	Sense	On his way there, he passed the garage.
	Metonymic	Sense	On his way there, he phoned the garage.
Frame 2	Literal	Sense	The man with the Ferrari passed the garage.
	Metonymic	Sense	The man with the Ferrari phoned the garage.
Nonsense 1		Nonsense	Despite his hangover, the postman recorded the garage.
Nonsense 2		Nonsense	One Friday morning, the students downloaded the garage.

Note. Participants saw the target (*garage*) once with the literal frame (Frame 1 or Frame 2) and once with the (alternate) metonymic frame (Frame 2 or Frame 1). They also saw both versions of the nonsense frame–target combination.

individual participants. Here, we optimized Equation 1 to each participant's responses and tested the mean parameter values across conditions using inferential statistics. Because analyses (a) and (b) revealed that d' differed significantly across conditions, we restricted ourselves to models in which two λ parameters were needed (i.e., $2\lambda-1\beta-1\delta$, $2\lambda-1\beta-2\delta$, $2\lambda-2\beta-1\delta$, and $2\lambda-2\beta-2\delta$). We applied these three analyses to the combined set of items, the Lowder and Gordon (2013) items alone, and the novel items alone.

Analysis

F2

Figure 2 shows the average time course functions for literal and metonymic sentences (novel and Lowder & Gordon, 2013, items combined). Performance on the final lag (3.75 s) provides an empirical measure of asymptotic accuracy. Performance was higher in the literal condition by 0.36 d' units, $M = 2.68$ ($SD = 0.47$) versus $M = 2.32$ ($SD = 0.42$), $t_1(29) = 5.21$, $p < .001$, $t_2(38) = 3.61$, $p < .001$. Similar results were obtained when novel and Lowder and Gordon items were tested separately, all $ps < .05$. These results indicate that, for our participants, the sentences in the literal condition were more sensical or meaningful than those in the metonymic condition.

Fitting Equation 1 to the average data and the individual participants' data also provided support for more meaningful literal

than metonymic sentences. For the average data, allowing λ to vary across conditions always significantly improved the fit of the model, regardless of whether β and δ also varied: The $2\lambda-1\beta-1\delta$ model significantly improved fits relative to the $1\lambda-1\beta-1\delta$, $\chi^2(1) = 80.33$, $p < .001$; the $2\lambda-1\beta-2\delta$ significantly improved fits relative to the $1\lambda-1\beta-2\delta$ model, $\chi^2(1) = 77.16$, $p < .001$; the $2\lambda-2\beta-1\delta$ model significantly improved fits relative to the $1\lambda-2\beta-1\delta$ model, $\chi^2(1) = 64.1$, $p < .001$; and the $2\lambda-2\beta-2\delta$ model significantly improved fits relative to the $1\lambda-2\beta-2\delta$, $\chi^2(1) = 62.7$, $p < .001$. We also conducted this analysis on the Lowder and Gordon (2013) items and the novel items separately. Different λ parameters across conditions again always yielded better fits than comparative models with the same lambda value, all $\chi^2(1) > 10.95$, $ps < .001$. All model parameters, error terms and r^2 adjusted scores are shown in Table 2.

T2

For the individual participant model fits, the λ values were always significantly lower in the metonymy condition than in the literal condition, regardless of whether β and δ also varied. For the $2\lambda-1\beta-1\delta$ model, $t_1(29) = 4.50$, $p < .001$, $t_2(38) = 3.17$, $p = .004$; for the $2\lambda-2\beta-1\delta$, $t_1(29) = 4.56$, $p < .001$, $t_2(38) = 3.36$, $p = .002$, for the $2\lambda-1\beta-2\delta$ model, $t_1(29) = 4.58$, $p < .001$, $t_2(38) = 3.14$, $p = .003$; and for the $2\lambda-2\beta-2\delta$ model, $t_1(29) = 3.47$, $p = .002$, $t_2(38) = 3.41$, $p = .002$, $t_2(38) = 3.41$, $p = .002$. Similar findings

Figure 2. Average d' accuracy as a function of processing time. Processing time refers to lag + latency. Smooth curves show the $2\lambda-1\beta-1\delta$ model.

Table 2
Averaged Participants Model Fits

Model	$r^2(\text{adj})$	Literal			Metonymic			SSE
		λ	β	δ	λ	β	δ	
All items								
1 λ -1 β -1 δ	.9746	2.4373	1.8343	.5180	2.4373	1.8343	.5180	.5638
2 λ -1 β -1 δ	.9979	2.5939	1.8309	.5176	2.2817	1.8309	.5176	.0458
1 λ -2 β -1 δ	.9843	2.4693	2.0506	.5077	2.4693	1.4139	.5077	.3366
1 λ -1 β -2 δ	.9763	2.4445	1.7874	.4764	2.4445	1.7874	.5469	.5083
2 λ -2 β -1 δ	.9978	2.5975	1.8142	.5176	2.2777	1.8523	.5176	.0454
2 λ -1 β -2 δ	.9978	2.5930	1.8311	.5159	2.2826	1.8311	.5198	.0456
1 λ -2 β -2 δ	.9849	2.4808	2.1139	.5290	2.4808	1.2841	.4547	.3129
2 λ -2 β -2 δ	.9978	2.6005	1.7853	.5107	2.2747	1.8892	.5258	.0441
L&G only								
1 λ -1 β -1 δ	.9283	2.2973	1.8942	.4581	2.2973	1.8942	.4581	1.1655
2 λ -1 β -1 δ	.9759	2.4870	1.8933	.4584	2.1082	1.8933	.4584	.3785
1 λ -2 β -1 δ	.9534	2.4205	1.5296	.2813	2.4205	.9730	.2813	.7304
1 λ -1 β -2 δ	.9339	2.3374	1.5468	.2916	2.3374	1.5468	.4568	1.0363
2 λ -2 β -1 δ	.9750	2.4916	1.8694	.4586	2.1026	1.9302	.4586	.3777
2 λ -1 β -2 δ	.9750	2.4892	1.8932	.4631	2.1056	1.8932	.4519	.3775
1 λ -2 β -2 δ	.9618	2.4063	2.1630	.4816	2.4063	.8972	.1868	.5783
2 λ -2 β -2 δ	.9754	2.4903	1.8843	.4619	2.1576	1.3640	.2821	.3583
Novel only								
1 λ -1 β -1 δ	.9840	2.5337	1.7962	.5522	2.5337	1.7962	.5522	.4293
2 λ -1 β -1 δ	.9973	2.6655	1.7924	.5516	2.4029	1.7924	.5516	.0698
1 λ -2 β -1 δ	.9893	2.5529	1.9944	.5471	2.5529	1.4916	.5471	.2777
1 λ -1 β -2 δ	.9851	2.5381	1.7710	.5210	2.5381	1.7710	.5772	.3858
2 λ -2 β -1 δ	.9972	2.6710	1.7692	.5516	2.3972	1.8198	.5516	.0690
2 λ -1 β -2 δ	.9973	2.6632	1.7931	.5473	2.4052	1.7931	.5569	.0686
1 λ -2 β -2 δ	.9890	2.5557	2.0182	.5550	2.5557	1.4504	.5322	.2740
2 λ -2 β -2 δ	.9973	2.6762	1.7247	.5404	2.3928	1.8711	.5638	.0646

Note. L&G = Lowder and Gordon (2013); adj = adjusted; SSE = summed squared error. The three sections of the table refer to the analysis based on the combined items, L&G items only, and the novel items only. Parameter values are shown for each model type. Where the model assigns only one parameter across two conditions, the same parameter value is shown in both cells of the table.

obtained when we conducted the analysis on the novel and Lowder and Gordon (2013) items separately, all $t_s > 2.33$, all $p_s < .05$. Table 3 shows parameter values for the individual participant 2 λ -1 β -1 δ models.

In summary, analysis of the empirical d' , the average data model fits, and the individual participant model fits all indicate that the literal sentences were more meaningful than the metonymic sentences. Furthermore, we found these effects both when we analyzed the novel and Lowder and Gordon (2013) items combined, and when we analyzed the item sets separately.

These analyses indicate that the retrieval function for literal and metonymic sentences requires different asymptotic accuracy parameters. In contrast, there was no evidence of other differences in the retrieval function. For the average data, there were no 2 λ models for which the addition of varying δ or β parameters improved model fits. Neither the 2 λ -1 β -2 δ nor the 2 λ -2 β -1 δ models significantly reduced error relative to the 2 λ -1 β -1 δ model, $\chi^2 < 1$, nor did the 2 λ -2 β -2 δ model significantly reduce error relative to the 2 λ -2 β -1 δ or the 2 λ -1 β -2 δ model, $\chi^2 < 1$. The same results were observed when considering the novel and Lowder and Gordon (2013) items separately, all $\chi^2 < 1$. Overall then, there was no evidence that different δ or β parameters across conditions were needed to model the average data (a similar conclusion can be reached by considering the r^2 -adjusted scores shown in Table 2).

For the individual participant data fits, neither intercept nor rate varied systematically across conditions (for models in which λ

varied). For the 2 λ -2 β -1 δ and the 2 λ -1 β -2 δ models, all $t_s < 1$. For 2 λ -2 β -2 δ , rates were slightly slower in the literal condition than the metonymic condition, with average $1/\beta$ rates of 666 ± 189 ms ($M \pm SE$) for the literal condition and 458 ± 43 ms in the metonymic condition, $t_1(29) = 1.27$, $p = .21$, $t_2 < 1$, but intercepts were somewhat earlier, 567 ± 28 ms versus 595 ± 37 ms, $t_1(29) = 1.57$, $p = .13$, $t_2 < 1$. When rate and intercept were combined to form a composite measure of processing speed to avoid parameter tradeoffs ($\delta + 1/\beta$) processing was nonsignificantly slower for the literal sentences, $1,233 \pm 198$ ms versus $1,053 \pm 59$ ms, $t_1(29) = 1.16$, $p = .26$, $t_2 < 1$.

The same general pattern was observed for the novel and Lowder and Gordon (2013) items. For the novel items, there were no significant differences in rate or intercept for the 2 λ -2 β -1 δ , 2 λ -2 β -1 δ , and 2 λ -2 β -2 δ fits, all $t_s < 1$. For the Lowder and Gordon items, there were no significant rate differences, $t_s < 1$, but there was some evidence of later intercepts for the literal sentences. The 2 λ -1 β -2 δ fits resulted in significantly later intercepts in the items analysis, $t_2(15) = 2.19$, $p = .045$, but not the subjects analysis, $t_1 < 1$, and for the 2 λ -2 β -2 δ fits, the intercept effect was significant in both analyses, 427 ± 66 ms versus 286 ± 61 ms, $t_1(29) = 2.11$, $p = .044$, $t_2(15) = 3.52$, $p = .003$. Importantly, the intercept differences were in the opposite direction to the predictions of indirect models. Moreover, when the composite measure of processing speed was considered, these differences disappeared, $t_s < 1$.

Table 3
Individual Participant Model Fits

Participant	r^2_{adj}	λ (literal)	λ (metonymic)	β	δ
1	.9842	2.7999	1.6725	2.9558	.7221
2	.9818	2.9098	2.7850	1.9372	.5797
3	.9805	2.6290	2.4696	1.6742	.3340
4	.9753	2.8650	2.0984	7.0925	.7288
5	.9756	3.7554	3.0562	1.8474	.5199
6	.9936	2.6553	2.0751	2.8059	.7607
7	.9766	2.3887	1.9217	2.8784	.7268
8	.9869	2.3276	1.8506	1.5594	.7636
9	.9830	3.5647	2.8149	1.4257	.4580
10	.9769	2.5201	2.6587	1.0551	.4855
11	.9842	2.5538	2.6782	2.7775	.4089
12	.9966	3.3356	2.4774	2.5629	.5225
13	.9816	2.6896	3.0556	2.0732	.7923
14	.9762	1.7697	1.7095	1.9859	.2963
15	.9875	2.9849	3.2937	1.6688	.5167
16	.9798	3.0055	2.5325	4.9343	.3363
17	.9813	3.2881	2.9873	2.5943	.5200
18	.9881	2.4989	2.0383	1.8009	.5508
19	.9935	3.4363	2.2727	2.0741	.3381
20	.9793	2.8023	2.4237	1.7175	.5298
21	.9799	2.1948	1.6992	3.8637	.7819
22	.9966	3.0818	2.7194	2.8239	.5845
23	.9472	2.3846	2.0634	2.1094	.2341
24	.9815	2.3057	2.0881	3.1510	.7516
25	.9776	2.4092	2.4932	1.4182	.5069
26	.9891	2.3088	2.3310	5.8243	.5540
27	.9645	2.8878	2.7584	.4741	.9298
28	.9819	2.7155	2.4861	3.2215	.5454
29	.9810	1.9775	1.9521	2.0319	.7077
30	.9763	1.8811	1.9343	2.5438	.9703

Note. r^2_{adj} = adjusted. Parameter values are shown for each participant's 2λ - 1β - 1δ model.

Our analyses show two broad findings. First, there was strong evidence that literal sentences were more meaningful than metonymic sentences. Second, there was no evidence that literal sentences were processed faster than metonymic sentences. Both of these conclusions apply to Lowder and Gordon's (2013) items, the novel items, and the combined data set.

General Discussion

Lowder and Gordon (2013) found that metonymic sentences were read more slowly than literal sentences. They also argued that this result supported indirect models of metonymic processing, that is, a model that involves an extra stage of processing to access the metonymic meaning compared to the literal meaning, such as the literal-first model (Grice, 1975; Searle, 1975). This type of model predicts that the retrieval dynamics for metonymic sentences should be different to that of literal sentences. In contrast to these predictions, our data revealed similar processing dynamics across sentence types but different retrieval probabilities. Our experiment therefore provides evidence against the literal-first model of metonymic comprehension or indeed any model that describes metonymy as entailing the access of a literal meaning combined with extra serial processing.

The similarity in processing dynamics is consistent with a range of direct access models of metonymy (e.g., Frisson &

Pickering, 1999; Gibbs, 1994; Gibbs & Gerrig, 1989; Gildea & Glucksberg, 1993; Glucksberg, 2001, 2003). There are many types of direct access model and we cannot discuss them all. However, here, we present three examples that are illustrative of the general principles that explain the observed processing dynamics. The first is a model that assumes metonymic and literal senses are stored in the lexicon as distinct entries (as in homonymy; see Rayner & Duffy, 1986), and that both are retrieved in parallel when the target word is processed. The match between the resulting sense and the context would determine which of the two senses was ultimately integrated into the sentence representation. Metonymic and literal comprehension would occur equally quickly because both senses would be retrieved using the same process (from the lexicon), without either sense having a priority. A second approach would be to consider metonymy as involving the initial activation of a shared meaning, which could then be narrowed by context as processing progressed (as in the underspecification model of Frisson & Pickering, 1999, 2001; see also Frisson, 2009). This model predicts similar processing dynamics because the starting point for both senses is the same and the context-matching procedure applies similarly to both senses. Finally, the results also fit a model in which only the contextually relevant sense gets activated, assuming that there is no priority for a specific sense (e.g., Gibbs, 1994).

We also found different retrieval probabilities across conditions. This effect was caused by participants constructing a greater proportion of meaningful interpretations in the literal condition than the metonymic condition. Although not directly related to the distinction between direct and indirect models of metonymy, the result is nonetheless informative because of how it might explain the findings of Lowder and Gordon (2013). We can identify two potential explanations for what caused the differences in retrieval probabilities (and elevated reading times in Lowder & Gordon). The first is that participants were successfully retrieving the metonymic sense of the target word, but that the result did not provide a good real-world fit to the rest of the sentence. In other words, the metonymic sentences could have been less plausible than the literal sentences. The second is that the metonymic retrieval (or construction) mechanism might be inherently more error prone than the literal retrieval mechanism. Under this explanation literal and metonymic retrieval processes are qualitatively different and have different degrees of internal error associated with them, but take similar time to complete. The difference between the two explanations is that the first applies only to a restricted range of items (specifically those used in our experiments) while the second applies to metonymy as a whole.

We used the same items as Lowder and Gordon (2013; Experiment 1), together with a similar, but novel set. Because Lowder and Gordon found significant plausibility differences in a test of materials, it is tempting to conclude that real-world fit is responsible for the differences we observed in retrieval probability. However, a higher error rate in the metonymic retrieval process would also lead to lower plausibility ratings—a failure to retrieve the metonymic sense would make the sentence implausible, just as if there were a poor real-world fit. Thus plausibility ratings do not distinguish between these explanations. Furthermore, when we tested Lowder and Gordon's materials and our own, we found the

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reverse result to Lowder and Gordon: Metonymic items were judged as more plausible than the literal items.⁴ Thus, attempts to separate metonymic error from plausibility would have to involve a series of carefully designed interpretation questions all conducted on the same participants.

Lowder and Gordon (2013) argued that sentence structure affects the processing of metonymy. Although our results do not directly address this issue, they are nonetheless informative. In their Experiment 1, Lowder and Gordon used sentences like those in (a), in which the critical noun phrase (*the college*) was an argument of the verb (*photographed/offended*) and observed longer reading times for metonymic sentences compared to literal sentences. They contrasted these results with those of Frisson and Pickering (1999), who sometimes placed the critical noun phrase in an adjunct (e.g., “The bright boy was rejected by the college”) or a prepositional phrase, rather than in the argument of the verb, and who did not observe extensive early reading time delays. Lowder and Gordon (2013) argued that the discrepant results were because Frisson and Pickering’s (1999) sentence structure did not encourage deep enough processing of the metonymy. Their Experiment 2 produced further evidence that the sentence structure affects the depth of metonymy processing.

Our results suggest that sentence structure does not affect speed of metonymy processing. If it did, we would have observed retrieval processing delays for metonymic sentences, because according to Lowder and Gordon (2013), greater depth of processing leads to slower processing of the metonymy. However, it is possible that sentence structure alters the probability that a sensible interpretation of the metonymy is retrieved. This prediction would be consistent with Lowder and Gordon’s data and our own. However, further experiments directly comparing sentence structure using SAT would be required to address this issue.

Conclusion

Our data have demonstrated that while there are significant retrieval probability differences between metonymic and literal sentences, there are no dynamics differences, contrary to recent claims by Lowder and Gordon (2013) in support of indirect access models of metonymy. More generally, our findings add to a growing body of work suggesting that deferred interpretations, such as metonymy, are not computationally costly per se (cf. Nunberg, 2004); differences in processing time, where they are found, reflect either a difficulty in retrieving an appropriate interpretation or additional compositional work unrelated to the deferred interpretation itself (as in the logical metonymies of McElree et al., 2006).

⁴ We asked 50 participants to rate the plausibility of our novel items and those of Lowder and Gordon (2013). The items were counterbalanced across two lists and we included implausible filler sentences. We used the same question as Lowder and Gordon, “How likely are the events shown in the sentence?” and the same 1–7 ratings scale. Each item was presented on a separate screen and in a different random order for each participant. Participants were recruited online using Prolific Academic, and were paid (\$1.5). We found significantly greater plausibility for the metonymic items than the literal items, novel: $M_{\text{met}} = 5.48$ ($SD = 0.77$) versus $M_{\text{lit}} = 5.13$ ($SD = 0.73$) versus $M_{\text{filler}} = 2.52$ ($SD = 0.50$), all pairwise $ps < .001$;

Lowder and Gordon: $M_{\text{met}} = 5.08$ ($SD = 0.75$) versus $M_{\text{lit}} = 4.53$ ($SD = 0.76$) versus $M_{\text{filler}} = 2.33$ ($SD = 0.56$), all pairwise $ps < .001$. This effect is in the reverse direction to Lowder and Gordon. We were so surprised by this that we conducted another ratings experiment, with a different set of 50 participants, in which we asked participants to make sensicality judgments, mirroring the question asked in the SAT, together with the SAT filler items. Our findings were consistent with those of the plausibility experiment: metonymic sentences were rated as being more sensible than literal sentences, novel: $M_{\text{met}} = 6.02$ ($SD = 0.81$) versus $M_{\text{lit}} = 5.57$ ($SD = 0.74$) versus $M_{\text{filler}} = 2.04$ ($SD = 0.95$), all pairwise $ps < .001$; Lowder and Gordon: $M_{\text{met}} = 5.82$ ($SD = 0.81$) versus $M_{\text{lit}} = 5.03$ ($SD = 0.73$) versus $M_{\text{filler}} = 1.90$ ($SD = 1.11$), all pairwise $ps < .001$. Our conclusion from the disparity in results is that the meaningfulness of these materials varies greatly with the particular sample being tested. Fortunately, overall meaningfulness and retrieval dynamics are measured within the same participant in SAT and so conclusions about retrieval dynamics can be made without fear of the sampling difficulties highlighted here.

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Appendix

AQ: 5

Experimental Materials

Items used in Experiment 2 (in addition to those used by Lowder & Gordon, 2013). Lines 1 and 3 of each item are the metonymic sentences and 2 and 4 are the literal sentences. Lines 5 and 6 are nonsense sentences.

- Last week, the elderly man upset the monastery.

Last week, the elderly man locked the monastery.

Swearing loudly, the drunken soldier upset the monastery.

Swearing loudly, the drunken soldier locked the monastery.

One Tuesday morning, the Russian pulled the monastery.

After his dinner, the snake digested the monastery.
- This morning, the distressed parent hassled the nursery.

This morning, the distressed parent searched the nursery.

The mother of the twins hassled the nursery.

The mother of the twins searched the nursery.

With skill, the new waitress carved the nursery.

At the factory, the accountant calculated the nursery.
- The company based in Bristol prosecuted the resort.

The company based in Bristol designed the resort.

Last year, the young architects prosecuted the resort.

Last year, the young architects designed the resort.
- In the summer, the diners applauded the restaurant.

In the summer, the diners flooded the restaurant.

Its top chef ensured reviewers applauded the restaurant.

Its top chef ensured reviewers flooded the restaurant.

That group of new pilots flew the restaurant.

All last night, the pigeon flapped the restaurant.
- Bad service meant the customer boycotted the shop.

Bad service meant the customer vacated the shop.

At last, the disgruntled clients boycotted the shop.

At last, the disgruntled clients vacated the shop.

During his classes, the pupil graphed the shop.

At the Olympics, the swimmer floated the shop.
- That group of bulky men terrorized the station.

The group of bulky men flattened the station.

Last Wednesday, the horrible gang terrorized the station.

Last Wednesday, the horrible gang flattened the station.

At the sunset, the blind assassin knifed the station.

After lecturers, the arts student jiggled the station.

(Appendix continues)

7. Last Tuesday, the discontented employee quit the supermarket.
Last Tuesday, the discontented employee burgled the supermarket.
Apparently, the troubled floor manager quit the supermarket.
Apparently, the troubled floor manager burgled the supermarket.
On Sunday, the elderly man grated the supermarket.
At work, the new roofer generated the supermarket.
8. The men in firefighting gear shocked the theater.
The men in firefighting gear evacuated the theater.
Two doctors in bloodied gowns shocked the theater.
Two doctors in bloodied gowns evacuated the theater.
The plumber bent down and unclogged the theater.
A week last may, he scooped the theater.
9. Having waited so long, Harry nagged the warehouse.
Having waited so long, Harry rebuilt the warehouse.
After waiting months, the distributor nagged the warehouse.
After waiting months, the distributor rebuilt the warehouse.
During his long shower, he shaved the warehouse.
With panache, the Spanish professor implied the warehouse.
10. After a week, the manager criticized the bank.
After a week, the manager visited the bank.
Months later, the new attorney criticized the bank.
Months later, the new attorney visited the bank.
After the slaughter, the butchers froze the bank.
At the nursery, Jimmy's mother bit the bank.
11. Last week, the French patient praised the clinic.
Last week, the French patient left the clinic.
On Friday evening, the family praised the clinic.
On Friday evening, the family left the clinic.
Quite deliberately, the evil priests bathed the clinic.
Not surprisingly, the sensible barber injected the clinic.
12. Last Tuesday night the officer forewarned the café.
Last Tuesday night the officer inspected the café.
Early Monday morning, the police forewarned the café.
Early Monday morning, the police inspected the café.

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- With his machine, the baker sliced the café.
To her disgust, the policeman hit the café.
13. Because of illegal dealings, they fined the casino.
Because of illegal dealings, they shut the casino.
Yesterday, the secret police officers fined the casino.
Yesterday, the secret police officers shut the casino.
One February evening, the nurses cut the casino.
Eventually one of the children baked the casino.
14. The Health and Safety officers censured the cinema.
The Health and Safety officers emptied the cinema.
A week ago, the police censured the cinema.
A week ago, the police emptied the cinema.
One time last summer, James melted the cinema.
Late last year, the engineers levered the cinema.
15. I'm aware that the worker advised the factory.
I'm aware that the worker exited the factory.
This afternoon, the the manager advised the factory. AQ: 7
This afternoon, the the manager exited the factory.
On Saturday, the fragile businessman peeled the factory.
Last Sunday evening, my husband fished the factory.
16. On his way there, he phoned the garage.
On his way there, he passed the garage.
The man with the Ferrari phoned the garage.
The man with the Ferrari passed the garage.
Despite his hangover the postman recorded the garage.
One Friday morning, the students downloaded the garage.
17. Apparently, the muscular young man joined the gym.
Apparently, the muscular young man trashed the gym.
I heard that some bodybuilders joined the gym.
I heard that some body builder trashed the gym.
In the winter, the hunters tracked the gym.
While very drunk, the groom stripped the gym.
18. Last year, the religious community aided the synagogue.
Last year, the religious community built the synagogue.
Ages ago, some devout residents aided the synagogue.
Ages ago, some devout residents built the synagogue.
With vigour, the young cook simmered the synagogue.
Despite her anger, the maid fetched the synagogue.

TIME COURSE OF FAMILIAR METONYMY

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19. On their way back, they congratulated the hostel.
 On their way back, they noticed the hostel.
 This morning, the friendly couple congratulated the hostel.
 This morning, the friendly couple noticed the hostel.
 To my dismay, the hairdresser tinted the hostel.
 Because he was bored, Henry tickled the hostel.
20. In the end, the workmen asked the hotel.
 In the end, the workmen constructed the hotel.
 Paul said that the men asked the hotel.
 Paul said that the men constructed the hotel.
 In the desert, the cowboy rode the hotel.
 Every Thursday afternoon, the cleaner bleached the hotel.
21. Last weekend, the famous player angered the club.
 Last weekend, the famous player reached the club.
 After two hours, the player angered the club.
 After two hours, the player reached the club.
 To my surprise, the doctor read the club.
 Week ago, my nursed severed the club.
22. After a while, the madman blamed the asylum.
 After a while, the madman fled the asylum.
- Feeling totally isolated, the maniac blamed the asylum.
 Feeling totally isolated, the maniac fled the asylum.
 Every Tuesday night, the chef fried the asylum.
 Although very tried, the waiters steamed the asylum.
23. The man in camouflage gear called the jail.
 The man in camouflage gear circled the jail.
 Last night, a suspicious man called the jail.
 Last night, a suspicious man circled the jail.
 Although frightened, the little girl uploaded the jail.
 Within one week, the baby sucked the jail.
24. Last summer, the eager volunteers helped the library.
 Last summer, the eager volunteers decorated the library. **AQ: 8**
 Last August, the scout's troop helped the library.
 Last August, the scout's troop decorated the library.
 After class, the yoga teacher rolled the library.
 Interestingly, several of the administrators printed the library.
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