Anti-Intellectualism and Israeli Politics

Abstract

Anti-intellectualism is a discrete social phenomenon which eschews spatial or temporal boundaries. While it defies a restrictive definition, it is commonly understood as a populist disdain of individuals who speak of certain universal values and engage in the pursuit of knowledge from reason; conversely, an anti-intellectual is a person who is not a ‘dealer in ideas’ and is not committed to the ‘life of the mind’. This article focuses on anti-intellectualism as a defining characteristic of the Israeli ethos which predates the establishment of the Jewish state. The article begins with a terminological discussion and a brief historical survey of the prevalence of anti-intellectualism in contemporary societies. It then traces the roots of Israeli anti-intellectualism and examines their manifestations in the case of Abba Eban, Israel’s most quintessential diplomat, an orientalist scholar, a Cambridge don, a polyglot and a public intellectual. The article concludes by pointing to the uneasy fit between the political and intellectual spheres in Israeli politics and the challenges posed by the former to the latter.
Defining anti-intellectualism

Anti-intellectualism is a pervasive social phenomenon which transcends temporal and spatial boundaries, however authoritative definitions of the term are few and far between. As Richard Hofstadter pointed in his 1962 seminal study of anti-intellectualism in American life, the term “does not yield very readily to definition... I can see little advantage in a logically defensible but historically arbitrary act of definition, which would demand singling out one trait among a complex of traits.”¹ It may be easier to begin with a definition of what intellectualism is not – it is not the same as intelligence or intellect. It is not enough to be a ‘man of letters’ or to possess formal education to be deemed an intellectual. According to Antonio Gramsci, there is a degree of minimum creative intellectual activity in even the most menial physical work, and therefore all men are intellectuals, but not all men in society perform this function in society to its maximum limits.² According to Sowell’s powerful critique of the intellectual class, “the capacity to grasp and manipulate complex ideas is enough to define intellect but not enough to encompass intelligence, which involves combining intellect with judgment… Intelligence minus judgment equals intellect. Wisdom is the rarest quality of all – the ability to combine intellect, knowledge, experience, and judgment in a way to produce a coherent understanding.” Intellectuals are essentially “dealers in ideas” which is why brain surgeons or engineers are not thought of as intellectuals.³ An anti-intellectual can thus be described either as a person who mistrusts and derides intellectuals, or a person who does not possess the mental facilities to engage in intellectual activities, namely the pursuit of knowledge from reason and the dedication to the ‘life of the mind’. Whereas the investigation of anti-intellectualism ought to eschew universal generalizations, there seems to be a common thread, which for Hofstadter entails “a resentment and suspicion of the life of the mind and of those who are considered to represent it; and a disposition constantly to minimize the value of that life.”⁴ Morton White also points
to the ambiguity of the term, but proceeds to make a useful distinction between an ‘anti-intellectual’ who is hostile to intellectuals, and an ‘anti-intellectualist’ who is critical of rational claims to knowledge.\(^5\) Similarly, Shogan distinguishes between ‘anti-intellectualism’ which denotes “the attainment of knowledge through instincts, character, moral sensibilities, and emotions”, and a person who displays ‘anti-intellectual’ qualities, and therefore “disparage the rational complexity associated with intellectual pursuits” – this is often described as anti-elitism (i.e. anti-smugness and anti-pretentiousness) rather than sheer dismissiveness of ‘smart people’.\(^6\) This paper follows these terminological distinctions, and focuses on anti-intellectualism as a socio-political phenomenon rather than a philosophical doctrine which is critical of rationalism. In crude terms, it adopts White’s definition of the anti-intellectual: this person is usually “an ordinary man, non-intellectual, to whom an egghead is an egg-head, whether scientist, historian or philosopher, rationalist or empiricist, hard-boiled or scrambled. For the anti-intellectual, the important contrast is that between the pursuits of the professor, artist, scholar, and scientist, on the one hand, and those of the business man, plumber, secretary, barber, and politician, on the other.”\(^7\)

\(\textit{A cursory survey of anti-intellectualism}\)

Intellectuals have been ridiculed and chastised since ancient times. Aristophanes’ \textit{The Clouds} (423 BC) caricatured ‘Socrates the philosopher’ as a tedious sophist, the master of the esoteric who indulges in overly-intellectual nonsense such as measuring the distance of a flea’s jump.\(^8\) Almost three centuries later, the Roman statesman Cato the Elder demanded the expulsion of three Athenian philosophers who visited Roma to give public lectures on the Platonist, Aristotelian and Stoic schools, for fear of corrupting the youth.\(^9\) The Catholic Church’s censorship of scholarship and learning in the Middle Ages has been well documented, whereas the Russian anarchists of the early twentieth century displayed an
innate distrust of intellectuals and their so-called scientific theories of history and society. Anti-intellectualism is also a running thread in British society, from the Puritan revolution of the 1640s and Edmund Burke’s construct of conservatism a century later, which was based on mistrust of ‘theory’ and universal values, to the Victorian ethos of hard work and common-sense. In the 1997 general elections Tony Blair appealed to ‘Mondeo Man’ as the archetypical everyday voter who drove Ford’s best-selling mid-range car, while more recently David Cameron has voiced his disdain for think tanks and abstract principles.

However the majority of studies of anti-intellectualism are based on the American experience. Hofstadter argues that anti-intellectualism is part of the fabric of American society, a product of evangelism, primitivism, business activism, and egalitarianism. Some potent examples of this pervasive tradition include the nineteenth century’s cult of the self-made man and hostility to formal education, the McCarthyism of the 1950s, and General Dwight Eisenhower’s victory over the quintessentially intellectual Adlai Stevenson (dubbed ‘egghead’ by Eisenhower’s running mate, Richard Nixon) in the 1952 presidential elections – a result which led *Time* magazine to lament about “the wide and unhealthy gap between the American intellectuals and the people.” Hofstadter’s incisive study did not appear in a cultural vacuum, but followed the footsteps of other academics who alerted to a perceived rise in anti-intellectualism in America. In 1954 Merle Curti, president of the American Historical Association, pointed to the early evangelists’ opposition to scholarly knowledge and the utilitarianism of the early frontier experience as the bedrocks of America’s prevalent anti-intellectualism, while in 1955 the *Journal of Social Issues* dedicated a special issue to anti-intellectualism. Its general conclusion was that the distrust and dislike of learned men was as old as the nation itself and could be found in all walks of life, from the family and schools, to the media and business world, the academia and government. More recently, in response to the resurgence of republican evangelism and the emergence of social media since
in the past decade, a new wave of studies have tried to deal with the perceived decline of reason in contemporary America.\textsuperscript{14} The denigration of the intellectual is a particularly acute feature in presidential campaigns. Five decades after the Eisenhower-Stevenson elections, the “brainiac” Al Gore was pitted against “everyman” George W. Bush, who was labelled as the candidate with whom the ordinary American would prefer to have a beer with. The cases of Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon and Reagan further support the claim that ‘anti-intellectualism’ populism can be an effective campaigning strategy to discredit the other guy and dissuade allegations of one’s own elitism. During his presidency George W. Bush would often repeat the same joke when in the company of someone with a postgraduate degree: “I remind people that, like when I’m with Condi I say, she’s the Ph.D. and I’m the C-student, and just look at who’s the president and who’s the advisor.”\textsuperscript{15} Conversely, the election of Barack Obama in 2008 led many (intellectual) observers to celebrate the return of the ‘intellectual president’ to the White House, for the first time since the days of John F. Kennedy. According to one Harvard historian, Obama was not only a “true intellectual”, but “a kind of philosopher president, a rare breed that can be found only a handful of times in American history.”\textsuperscript{16}

\textit{Israeli anti-intellectualism}

Israeli anti-intellectualism is not unlike American intellectualism, at least with regards to its origins in the pre-state years – the Jewish settlement in Palestine as the equivalent to Curti’s ‘frontier experience’ of the early American settlers. Anti-intellectualism in Israeli society is pervasive and obvious, though it has yet to receive a systematic analysis. Several studies have alluded to the origins and various manifestations of Israeli anti-intellectualism, and most have pointed to the provenance of the Jewish state as the underlying reason for the subsequent emergence of anti-intellectualism. After centuries of diasporic persecution and physical
humiliation, the Zionists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sought to transform Jewish identity. The ‘New Jews’ who settled in Ottoman and later Mandatory Palestine were the antithesis of their forbearers - no longer the passive victims of anti-Semitism, but the resilient, hardworking pioneers of the promised land. The ideal image of this generation was that of the “young intellectual or professional who left a promising career in order to redeem the land and build a moral society.” In the secular social-Zionist discourse, anti-intellectualism was the response to the excessive intellectualism of the Jewish Enlightenment movement (Hasbarah) in Europe of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. According to the Zionist thinker and eugenicist Arthur Ruppin, excessive intellectualism was actually detrimental to the pioneering experience in Palestine and might even drive the young generation back to Europe; anti-intellectualism was therefore necessary to “heal the Jews of their reflectiveness”.

During the pre-state years and even after the establishment of the State of Israel, the pursuit of purely intellectual vocations (Sowell’s ‘dealers in ideas’) was largely undervalued. The pioneering ethos of the first Israelis was sanctified by actions, not words. Self-sacrifice and manual labour glorified the new society’s ideas of absolute egalitarianism and community service. Hofstadter’s assertion that anti-intellectualism is a natural by-product of a democratic and egalitarian society was perfectly illustrated in the young Jewish state, where the pursuit of theoretical knowledge was deemed frivolous, unnecessary and unproductive. Referred to informally as sabra, after the thorny, thick-skinned desert plant, the first Israelis not only worked the land but were attached to it and prepared to die to defend it. Audacity, impudence and a can-do attitude subsequently became the watchwords of successive generations, permeating all sectors of society. As Ebel aptly put it, “No longer was the Jew to be flat-footed, myopic pedant, a scholar who spun out his life in mystical abstractions. Rather he was to be a man of action and manual skill, a tiller of the soil, a laborer. Anti-intellectualism – a deeply-ingrained contempt for scholarship and
speculation – is therefore something of an Israeli tradition.” Accordingly in the first two decades of the state leading public intellectuals readily submitted to the monolithic Ben-Gurionist Statism (mamlachiuiit) and the military elite, the “high priests of this cult of power”, according to Sand. Adamsky further traces the roots of anti-intellectualism in the Israeli military to these formative pioneering years, noting that military leaders “cultivated a self-image of ‘doers’ rather than ‘talkers’, not of philosophers but of pragmatic and realistic men of action who prefer deeds over words”; the inevitable result being an anti-intellectual and highly pragmatic culture, whereby relatively little attention is paid to theoretical engagement with the theory and philosophy of warfare. Another study of the Israeli military finds serious neglect of the intellectual dimension of the military profession, to the extent that it calls for a process of institutional intellectualism, if necessary one imposed by the political echelon. Unsurprisingly, a similar culture is prevalent among the country’s top policy-making echelons, including the most intelligent members of the statecraft elite (many of which are former generals). According to Dror, the key manifestations of this ‘anti-intellectualism of the very intelligent’ include, among others, poor reading habits as a consequence of cultural norms; little reliance on theoretical insights in assessments and decisions; over-reliance on so-called common-sense and naïve conceptions of pragmatism; and finally, inadequate academic and professional knowledge. In its most simplified form, anti-intellectualism in the Israeli context is a natural by-product of the concept of Bitzuism, or “Do-ism”, commonly expressed through the adage “let’s stop talking and start doing”. Anti-intellectualism as a form of populist anti-elitism is also pervasive among large sectors of the political right, where it is often manifested by lack of confidence in the Supreme Court and the old leftist elites. Anti-intellectualism is also cited as a major source of threat to academic freedom in Israeli universities, propelled by a “perceived antipathy toward ‘elitism’ in Israeli society – and in the government.”
Abba Eban and anti-intellectualism

It is not the remit of this paper to provide a sweeping Hofstadterian cultural survey of anti-intellectualism as a discrete Israeli phenomenon. Instead, it seeks to capture the essential contours of Israeli anti-intellectualism by tracing their manifestations in the life of Israel’s most quintessential intellectual, Abba Eban (1915-2002). The father of Israeli diplomacy, Eban was a Cambridge Don, an orientalist scholar, and a polyglot who translated ancient Greek into Latin in his pastime. During his four decades of public life as an ambassador, government minister and a member of the Israeli Knesset, Eban advocated a conciliatory policy towards the Arab world which often stood decidedly at odds with the disposition of his contemporaries. There was a certain dualism in the public treatment of Eban: on the one hand he was ridiculed for his eloquence, accused of elitism, charged with snobbery and pretentiousness, and was ostracized by his peers. But at the same time he was admired for his rare oratorical skills and respected for his professionalism, even if his ‘excessive reflectiveness’ was judged to be superfluous in the realm of Israeli politics.

Eban was born Aubrey Solomon in Cape Town, South Africa in 1915. He grew up in London, where his mother worked for the Zionist leader Nahum Sokolow and helped translate the Balfour Declaration into French and Russian in 1917. He received classical British education, with a focus on Latin and Greek literature, English poetry and biblical studies, while his grandfather taught him Jewish philosophy, the Talmud and Modern Hebrew. By his eighteenth birthday Eban was already fluent in English, Hebrew, Latin, Greek, French, German and Arabic, to which he would add Farsi and Spanish in later years. Eban studied Classics and Oriental Languages at Cambridge University (1934-1938), where he was recognized as the most brilliant speaker of the Cambridge Union, and graduated with a remarkably rare Triple First. At the age of 23 he became a don at Pembroke College and seemed destined to embark on an exceptional academic career, however the outbreak of
World War II altered his plans. He joined the British Army where he rose to the rank of Major, serving in Jerusalem as a liaison officer between British Intelligence and the Jewish community in Mandatory Palestine, and later as chief instructor in the British Middle East Centre for Arabic Studies. After the war Eban joined the Information Department of the Jewish Agency in Palestine and was later appointed liaison officer to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, where he helped articulating the case for partition in 1946-47. At the young age of 33 Eban was appointed Israel’s first permanent representative to the United Nations, and in 1950 he was also appointed ambassador to the United States in Washington. He held both position simultaneously until 1959 and quickly earned a reputation as one of the most brilliant diplomats of his time, earning the epitaph ‘The Voice of Israel’ for his eloquent perorations before the UN Security Council and General Assembly. In 1959 Eban entered Israeli politics, where he served as education minister, deputy prime minister and foreign minister. Following his forced departure from government in 1974 he became a prolific writer, public speaker and a visiting professor at Columbia, Princeton and George Washington Universities. Eban also received more than a dozen honorary degrees and was voted as one of the greatest orators of the modern era, together with Churchill and Martin Luther King, Jr. The Times of London called Eban as the most brilliant diplomat in the second half of the twentieth century, while the Guardian described him as the “Rolls-Royce of the diplomatic circuit.” The Financial Times dubbed Eban “Israel’s Cicero”, alluding to his “Donish, remote, supremely articulate, precise grandiloquent style”, and the New York Times observed that “In a country where intellectuality is hardly commonplace among professional politicians, Abba Eban is an uncommon politician.”

Eban did not encounter any displays of anti-intellectualism until he settled in Israel in 1959. As the spokesman of a nation for more than a decade, his unparalleled eloquence and oratory were admired in Israel. “He is without doubt one of the most talented individuals in
our foreign service”, an Israeli reporter at the UN told his readers after Eban’s first appearance in 1949. “He is the master of languages – not only English, French, German, etc. – he is internationally renowned scholar of Arabic and Farsi, and he is only in his thirties. He supersedes many of our diplomatic representatives. With no nervousness, without deference to the gentiles or condensation over the Jews – quietly, with light humor and constant vigilance, he walks among world statesmen as seasoned veteran.” Another Israeli journalist enthused: “He fuses knowledge of British diplomacy with a sense of Jewish morality, and most importantly – he utilizes his wonderful English and deep convictions for a just cause.”

In describing the unfamiliar Eban to the people of Israel for the first time, the reporter noted the young diplomat’s slightly downward-tilting head and squinting eyes, “who seems to be invariably preoccupied with reading and studying – a genuine man of words, as evidenced by his rare triple-first at Cambridge and his fluency in Hebrew, Arabic, Farsi, French, German and Yiddish, and of course his masterful command of the English language. Major Aubrey S. Eban is not an ambitious professional diplomat. He considers himself first a man of science and a scholar.”27 On his departure from his ambassadorial duties in 1959, the Washington Post aptly summed up Eban’s success as a diplomat – it was not merely his sheer eloquence and mastery of nearly ten languages, but his ability to speak to universal values: “The Cambridge-trained diplomat has presented the cause of the young Jewish state with great oratorical brilliance and intellectual agility, and sometimes he has overwhelmed others by the sheer force of his eloquence…He has been an inspired spokesman for the cause of world freedom and for those values and traditions which are common not only to Americans and to the people of Israel but to all people everywhere who cherish freedom and seek the paths of world cooperation toward peace.28

As long as Eban spoke of the abstract notions of peace, justice and equality before the world gallery abroad, The Israeli body politic embraced him as the ‘Voice of Israel’, the
brilliant orator who with the power of his words and intellect championed Israel’s cause before the nations of the world. However once Eban arrived in Israel and entered the political arena as member of the ruling Mapai party, those qualities which had made him one of the most revered statesmen of his generation – the exuberant intellectualism, urbane demeanor and utter reverence to the written and spoken word – now made him an easy target for ridicule and contempt. Eban’s elitist education, military service in the British Army, and more than a decade abroad as Israel’s chief diplomat, had made him quintessentially international in his orientation and wholly removed from the Israeli ethos. Eban was thus foreign – literally and figuratively – to the anti-intellectual and laborious spirit of the young Jewish state. As a young man, Eban did not flee anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe and settled in Ottoman or Mandatory Palestine. He had never held a plow, pitched hay or dried a swamp in his life. He did not join in his youth a Jewish paramilitary group to defend his farm from Arab hostility, tease the Ottoman rulers or harass the British mandatory powers. His upbringing was British, privileged, middle class and idyllic. For Eban this was a prime reason for the sense of ‘alieness’ which accompanied him in Israel: “If I wanted to be prime minister, I would have had to reborn”, he told a reporter in 1969; “You know, I wasn’t born in [kibbutz] Nahalal, Mescha or Eastern Europe.”

But Eban’s birth certificate alone cannot explain the ostracism he experienced in Israel. For example, his brother-in-law, Chaim Herzog, was born in Belfast, earned a law degree from University College London, joined the British Army during World War II, and served as Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations (and later as the sixth president of Israel). But unlike Eban, he was never mocked for his ‘intellectualism’ and ‘elitism’, or was considered ‘alien’ by his countrymen. Eban however, carried with him what Shogan refers to as this certain ‘qualities’ which anti-intellectuals seem to detest the most - pomposity, elitism and snobbery. Whereas Eban’s closest friends and relatives insisted that he was merely
absent-minded and hopelessly shy, to the outside world this introvert man appeared aloof and condescending. While Eban was painfully aware of his elitist image, he seemed unable to shake it off: whereas two of the country’s proudest self-proclaimed anti-intellectuals, Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin, were heavy cigarette smokers, Eban opted for imported Montecristo no. 3 cigars, while his innocuous obsession with Golf did little to persuade the average Israeli that Eban was an ordinary man. In 1961 Eban was elected to captain of the newly-opened Golf Club in the coastal town of Caesarea, the first (and only) 18-hole golf course in the country. The exuberant membership fees - $55 a year, the peculiar clothes and the flocks of rich American Jews who crowded the 100-acre course, were as alien to the austere Israeli society as was Eban’s witty self-deprecation. The Daily Mail aptly captured Eban’s uneasy relationship with his countrymen: “As Israel’s best possible spokesman abroad, Eban has no party qualifications. Israelis say he lacks rapport with simple people, being ‘the prototype intellectual devoid of popular humanity.’”

This lack of rapport with ‘simple people’ – seemingly another prime attribute of the intellectual – was indeed one of Eban’s most enduring trademarks. He struggled to connect to the sabra mentality and had no appetite for the wheeling and dealing of Israeli politics. Days after his arrival in Israel the press began speculating whether his demeanor will eventually become more Israeli-like and less uptight. It was reported that during his ambassadorial years he was one of the few men in the United States who did not succumb to the informal custom of tapping on one’s shoulder; will he try to lend his shoulder for tapping in Israel? Similar concerns were raised in the press regarding Eban’s uppity image and his too-eloquent way with words. Most people chiseled their words out of stone; Eban, however, was depicted in one caricature chiseling his words out of marble. The contours were more refined and elongated. There was no innate antagonism towards Eban in the press, but genuine curiosity about his ability to adapt to an environment which was not familiar to him. In a country of
immigrants from the four corners of the world, Eban’s bombastic and long-winded vernacular, always delivered in a perfectly punctuated Hebrew, was so unintelligible to its listeners that David Ben-Gurion asked him to tone it down a bit. After hearing Eban speaking at a public event the prime minister – a great admirer of the Hebrew language – noted in his diary: “In the afternoon at the Weizmann memorial Eban gave a speech... He spoke with clear, crisp and polished Hebrew – though somewhat foreign.”35 At the end of another address by Eban before an audience of immigrants in a development town, the first question from the crowd was: “please, can we hear it in Hebrew now!!?” Despite the perceived natural dissonance between the ‘aristocratic’ Eban and the recent Mizrahi/Sepharadic immigrants in Israel, he was tremendously popular among these communities, which admired his command of their language. At the same time, like the political (Ashkenazi) elite, they doubted his political nous. The jokes about the long-winded intellectual soon followed thick and fast: “Abba Eban is so good, he is incomprehensible in ten languages!”; “Eban can explain in seven languages why proportional representation is appropriate, and why it is inappropriate in eight languages”; “Abba Eban is the only politician in Israel who can finish a sentence – but when !!?”; “So what if he speaks six languages”, one cabinet minister was overheard snorting, “what about the ones that count here – Russian and Yiddish?”36

This last offhanded remark was particularly instructive of Eban’s place in the Israeli landscape: of the eighteen politicians who were members of Israel's high policy elite from 1948-1968, only Eban was not born in Poland or Tsarist Russia. He was the only one who counted English as his mother tongue, and he settled in Israel in 1959 at the grand old age of 44 - making him the oldest and last to do so compared to his peers, most of whom arrived in Palestine in their teens or early twenties during the first three decades of the last century. Eban was well aware of his own ‘alienness’ in his party, as he lamented in a 1971 interview: “There are alien phenomena in the party. There are certainly many differences in background.
There are certainly not many cycles in the party whose ideational and temperamental origins are similar to mine. First of all, unfortunately, the academic public is insufficiently represented. There is also a lot more representation of Eastern European Jewry than that of Western Europe.”37 On another occasion he observed, “Intellectuals generally don’t fare well in politics in Israel”, before adding hopefully that perhaps the Israeli public would soon grow tired of old-style politics and wouldn’t mind “hearing a problem intelligently analyzed”. It was just these kinds of statements that made Eban seem big-headed and condescending in the eyes of his fellow colleagues.38

In his groundbreaking study of the foreign policy system of Israel, Michael Brecher provided an insightful glimpse into Eban’s unique place amongst his countrymen: He was “more formal than his peers in bearing, dress, manner and speech. He is less quick to make decisions, more inclined to delay while the complex forces at work... As a diplomat, with a donnish air, he has a basic mistrust of “the generals” and their bitzuist mentality, with the strong taint of chauvinism, total self-reliance, isolationism and disdain for “the world...”39 Henry Kissinger offered a similar analysis: “I have never encountered anyone who matched his command of the English language”, he wrote of Eban in his voluminous memoirs; “Eban’s eloquence – for those who had to negotiate with him – was allied with first class intelligence and fully professional grasp of diplomacy... I was not always sure whether Eban’s more matter-of-fact colleagues in Jerusalem appreciated his eloquence as much as I did.”40 As a man of words rather than deeds, Eban was more reactive than active, more contemplative than instinctive – almost the exact opposite of the towering figures of his time, such as Ben-Gurion, Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan and Yitzhak Rabin. When Ben-Gurion once suggested to Eban that Charles De Gaulle was the greatest Frenchman of their time, Eban responded that “Jean Monnet – and not De Gaulle – is the greatest Frenchman of our generation because the actions of men are ephemeral but noble ideas are immortal.”41 Ben-
Gurion’s view of Eban was typical of the time – deep respect for his intellectualism but misgivings about his political and leadership prowess. “Abba Eban is a certified intellectual”, one op-ed observed, “and Ben-Gurion has an inferiority complex towards highly educated individuals.” Levi Eshkol, Ben-Gurion’s successor and another admirer of intellectuals, held a similarly dim view of Eban’s political nous, believing that his judgment was clouded by too much idealism and not enough pragmatism. “Eban never gives the right solution, only the right speech”, Eshkol said of his foreign minister, and his Yiddish moniker of Eban perfectly captured this dualist sentiment: Der klug nar, “the wise fool”. Golda Meir, who became prime minister in 1969 following Eshkol’s death, recognized Eban’s redeeming features as Israel’s face and voice abroad, though she had no time for him and ‘his kind’. Golda had a disparaging view of diplomacy as a vocation, famously noting that “all a foreign minister does is talk and talk more”. She explained her aversion of this profession in her memoirs: “Many of the more senior ambassadors and officials had been educated at British universities, and their particular brand intellectual sophistication… was not always my cup of tea.” Of Eban himself, Golda once exclaimed: “we have a fantastic foreign minister… he lives in a fantasy land!” Eban’s retort was equally acerbic, claiming that Golda chose to use only 200 words, although her vocabulary extended to 500. Eban also enjoyed mocking Yitzhak Rabin for his brash style and limited diplomatic skills, describing him as the repelling pole of a magnet. A man of few words, Rabin’s epitaphs of Eban were more rudimentary: “worthless”, “stupid”, idiotic”. To General Moshe Dayan, who dared to interfere in matters of foreign policy, Eban wrote: “showing an interest in a subject is one thing – and knowing it is something else. I think that you have yet to pass the threshold leading from a welcome interest to serious knowledge”. This kind of acerbic sarcasm certainly did not endear Eban to his peers, and only contributed to his image as a condescending, pompous intellectual.
The anti-intellectualism which Eban experienced encompassed more than the trivial idiosyncrasies of his elitist education and accentuated vernacular. Eban represented an approach to international relations which seemed to be at odds with the unshakable paradigm of realpolitik as espoused by Ben-Gurion and his young disciples Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres, most infamously exemplified by the Israel’s military reprisals policy of the 1950s. Eban’s forte – the speeches at the General Assembly, the presentations before the Security Council, the press conferences and media appearances, the mobilization of public opinion and his diplomatic nuances – seemed rather intangible as tools of policy. Inevitably, many in the political sphere and the media criticized Eban for displaying excessive deferment to world opinion and for harboring a naïve and overly-optimistic outlook of Israel’s relations with the world.45

Taken together, Eban’s elitist image and international orientation made him a lonely man in Israeli politics. His support for multilateralism against the popular Israeli delusion of self-reliance; his romantic notion of diplomacy as a noble vocation and his dedication to what Hofstadter termed ‘the life of the mind’; his insistence that national leaders do not necessarily make for the most effective diplomats; his call to engage with the Arab world and understand its history and culture, rather than adopting a prejudiced and embittered foreign policy – all led to a common view of him in Israel as a detached intellectual, an elitist egghead who was a stranger to his own community.46 Ironically, Eban himself identified this notion of ‘strangeness’ as a quintessential quality of the ideal diplomat. In 1944, during his first year as the chief instructor at the British Middle East Centre for Arabic Studies in Jerusalem and shortly before his 29th birthday, Major Aubrey Eban outlined the guiding principles of Zionist diplomacy, and the kind of qualities which the ideal diplomat must possess:

It is clear that this aspect of policy requires a special set of attributes and a special technique. To represent a cause to the outside world does not necessarily require the same qualities as the task of mobilizing and organizing national resources.
There is a diplomatic temperament which is international. There is a diplomatic code which goes far beyond the trivialities of etiquette. Men who represent their nations outside their frontiers move in a society and atmosphere of their own, develop special instincts and capacities, and are often bound by a common professional solidarity. Insularity, self-sufficiency, seclusion, self-assertion - these are luxuries which a diplomat cannot afford. He cannot afford the casual prejudices, the current phobias, the transient excitements. He must, to that extent, at least, be intellectually ascetic and stand in a detachment which makes him a stranger to his community.47

Eban’s diminished political power as a foreign minister was particularly acute in the aftermath of the 1967 Six Day War. Following Israel’s dramatic military victory and the capturing of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula, a messianic euphoria engulfed the nation. Even before the guns fell silent Eban had no illusion about what Israel should do with the newly acquired territories, telling his life: “What are we going to do with all these territories? We will have to give them back after some frontier adjustments which will be necessary for security.”48 However the national infatuation with the new territories and the prospect of expanding Israel’s borders to biblical proportions, made Eban and his humane universalism rather superfluous, as he lamented in his memoirs: “I lived in an isolated realm of anxiety while the noise of unconfined joy kept intruding through the window. For me, the Six Day War meant salvation in an hour of peril… and the possession of territorial assets that could be transacted in a negotiation for peace. For many Israelis, it was a providential dispensation enlarging Israel’s areas of jurisdiction beyond anything that has ever been conceived before…”49 Unsurprisingly, many Israelis came to view Eban as a very foreign foreign minister. Only weeks after the war had ended a caricature in the Israeli press depicted an impeccably attired Eban striding into the UN General Assembly building, only to be blocked by one of his countrymen. Wearing Khaki shorts, sandals and a soiled open shirt, this “typical” Israeli, a sabra, was blocking Eban’s way and suggesting that he changed into similar attire before he entered the building. The
message to Eban was clear: you do not represent us. As one of Eban’s colleagues later remarked, “he is our attorney, not our representative.”

Following the war Eban became increasingly perturbed by what he termed the absence of a mystique of peace in Israel, compared to the all-too-pervasive mystiques of territories and security which engulfed political discourse. Though few were willing to listen to him, he insisted that this imbalance could be corrected if peace was presented as a credible option: “If you confront the general public with the actual alternative: peace without part of the territories or all the territories without peace, I do not think that public opinion will necessarily be against peace”, he said a few months after the war. This carefully-worded statement made instant headlines in Israel and irked many circles. The burgeoning ‘Greater Israel Movement’ publicly called on the government to denounce Eban’s comment, while his own Mapai party devoted considerable time to scrutinize his statement. One of the most vocal critics of Eban was Shimon Peres: “Why does the foreign minister of Israel has to say, in 1968, that there are mystiques of security and territories in Israel!?”, Peres demanded to know; “I think it’s a mistake and Eban has been repeating it for many years, that the matter of peace or lack of it stems from omissions of the State of Israel.” Prime Minister Eshkol worried whether Eban’s “mystique of peace” could be misconstrued as an Israeli desire for peace at all cost. David Hacohen was one of the few party members who congratulated Eban for “daring to speak his mind” against the current trend in the country, where “whenever one speaks his mind he is immediately labeled a ‘Chamberlainite.’”

In this respect Eban’s experience typified Heinrich Heine’s depiction of the lone intellectual in his introduction to Don Quixote: “Society is a republic. When an individual strives to rise, the collective masses press him back through ridicule and abuse. No one shall be wiser or better than the rest. But against him, who by the invincible power of genius towers above the vulgar masses, society launches its ostracism, and persecutes him so
mercilessly with scoffing and slander, that he is finally compelled to withdraw into the solitude of his own thoughts."

Eban’s protest against the prevailing mystique of security in Israeli society and the absence of a parallel mystique of peace had not diminished over the years; if anything, he became more disillusioned about his colleague’s indifferent attitude to the very idea of peace. For Eban this was a symptom of an ailing Israeli society which had lost its moral compass. Addressing university graduates in 1973, Eban condemned the Israeli national style as too hyperbolic, too indignant, too vulgar, and insufficiently attentive to the suffering of others. This national character lacked humanity and was nothing less than “a defensive attitude which would be suitable for a weak country subjected to perils and threats… A strong nation does not have to shout or to beat drums in nervous agitation in order to make its voice heard. On the contrary; a confident and balanced national style is perfectly reconcilable with an alert security consciousness and a rational and firm political line.” The challenge for Israel, Eban concluded, was how to put “the emphasis on freedom, tolerance, equality, social justice, spiritual and intellectual creativity, and human brotherhood, as the salient characteristics of a strong and confident Israeli society.”

According to Edward Said, it is precisely this defense of universalism against the rise of national chauvinism which defines the quintessential quality of the intellectual: “Intellectuals are guided by universal values, thus clashing with national narratives. At the same time the means of effective communication is the intellectual's currency - he is used to polish and justify national policies. If the intellectual exposes the truth or depart from the narrative his existence becomes a lonely one.” Said’s intellectual is not necessarily a pacifier or a consensus-builder, “but someone whose very being is staked in a critical sense, a sense of unwilling to accept easy formulas or ready-made clichés perpetuated by the powers-that-be. These attributes makes the intellectual's life richer, though they don't make him particularly popular.”
Conclusion

To a large extent Eban’s hostile reception by his compatriots says as much about the intellectual as it does about Israeli anti-intellectualism. It speaks to the uneasy fit between the intellectual and the political spheres. Common wisdom dictates that in order to make a successful political career, one has to dumb down and appeal to the ‘public’, the lowest common denominator – a sentiment perfectly captured by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who said of Eban that “he spoke beautifully but nobody understood what he said.” To paraphrase Gramsci’s assertion that all members of society possess the potential to be intellectuals, one can argue that all members of society can make it as politicians, though intellectuals are least equipped to maximize their potential as political actors. As arguably the highest-profile intellectual to have played a part in Israeli politics, Eban’s experience reinforces the impression that anti-intellectualism is not merely the by-product of political or ideological rivalries. Neither is it the trivial manifestation of disdain of eggheads or their elitist education. It would also be wrong to view anti-intellectualism in a democratic society as a principled crusade against a certain class of people. As Hofstadter suggested, “Men do not rise in the morning, grin at themselves in their mirrors, and say: ‘Ah, today I shall torment an intellectual and strangle an idea!’” Rather, anti-intellectualism is an amalgamation of historical, social and cultural traits which not only manifests itself as a contemporary phenomenon, but defines the very ethos of the nation. There is little evidence to suggest that the anti-intellectualism which Abbe Eban had experienced two generations ago is likely to diminish; if anything, Israeli anti-intellectualism is on the rise. Political Science Professor Gabi Sheffer of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem lamented the silence of the intellectuals over the increasing hold of the belligerent religious-nationalistic paradigm in Israeli politics. As if to prove Sheffer’s point that intellectuals have little relevance in the political domain, former Knesset member Aryeh Eldad provided the following insight: “Conventional
wisdom states that someone could be a professor in the faculty of citrus fruits, but that does’t mean that he is smarter than me when it comes to Judea and Samaria. The fact that a person is a talented writer, a philosopher or an ethicist doesn’t necessarily prepare him to be a politician or to express more pertinent political opinions than the owner of a grocery store in Sderot.”

In the Israeli case, the securitization of the public domain does not seem to allow for permissive reflectiveness or the framing of the country’s dilemmas through anything but an ethnocentric discourse. Neither does it allow for the secular, progressive, anti-dogmatic and pluralistic voices to successfully challenge the dominant nationalistic paranoia which dominates the public domain, therefore making anti-intellectualism certain to remain a pervasive feature of the Israeli national character for the foreseeable future.

2 Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (eds.) Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971), pp. 139-140.
4 Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, p. 7.


Curti’s 1954 keynote address at association’s annual conference was printed the following year; see the Merle Curti, ‘Intellectuals and Other People’, *American Historical Review* 60:2 (1955), pp. 259-282; *Journal of Social Issues* 11:3 (1955), see the conclusions by Theodore Brameld and S. Stanfeld, pp. 54-56. See also White, ‘Reflections on Anti-Intellectualism’, pp. 457-468.


30 Interviews with members of Eban’s family.
31 D. Ochert to J. Cohn, October 5, 1962, GL 7571/5, Israel State Archives (henceforth ISA).


33 ‘Who steps In?’, Daily Mail, February 27, 1969.

34 Author interviews with Shlomo Nakdimon (July 2010, Tel Aviv) and Esther Herlitz (March 2013, Tel Aviv).

35 Ben-Gurion diary, November 2, 1958, Ben-Gurion Archives, Sde-Boqer.


37 Interview with Abba Eban, Ot, May 27, 1971.


42 ‘Internal Intrigues among Mapai Leadership Hamper Government Formation”, Heruth, November 29, 1959; Author interviews with Nakdimon, Michael Bar-Zohar (Tel Aviv, July 2010), Yehuda Avner (Jerusalem, December 2011) and Meron Medzini (Jerusalem, May 2013); Yehuda Avner, The Prime Ministers: An Intimate Narrative of Israeli Leadership (New Milford, CT: Toby Press, 2010), p. 142.

‘Interviews with Shlomo Nakdimon, Meron Medzini, Michael Bar-Zohar; ‘Israel’s Self-Inflicted Wounds’, *New York Times*, April 24, 1977; Minutes of meeting between Gideon Rafael and Rabin, December 14, 1970, C-205/F-2228, AEA.

Minutes of Meeting of Mapai’s Political Committee, September 9, 1954, C-297/3566, AEA. See also Minutes of Meeting of Mapai’s Central Committee, September 9, 1954, 2-003-1954-76, Moshe Sharett Labor Party Archives; Interview with Brian Urquhart (New York, February 2010).

Eban recalled in his memoirs that his academic engagement with Arab culture and history made it “impossible for me thereafter to adopt the routine Zionist stereotype that regarded the Arab nation with intellectual condensation.” See Eban, *An Autobiography*, p.18.

Aubrey Eban, ‘Reflections on Policy and Diplomacy’, 20 November 1944. C-150/F-1612, AEA.

Interview with Suzy Eban (July 2010, Hertzliya).


*Davar*, February 8, 1968; Minutes of Mapai party meetings on February 13, 1968, 2-11-1968-153, MSLA, and April 4, 2-24-1968-93A.


57 Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, p. 22.
