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GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP AS THE COMPLETION OF COSMOPOLITANISM

LUIS CABRERA

Abstract: A conception of global citizenship should not be viewed as separate from, or synonymous with, the cosmopolitan moral orientation, but as a primary component of it. Global citizenship is fundamentally concerned with individual moral requirements in the global frame. Such requirements, framed here as belonging to the category of individual cosmopolitanism, offer guidelines on right action in the context of global human community. They are complementary to the principles of moral cosmopolitanism – those to be used in assessing the justice of global institutions and practices – that have been emphasised by cosmopolitan political theorists. Considering principles of individual and moral cosmopolitanism together can help to provide greater clarity concerning individual duties in the absence of fully global institutions, as well as clarity on individual obligations of justice in relation to emerging and still-developing trans-state institutions.

Keywords: Cosmopolitan, global citizenship, global justice, positive duties, world government

The No More Deaths volunteer, a recent college graduate who was spending her summer conducting humanitarian patrols in search of border crossers stranded in the harsh desert of southern Arizona, struggled for words. The question grated. ‘I think that’s ridiculous’, she finally said, in response to those who would contend it is wrong to aid unauthorised crossers. ‘One of the first questions a reporter ever asked me was “why, as an American, are you doing this?” That’s always funny to me, when people ask that. It’s not really an American thing. It’s a people thing. You know, thirsty people should be given water. It seems to me just to make sense’ (Author interview, 06/05). Her co-volunteer at the No More Deaths patrol camp expressed a similar mix of difficulty and exasperation when asked why she felt compelled to seek out migrants in distress. ‘There’s this

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imaginary line drawn across the desert. That doesn't make any sense to me. For someone to become illegal as soon as they cross that line – they are just people. It's that simple to me' (Author interview, 06/05).

Meanwhile, participants in the Minuteman effort, who stand armed vigil on some of the same stretches of desert, hoping to spot unauthorised entrants and report them to US authorities, expressed quite a different sentiment toward the crossers. 'The country belongs to us. The country doesn't belong to them', said one retiree who had traveled from Eunice, New Mexico, to take part in the inaugural Minuteman action on the border in southeastern Arizona (Author interview, 04/05). 'I didn't force them to come to the United States', said David Jones, a Minuteman leader in Arizona who had served as 'line boss' on several vigils. Addressing a group at Minuteman field headquarters on a rural ranch, he indicated a jug of murky brown water, likely filled in a cattle tank, that had been taken from two crossers his group had helped apprehend. 'If they want to come and drink that, that's their problem', he said, while adding that he would not refuse water to a crosser (Author interview, 10/06).

In this article, I discuss how the understanding of obligation and human community expressed by the No More Deaths patrollers captures the core of a defensible conception of global citizenship. More centrally, I explore ways in which such a conception is necessary to developing a comprehensive cosmopolitanism. That is, global citizenship, appropriately understood, should be viewed not as separate from or synonymous with the cosmopolitan moral orientation, but as a primary component of it. Global citizenship is fundamentally concerned with individual moral requirements in the global frame. Such requirements, framed here as belonging to the category of individual cosmopolitanism, offer guidelines on right action in the context of global human community. They are complementary to the principles of moral cosmopolitanism, or those to be used in assessing the justice of global institutions and practices, that have received the great majority of attention from cosmopolitan political theorists. Considering principles of individual and moral cosmopolitanism together can help to provide greater clarity concerning individual duties in the absence of fully global institutions, and individual obligations of justice in relation to still-developing institutions in interstate trade, the global environment, human rights, and other substantive areas. Ultimately, the fuller incorporation of global citizenship into the cosmopolitan moral discourse is an important step toward developing an overarching conception of cosmopolitan right, one that would detail appropriate courses of action and reform in relation to individuals and institutions in the current global system.

The Cosmopolitan Moral Orientation

The concept of global citizenship often has been presented as strongly synonymous with, or equivalent to, a cosmopolitan moral outlook (Heater

2002; see Carter 1997). While the global citizen and cosmopolitan orientations share many commonalities, significant insight can be gained by recognising the two as distinct, and by considering the discrete variants of both approaches. This section is concerned with identifying the main currents within recent cosmopolitan thought. I will note first that cosmopolitan moral orientation is generally understood as one in which individuals, rather than societies or states, are presumed to be the ultimate units of moral concern. All individuals are presumed to have equal status as the objects of moral concern, and all individuals 'are ultimate units of concern for everyone – not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or suchlike' (Pogge 2002: 169; see Caney 2005a: 3–4).

Thus, when applied to substantive issues such as distributive justice, a conception of cosmopolitanism would hold that obligations to distribute resources to compatriots are not categorically stronger than obligations to those who do not share our citizenship. In fact, for those living in affluent states, duties to redistribute to those in less-affluent states easily could trump duties to compatriots, given the greater exposure of the former to hunger and other poverty-related ills (see Beitz 1999a; Brock 2005). Other substantive concerns include the justice in operation of such global institutions as the World Trade Organisation (Moellendorf 2005), as well as the defensibility, in a cosmopolitan moral frame, of particular kinds of interstate or inter-group conflict (Buchanan 2004; Caney 2005a: 201–14). In the context of political justice, theorists of cosmopolitan democracy have argued that respect for individual autonomy in an age of eroding state sovereignty requires the creation of supranational participatory mechanisms better able to afford meaningful input to individuals within states (Archibugi 2004; Held 2004).

Important theoretical distinctions are drawn within the cosmopolitan approach, in particular between institutional and moral cosmopolitanism, and within moral cosmopolitanism itself. Institutional cosmopolitanism is understood by most commentators as concerned with the creation of some comprehensive network of global governing institutions, i.e. a world state, in order to just global distributive and other outcomes (Beitz 1999b: 129; see Barry 1998: 144; Waldron 2000: 228–9). Most reject any suggestion that a cosmopolitan orientation necessarily entails a specific commitment to institutional cosmopolitanism, though some, including this author, have argued that in practice something like a global government likely would be required to ensure that all individuals had sufficient access to life resources and opportunities (Cabrera 2004; see Tannsjo 2008; c.f. Caney 2005a: 159–60).

Moral cosmopolitanism has been characterised as primarily concerned not with institution building, but with assessing the justice of institutions in the existing global system according to how individuals fare in relation to them. Further, both Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge, probably the two most influential recent cosmopolitan theorists, have argued that moral cosmopolitanism should be understood as including two categories of principles (Beitz 1999c: 519;

Pogge 2002: 170).¹ The first, which Beitz calls cosmopolitan liberalism, essentially is identical to what had been called moral cosmopolitanism. It remains an approach to assessing institutions or broad schemes of cooperation by ‘identifying principles that are acceptable when each person’s prospects, rather than the prospects of each society or people, are taken fairly into account’ (Beitz 1999c: 519). The second variant Beitz calls individual cosmopolitanism. It is described as a guide for individual conduct consistent with cosmopolitan principles. However, Beitz defers any further discussion on individual cosmopolitanism, and he has not since returned to the topic. Pogge, while noting that individual ethical principles may complement principles of justice applicable to global institutions (2002: 170–72), has focused almost exclusively on the institutional side. My claim again is that individual cosmopolitanism can be understood as global citizenship, appropriately configured, and that it is necessary to incorporate a defensible conception of global citizenship into cosmopolitanism in order to present a complete view of cosmopolitan right.

Cosmopolitan Right

The concept of cosmopolitan right is most directly traceable to Kant’s political writings (see Reiss 1970). As outlined in ‘Theory and Practice’, the basic concept of right entails ‘the restriction of each individual’s freedom so that it harmonises with the freedom of everyone else.... And public right is the distinctive quality of the external laws which make this constant harmony possible’ (Kant 1970: 73). By extension, cosmopolitan right would address comprehensively the principles that should rightly govern global human interactions, primarily intersocietal ones but also some at the individual level.

For Kant, appropriate principles are derived in an approach in which all individuals imagine themselves as co-legislators in a global ethical commonwealth or ‘kingdom of ends’, concerned to respect the autonomy of all others (Kant 2001; Linklater 1999a: 41). He also adopts the normative claim that the earth is a common human holding, and he emphasises empirical tendencies for groups to come into contact and often conflict with each other (Waldron 2000: 230). The resulting principles of cosmopolitan right are most fully elaborated in *Perpetual Peace* (Kant 2003; see Hayden 2005: 21). There, the first definitive article addresses the republican principles that Kant believes should prevail in domestic societies. The second definitive article mandates the familiar global federation of republics, and the third article outlines a duty of universal hospitality that should be extended to all individuals, one based in the principle of common ownership of the earth.

Kant’s third definitive article is titled ‘*The Law of World Citizenship Shall Be Limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality*’, and indeed, his *ius cosmopoliticum*, in its emphasis on not treating strangers as enemies, has been

seen by some as quite limited. That is in part for its failure to attempt a global regulation of individuals who are members of the same political community (Benhabib 2001: 43), for a lack of consideration to distributive relations between societies, and for a lack of attention to bringing individuals into some global program of actual co-legislation, as per current proposals for cosmopolitan forms of democratic rule (Linklater (1998: Ch. 6). Even so, Kant's conception of world citizenship, or a common human community, has served as a significant model or starting place for many current conceptions (see Habermas 2006, 123–6), and his multi-level framework offers invaluable guidance toward a more encompassing concept of cosmopolitan right.

A more systematic or detailed framework, and one that has influenced the divisions within current cosmopolitanism, is offered by John Rawls. Like Kant, Rawls explores within a concept of right moral principles that could be appropriately applied at the individual, societal, and intersocietal levels (Rawls 1999a: 93–101; see Kokaz 2007: 326). Each set of principles is chosen within a discrete original position, the familiar Rawlsian device for deriving appropriate moral guidelines by depriving each participant of the knowledge of her or his own social standing, particular talents, and related information. Rawls gives predominant attention, of course, to the principles he believes would be chosen to apply to domestic institutions, and he is explicit that those should be the first principles chosen. Principles of individual duty are to be chosen in a second original position, along with principles of individual obligation in relation to institutions. The individual principles are expected to be significantly influenced or limited by the principles of justice for institutions chosen in the first original position. Finally, principles to govern intersocietal relations, or in Rawls's specific term the law of peoples, are chosen in the third original position (Rawls 1999a: 331–5; Rawls 1999b).

Schematically, each set of principles is seen as necessary to complete a concept of right, which itself is a component, alongside concepts of value and moral worth, of an overarching concept of practical reason to guide moral action in various contexts (Rawls 1999a: 94). I will note that, as was the case with Kant, the framework or schematic structure of Rawls's concept of right is more salient here than the specific conceptions of justice, individual duty and obligation, and intersocietal relations that Rawls believes would emerge from the choosing situations at each of the levels. Rawls's favored principles to govern intersocietal relations, for example, would not require the kinds of high-level, trans-state distributions that many cosmopolitans have argued are obligatory (Moellendorf 2002: Ch. 2; Hayden 2002). However, giving some attention to the individual ethical principles that ostensibly would be chosen will help to make clearer some ways in which conceptions of global citizenship would fit within a conception of right that is specifically cosmopolitan in its orientation.

In Rawls's schema, both natural duties and obligations are incumbent on all individuals. Obligations arise within, and are to be defined according to, the

rules or practices of specific institutions. Natural duties accrue to all persons regardless of their membership in specific institutions or schemes of social cooperation, include negative duties to avoid injuring others and positive duties of mutual respect, mutual aid, and upholding justice. Mutual aid, characterised as ‘helping another when he is in need or jeopardy, provided that one can do so without excessive risk or loss to oneself’ (Rawls 1999a: 98) is particularly significant here, as is the duty to uphold justice, which includes a requirement that all persons comply with existing just institutions of which they are a part, as well as to ‘further just arrangements not yet established’ (Rawls 1999a: 98–9).

A duty to comply with existing institutions may face special difficulties in relation to gaps in justice between the principles of justice Rawls believes would be chosen in the first original position – equal basic liberties and the difference principle – and the justice of any actual scheme of institutions (Lyons 1998), as well as more direct theoretical challenges concerned with political obligation *per se* (Simmons 1979: 145–6; see Pogge 2002: 134–9). It will be appropriate to limit the focus here to duties of mutual aid and a duty to further or possibly create just arrangements, given their strong significance to questions arising in a global frame, where no cohesive, comprehensive institutional structure exists. It is here where conceptions of global citizenship become salient, in terms of offering the most discrete and detailed forms of guidance for individual ethical action in the absence of a fully elaborated institutional framework.

Global Citizenship

Global citizenship, as a theory of citizenship, is fundamentally concerned with appropriate individual action (Dower 2005: 105; see O’Byrne 2003). In fact, inherent in the concept of citizenship *per se* are probably the most concrete and comprehensive expressions of individual moral requirement. This ‘legal dimension’ of citizenship (Dagger 1997: 99; Janoski 1998: 8–11) is formalised domestically in constitutions or sets of constitution-like documents, as well as in the subsequent court rulings interpreting those documents and giving more detailed substantive content to packages of rights. In the same vein, a fully elaborated conception of global citizenship holds the promise of delineating both the rights that individuals should be presumed to possess in the global human community, and the duties and institutionally linked obligations that can be viewed as incumbent on individuals in order to better secure the fulfillment of those rights.

In this section, I consider three broad ways of thinking about how citizenship above the state might be conceived, formulated, or put into practice. Throughout, I strive for sympathetic immanent critique, addressing the arguments on their own terms as conceptions of global citizenship, and developing in context an approach to global citizenship that could both encompass core aspects of many of the specific conceptions discussed, and serve as a conception of individual cosmopolitanism in the broader framework of cosmopolitan right.

International Citizenship

This approach essentially takes the sovereign states system as it is structured and exhorts states, or state leaders, to pursue ethical foreign policies, including respecting individual rights, assuming strong foreign aid obligations, acting responsibly on environmental issues (see Linklater 1992; Carter 2001: 173–4; Williams 2002). The approach is longstanding, with some significant resonance of Kant's prescriptions for states in *Perpetual Peace*. Aspects of it are present in the Liberal idealism of Woodrow Wilson and others in the early twentieth century, and in current human rights doctrine (see Beitz 1999b: 127).

The statist emphasis of international citizenship might be viewed as putting the approach in immediate tension with the inherent universalism of a fully global conception of citizenship. It will be useful to consider a nuanced recent account, however, to clarify some sources and expressions of such tensions, and to move toward a conception of international citizenship that could be compatible with cosmopolitanism. Bryan Turner, one of the most prominent current citizenship theorists, has offered an argument for international citizenship that could be demanding in its individual moral prescriptions, and which, while not rigidly statist, remains rooted in a states system (Turner 2002). For Turner, patriotism, or love of one's country, is compatible with a global citizen orientation, which would consist in large part of the promotion of universal human rights and obligations to secure them. One first learns to love one's own country, ideally in a way that allows for an ironic, critical distance from it, and the development or inculcation of such attachment serves as preparation for the development of respect for other state cultures (Turner 2002: 49).

Noting the difficulties inherent in obtaining compliance from individuals with the duties embedded in any conception of global citizenship, Turner argues for an emphasis not on a core of rights ostensibly evident across all cultures (see Ignatieff 2001). Rather, he advocates an emphasis on the 'unity of human misery', or a consensus that he sees having emerged around actions or events that are considered insufferably wrong (Turner 2002: 55). Respect for other cultures is noted as a key value, but Turner rejects strong cultural relativism, for example, allusions to 'Asian values' as a means of critiquing claims for universal human rights (46–7; see Sen 1997; Langlois 2001). Rather, individuals within specific nation-states are to be educated in a way that promotes love of country, and at the same time educated to adopt a 'cool' or thin identification that does not preclude support for international citizenship or human rights doctrine.

Turner's account is explicitly universalist in its promotion of a relatively strong conception of human rights, yet it emphasises the importance of particular communities in ways that recall more straightforwardly particularist accounts of community and belonging. For example, Michael Walzer would cite principles of state sovereignty, in particular non-intervention and the ability of a community to admit or exclude outsiders as it chooses, as vital in sustaining 'communities of

character, historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women with some special commitment to one another and some special sense of their common life' (Walzer 1983: 62; see also Walzer 1977: 90). However, for Walzer, the presumed uniqueness of the way of life that has been developed within the nation-state tends to preclude the development of relatively thick conceptions of universal human rights.

In Turner's approach, the presumed uniqueness of national communities is not emphasised. Rather, the state context is a training ground for the kinds of values that can encourage individuals to adopt a genuinely universalistic stance toward human rights. If that is the case, however, it is not clear why the state per se must be viewed as the appropriate inculcator of global citizenship values, or in Turner's term, cosmopolitan virtue. For example, states and state sovereignty could be seen as merely a means to the end of protecting and promoting the interests of individuals. Cosmopolitan theorists commonly note, with commentators on human rights theory and practice, that principles of state sovereignty, especially of non-intervention, often have facilitated the violation of human rights within states (Pogge 2002: 139–44; see Donnelly 2002), though of course that outcome is not categorical (Falk 2000: Ch. 4). However, in a universal individualist frame such as cosmopolitanism, if some other global institutional configuration were found to better achieve the promotion of core individual rights, or to better promote just outcomes for individuals in general, then that system would be viewed as preferable. The advocate of a more explicitly universalist form of international citizenship will have difficulty demonstrating why such institutional evolution should not be prescribed if it would better promote human rights.

In fact, an approach to international citizenship that offers such an instrumental view, in addition to presaging a remarkable range of insights offered by current cosmopolitan and global citizenship theorists, originates with MacCunn (1899). MacCunn, who is most often identified with the British Idealists, in his more cosmopolitan vein cited the Westphalian system as a frequent impediment to the realisation of cosmopolitan ideals, as well as their best institutional hope. The core individual duty identified by MacCunn, and one that receives current expression in the capabilities-based cosmopolitanism of Nussbaum (2000b), is for individuals to help others realise 'the capacity for a good life' (1899: 155). For MacCunn, helping others realise that capacity, whether they are compatriots in a relatively wealthy state or living in a distant, impoverished state, is our fundamental duty as human beings.

The ideal for MacCunn is a system structured so that one's duties to act as a global citizen are discharged in also acting as a good national citizen, i.e. by helping compatriots to realise their capacity for a good life. Again the importance of working through the existing institutional structure is considered instrumental. That is, one could attempt to 'walk the noble but less effectual path' of the missionary or others delivering direct aid to individuals overseas (MacCunn

1899: 167), but the existing states system is likely the best available means of fulfilling natural duties of mutual aid.

The state instrumentalism implicit in such an account bears important similarities to many cosmopolitan-liberal arguments, where states are held to have potentially strong instrumental value as institutions capable of securing rights and organising the discharge of individual obligations, but they are not seen as having intrinsic value or interests independent of the individuals within them (Beitz 1999a). It represents a departure from a more straightforward international citizenship view, which would see state membership as intrinsically significant. Such an approach can be seen as an important potential bridge between international citizenship and more encompassing conceptions of global citizenship, as well as between the global citizenship and cosmopolitan literatures.

Global Citizenship as Moral Orientation

One more encompassing approach to global citizenship involves the promotion of a global ethic or attitude toward the other across national boundaries. Examining some particular arguments here may be useful for clarifying individual duties, and especially for highlighting a key difference between the individual global citizen and the kind of individual moral agent that may be presumed within moral cosmopolitanism. That is, moral cosmopolitanism, while it may consider the interests of all individuals, does not necessarily presume the existence of some actual or potential global community of which each individual is in some substantive way a member (Van den Anker 2002: 166). Central to the concept of the global citizen is the understanding that one is part of a discrete global community, with duties toward specific others in that community, rather than a bearer of essentially abstract rights or duties to all others. As Dower and Williams note, in essentially all accounts of fully global citizenship, ‘what is being asserted is that humans are in some fundamental sense members of a wider body as contrasted to the membership of a particular political community such as the city-state, nation-state, or even an empire. All the latter are accidents of one’s birth or circumstance. . . . There is something . . . that ties us together in terms of identity, loyalty or commitment’ (Dower and Williams 2002: 2).

That is not to say that the global citizen must be construed as a member of some solidarist Republican world state, with some form of global-national consciousness being promoted by state institutions and absorbed by its members. Rather, individuals, by imagining themselves in global community with all others, may be more inclined to consider the interests of particular, concrete individuals across borders, and may be more inclined to engage in open, mutualistic dialogue with them. Likewise, a global citizenship approach presumes that, even if some comprehensive set of moral principles could be derived from the bare facts of what humans need and what they deserve, those

principles likely could not be effectively enacted without the actual negotiation of difference through dialogue that is inherent in the concept of community. An emphasis on global citizenship helps to promote sensitivity to such variation and can help to promote an attitude of respect in dialogue where traditions, or local practices of power or domination, may seem to be at odds with cosmopolitan principles (see Nussbaum 1999).

So, presuming some sort of membership in a global human community, theorists of global citizenship as a moral attitude have been concerned foremost with identifying the ethical orientation most appropriate to guiding individual action in that community. Along with offering accounts that are clearly rooted in the Kantian ethical commonwealth (see Carter 1997; Hutchings 1999), theorists have examined ways in which some sort of global loyalty might be inculcated in individuals to promote the observance of human rights (Roche 1997; Midgley 1999), how a global ethic could be formed and promoted around principles shared by the world's major religions (Küng 1997), or how a global civic culture (Boulding 1988) might be developed.

Richard Falk offers an account that is less specific in its moral prescriptions than some, but which may offer the best overall guidance for the kind of moral attitude the global citizen could adopt. Falk has developed the ideal of the global citizen as 'citizen pilgrim' (Falk 1995, 2002). The citizen pilgrim is one who possesses 'the spirit of a sojourner, committed to transformation that is spiritual as well as material, that is premised on the wholeness and equality of the human family' (Falk 2002: 27). Citizen pilgrims are not interested in 'technical fixes' to improve the efficiencies of neoliberal economic integration, while giving insufficient attention to what Falk sees as its many harmful effects (2002: 27). Nor are they multinational elites who consider themselves at home in an intercontinental world of posh hotels and restaurants while giving little thought to the struggles faced by the less-affluent who constitute most of the world's population (Falk 2005).

Citizen pilgrims are expected to act in a way that is resonant in some ways of Plato's guardians. Bearing appropriate values and an orientation of solidarity in global community toward others, they will address challenges and opportunities as they emerge in an integrating global system, with an eye to promoting sustainable development and humane governance (Falk 2002: 28). While Falk does not elaborate specific institutional changes that a citizen pilgrim might be expected to undertake, his outline of the orientation that should be adopted actually is quite demanding and can offer useful guidance for accounts more directly concerned with necessary or appropriate trans-state institutions. In particular, Falk's account can provide a means of understanding how current trans-state activists, such as those noted at the beginning of this article, can be viewed as practicing a normatively and empirically meaningful form of trans-state or global citizenship, or at least embodying significant aspects of it.

Global Citizenship and Global Institution Building

Theorists working within this approach do advocate the creation of supranational institutions capable of enabling a concrete practice of trans-state citizenship, and there is a potentially significant link between institutional global citizenship and the conception of natural duty outlined by Rawls. Recall that in Rawls's scheme of natural duties, all individuals, regardless of their institutional affiliations, would have a duty to further just arrangements (Rawls 1999a: 98), or 'to assist in the establishment of just arrangements when they do not exist, at least when this can be done with little cost to ourselves' (Rawls 1999: 294). Some cosmopolitan theorists have extrapolated from this a straightforward individual duty to promote the creation of global institutions capable of regulating trans-state interactions, though not a comprehensive world state (see Tan 2004: 170). Others have identified a closely related duty to promote the creation of global institutions generally capable of securing just outcomes (Jones 1999: 69), and possibly including a world state (Copp 2005).

I have argued elsewhere that, given biases against cosmopolitan distributive justice inherent in a sovereign states system, the cosmopolitan theorist should advocate comprehensive, democratically accountable integration between states, from the regional to the fully global level (Cabrera 2004, 2005). In that context, a conception of global citizenship could identify the very specific duties incumbent on all to promote the creation of an actual global political community, up to and including some comprehensive form of world state. It is not necessary, however, to firmly press the institutional claim in order to identify the ways in which a conception of global citizenship can help to clarify the parameters of individual cosmopolitanism. I will offer here an approach to global citizenship that is broad enough to be consistent with a range of particular conceptions, and yet is specific enough to play the role identified for global citizenship as individual cosmopolitanism. According to this conception, individuals act as global citizens when they:

- a) reach across international boundaries, or internal boundaries of differential citizenship
- b) in order to help secure those fundamental rights that would be better protected if there were a just system of global institutions in place, and
- c) work to help put such a system in place.

I will note first that implicit in criterion 'a' is that such cross-border outreach is undertaken in a spirit of community with all others. Individuals imagine themselves embedded in a global community, rather than as members of discrete, 'separate but equal' moral communities, and they are concerned to ensure the justice and sustainability of the global community. Thus, the desert humanitarians noted at the beginning of this article cite their sense of

belonging to a common humanity as reason enough to reach across barriers of citizenship, nationality, and in the frame of some more critical observers, criminality, to fulfill felt duties of mutual aid. The Minutemen, adopting more a rigidly nationalistic approach to membership, express a much different sense of duty to the non-citizen other, in particular those attempting to cross a national boundary without authorisation.

Emphasised in criterion 'b' is the importance of envisioning a fully just system of global institutions and the principles that would obtain within it. It offers an approach to identifying a firm schedule of moral requirements, i.e. to conceiving of ourselves as embedded in a framework of just institutions that would enable us to move from somewhat weak and vaguely specified natural duties of aid, to a clearly delimited set of obligations to be discharged in global community: a 'legal dimension' of global citizenship. This approach can be seen as positing a duty to act as though one had firm obligations of justice within an actually existing scheme of institutions. As such, it would not draw a sharp distinction between individual duties and obligations, as discussed below. Finally, under criterion 'c', individuals are understood to have a duty to help promote the kind of institutional transformation under which all in the global human community would be offered due protection. It attempts to fill in the contours of Kant's imagined global community of co-legislators by positing actual institutions within which members of a global community would engage in dialogue, coordinate action and regulate shared practices.

To reinforce, the characterisation offered here would accommodate a range of specific conceptions of global citizenship. It is consonant with, and could be enriched by, many within the global ethic approach, including Falk's account of the citizen pilgrim. It could accommodate an instrumentalist international citizenship such as MacCunn's, given that it is possible to conceive and move closer at least to some ideal form of Westphalian states system in which all states would be equally empowered to protect the rights or vital interests of their citizen charges. The approach also would accommodate many discrete conceptions of institutional global citizenship. Those would include moderate institutional accounts that would stop short of advocating some comprehensive global government while still calling for extensive global integration (Van den Anker 2002), or Kantian 'constitutionalization' (Habermas 2006: Ch. 8) to secure more just outcomes for individuals within states.

I will close this section by focusing on a particular, discourse-based account of institutional global citizenship offered by Andrew Linklater (1998, 1999a, 1999b). Emphasis will be given to its potential significance and some important possible challenges to it. Both should provide further clarification on the contours of a defensible global citizenship, as well as the fit of such a conception within a broader concept of cosmopolitan right.

Linklater argues that Kant's imaginary kingdom of co-legislators should be transformed where feasible into actual transnational citizenries (1998: 205–6).

Like the cosmopolitan democrats, he emphasises ways in which the processes of economic integration may be reducing the ability of those within states to exercise democratic control over a range of policy issues (1998: 191–2). He gives attention to the harms that may be perpetrated by a state on others as further reason to move toward supranational institutions within which a more concrete trans-state citizenship can be practiced, and in which individuals ‘can exercise their moral right to refuse and renegotiate offers’ (Linklater 1999a: 51). He is, however, explicit that the individual duty to create supranational institutions arises among members of like-minded societies, ‘in the sense of having broadly similar conceptions of citizenship’ (1999a: 51).

Linklater’s approach is concerned not only with the kinds of institutions which could embody a conception of trans-state or global citizenship, but with the kinds of duties that may be incumbent on individuals to create them. It thus offers a route to conceiving of and actually moving toward the implementation of forms of trans-state citizenship, and its emphasis on converting an imaginary commonwealth of co-legislators into an actual process of dialogue and contestation among trans-state citizens is potentially quite significant. There could be, however, significant theoretical friction between the universals that underlie the conception of trans-state citizenship Linklater advocates, and an implementation scheme that would place strong emphasis on interdependence or like-mindedness.

Consider how the interdependence issue has been addressed in terms of cosmopolitan distributive justice. In that frame, Beitz initially argued that it was the fact of global economic interdependence that justified speaking in terms of a global basic structure to which principles of distributive justice should be applied, and within which there were recognisable obligations of justice to extend distributions (Beitz 1999). Later, however, Beitz moved away from a strong emphasis on the actual character of relations between states in determining the distributions that individuals within and across states owe to one another (Beitz 1983). Instead, he made reference to universal human characteristics. Such a move helps in part to avoid circumstances under which individuals could be construed as appropriately excluded from trans-state distributions because of wholly contingent factors that caused them not to be integrally embedded in the global economy, including their states’ level of development or possession of valuable resources, or decisions made by elites in hierarchical states (see Cabrera 2004: Ch. 3; Caney 2005b). Others, including Barry (1995: 52–67) and Waldron (1993: 21), also have focused on universal human characteristics, rather than interstate relations, in developing and defending principles of cosmopolitan justice.

The guiding aim of the dialogic approach Linklater outlines is to enable individuals, especially the vulnerable within states, to engage in dialogue as equals in a global public sphere, and by so doing to highlight and oppose injustices both within and above states. However, if global citizenship, or

regional trans-state citizenship, is presumed to be appropriately differentiated according to a state's level of economic interdependence with others, or its 'like-mindedness' with nearby states, then the most vulnerable may still have no voice. That is not, of course, to pose some universal imperative to intervene in hierarchical states or otherwise pursue integration by force. Rather, it is to say that a more straightforward emphasis on the universalist ethical underpinnings of Linklater's approach could better enable it to achieve its goal of ultimately bringing all individuals into the global public sphere as interlocutors.

Objections: Duty and Obligation

Interdependence and related questions, in fact, speak to the core defensibility of the concept of global citizenship. Consider the challenge to the definitional coherence of global citizenship offered by Hannah Arendt, among others. It holds that one simply cannot be a global citizen in the absence of state-like global institutions. Since there are no such bodies to define and enforce citizen duties and rights, to specify participatory procedures, avenues of institutional access and other parameters of concrete citizenship practice, there is no global citizenship (Arendt 1968a: 81; see Walzer 1996). The claim also could be understood more narrowly in terms of duty and obligation. That is, since concrete obligations of justice arise only in the context of institutions, and there are no fully cohesive global institutions, it may be incoherent to speak of firm global citizen requirements in the current system. Thus, David Held speaks of the institutions of cosmopolitan democracy as potentially a context within which 'the elusive and puzzling meaning of global citizenship becomes a little clearer' (Held 2004: 115).

First, I will note that Arendt's claim must be formally true. Individuals do not hold membership in cohesive global institutions and thus cannot be global citizens. They can, however, act 'as' global citizens, and in a non-trivial sense. As outlined above, they can be viewed as having a natural duty to act as though there were a just global institutional frame in place, and to discharge their presumed obligations toward others accordingly. I will suggest that such an approach is defensible in large part because the line between duty and obligation is not so bright as is sometimes claimed. To elaborate, I will consider distinctions Thomas Pogge has drawn between the two, and some ways in which his firmly obligations-based approach may rely implicitly on the moral force of natural duties to aid.

Pogge has argued strenuously that the cosmopolitan should not place strong emphasis on individual natural duties of mutual aid, in part because it would be difficult to motivate individuals to act on such positive duties to others, especially to noncompatriots. He views obligations not to harm others as potentially much more capable of motivating action consistent with

cosmopolitanism, including fulfilling cosmopolitan distributive demands (Pogge 2002: 132–6). For Pogge, those in affluent states are implicated in a range of harms perpetrated through unjust global institutions, including the global trade regime, intergovernmental organisations, norms regulating interstate borrowing that allow corrupt leaders to enrich themselves, and a host of others. Thus ‘the worse-off are not merely poor and often starving, but are *being* impoverished and starved under our shared institutional arrangements, which inescapably shape their lives’ (Pogge 2002: 201).

Pogge places greatest emphasis on the responsibility of decision-makers and other influential elites within affluent states to initiate changes in the global order (2002: 172–3). He maintains, however, that ordinary individuals in affluent states also are responsible for institutional harms. An analogy is drawn between current citizens of affluent states and those living in the slaveholding states of the past. Even if citizens of those states did not hold slaves themselves, Pogge asserts, they could be held responsible at some morally significant level for the institutional scheme which they helped to uphold through their routine daily actions. Thus, they had clear obligations of justice to promote the transformation of unjust societal institutions (Pogge 1989: 178).

A harm interdependence approach is potentially extremely valuable as one frame of obligation, not least for encouraging individuals to consider the institutional effects their freely made choices could have. However, Pogge’s scheme, besides being subject to some of the same critique noted above in Beitz’s turn from interdependence, will face specific challenges in its emphasis on collective responsibility. First, we can note that Pogge, like many who ground cosmopolitan distributive obligations in interdependence or intense mutual influence, appears to presume that there is a threshold of mutual influence among states that, once reached, justifies the application of some distributive principle that would apply to all equally. But it is not clear why, if states are to qualify for some scheme of distribution based on their level of interaction or influence with other states, some variable principle would not be more appropriately applied (Caney 2005: 396–7; cf. Beitz 1999a: 165). David Hume, for example, argued that, since human interaction or mutual influence was weaker at the interstate level than within states, moral principles applied with less force above the state (see Cohen 1984). Such a principle would at least have to be considered if individuals were to be included or not in a global distributive scheme based on some variable status such as their state’s level of interaction with other states, rather than on their status as human beings.

Pogge would hold direct decision makers and influential elites, who have a clearer chain of accountability, more responsible for harms imposed. All non-elites, however, also would be held accountable at some equal baseline level. All are exhorted to promote movement toward a more just institutional structure, and institutional transformations of the kinds mandated would require significant tax-financed revenues to execute. Regardless of their personal participation in the

kinds of institutional regimes implicated, all would appear to be held to an equal standard of responsibility and amount of rectification.

Further, and perhaps more significantly, in adopting an approach that would hold all in a state responsible and obligated to rectify injustices, Pogge must show how even very young children and others who cannot be said to have participated in imposing harms are justifiably implicated. Related critiques have been made of collective-responsibility arguments that would reject cosmopolitan distributions on grounds that less-affluent states are rightly held responsible for their own policy choices (Rawls 1999; Miller 2004). How, some critics have asked, can ordinary individuals, much less children, be implicated in such policy choices? (LaFollette 1996: 79; Dworkin 2000: 322). A harm-interdependence approach may fare somewhat better in response to this critique, given that children born into affluent states would be held responsible for actions by a state that likely can offer them many benefits. Significant questions would remain, however, about holding individuals directly responsible for events over which they exercise no control, e.g. their luck of birth.

Finally, and most salient here, implicit positive duties to aid or further just institutions actually may be doing much of the work that is claimed for obligations not to harm in Pogge's scheme. Pogge himself has acknowledged that it may not be possible for individuals in affluent states to avoid contributing to the harms he identifies. Even so, he states, those in affluent countries are obligated to promote institutional transformation. 'Those presently most disadvantaged have virtually no means for initiating such reforms. We do. And our responsibility vis-à-vis existing injustices hinges upon our ability to initiate and support institutional reforms' (Pogge 1989: 11–2). It is difficult to see, short of re-placing themselves in a less-favored position within a less-affluent state, how individuals can be held firmly responsible for harms they could not have conceivably avoided causing. It is not the case, for example, that they could or should have been more careful prior to some accident that injured others. Rather, all are somehow equally implicated by their life placement in an affluent state. That being the case, the force of the moral requirement to promote institutional reforms may actually spring from implied positive duties to further just institutions. As in the case above, individuals who are so placed as to be capable of rendering aid in the form of institutional change are said to be required to do so, but the moral requirement does not clearly spring from any harms they have caused.

The foregoing should be sufficient to show that the case for focusing almost exclusively on individual obligations to avoid harming is not so clear cut. Rhetorically, encouraging individuals to avoid harming others may carry more general weight than exhorting them to act on positive duties per se. In practice, however, it is not a straightforward matter to demonstrate how far or whether any specific non-elite within an affluent state can be held responsible for injustices produced by current global institutions. More centrally, the insight that individual natural duties of mutual aid and furthering just institutions may be

implied within a harm interdependence approach helps to strengthen the case for treating duties and obligations as closely interconnected, or as both vital to the overall cosmopolitan project (Caney 2007). As such, it reinforces the coherence of a conception of global citizenship that, in the absence of cohesive global institutions, would speak in terms of individual duties to act according to the obligations, or ‘legal dimension’, of a fully global citizenship that would obtain were a just system of global institutions in place.

Conclusion

In this article, I have argued that global citizenship, appropriately understood, is an integral part of a comprehensive conception of cosmopolitan right. By conceiving of global citizenship as filling the theoretical space of individual cosmopolitanism, we can clarify both the parameters of a defensible conception of global citizenship and the duties and obligations that are incumbent in a frame which treats individuals, rather than states or other groupings, as the ultimate units of moral concern.

According to the approach detailed here, individuals are acting as global citizens when they reach out to others across international boundaries, or internal boundaries of differential citizenship, in order to help secure those fundamental rights that would obtain were there a just global system of institutions already in place, and when they work to help put a system in place. Such an approach is consonant with a broad range of specific conceptions of global citizenship, including those that would argue for the creation of supranational institutions within which a more encompassing, actual global citizenship could be practiced. In positing a natural duty to act as though there were a just system of global institutions already in place, the approach helps to highlight connections between individual natural duties and obligations of justice. Thus, it can help to clarify individual moral requirements that are unmediated by institutions, those that arise in relation to the transformation of existing global institutions, and those that may arise in relation to institutions that do not yet exist.

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Note

¹ Pogge uses different, somewhat singular, terms to express essentially the same division. In the interest of consistency with the bulk of the cosmopolitan literature, I will follow Beitz’s terminology.

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