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A new standard for the evaluation of solidarist institutions

Abstract

Building on Buzan’s suggestion that when conceived as an analytical tool the English school’s concept of solidarism simply describes those norms and values majorities can agree on this paper argues – contra most English school solidarists, who tend to be normative theorists – that solidarist institutions have no intrinsic moral value. It is argued that if the English school’s contribution to normative theorizing is to be widely useful we need a standard for the moral evaluation of solidarist institutions; one that examines their value in instrumental terms. Specifically this paper suggests that solidarist institutions need to be assessed in terms of their ability to meet basic human needs. This standard for moral evaluation is then applied to the solidarist institutions prevalent at the contemporary core of international society. It is demonstrated that at least the first three of the four solidarist institutions found there – human rights, liberal democracy, environmental responsibility and market capitalism – foster two basic human needs (i.e. autonomy and physical health) and as such are instrumentally valuable.

Key words: English school, human rights, basic needs, market capitalism, environmental responsibility, liberal democracy
Introduction

Many authors from different disciplines have written about or made reference to the society of states also known as international society. In International Relations (IR) theory the idea of an international society is most closely associated with the English school. All members of the English school agree that the condition of anarchy in international relations is not nearly as crippling as realists would have us believe. Not only can states be shown to interact with each other in a number of ways, they also do so to such a degree that they can be said to form an international society.

Works on the English school usually fall in one of four strands: (1) historical, (2) analytical, (3) normative and (4) ‘state-of-the-debate’ reflections. The historical strand includes works concerned with the expansion of international society (e.g. Bull, 1984; Keene, 2002) and works on different states’ systems in distinct historical time periods (e.g. Watson, 1992; Wight, 1977). The analytical strand includes Hedley Bull’s classic text The Anarchical Society (1977), as well as, Barry Buzan’s complete reworking of most of the English school’s key concepts in From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation (2004). The normative strand includes John Vincent’s (1986) call for the importance of human rights and Nicholas Wheeler’s (2000) work on humanitarian intervention. Finally, the state-of-the-debate strand includes most famously Tim Dunne’s Inventing International Society: A History of the English School (1998), and more recently also Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami’s assessment in The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment (2006). The argument advanced in this paper contributes to the normative strand of the English school, which has hitherto been dominated by the so-called pluralist-solidarist debate. Pluralism and solidarism are scholastic terms that mean little to anyone outside of the English school and even here their meaning is not written in stone (see Hurrell, 2007: 58). For most scholars, however, pluralism is about states,
survival and co-existence under anarchy unusually expressed in a commitment to the status-quo (though see Williams, 2005), whereas solidarism is about the primacy of individuals in international society, usually expressed in a normative commitment to human rights. A truly solidarist international order aims to realize some cosmopolitan goals (e.g. individualism), within a state dominated system (i.e. international society) (ibid. 85). Put differently, solidarists seek normative change – some even towards the formation of a cosmopolitan world society (Linklater, 1998). This was not always the case. For Bull who is the originator of these terms they were originally analytical concepts intended to map the actual amount of solidarity on law enforcement in international society (Linklater and Suganami, 2006: 68). Because value-free analysis is no longer fashionable or even considered possible within much of IR theory, normative pluralists and solidarists are not concerned with whether international order is more or less solidarist/pluralist, but rather much of the discussion centres on which concept should have primacy in international society. While notable works have emerged on either side of the debate, the different goals of participants means that the normative strand of the ES has arrived at an impasse without an easily foreseeable exit (see Linklater and Suganami, 2006: 68; Bellamy, 2005, 84; Almeida, 2006).

A number of thinkers have aimed to resolve this impasse by stripping both concepts of their normative contents, and by returning them to the English school’s analytical strand (e.g. Weinert, 2011; Almeida, 2006). Buzan, for example, has argued that as analytical categories pluralism is simply about those institutions that sustain co-existence and survival, while solidarism is about institutions that sustain convergence and collective action and that both are present within all possible types of international society, if so to varying degrees (Buzan, 2004: 141). The veracity of these ideas is central to the argument advanced in this paper and will be examined in detail later on. For now it is important to understand that if Buzan is correct and solidarists institutions are simply sets of norms, practices and values majorities can agree on and share, then these institutions simply have no intrinsic moral value. Indeed there is ‘a dark side’ to such
institutions because majorities can get it wrong (ibid. 85) as they did most famously in many states of twentieth-century Europe when they rallied around nationalism and fascism. To be fair, however, normative solidarists are highly unlikely to fall into that trap. Not, however, because they have realized that solidarism has no intrinsic normative value, but rather because the vast majority of normative solidarists simply equates solidarism with human rights, which – though valuable – do not exhaust the concept. Yet normative theorizing, especially in its solidarist guise (because it is intended as a considered move towards a more just international order), is not only an intrinsic part of English school theory, but it also places the English school ahead of the curve of much of IR theory, where the importance of normative argument for holistic theorizing is only just being discovered (see, for example, Price, 2008).

In my view at least, the normative solidarist argument ought to be strengthened, and to this end I propose that what is needed is a standard for the moral evaluation of solidarist institutions. The aim of this paper is to develop such a standard. Specifically, I argue that the fact that solidarist institutions do not have intrinsic moral value does not preclude the possibility that solidarist institutions can be instrumentally valuable, which is to say that they can be the means towards achieving something else that is valuable. I propose that in order to get at the instrumental value of different solidarist institutions we need to examine them in terms of how well they contribute to human well-being.

A thing’s propensity to contribute to objective human well-being, as distinct from subjective well-being i.e. happiness, is the standard measure of value wherever morality is concerned. We can see this clearly when we look at moral philosophy. Thus although moral philosophers establish the value of things in different ways, for example, some focus on consequences, others on the intrinsic value of certain procedures, and others yet again on the character of individual human persons, most, and indeed most humans, agree that a thing is valuable only insofar as it contributes to objective human well-being (in other words, when the thing is instrumentally valuable). To be clear, I do not wish to suggest that all moral philosophers theorize with explicit reference to human well-being, only that preoccupation with, for example, liberty, desert and
fairness are ultimately concerned with how the human condition can be improved. I propose that the best way to establish the value of solidarist institutions is to assess them in terms of their ability to meet basic human needs. Needs are ‘prime organizing principles’ (Dean, 2010, 4) that serve to establish what people need to live minimally decent lives, or put differently, achieve objective human well-being. A focus on needs is a radical departure from much of the thinking of the English school. Ever since Vincent’s case for rights over needs (1986: 83–88) needs have played virtually no part in English school theory, when, as will be argued, needs satisfaction is a better indicator of well-being than the mere presence of rights. This research article utilizes Ian Gough and Len Doyal’s well-established theory of basic human needs that identifies in autonomy and physical security two basic human needs that can be tracked empirically by focusing on a series of intermediate needs (including, for example, adequate nutritional food and clean water) and their often well-known social indicators (including, for the aforementioned intermediate need, percentage of access to adequate safe water; percentage suffering malnutrition and percentage of low birthweight in babies). My aim, in short, is to establish how well solidarist institutions meet basic human needs, which, in turn, will allow for a judgement on their moral value.

According to Buzan and other English school scholars the core of international society (i.e. the West and within it the EU) is currently home to the largest number of solidarist institutions, which is why I take the core as my case study in this paper. It is important to understand that this choice does not suggest that the idea of solidarist institutions is a Eurocentric concept. As Buzan and others have shown, other regional international societies may well converge on distinct solidarist institutions (for example, religion or Asian values) (see various contributors in Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez et al., 2009).

This paper is structured as follows: Section one examines Buzan’s attempt to resolve the deadlock between pluralists and solidarists by placing them at opposite ends of a spectrum, along which different types of international societies can be found. Although Buzan himself does not
contribute to the normative strand within the ES, his analytical and historical work serves as a starting point for the analysis here offered. Not only because of his discovery of seeing solidarist institutions as normatively neutral, but also – as we will see - for identifying a myriad of solidarist institutions. Section two makes the case for how the value of solidarist institutions should be assessed. Section three examines in what sense the core’s foremost solidarist institutions – human rights, liberal democracy, environmental responsibility and market capitalism – contribute to human well-being as the satisfaction of basic human needs. Section four discusses the value of solidarist institutions at the core of international society. The conclusion examines the implications of this research for the normative strand of the English school as well as for the role and relevance of the English school in IR theory.

**Laying the ground work: Buzan on rethinking solidarism**

The research argument advanced in this paper commences from Buzan’s analysis of solidarism as first expressed in his 2004 book *From International to World Society?* Given this, it is first of all necessary to briefly state what Buzan has to say. One of his ambitions is to resolve the deadlock of the pluralist-solidarist debate. Since his argument is not a normative one, indeed he takes great care to stay clear of normative claims, he proceeds not by endorsing one over the other, but instead he returns the concepts into the analytical realm, with analysts asked to focus on how much solidarity (on a whole range of issues) exists in any given international society. Though now sometimes forgotten, it is important to realize, that this was the original starting point of the terms solidarism and pluralism, which were first used by Bull in 1966 when he described a debate between the followers of, on the one hand Grotius and Oppenheim on the other, on the empirical amount of law enforcement (for example, on war) in international society. A unique combination of an apparent shift in Bull’s work towards embracing solidarism as a normative concept in the so-called Hagey Lectures from 1983, Bull’s untimely death just a year later, a
number of inconsistencies in his work concerning detachment of the scholar, coupled with a bias
against value-free analysis soon meant that solidarism lost its original meaning as an analytical
concept and became a normative one (see Cochran, 2009 and on inconsistencies Williams, 2006).
Conceived as an analytical concept, Buzan argues that for Bull solidarism is about more than
simply the empirical amount of law enforcement in international society; instead solidarism rests
mainly within Bull’s third level of society which concerns rules to regulate cooperation in politics,
strategy, society and economy (Buzan, 2004: 53). According to Buzan Bull says the following
about these rules:

Rules of this kind prescribe behaviour that is appropriate not to the elementary or
primary goals of international life, but rather to those more advanced or secondary
goals that are a feature of international society in which consensus has been reached
about a wider range of objectives than mere coexistence. [A statement to which
Buzan adds:] Here one would find everything from the UN system, through arms
control treaties, to the regimes and institutions for managing trade, finance,
environment, and a host of technical issues from postage to allocation of orbital
slots and broadcast frequencies (Buzan, 2004: 52).

Several more of Buzan’s observations are important for the argument advanced in this paper.
First, rules about cooperation widen the scope of solidarism, thus they include cooperation in
the environmental, regional and economic realm, all of which were severely neglected by Bull in
favour of high politics. Second, because solidarism is part of international society and not world
society, and because, for Bull, international society was based on positive law, solidarism is
identifiable with positive and not natural law (ibid. 54). Third, positive law has not prevented
states from developing solidarist rules of cooperation. Fourth, acceptance of positive law draws
a straight line between the pluralist and solidarist positions, and eliminates the logic of their
being opposed’ (ibid. 55). Consequently, both pluralism and solidarism are part of the empirical make-up of each international society, albeit to varying degrees.

In line with this Buzan suggests the pluralist–solidarist debate must be rethought as a debate that is not about how/why values are implemented/shared (because all values are shared through a mix of coercion, calculation and belief), but rather as a debate about what kind of values are held. ‘Values relating to the survival and self-interest of states and to coexistence defined pluralism and therefore thinness. Values to do with convergence and the pursuit of joint projects defined solidarism and therefore thickness’ (ibid. 154, my emphasis).

Locating the prevalence of solidarist and pluralist values at the level of international society potentially has repercussions for the English school’s concept of institutions as it is here that solidarism and pluralism play out. According to Buzan some institutions (for example, ‘territoriality’) are pluralist, while others (for example, ‘equality of people’) are solidarist (Buzan, 2004, 185-86). Another observation made by Buzan in his 2004 book is that if the defining features of solidarism are: (a) convergence on joint values and (b) collective action on joint values then solidarism does not equate to a specific type of ethical commitment. Thus, ‘states might cooperate in one or more joint project in pursuit of one or more common value. Such projects can of course come in as many different forms as there are common values that might be taken up in this way’ (Buzan, 2004: 149, 61). In the context of this paper these observations are crucial; because they suggest that solidarist institutions have no intrinsic moral value. As we have seen, because normative theorizing especially in its solidarist guise (i.e. the move towards creating a more just international order) is an intrinsic and valuable part of English school theorizing, Buzan’s analytical approach does not suffice; and I propose that we need to develop a standard for the moral evaluation of solidarist institutions. The latter is attempted in the following section.
Satisfaction of basic human needs as a standard for the evaluation of solidarist institutions

That normative solidarists are fundamentally concerned with the fate of individuals within a state-dominated international society is clear from the fact that the concept has become almost synonymous with human rights:\textsuperscript{ix} ‘Human rights are requirements whose object is to protect urgent individual interests against certain predictable dangers (“standard threats”) to which they are vulnerable under typical circumstances of life in a modern world order composed of states’ (Beitz, 2009: 109). If, however, Buzan is right and solidarism, once more conceived an analytical category merely captures the idea that states converge on joint values and act collectively on these same values, it follows that human rights is but one of several possible solidarist institutions.

Normative solidarists hold human rights in such high esteem not only because they care about the individuals in a state-dominated system, but also because human rights exist in practice and because they have proved very successful (Donnelly, 1998). It is conceivable that normative solidarists would – if charged with the task of examining the value of solidarist institutions other than human rights – simply examine whether or not any given solidarist institution fosters human rights; referring back to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the covenants regarding questions of what human rights actually are (see Donnelly, 2003: 24 for a complete list). The underlying ideas here would be that because: (a) the highest value is human well-being (incidentally something Bull believed (Bull, 2002: 21)), and (b) that human rights can foster well-being (see Simmons, 2009), it matters whether solidarist institutions are or are not conducive to human rights.
Despite its intuitive appeal such an approach would only be of limited utility. This is so for two reasons. First, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and its covenants include a good number of questionable rights. Specifically, for the existence of a right there needs to be a duty bearer and the duty needs to be performable. Griffin illustrates the latter point by arguing that there cannot be a ‘right to health’ as specified by the Universal Declaration, as ‘we have only limited control over health. If I am struck down by an unpreventable and incurable cancer, my rights are not violated. “Ought” implies “can”: in many cases we cannot do anything to preserve health’ (Griffin, 2008: 99). In short, having a right to something does not improve well-being, if that something cannot be performed. In many ways physical health, which is indeed one of the corner-stones of human well-being, is more adequately thought of as a basic human need. Needs identify universal requirements of people, in order to either avoid their being harmed or to enable them to achieve human well-being. Needs, in David Miller’s terms, are all those things ‘essential’ for a human being, in the sense of enabling her ‘to live a minimally decent life in the society to which she belongs’ (2007, 180-1).

While one could plausibly object that a right to health becomes performable when we speak of a ‘right to healthcare’ instead, let me now turn to my second reason why rights are not appropriate for the purposes of evaluating solidarist institutions. I want to demonstrate that even if a right is performable, having that right does not necessarily mean that one is better off than not having that right.

In philosophy rights are generally taken to be a measure of justice or more likely legitimacy, whereas basic human needs chart either the presence of objective human well-being or the absence of harm (Dean, 2010). Bearing this in mind, consider two countries A and B both of which have the same extensive set of rights, as well as the same institutions and policies, suggesting that they are just the same. A close look at their respective economies and welfare budgets, however, indicates that A spends vastly more money on healthcare and education leading to consistently higher living standards, higher life expectancy and better levels of
education. The lower levels of spending do not necessarily render B (more) unjust, (especially not if it spends the same percentage of GDP on the welfare state as does A), what it shows is rather that in spite of having all of the same rights well-being in A and B still differs, suggesting that well-being cannot be adequately charted by looking for rights alone, we ought to look for the satisfaction of needs as well.

It is important to note that none of this is to suggest that rights are not important. To the contrary some needs are clearly met by rights, and many needs theorists advocate rights as a way to meet basic human needs (see Gasper, 2007: 50). We will look into this in more detail a little later on, but for now consider that the rights to liberty, freedom of assembly and to freedom of speech are all clearly essential in allowing people to freely participate in the society to which they belong.

A theory of human need

Needs theories exist in abundance (see Alkire, 2002: 78–84), but one of the most compelling theories – because of its operability – is Doyal and Gough’s (1991) *A Theory of Human Need* (hereafter THN). Because this theory is instrumental to the analysis that follows an explanation of what it contains is required.

Doyal and Gough’s theory defines needs, negatively, as what is needed to avoid being harmed (but could easily be turned-around into specifying what humans need in order to achieve well-being). A person is harmed when he cannot participate in social life, which in turn is based on the understanding that people are social creatures, whose life gains meaning only in interaction with others. The two most fundamental ways in which a person cannot partake in social life is when he is not in charge of his own life. This can happen if there is an absence of choices, a lack of free will or low levels of education, in short in the absence of (personal) autonomy.
Second, a person is also unable to meaningfully partake in social life when she does not possess physical health, leaving her unable to work. These two basic human needs are further broken down into a number of easily recognizable intermediate needs. Five of these correspond to physical health: (1) adequate nutritional food and clean water, (2) adequate protective housing, (3) a non-hazardous work environment, (4) a non-hazardous and physical environment, and (5) appropriate health care. The remainder: (6) security in childhood, (7) significant primary relationships, (8) physical security, (9) economic security, (10) appropriate education, and (11) safe birth control and child bearing correspond to autonomy.

In a final step, both basic and intermediate needs’ satisfaction are translated into social indicators which enable the researcher to locate the relative satisfaction of each need for any given social or political order. For the most part the social indicators are well known and regularly charted by international organizations such as the World Bank, UNESCO and the World Health Organization (WHO). Thus, indicators that measure needs’ satisfaction with regard to physical health, or lack thereof, include: life expectancy at various ages, age-specific mortality rates, calorie consumption below WHO requirements, the percentage of people lacking access to adequate safe water and the percentage of babies with low birth weight. Social indicators of autonomy dissatisfaction include: the lack of primary education, levels of illiteracy and lack of higher education. Importantly, Doyal and Gough realize both that there might not always be reliable data for all countries for all these social indicators, and that social indicators might change over time (prevalence of HIV/AIDS, for example, has of course only been charted since the emergence of the disease). As a result, their list of social indicators is both extensive and non-binding, and any researcher applying THN is therefore not exclusively bound to the indicators they have identified, but can work with those for which she can find sufficient data.

The next section will examine the causal link between the solidarist institutions at the core of international society and objective human well-being utilizing THN. That is, I will trace the causal connections between each of the four solidarist institutions and human well-being,
whereby the latter is defined as the satisfaction of the two basic needs autonomy and physical health. It should be noted that in addition to ease of operability the latter has the added benefit that it combines insights gained from normative theory (especially moral and analytical political philosophy) with statistical data (from a range of fields, including political science, environmental psychology, environmental sciences and development economics). In short, the moral standard for the evaluation of solidarist institutions proposed here combines moral–philosophical knowledge with empirical–pragmatic knowledge, whereas, as Cochran has noted, most existing arguments by normative solidarists rely on the latter only and are therefore not always sufficiently grounded (Cochran, 2008: 293).

The nature of solidarist institutions at the core of international society

This section examines the value of solidarist institutions at the contemporary core of international society in accordance with the above suggested standard for moral evaluation. If solidarism is about (a) convergence on joint values and ultimately homogeneity, and (b) collective action on joint values, then it is possible to identify institutions at the Western core of international society that are best described as solidarist. Here states share a strong commitment to liberal democracy as well as to market capitalism making for a great deal of homogeneity. Furthermore the core has taken collective action on joint values; besides dealing with human rights violations, often followed by enforced and top-down democratization, also increasingly on global environmental issues.

The reality of global climatic change has brought to the forefront once again the issue of the finiteness of the global commons, the disregard of global environmental problems for territorial boundaries and the associated need for collective action. In a recent piece Falkner, who does not distinguish between master and derivate PIs, argues that global environmentalism (in a
nutshell: ‘an empirical belief that many of the planet’s ecosystems and species are under threat, and a normative belief that humans should take greater care of the environment’ (Falkner, 2012: 511) gave rise to both pluralist state-led global environmental governance (effectively a branch of diplomacy), and increasingly to solidarist environmental responsibility. Substantively they are both forms of environmentalism, yet one exists within the logic of coexistence, the other within that of convergence. The latter can increasingly be found at the core of global international society.

This section aims to assess the causal connection between the four solidarist institutions (1) human rights, (2) liberal democracy, (3) environmental responsibility, and (4) market capitalism and human well-being defined as the satisfaction of basic human needs respectively. Before I can begin that analysis a disclaimer is in order. The analysis that follows relies on data compiled from primary and secondary sources. Given the wide variety of data used the underlying methodologies and ontological assumptions vary and in some cases may be contested. Above all else the definitions of cause and causation adopted in this paper are informed by IR’s critical realists, most notably by Milja Kurki (2008, 2006), who has argued that rationalist and reflectivist scholars alike have unhelpfully narrowed the concept of cause to its Humean understanding where it refers to empiricist, observable and repeatable ‘pushing and pulling factors’ that designate change of a given state of affairs. When, so Kurki, social structures such as ideas, rules, norms and discourses too have causal impacts on the world, not only because they enable (make possible) and preclude certain types of action and ways of thinking, but also because they give way to real material structures. Human rights, for example, have given way to legislation as well as to the European Court of Human Rights. While not everyone will agree with the ontological assumptions and methodologies underwriting each and every one of the studies cited, I would nevertheless contend that the bulk of the data allow for at least a tentative verdict on the linkage between the satisfaction of needs and any given solidarist institution.
Human rights

Autonomy

I have already said that rights play an important role in meeting needs. The list of human rights is however extremely long and given the limits of space it would be impossible for me to examine each right individually, while it would be wrong to focus on only one human right as indicative of them all. In my view, the easiest way to observe a connection between the solidarist institution of human rights and well-being as the satisfaction of human needs is to examine a case where (a good number of) rights are systematically infringed. Such a case study at the core of international society is offered by the situation in Ireland regarding abortion before the signing of the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013. Before that time all abortions were deemed illegal except for cases where the woman’s life was in danger – including from suicide. A 2010 report by Human Rights Watch, however, found that this exception was only notional, as there was no evidence that (legal) abortions were being carried out in Ireland (Gerntholtz, 2010: 17). This meant that unless the women had the financial means to travel to other European countries where the abortion could be carried out, they were forced to continue with unwanted pregnancies, even in cases where the pregnancy ensued as a result of rape, incest and where the foetus was known to have been so severely disabled that it would not survive. What is more, there was virtually no adequate advice or help available for women, not even to those who were in principle entitled to have an abortion. There was also no regular screening for birth defects available.

Ireland was repeatedly criticized for its abortion policy. The UN, for example, has ‘recognized that firmly established human rights are jeopardized and prejudiced by restrictive and punitive abortion laws and practices’, and Human Rights Watch holds that the human rights ‘jeopardized by Ireland’s restrictions on abortion include the rights to life, health, liberty, non-
discrimination, physical integrity, freedom of expression, and the right to be free from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment [and] the right to information’ (ibid. 44).

The infringements of these human rights show that, when observed, human rights facilitate autonomy and physical health. At the most basic level, not being able to have an abortion inhibits women from determining their own lives. The consequences of this are, I think, especially severe, when the pregnancy is a result of sexual intercourse to which no consent was given and in foetal abnormal pregnancies. The Human Rights Watch report conclusively shows that unwanted pregnancies are bad for mental health. Especially in cases where the women are being forced to carry out a non-viable foetus is traumatic, and ‘women are likely to suffer from anxiety, severe depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)’ (ibid. fn 76).

**Physical health**

The connection with physical health is especially apparent in women with foetal abnormality pregnancies as these carry different health and typically include ‘polyhydramnios, postural hypotension, premature membrane rupture, breech birth or other forms of dystocia, and amniotic embolisms (ibid.).’

Physical health was also at risk if women reverted to ‘backstreet’ illegal abortion clinics. Given that travelling to another European country to have an abortion, as well as the procedure itself is relatively expensive (€800–1000) not everyone had the option to do so. The median income in Ireland at that time was €580 per week, consequently for ‘someone living under the poverty line, the cost of an abortion could easily represent more than a monthly salary (ibid. 32).’ Those with lower incomes were thus doubly disadvantaged and also more likely to revert to illegal abortion clinics where hygienic standards and training might be questionable.
Finally, the stigma of having an abortion was so bad, that those women who had an abortion abroad were often too scared to go for aftercare if complications (bleeding or abdominal pain) ensued, thereby putting their health and lives at risks.

The example of Ireland’s abortion policy is but one possible example I could have chosen to exemplify the deep connection between human rights and human needs. Beth Simmons’ 2009 research on the effectiveness of human rights regimes offers a whole host of other examples. Contrary to International Relations realists she argues that human rights regimes do matter because they enable groups and individuals to mobilize in the name of that right, and she shows that this has significantly increased human well-being in many countries.

**Liberal democracy**

**Autonomy**

Democracy has been defined as ‘a regime in which those who govern are selected through contested elections … Contestation occurs when there exists an opposition that has some chance of winning office as a consequence of election. [In short] democracy is a system in which parties lose elections’ (Przeworski et al., 2000: 15–16). In this section I evaluate liberal democracies ability to satisfy basic human needs vis-à-vis non-democracies. At the most basic level it could be said to foster autonomy as freedom of agency by its very nature, because liberal democracies take individual rights seriously (Waldron, 2002: 51). One of democracy’s constitutive rights is the right to vote. According to Doyal and Gough this right facilitates ‘critical autonomy’, i.e. the capacity to reflect on the values held in one’s own culture and the necessary aptitude to change these (Doyal and Gough, 1991: 68).
Empirical evidence suggests that democracies encourage/discourage certain kinds of action that are beneficial to personal autonomy. First and foremost this takes the form of good levels of physical security. Doyal and Gough measure the satisfaction of this intermediate need by looking at war victims. Research that compared democratic and non-democratic regimes from 1950 to 1990 suggests that dictatorships tend to be more violence prone than democracies, with the former experiencing a war on average every twelve years and the latter every twenty-one years (Przeworski, 2000: 190). One of the defining features of a liberal democratic country is that it does not engage in warfare with other liberal democracies (Doyle, 1983). Although this does not stop democracies from going to war with non-democracies, if the democratic peace thesis holds true it should mean that as more countries become democracies the number of wars decreases. Among the countries of the liberal core at least war has all but disappeared as an institution of international society. Physical security is enhanced further by the fact that democracies tend to be more stable than non-democracies (Przeworski et al., 2000: 98), and that the change of government is more likely to be bloodless (Popper in Przeworski, 1999: 23).

A second link can be found in democracies’ record in providing education. Democracies regularly top the Human Development Index (HID), a composite statistic that measures three dimensions of human development: (1) living a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy), (2) being educated (measured by mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling) and (3) having a decent standard of living (measured by gross national income), as well as the separately compiled education index. Levels of education in turn are correlated to fertility and a positive correlation between female secondary school enrolment rates and lower levels of fertility has been suggested (World Bank Data Viz, 2013). What is more, in democracies government spending on health and social security is likely to be higher than in dictatorships (for details see below). As a result children are no longer required as insurance against old age, which in turn leaves couples freer to decide whether or not to have children and how many.
Finally democracies’ record of economic security tends to be better than that of non-democracies. Doyal et al.’s preferred social indicators of this intermediate need are levels of absolute and relative poverty. In the first instance per capita income tends to be higher in democracies than in autocracies (World Bank, 2012). Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that poverty alleviation is likely to be more consistent in democracies than in authoritarian regimes where there are huge discrepancies between different countries (Varshney, 2000: 12). It is also the case that absolute poverty under democracy has not increased, whereas this has been the case in non-democracies (ibid. 13).

**Physical health**

The authoritative comparative study by Przeworski and colleagues of the material consequences of different political regimes in fifty-one poor countries (1950–1990) points to a positive link between democracy and physical health. The study found, first, that infant mortality is lower in democracies (at all income levels) than in non-democratic regimes: ‘For each 1,000 children born, between seven and twenty more die under dictatorship’ (2000: 228). Second, fewer women die in labour and of maternity-related causes in democracies than under dictatorships. Plus higher fertility rates in dictatorships put women at risk more often than in democracies. Third, overall life expectancy is higher in democracies than in authoritarian regimes. ‘In democracies with incomes between $3000 and $4000, people live almost as long as those in dictatorships which have twice that income. Moreover, regime differences in life expectancy are similar for males and females: Men live 66.2 years under democracy and 50.8 years under dictatorship, and women 71.5 years under democracy and 54.2 under dictatorship’ (ibid: 228). The most important factor explaining the comparatively better record of democracies on the physical health of their populations is the government’s proportional expenditure on education, recreation and culture, social security and welfare, housing and health. In democracies governmental expenditure for
these goods lies at 18.9 per cent of GDP, in dictatorships it lies at 9.2 per cent. Notably, ‘expenditures on health are twice as large in democracies, 3.3 per cent, as compared with 1.7 per cent in dictatorships’ (ibid: 237). Given that democracies are likely to have better accountability mechanisms, they also tend to have a better record in providing a non-hazardous work environment. Bardhan, for instance, argues that ‘accountability mechanisms are particularly important in averting disasters; in their absence, major ecological damages in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe went unchecked for too long’ (Bardhan, 1999, 102).

**Environmental responsibility**

**Autonomy**

Environmental responsibility as a social institution captures the fact that environmentalism has ‘succeeded in establishing a global norm [whereby] states have come to accept responsibility for environmental protection beyond their national territory’ (Falkner, 2012, 522). This is contrary pluralist versions of environmentalism (we might call these state-led environmental governance or environmental diplomacy), which – as specified in the 1972 Declaration on the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment- insist on states’ ‘sovereign right to use natural resources within their national territory’ (ibid. 516). The ‘sovereignty clause’ informing pluralist environmentalism has had major drawbacks as far as environmental protection is concerned. For example, it (unintentionally) legitimized Brazil’s widespread deforestation of the Amazonian rainforest in the 1980s in the name of national security (McDonald, 2012, 65-108). In this section I evaluate whether environmental responsibility is better suited to meeting basic human needs.

States informed by environmental responsibility recognize that a global climate regime poses a significant economic and financial burden on many developing countries. Indeed, without the ability to develop carbon intense industry development itself is at stake. Key
indicators of development, notably economic security and education also are indictors of autonomy. Environmental responsibility has the potential to make environmentalism, including a new global climate regime compatible with meeting human needs by facilitating the transition to sustainable development including to low-carbon economies. In this regard, environmental responsibility currently takes the form of over a dozen multi-actor international funds all aimed at financing mitigation and/or adaptation initiatives (e.g. clean technology, emissions reduction from deforestation, green energy) in developing countries. Together these funds command billions of dollars in investment; indeed ‘in 2010 at the UNFCCC talks in Cancun countries committed to provide funds rising to USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to support concrete mitigation actions by developing countries that are implemented in a transparent way’ (UNFCCC, 2015). Overall, empirical evidence suggests that climate funding is making a positive difference. A 2014 report by the independent Overseas Development Institute found that: ‘Climate funds have broken new ground by helping countries begin to confront the implications of climate change for development. The finance they spend is targeting countries that need it. Mitigation funding is concentrated in developing countries with relatively high (and rising) greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, maximising with opportunities for efficient mitigation. Adaptation finance is targeting some of the poorest countries’ (Nakhooda et, al, 2014, 10). In other words, by facilitating sustainable development ‘climate funding’ fosters autonomy.

Another linkage between environmental stewardship, development and consequently autonomy are payments for ecosystem services. These schemes aim to lift farmers and small landowners out of poverty by paying them to protect ecosystems and their services. The concept of ‘ecosystem services’ was developed by the authoritative Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) and refers to the benefits ‘people obtain from ecosystems’ (MEA, 2003, 3).
Physical Health

Environmental responsibility cannot only help to achieve (sustainable) development; it also helps to create/maintain a healthy natural environment beyond national borders. It does not take much to recognize the intricate relationship between a healthy environment and physical health. The ability to be adequately nourished, to be free from disease, to have sufficient drinking water, clean air, as well as the ability to have energy to keep warm and cool, all are constitutive of physical health. Global warming, for instance, is feared in part because it is expected to unsettle the finely balanced relationship between human health and the natural environment. Human health is endangered by climate change induced natural disasters, including hurricanes, coastal flooding and cyclones. In addition, higher mean temperatures encourage disease carriers. Already malaria-carrying mosquitoes are found in new areas of Africa, quite possibly ‘due to a scarcity of cool mosquito-killing temperatures’ (Henson, 2008, 156). While the direct link between these two events is still being studied, it is certain that warmer temperatures will lead to more mosquitoes.

At the core of international society environmental responsibility with a view to protecting the global natural environment takes the form of a myriad of international multi-actor environmental initiatives, funds, projects and conventions that seek to protect ecosystems and their services. Environmental responsibly means recognizing that many of the world’s environmental riches (including biodiversity hotspots) are located in the poorest countries least well equipped to conserve them. For example since its inception in 1992 the United Nations led Convention on Biological Diversity aims to prevent the loss of biodiversity globally. Ecosystems are so closely connected that the loss of one species can reduce the functioning of an ecosystem, thereby reducing the number of ecosystem services available to humans (Beeby et.al, 2008, 345). While the convention has been unable to completely halt the loss biodiversity it has made significant inroads in promoting the public understanding of the connection between well-being and biodiversity and it has rendered signatories accountable for how well they protect
biodiversity in their countries. Article 26 of the convention, for example, requires individual countries to submit National Reports outlining precisely how well the commitments in the convention have been met.

**Market capitalism**

**Autonomy**

Market capitalism is essentially an umbrella term that describes ‘any economic system where there is a combination of private property, a relatively free and competitive market, and a general assumption that the bulk of the work-force will be engaged in employment by private (non-governmental) employers engaged in producing whatever goods they can sell at a profit’ (Robertson, 1993: 49–50). Capitalist systems can be more or less regulated. In this section I evaluate regulated capitalist systems ability to satisfy basic human needs vis-à-vis unregulated ones.

At the most basic level, market capitalism fosters autonomy because it provides people with the freedom to choose, a choice of goods and the right to participate in the market (Sen, 1985: 3). While the ‘freedom to choose’ is a basic liberty, it ignores the fact that companies thrive by creating false needs and wants in people, leaving them neither completely free nor autonomous. Similarly, while a capitalist system supports the right to participate in the market thus supposedly giving way to meaningful employment, capitalism has often been unable to escape Marx’s charge that the commodification of labour leads to the alienation of labour.

Empirical evidence suggests two clear linkages between market capitalism and autonomy. First is the age-old thesis of liberal institutionalists that increased interdependence between liberal market economies leads to more peaceful relations between states (Held and McGrew, 2002). As already noted above, the absence of war is a major factor in ensuring physical security and hence autonomy.
Second is the fact that capitalist systems often invest heavily into education. The reasons for this, however, are not necessarily magnanimous; instead, in order to remain competitive, capitalist systems need to make a profit. Competitiveness can only be ensured if the workforce is highly skilled. In highly regulated capitalist systems this has meant heavy investment in state school education and free or affordable access to higher education (Gough, 2000: 28). Unless the economic system is regulated it does not automatically follow that there will be free and high quality education for all. The unequal impact of private education is visible even in a welfare state like the UK that invests heavily in education and where misleadingly named ‘public schools’ enable disproportionate access to top universities and consequently to better (paid) jobs. Thus, 50 per cent of undergraduates at Oxford and Cambridge are privately educated, ‘one in six postgraduate students was privately educated’, and ‘over one third (35%) of MPs elected in the 2010 General Election attended independent schools, which educate just 7% of the school population’ (Sutton Trust, 2010: 2). Figures for the 2015 General Election are similar, with 32% of elected MPs having been educated privately compared with 7% of the population) and with one in ten MPs was educated at Eaton (Sutton Trust, 2015, 1). The school fees for Eaton College for the academic year 2015-2016 are £35,721 plus extras in the area of £600-£2400 (Eaton College website 2015). The UK’s Office of National Statistics estimates that the average income in the UK in 2013 was £27.0000 (ONS, 2013,1).

**Physical health**

Moving on to our second basic need, there is no question that there is a strong correlation between market capitalism and healthcare. Thus in unregulated capitalist systems, just like any other service, healthcare is simply a source for enterprise and profit. As noted in the case of education, the inequalitarian effects of private healthcare are visible in the United Kingdom today. For example, although everyone has access to an NHS dentist, some treatments (for instance, retreatment of a root canal) are outsourced to specialists who charge over four times the amount
NHS dentists do for the initial treatment. These effects are even more visible in the United States where high premiums on health insurance disadvantage the less well-off. In short, although there is a strong correlation between healthcare and capitalism, it is another issue altogether whether healthcare should or should not be determined by the market. The 2008 World Health report explicitly warns against the continuing privatization of healthcare:

Commercialization has consequences for quality as well as for access to care. The reasons are straightforward: the provider has the knowledge; the patient has little or none. The provider has an interest in selling what is most profitable, but not necessarily what is best for the patient … Those who cannot afford care are excluded; those who can may not get the care they need, often get care they do not need, and invariably pay too much. Unregulated commercialized health systems are highly inefficient and costly: they exacerbate inequality, and they provide poor quality and, at times, dangerous care that is bad for health (WHO, 2008: 14).

Moreover, the question whether or not people are generally healthier in capitalist market economies than in other systems cannot be answered conclusively. The reason for this is that capitalism cannot be singled out as the independent variable in physical health. Thus capitalism is usually accompanied by democracy and social policies (Gough, 2000: 28), either one of which could be responsible for a good record on physical health. What is more, capitalism has led to the increase of some diseases, most notably obesity and associated heart diseases and diabetes. Globally obesity figures are on the rise: ‘worldwide obesity has more than doubled since 1980 [and] overweight and obesity are linked to more deaths worldwide than underweight’ (WHO, 2012). Obesity is linked to the easy availability of cheap unhealthy food (notably fast food) and to low levels of activity. For example, in 2010 it was reported that the average Briton watches
more hours of television (30 hours and 4 minutes per week) than ever before, thanks to more channels and on-demand services (Clark, 2010).

In summary, although capitalist systems can produce healthcare, nutritious food, education and clean water, without regulation not everyone has access to these goods; consequently, the less well-off will always do worse than those with higher incomes. In evidence, consider the fact that obesity tends to coincide with lower levels of income (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009: 89).

What has been said so far suggests that when it comes to the satisfaction of human needs there are better and worse capitalist economic systems. Generally speaking the less regulated the system, the worse it is at meeting human needs. There are two reasons why unregulated capitalism is so bad at meeting human needs. First, unregulated systems breed inequality and the more unequal any given society is the higher the occurrence of social and environmental problems and vice versa (Dahl, 1998:174). Second, unregulated capitalism can satisfy only ‘certain wants of some people by means of commodities’ (Gough, 2000: 17), these materialistic wants being quite separate from needs, while at the same time not increasing subjective levels of well-being, more commonly referred to as happiness (Jackson, 2009: 35ff).

**The value of solidarist institutions at the core of international society**

The evaluation of contemporary solidarist institutions at the core of international society suggests that here majorities haven’t got it all wrong. While the scope for analysis is limited due to the preclusion of space, empirical evidence from a wide variety of primary and secondary sources tentatively suggests that while market capitalism needs to be regulated to have positive effects, human rights, democracy and environmental responsibility appear to benefit people extensively. Historical evidence shows that when people derive a benefit from something it leaves them
positively inclined towards its preservation (see J. Floyd, 2011: 38ff.). Watson in his history of different international societies shows that the most important factor in explaining the popularity of the Roman Empire – among its peoples and even well beyond its demise – was the high standard of living and the high level of personal security enjoyed under that regime (Watson, 1992: 101). Well-being also explains why, at the core of international society, solidarist institutions are held in place by belief and not calculation or force. Thus in the West each one of these institutions is shared and endorsed beyond interstate society – if not equally strongly for each institution – also at the levels of interhuman and transnational society.XIV

Despite this positive evaluation there are problems with some aspects of each of the solidarist institutions in question. First, we have seen that human rights not only require a duty bearer, but also the duty they entail needs to be performable. Second, democracies are a long way removed from the ideal envisaged by its founders. Przeworski points out that democracy continues to ‘feed widespread and intense dissatisfaction today’ centring on: ‘(1) the incapacity to generate equality in the socioeconomic realm, (2) the incapacity to make people feel that their political participation is effective; (3) the incapacity to ensure that governments do what they are supposed to do and not do what they are not mandated to do; and (4) the incapacity to balance order and non-interference’ (Przeworski, 2010: 1–2). Third, environmental responsibility suffers from unequal commitment across different states and populations within the core. Support for collective climate action, for example, is much stronger in Europe than in either North America or Australia. Yet, even the European nucleus of the core of global international society is at odds over the issue of reducing carbon emissions responsible for climate change, with opposition strongest from the newest members of the European Union (Poland and the Czech Republic) who are wary of the possible economic setbacks resulting from such measures. By contrast, fourth, market capitalism enjoys strong support everywhere, in part because people enjoy the freedoms associated with it, but also because they associate it with automatic prosperity, despite the fact that even in regulated capitalist states, there are many disenfranchised people and the gap
between rich and poor is constantly widening (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). These problems mean that it is important to note that the analysis above is very much concerned with ideals derived from these institutions; it seeks to draw out a large number of possible causal linkages between each one and the satisfaction of needs. At most we can say then that each institution has the capacity to satisfy human needs, but whether it actually does depends on its effectiveness, implementation and, in the case of the market, also on how well and strongly the latter is regulated.

These limitations and problems are important also in the context of the fact that global international society is highly unequal, with the core still setting the standard of civilization the periphery ought to achieve (Buzan, 2004, 222-227). This means that any championing of specifying institutions at the core will impact on international order in the periphery. Depending on how this is done this may not produce well-being in the periphery. Democracy, for example, has been exported to the periphery by force and to the detriment of many. Related to this it is important to recognize that while some solidarist institutions might produce well-being at the core they do so at the expense of well-being within the periphery. Market capitalism within the core, for example, is often accompanied with protectionist measures vis-à-vis the periphery, that seriously aggravate its detrimental effects, as, for example, EU agrarian policies with its market access restrictions, coupled direct payments and export subsidies show. XV

Finally, there is the not insignificant fact that there exist conflicts of interest between some of the solidarist institutions examined here. For example, not everyone recognizes the deep connection between well-being and the environment. Those who only conceive of well-being as income maximization are likely to be opposed to strict environmental responsibility, as this can be at odds with economic development. Indeed, conflict of interest is most acute with regard to environmental responsibility and market capitalism. These two forces can only be reconciled as sustainable development, a strong version of which would – in an ideal world – be adopted. But this paper does not seek to claim that the core of international society is the best order
imaginable; rather, the only claim substantiated by this research is that most of the solidarist institutions on which the West has converged are instrumentally valuable because they contribute to objective human well-being.

**Conclusion**

Building on Buzan’s observations that solidarism has no specific ethical commitment and as an analytical concept merely captures that states convergence on joint values and act collectively on the latter; this paper has suggested that solidarist institutions have no intrinsic moral value. It was argued that the (normative solidarist wing of the) English school can play a better role in normative IR theory if we have a standard for the moral evaluation of solidarist institutions; one that examines the value of these institutions in instrumental terms. Specifically, this paper has suggested that solidarist institutions need to be assessed in terms of their ability to meet basic human needs; in part because the satisfaction of basic human needs is a better marker of levels of well-being than the mere existence of rights.

This standard for moral evaluation was then applied to the solidarist institutions prevalent at the core of international society. It was demonstrated that three of the four solidarist institutions found there – (performable) human rights, liberal democracy and environmental responsibility – appear to foster autonomy and physical security (the two basic human needs). In short, these three solidarist institutions are instrumentally valuable. The picture is more mixed when it comes to market capitalism. While some causal connections between autonomy and this institution can be established, no clear connection between the latter and our second basic need (physical health) exists. This example only goes to show that just because an institution is solidarist does not mean that it is automatically valuable.

This research has implications for the normative strand of the English school. In the first instance the fact that solidarist institutions have no intrinsic moral value means that normative
solidarists should be aware of what they are dealing with when they promote convergence on joint values and collective action on these values as a good thing (see Buzan, 2004: 158). Of course the commitment to human rights suggests that most normative solidarists have in mind the kind of ‘well-being solidarism’ endorsed here\textsuperscript{XVI}, but by focusing mainly on human rights normative solidarists short-change themselves, because human rights do not exhaust the amount of solidarist institutions possible.

Second, this research has implications for the normative pluralist–solidarist debate. Along with others, Foot has long pointed out that order is of limited value unless it is just, while justice cannot be achieved in the absence of order (Foot, 2003: 2). This paper substantiates these claims; thus instead of dismissing pluralism, the idea of ‘well-being solidarism’ actually strengthens interstate society, insofar as democracy, human rights, environmental leadership and welfare systems are best delivered by strong, individual states (see Weinert, 2011). This paper reaffirms that for the normative strand of the English school it does not make sense to discuss the merits of order or justice separately from one another in the context of international society. It is more useful to focus on the nature of, and perhaps also the possibility of creating, a just international society. Thinking hard about the value of solidarist institutions is but the first step in that direction.

Beyond this, this research has implications for the role of the English school in IR theory. By examining how the value of individual solidarist institutions should be assessed the paper also establishes the English school’s value for IR theory as a whole. Thus this research demonstrates how the English school (who have always been interested in ethical questions, but whose work has by and large failed to engage the interest of mainstream constructivists (Reus-Smit, 2008: 80)) can enable mainstream constructivists to be clear on the difference between good and bad norms and on the nature of progress, which they have hitherto failed to be (Price, 2008: 3). In short, the ability to measure the normative value of different solidarist institutions points to the value of English school research as a whole.
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For an idea of who exactly might count as a member, see The British International Studies Association’s English school working group bibliography of the English school’s back catalogue available here [1].

Sometimes also as collective security and humanitarian intervention. [2]

This is not intended as a negative verdict on pluralism’s normative promise (see Williams, 2005 who exposes the virtues of a pluralist world society), instead there is simply no room within the limitation of space [3].

This is of course part of normative solidarists’ work. Wheeler (2000) for example, examines to what extent the norm of humanitarian intervention has taken hold at the core of international society. Because his study is ultimately informed by the argument that humanitarian intervention is sometimes necessary, it is also normative. [4]

The Hagey lectures are regarded by many who take solidarism and pluralism to be two opposing normative positions as the decisive turn in Bull’s argument (c.g. Dunne, 1998: 149; Holbraad, 1990: 186ff; Hurrell, 2000: 3ff; Wheeler, 1992: 476). While there can be little doubt that Bull’s world view is more solidarist in these lectures than in his earlier work, it is not clear why for many solidarism and pluralism appear to have lost their original meaning and taken on a different one. Thus, here as before it is perfectly plausible to employ the labels in their original meaning, of being about the empirical amount of solidarity in international society (see Jackson, 2000: 111; Cochran, 2009; Almeida, 2006). Consequently, if Bull’s argument is more solidarist – about which there can be no doubt – this is because there is more solidarity in the international society of 1983 than in that of 1977 or 1966. In support of this argument it is important to note that justice became an issue for Bull largely in the wake of the rise of North/South issues in the 1970s; in particular he was interested in the challenge posed to international society by the revolt of the Third World against western dominance. In short, justice became a concern for Bull because it had become an issue in the real world (Cochran, 2009: 215). [5]

Please note that Buzan dives into primary and derivative institutions, whereby the former contain or generate others. International law, for example is a master PI that gives way to endless treaties and particular laws best described as derivative PIs (Buzan, 2004, 182). [6]

Given certain methodological challenges in Buzan’s framework (see Wilson, 2012) he has more recently moved away from this and he now argues that one and the same primary institution (PI) (can be more or less pluralist/solidarist (Buzan, 2014: 145ff). It seems to me, however, that it might be more accurate to holds that some master PIs are neutral and instead consider derivative PIs as either solidarist or pluralist. The market, for example, can give way to the pluralist derivative PI ‘economic nationalism’, as well as to the solidarist ‘single market’. Be that as it may, my concern is with clearly definable solidarist institutions in this paper. [7]

Sometimes this is expressed in a commitment to humanitarian intervention. [8]

Conversely many rights theorists implicitly rely on needs-based justifications of rights (Floyd, 2011). [9]

This subsection makes draws heavily on Gerntholtz’s report [10].

XIII The education component of the HDI is now measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and expected years of schooling for children of school entry age. The top twenty for the period of 1980–2011 are Norway, Australia, Netherlands, United States, New Zealand, Canada, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, Hong Kong, Iceland, Republic of Korea, Denmark, Israel, Belgium, Austria and France (according to data available to the Human Development Report Office as of 15 May 2011, source [http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103706.html](http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103706.html)).

XIV Terminology as in Buzan, 2004: xvii and xviii.

XV I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this point and the example.

XVI Indeed at least one analyst speaks of ‘liberal solidarism’. See Hurrell, 2007: 57ff. For different types of solidarism see also Bellamy, 2005: 292ff.