Cinemas of Citizens and Cinemas of Sentiment

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*Obviously, a rigid, blinkered, absolutist world view is the easiest to keep hold of, whereas the fluid, uncertain, metamorphic picture I've always carried about is rather more vulnerable.*


Arguments over inclusion and exclusion flare when terms like refugee and migrant hit the headlines and tensions are exacerbated when nation-states change as a result of referenda, elections and conflict. At such times, national identity may freeze when nationalism surges or melt as treaties break boundaries and dilute definitions. The terms of citizenship are designed to be rigid and inviolate, but shifts in status can impose and withdraw this actually abstract condition, rendering it subject to chimerical criteria. Boxes within boxes make citizenship increasingly opaque – Scottish, British, European; Cuban, Caribbean, Latin American; Hong Kong, Chinese, East Asian – and the consequences for world cinema are manifold. Beyond the nation-state, between the limitations of national cinemas and before the dispersion of transnational ones, how can the remapping of contemporary world cinema cope with its ongoing coagulation and dissolution? As Mette Hjort and Scott Mackenzie observe, “many current attempts to articulate the national or nationalist dimensions of cinematic cultures draw on only the most limited corpus of relevant theoretical texts. Indeed, in many cases it is a matter of mobilising Benedict Anderson’s modernist conception of the nation as an imagined community” (2000: 2). In this new attempt to encourage greater fluidity within considerations of world cinema, I follow the theorising of the political scientist Georg Sørenson, who looks beyond the nation-state to a world made up of communities of citizens, which are defined by an exchange of “political, social and economic rights and obligations” (Sørenson 2004: xiv), and communities of sentiment, which are based on an ungovernable flow that extends via empathy to
include those along a strata of common or similar cultural, social, linguistic, economic conditions enabling “a historical identity based on literature, myths, symbols, music and art, and so on” (Sørenson 2004: 83). Then, by extrapolating a new theoretical framework of cinemas of citizens and cinemas of sentiment, I apply this to the study of world cinema in order to ameliorate its submission to what Andrew Higson called “the limiting imagination of national cinema” (2000: 63).

Anderson theorised his imagined communities “as both inherently limited and sovereign” (2006: 6). They were “imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (2006: 6; emphasis in original). This was ideal for film studies because the imagined history and membership of a community provided synonyms for both onscreen histories of the nation and the domestic audiences of these films. Anderson’s theory of nationhood, which carries nationalism “as if it belonged with ‘kinship’ and ‘religion’, rather than with ‘liberalism’ or ‘fascism’” (Anderson 2006: 5), is limited, however, by mapping belonging “on to a carefully demarcated geo-political space” (Higson 2000: 65), one that emphasises its geographical and genetic juxtaposition with other imagined communities, whose differences denote otherness. Scholars of world cinema focused on these “processes occurring within what is construed as a national communicative space” (Hjort & Mackenzie 2000: 5) as they described the cinemas of Britain (Higson 1989, 1995; Street 1997), Spain (Stone 2001; Triana-Toribio 2003) and Japan (Standish 2006; Philips & Stringer 2007), amongst others, in deference to the idea that imagined communities belonged to “a world of sovereign states” (Schlesinger 2000: 29). Following Sørenson, however, the Bergsonian notion that world cinema should be understood as existing in permanent flux, which demands sociological enquiry into the relationships between cinema and identity in a context of political changes and cultural shifts, responds to the demand that the centrality of Anderson’s concept be respectfully challenged by “increased awareness, not only of the place of Anderson’s concepts and frameworks within the context of larger debates, but of competing accounts” (Hjort & Mackenzie 2000: 2).
One of the bases of Anderson’s theory (and revisionist history of the world) was that languages could be barriers on top of borders, but that the visual, performative and creative arts nevertheless managed to communicate commonalities in “a world in which the figuring of imagined reality was overwhelmingly visual and aural” (Anderson 2006: 23). This held true until capitalism reinstated criteria for inclusion and exclusion in relation to states and societies and “not least by its dissemination of print, helped to create popular, vernacular-based nationalisms in Europe” (Anderson 2006: 39). Holding that this “figuring of imagined reality” is an evocative definition of the function of the cinema led to recognition that the advent of silent cinema provided a composite art that truly created an all-inclusive “imagined reality”, at least until languages were heard in sound film, causing evolving cinemas to restrain universal visual signifiers in favour of localised linguistic signs.

The subsequent categorisation of these cinemas into items of coherent singularity due to their different languages favoured internal stratification within nations that tended to position domestic product as a wide range of middlebrow entertainment and pushed anything foreign to the edges via ‘low-brow’ dubbing and ‘high-brow’ subtitling. Distributors grew adept at marketing or dismissing films in terms of their nationhood. Once a profitable export brand for UFA in the 1920s, German expressionist cinema would be rejected as un-American by competitive US distributors in the 1930s, for example, and yet still prove itself an insidious influence on ‘un-American’ film noir. The relation between cinema and nation became the cornerstone of post-war European cinema and the studies that described it; but the recent jump from national to transnational cinemas via globalisation by means of digital technologies in relation to industry, funding and reception (Hjort 2010) has revived the need to understand world cinema as being formed not only by competing or colluding nation-states but also by ungovernable affinities made visible between communities. Like that of Anderson, Karl W. Deutsch’s theorisation of communication and nationalism was centred on the nation-state (1996: 4); but contemporary cinemas no longer have to rely upon the nation-state to be “still the chief political instrument for getting things done” (Deutsch 1996: 188). Indeed, as Deutsch foretold, “the essential aspect of the unity of a people […] is the complementarity or relative effi-
ciency of communication among individuals – something that is in some ways similar to mutual rapport” (1996: 188). Deutsch delves thereafter into the idea of a people forging a nationality, which is distinct from nationhood, but I shall argue that this “mutual rapport” must be construed more pointedly as a sentiment that, following Sørenson, is capable of transcending citizenship.

Several scholars have argued the cases for cinemas that oppose national cinemas and have called these accented, migrant, diasporic, peripheral, small or immigration cinemas (see Naficy 2001; Berghahn & Sternberg 2010; Iordanova, Martin-Jones & Vidal 2010; Petrie & Hjort 2007; Ballesteros 2015, respectively); but a viable framework for recognising and understanding the ongoing becoming of all cinemas must include those emerging from filmmaking communities that are within, beyond and aligned with nation-states. The emergence and erasure of representative cinemas that are cognisant of their social, political, economic and aesthetic impact and their implications is a mostly organic occurrence moving through rigidification, dissolution and vaporisation in both directions. At one extreme appear the frozen cores of seemingly rigid, introverted, solipsistic and servile cinemas that are fostered by government funding and in certain regimes may be all a domestic audience gets to see, while at the other extreme flicker inexpensive, untethered audio-visual items adrift on the internet. Both extremes may represent and be received by analytically capable communities, but whereas the latter may be up to the task of constantly rethinking collective and individual identity, the frozen kind may be less keen or able to engage in processes of reinvention. Like ice, water and vapour, these mutable cinemas are essentially the same thing – just films – but we must update our understanding of their condition, context and function because Anderson’s assertion that “nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time” (2006: 3) is simply no longer true. Also faulty therefore is the “linear notion of history that understood the nation-state as the natural, not to say, organic, result of an evolutionary trajectory” (Vitali & Willemen 2006: 3), which follows Deutsch (1953; reprinted 1996) and Ernest Gellner (1983) in being “mainly concerned with how a national culture comes to be created, rather than with how it is maintained and renewed” (Schlesinger 2000: 21).
In his corrective response, Sørenson investigates maintenance and renewal by conceptualising a borderless world beyond the nation-state, one that combines spatial and temporal, real and virtual arenas of communication in which identity is less likely to be withheld, inherited or imposed than, as Anthony Giddens contends, it is to be “discovered, constructed, actively sustained” (Giddens 1994: 82). In *The Transformation of the State: Beyond the Myth of Retreat* (2004), Sørenson assesses the effects of globalisation and concludes that identity is not solely determined by self-serving policies but by generous sentiment too. Thus he argues that modern identity exists in a condition and framework of flux between rigid citizenship and unrestricted sentiment, which I contend is relevant to contemporary world cinema too. This flux is about more than cinema as an “adjunct of capitalism” (Vitali & Willemen 2006: 7) or movement between “two understandings of cinema: as an industry and as a cluster of cultural strategies” (Vitali & Willemen 2006: 2). When Jürgen Habermas built a theoretical framework that allowed for flux while remaining anchored to nation-states, he described tendencies in the matter of national identity as centripetal and centrifugal forces; that is to say, on the one hand he detected “a hardening of national identities as different cultural forms of life come into collision; on the other, the hybrid differentiations that soften native cultures and comparatively homogeneous forms of life in the wake of assimilation into a single material world culture” (Habermas 2001: 73). Sørenson theorises this as the emergence of a community of citizens on the one hand, and a community of sentiment on the other, but crucially moves beyond the nation-state in order to keep pace with fluidity and, moreover, posit this as vital to constant renewal. Andrew Higson formulated a similar equation when investigating the limiting imagination of national cinema: “At times, the experience of an organic, coherent national community, a meaningful national collectivity, will be overwhelming. At other times, the experience of diaspora, dislocation and de-centredness will prevail. It is at times such as these that other allegiances, other senses of belonging besides the national will be more strongly felt” (Higson 2000: 65). Higson does not suggest what these “other senses of belonging” are, but their occurrence certainly recalls Deutsch’s “mutual rapport” and coincides with the fact that, as Sørenson observes, globalisation and its at-
tendant digital technology means that in the new millennium “a new system ‘beyond’ the sovereign state is in the making” (2004: xii). This had already been foretold by James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (1993), John Naisbitt (1994) and Kenichi Ohmae (1996) amongst others, with consensus settling on “a transformation away from governance in the context of national government towards multilevel governance at overlapping national, local and international levels” (Sørenson 2004: xiii). Crucially, however, Sørenson frames his corrective, which is both retrospective and prospective, as “a process of transition from modern to what I call postmodern statehood” (Sørenson 2004: xv) in order to contend that the area between the local and the global that was previously dominated by nation-states is now composed of communities of citizens and communities of sentiment that occur within this “new context characterized by the increased salience of globalization and the transnational relations that go with it” (Sørenson 2004: 90). Following Sørenson, I propose that a new framework for understanding world cinema can be predicated upon the relations between cinemas of citizens and cinemas of sentiment.

Like a community of citizens, a cinema of citizens is one based upon an exchange of “political, social and economic rights and obligations” (Sørenson 2004: xiv). It is in the community of citizens that the provision of healthcare might require payment of taxes, for example, a free or subsidised education may be conditional upon subsequent military service, and clean streets and civil liberties will depend upon the observation of public order. Thus, a cinema of citizens will be one of similarly close links between government and filmmakers, which are established and maintained (directly and indirectly) by funding, educational strategies, investment in related infrastructure, policies, quotas, incentives like tax-breaks, sponsored training and official campaigns that support and exploit the soft power of homegrown films at festivals and awards ceremonies. The rights in such exchanges are, in a sense, rewards that reinforce similarity to other members of the community and a shared experience of its cinema as well as difference from those beyond it. The exchange of rights and obligations is subject to change, of course, but the prevailing criteria for inclusion that they espouse and uphold contribute to the maintenance of a dictated or democratically determined mandate
for building or maintaining citizenship and cinema in a place with a shared idea and sense of itself as a subject with a historical, cultural and possibly linguistic identity that is legally binding, verifiable by census and different from those of other communities and cinemas of citizens. Sørenson’s communities of citizens are different from Anderson’s imagined communities because its members are at least as aware of their economic-legal rights as they are of their cultural-historic obligations. Communities of citizens can coincide with nation-states as they congeal around a consensus of historical criteria for inclusion and exclusion that flows like cement to the limits of national borders, although a homogenous ethno-national basis to the community is rarely viable. Correlatively, the cinema of citizens is perceived as having national affiliations and responsibilities although it might not represent the totality of its citizens, many of whom, as we shall see, may claim or pursue membership of cinemas of sentiment instead. If the exchange of rights and obligations is deemed fair, however, then a community and cinema of citizens is generally prone to go along with “‘banal nationalism’; that is, “a collection of ideological habits (including habits of practice and belief) which reproduce existing nations as nations” in everyday life (Billig 1995: 6).

In comparison, a cinema of sentiment, like a community of sentiment, is more focused on becoming than on being and as such offers “a dynamic picture of a contested identity always being debated” (Sørenson 2004: 85). Sentiment here is defined by awareness, empathy, reflection and acceptance or rejection of elements contributing to or detracting from identity and it is enacted through transactions that are uncontrolled by the state. A community and cinema of sentiment express themselves via a subjectivity that exceeds a legalised or politically circumscribed identity since such “identity formations consist of trying to ‘pin us’ to a specific, selected sub-set of the many diverse clusters we traverse in our lifetimes” (Willemen 2006: 30–31). This ‘pinning’ negates “flux, the continuity of transition” (Bergson 1992: 16), which allows a cinema of sentiment to represent an analytically competent people engaged in self-reflection. As such, the cinema of sentiment can represent what Manuel Castells calls a “resistance identity”, which is one that is generated by those actors that are “in positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domina-
tion, thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society” (Castells 1998: 8). As Sørenson suggests, whereas the community and cinema of citizens might be said to offer “an offensive, integrating response to globalization and other changes” that hardens the core definition of national identity at a certain moment, the cinema of sentiment offers “a defensive, fragmentary one” (Sørenson 2004: 93) that illustrates and gives voice to regional, ethnic and otherwise marginalised groups seeking a higher degree of autonomy.

The cinema of sentiment is much more fragile than one of citizens. It moves outwards, seeking lifelines thrown by international film festivals, smaller festivals elsewhere based on relevant themes or genres, such as gay cinema or documentary, and new audiences amidst the white noise of the internet. The cinema of sentiment can be a response to the weakening, fracture and diffusion of citizenship on the one hand, and to the hardening of criteria for citizenship on the other. Its potential for resistance may be strengthened by international funding and transnational distribution strategies and opportunities, which transcend the heterogeneity of localism but may also encourage resistance to the homogeneity of globalization. Here, perhaps, as Hjort suggests, the aim is primarily communication between a number of cultures whose empathy may be “understood in terms of ethnicity, partially overlapping or mutually intelligible languages, and a history of interaction giving rise to shared core values, common practices, and comparable institutions” (2010: 17). The sentiment of something shared, which might be regionalism, marginalisation of many kinds, economic sedimentation or much else besides, gives rise to a project of identity construction that suggests and may even realise a collective identity above and beyond the communities of citizens from which it emerges. In some cases, such as that in which cinemas of sentiment colluded to invent a nationalist African cinema tradition in the years between 1960 and 1975, such cinemas reveal ambitions to be a synecdoche for an otherwise lacking cinema of citizens in retrospective analysis that “comes on the heels of a moribund national construction discourse, after scores of national governments in Africa failed to provide for their citizenry” (Niang 2014: xii). In other cases, potential cinemas of senti-
ment, such as those emerging from the White and Black American lower classes in the United States, may fail to cohere because their commonalities are erased in the dominant Hollywood cinema, which is arguably tantamount to a cinema of citizens, which caters to aspirational Whites while largely erasing Blacks, as the 2016 uproar over #OscarsSoWhite suggested (Ryan 2016).

Willemen touches on that fact that citizenship is what is currently objectively correct, but sentiment is what is felt to be most relevant, when he notes that “the concern with socio-cultural specificity is different from identity searches and debates” (Willemen 2006: 34). Concern with citizenship tends to look backwards and inwards to a defining core that risks hardening, whereas sentiment tends to look forwards and outwards to possible new configurations and risks dissolution. Flux is evident because sentiment can be patriotic or nationalist too, of course, for an emotional attachment to the nation can be fierce. Indeed, when subscription to the beliefs maintained in a narrow, nationalist selection of “literature, myths, symbols, music and art, and so on” (Sørenson 2004: 83) upholds a socio-cultural criteria for inclusion and exclusion that is inscribed as legal criteria, the community of sentiment will become one of citizens. At the same time, cinemas of sentiment may compete with those of citizens by highlighting diversity at home and transnational connections abroad, whereby social media and digital communication also clarify the economic sedimentation of people the world over as a result of globalised neo-liberalism. This means that the horizontal affinities sought by communities of sentiment and manifested in their cinemas will tend to exhibit financially determined similarities in terms of production values, form and aesthetics, which currently result from accessible new digital technologies, multi-platform virtual environment, skill with inexpensive filmmaking equipment, online distribution and file-sharing that enable contact between those keen on making and watching certain types of film.

Such affinities are evident in the economic sedimentation of types of film production and the aesthetics of impoverishment shared by the American Mumblecore and the Romanian New Wave, for example. Mumblecore is a contested term that denotes a zero-budget cluster of films that emerged from the American indie scene in the 2000s in order to adequately represent educated but
dislocated twenty-somethings, while the Romanian New Wave, which is another contested categorisation, also emerged in the 2000s to describe those filmmakers who responded to the lack of a viable Romanian cinema of citizens by creating one of sentiment. The dissent over categorisation is itself suggestive of flux, because, as Marina Kaceanov explains of Romanian cinema, “after the troubled years of transformations, socio-economical problems, and constant battles with the bureaucracy of the National Centre for Cinematography, the growing conflict between past and present finally exploded into a cultural revolution. The present requires its own chroniclers, and the younger and more in touch they are with reality, the better. When there is no room, funding or support for younger people, an opposition is born” (Kaceanov 2008). The limitations of the filmmaking apparatus in both these cinemas of sentiment reveal numerous commonalities; not only the relatively cheap technology employed in their making but the resulting minimalism, long scenes of naturalistic dialogue alternating with introspective patches of silence, the use of subtle camera movement to represent negotiation and power-play between characters, a focus on the personal relationships of young adults that favours female subjectivity and, ultimately, a tone of lived-in resignation shared by the likes of Marnie (Kate Dollenmayer) in *Funny Ha Ha* (Andrew Bujalski, 2002) and Otilia (Anamaria Marinca) in *4 luni, 3 săptămâni şi 2 zile* (4 Months, 3 Weeks, 2 Days, Cristian Mungiu, 2007). Both Mumblecore and the Romanian New Wave outlived the comparatively brief life expectancy of cinemas of sentiment. Repetition and conformity rendered Mumblecore increasingly redundant and prompted its migration to television in series such as *Togetherness* (Jay & Mark Duplass, 2015–16), *Love* (Judd Apatow, 2016–) and *Easy* (Joe Swanberg, 2016–). And when sustained international festival success for Romanian cinema resembled “less a new wave than a persistent surf-pounding” (Zeitchik 2016), it drew criticism that Romanian filmmakers were second-guessing the sympathies of international juries: “How much to continue in a style that’s served it well but could grow stale, like all styles, is an open question, as is the challenge of keeping on in a nation where even leaders admit they've failed their filmmakers” (Zeitlich 2016). On the other hand, the persistence of Romanian filmmakers may have prompted their standing as an auteurist elite that so
‘branded’ Romanian cinema it may have obviated a Romanian cinema of citizens and precluded other Romanian cinemas of sentiment from emerging.

Clearly communities and cinemas of citizens and sentiment have the capacity to morph into each other and this is key to the context of flux that they inhabit. A community of citizens that absorbs an unlimited number of immigrants, cedes the provision of rights to a supranational body such as the European Union or United Nations, fragments into regions with claims on autonomy, enters into associations with other territories and/or populations that override internal policy, dilutes the legal criteria for inclusion and invests in cultural partnerships with others that erase differences between them may give rise to a community or communities of sentiment. At the same time, the hardening of criteria for inclusion can lead to exclusions within the community and cinema of citizens as some members are re-classified and lose their rights because of new laws and governments or referenda. The results and ramifications of the UK’s 2016 referendum on whether it should leave or remain in the European Union provide a pertinent example of this. Many voters clearly felt that their ‘British’ community of citizens, which was shown to be mainly English, had been superseded by a European community of citizens and so campaigned for a nationalistic ‘British’ community of sentiment that the result of the referendum would convert into a new community of citizens by means of reinstating sovereignty and protectionist immigration policies. The community of citizens is potentially transformative, but tends to resemble or reassemble as a rigid “historical structure” (Cox 1994) resembling the nation-state when its ambitions are informed by conservatism that exhumes the values of the past. At the same time, however, many other voters felt themselves wrenched from a European community of citizens and alienated from the nationalistic ‘British’ community of sentiment and the community of citizens that it would become, and, following the result, they subsequently clung to and campaigned for membership of a European community of sentiment. In relation to such changes, one might eventually in retrospect be able to recognise cinemas of citizens and of sentiment. A British cinema of citizens will tend towards thematic and generic limitations and favour telling stories that serve soft power policies and repay funding with a
flattering view of the community of citizens that watches them, as well as by occasional foreign audiences who enjoy the exoticism of such ‘English’ things as Edwardian etiquette in Thatcher-era films like *Room with a View* (James Ivory, 1985) or the prurience of the 1950s in *Dance with a Stranger* (Mike Newell, 1985), which were both co-produced by the National Film Finance Corporation. If, in such situations, filmmakers move away from the traditional themes or genres of a state-centric cinema of citizens they may struggle to obtain funding, which abets ignorance of the “accented cinema” of immigrants and disenfranchised minorities (Naficy 2001) as well as the independent, online and underground films associated with Welsh, Scottish, regional, Black British and queer British cinemas of sentiment and much else besides.

Moreover, although nationhood remains a strong context, cinemas of sentiment may gain strength and also demand rights and changes to the criteria for exclusion and inclusion that determines funding for films, as happens in Spain, where the Catalan-language cinema of sentiment, for example, represents an alternative socio-political context of increasing autonomy for the region of Catalonia and produces what many separatists hope might turn into a Catalan cinema of citizens. Fractures in the close links between citizenship and sentiment are particularly evident when a new system above the national, such as the European Union, emerges. In such instances, “with the growth of supranational cooperation, an institutional level ‘above’ the nation-state […] can become a new partner for the regional movements” (Sørenson 2004: 94). This allows regions within nation-states to appeal legally and emotively to entities beyond them, as with the Basque Country’s appeal to Europe during the Francoist dictatorship (Arrieta Alberdi 2015: 77–83), which carried with it the idea that a Basque cinema of sentiment might become part of a European cinema of sentiment or even of citizens as opposed to the Spanish cinema of citizens that then enclosed it. Cinemas of sentiment illustrate Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal’s argument that citizenship may be transformed “from a more particularistic one based on nationhood to a more universalistic one based on personhood” (Soysal 1994: 137), which may lessen links between individuals and their communities of citizens by enabling global movements of ethnic, political and social identification and protest too. Individ-
ual filmmakers who encounter exclusion in communities and cinemas of citizens for political or religious beliefs, sexuality or ethnicity, for example, may well find inclusion in a community and cinema of sentiment made up of similar and empathetic individuals.

Clearly it is possible to belong to both a community of citizens and a community of sentiment or indeed several at the same time, although the risk of plunging into contradiction and paradox increases. The relationship between cinemas of citizens and sentiment does not have to be conflictive, however. There is often ample space in developed, outward-looking communities of citizens for its centripetal cinema of citizens and various centrifugal cinemas of sentiment to co-exist, but if there is competition for resources and the state does not deliver on political, legal and social rights then questions of legitimacy arise and there may even be a switching point at which the revolutionary cinema of sentiment becomes one of citizens and the previous cinema of citizens finds itself redundant or redefined as one of probably resentful sentiment. Both cinemas of citizens and of sentiment may give rise to a filmmaking elite, although the critical emphasis on auteurism will probably favour the independence of the latter. In addition, governments may maintain funding for an artificially self-sufficient cinema of citizens offering more hagiographic representations of the nation than the multifarious films emerging from cinemas of sentiment. A cinema of citizens may also seek to absorb diversity when intending for this to become a marker of its identity, such as when Oscars go conspicuously to American films about strong gay, Black or female characters, or when New Zealand cinema is represented by films about Maori culture such as the realist *Once Were Warriors* (Lee Tamahori, 1994) and the mythic *Whale Rider* (Niki Caro, 2002). Then again, if a community of citizens encounters and displays weakness on an economic, political or cultural level, it might not be able to deliver the rights of citizenship, causing fragmentation into potentially ungovernable ethnic, tribal, religious or political loyalties and giving rise to cinemas of sentiment that move beyond ideological centring. And if there is little or no funding for a cinema of citizens within a community of citizens and hardly any domestic or foreign audience for films either, then only fleeting and possibly extremist cinemas of sentiment will be made by ambitious interest groups and individuals.
Crucially, whereas the community of citizens tends to define identity from above and impose it top-down, the community of sentiment creates it from below. The cinema of citizens is introverted when at its most patriotic or nationalistic, but the cinema of sentiment is extroverted by nature, seeking connections with the like-minded and reciprocally empathetic, which means it thrives on the internet. Another vital distinction is that the community of citizens is incapable of conceiving of itself as Other, whereas this is an essential trait of the community of sentiment because empathy is how it looks and reaches beyond itself to “discover the reference points of collective identity” (Sørenson 2004: 91). The cinemas of citizens and of sentiment are not mutually exclusive, however, and can twist together like a two-colour spiral when a minority language cinema like that in Basque or Welsh, for example, is held to be as much of a cinema of citizens as a cinema of sentiment. This spiralling also happens when a cinema that is critical of the community of citizens that birthed it is taken to be representative of it too. The films directed by fifth-generation Chinese filmmakers, such as *Da hong deng long gao gao gua* (Raise The Red Lantern, Zhang Yimou, 1991) and *Ba wang bie ji* (Farewell My Concubine, Chen Kaige, 1993), for example, questioned the totalitarian nationalism of the People’s Republic of China although they were officially funded and (mostly) passed by the Chinese censors because they were period films that included characters who espoused Communist dogma and thus formally represented a Chinese cinema of citizens. It was largely the international acclaim that celebrated their visual riches and subtle cultural critiques that revealed them as contradictory, even paradoxical, and therefore evidence of a cinema of sentiment. Similarly, in Spain under Franco (1939–75), the *cine metafórico* (metaphorical cinema) represented by the likes of *La muerte de un ciclista* (Death of a Cyclist, Juan Antonio Bardem, 1955) and *La caza* (The Hunt, Carlos Saura, 1966) demonstrated dissident, even communist sympathies that smuggled criticism of the dictatorship into international festivals and constituted a cinema of sentiment met by tolerance in Spain. This was partly because the ecclesiastical censor failed to decipher the metaphorical narratives and partly because the regime, seeking foreign investment, could point to such critical films as evidence of a cinema of citizens indicating a tolerant and open society, all the while knowing that
these films would be barely distributed in Spain and unpopular with Spanish audiences anyway. The post-Franco removal of censorship prompted the emergence of several cinemas of sentiment from regions with claims on autonomy as well as waves of queer, underground and, in time, immigrant cinema too, with the Basque cinema of sentiment actually becoming a cinema of citizens when the nation-building policies of the newly autonomous Basque government saw 5% of its entire budget dedicated to developing a domestic film industry (Stone & Rodríguez 2015). Similarly, the variety of cinemas that currently represent regions in the Middle East such as the Arabian Peninsula, the Nile Valley, Maghreb, Palestine and the occupied territory of the West Bank as well as cities like Cairo, Beirut, and Dubai all make claims to be cinemas of sentiment and may have ambitions to be cinemas of citizens.

Aiming to restore flux to considerations of world cinema, not simply as moments of change but as an ongoing, eternal becoming, this chapter answers Philip Schlesinger’s call for “an explanatory grasp of the increasingly evident contradictions between the various levels of culture and identity that are tending to decouple state and nation” (2000: 30). This new framework of cinemas of citizens and of sentiment thus challenges the long-standing paradigm of eight concepts of national cinemas elaborated by Stephen Crofts (1998), who writes from an occidental view of world cinema as a collection of “nation-state cinemas” (1998: 390). Crofts thus prioritises “United States cinema” (1998: 390), which retains no such privilege in this new framework. He then proceeds to map world cinema from a single-point perspective, noting the autonomy of large Indian and Hong Kong cinemas that “can afford to ignore Hollywood” (1998: 390), for example, and ignoring the unruly network of cinemas of sentiment that exist in the shadow of such monoliths as well as the ongoing need for the de-westernization of film theory championed by Ba and Higbee (2012). Furthermore, Crofts takes ‘Indian’ to be synonymous with the Mumbai-based, Hindi-language Bollywood, which means that the Bengali-language Bangladeshi cinema known as Dhallywood is dismissed as an imitation of what is ‘Indian’ cinema, thereby failing to recognise the cinema of sentiment that such apparently imitative but profoundly ambitious practices in Bangladeshi cinema represent. His similar
stratifications of ‘African’ cinema spoil the study of what should be approached as a plethora of cinemas of citizens and cinemas of sentiment too. Indeed, describing Australian and Canadian cinemas as “imitations of US cinema” (1998: 390) promotes another hierarchical categorisation that fails to accommodate cinemas of sentiment within both (such as Aboriginal and Canadian French-language cinema) or realise how imitation can shape citizenship and be a vehicle of sentiment too. His description of “totalitarian cinemas” (1998: 390) corresponds to cinemas of citizens, but his idea of “sub-state cinemas” that are defined “ethnically in terms of suppressed, indigenous, diasporic, or other populations asserting their civil rights and giving expression to a distinctive religion, language or regional culture” (1988: 390) does not allow for the transnational nature of many cinemas of sentiment, which may thrive beyond the nation-state. His erroneous categorisation of “Third cinema” as something separate, moreover, does not foresee that such cinemas of sentiment, although oppositional and anti-capitalist, can in time become those of citizens if their values rigidify, thereby inspiring a new cinema of sentiment to rise up and challenge it. This happened in Cuba, for example, where post-revolutionary cinema aspired to be a Third cinema but became institutionalised, prompting challenges by new filmmakers who operated beyond the control of the Cuban community of citizens thanks to cheap digital equipment and alternative means of dissemination (Stone & Fehimović 2015). Finally, Crofts’ broad assertion that “art cinemas vary somewhat in the sourcing of their finances and in their textual characteristics” (1998: 390) lacks a nuanced understanding of how subscription to a collective sentiment or servility to the hegemonic values that define citizenship can determine criteria for funding and be revealed in a film’s aesthetics.

Rather than frameworks that cannot keep pace with technological innovation, political change, the movement of people and the networks they inhabit, the concept of cinemas of citizens and of sentiment embraces the present continuous tense of world cinema and maps its real-time ongoing evolution. This mutable framework removes the limitations of thinking in terms of national cinemas and, indeed, “a narcissistic, self-reflexive and self-fulfilling view of national cinemas” (Hayward 2000: 92). It also does away with stateless, accented, interstitial and non-cinemas, which
are too fixed in their criteria, in favour of flux between cinemas of citizens or of sentiment. It recog-
nises that a context of increasing rupture between cinema and nation allows for the transfer of
social values between the cinema of citizens to a cinema of sentiment and, vice versa, it reacts to
new consolidations of citizenship and even nationhood by tracking the evolution of cinemas of sen-
timent into those of citizens. Unlike strict categorisations of films, filmmakers and cinemas, this
framework is defined by its flexibility, which includes and even emphasises overlap and coinci-
dence. The cinema of citizens is intended to strengthen the link between the community and its citi-
zens, whereas the cinema of sentiment may weaken it, while strengthening that between people and
other people. Taken together, but also apart, cinemas of citizens and cinemas of sentiment illustrate
that belonging is both a legal and an emotional quality, which may not coincide, but which reveal in
their own way how world cinema is held together and sometimes falls apart.

Works cited


