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Foucault and Lefebvre’s writings have rekindled interest among geographers in territory-state relations, with recent work conceptualising territory as a state strategy to control space, and on the state as a socionatural relation. However, what is lacking is how these debates intersect with post-human understandings of nature’s materialities, and how the resulting ‘material territory’ mediates state periodization. Drawing on a case study of Iceland, we address this issue to show how pre-modern territorialisation shaped state territorialities, and how state periodization arises from political order imbricating with the materialities of territory. The originality of the work is threefold. First is to show how territory as a material category resists or reinterprets political ordering through longitudinal examination of a single case. Second is to reconceptualise state periodization as an evolutionary material-political, as much as socio-economic, process. Third is to establish empirically the unacknowledged tensions between the state’s use of territory to order ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ affairs. We analyse the implications of a material conception of territory for state periodization and for wider understandings of contemporary statecraft. The state is revealed as a site of multiple territorialities in space, and territorial multiplicities over time.
(Dis)Ordering the state: territory in Icelandic statecraft

Abstract
Foucault and Lefebvre’s writings have rekindled interest among geographers in territory-state relations, with recent work conceptualising territory as a state strategy to control space, and on the state as a socionatural relation. However, what is lacking is how these debates intersect with post-human understandings of nature’s materialities, and how the resulting ‘material territory’ mediates state periodization. Drawing on a case study of Iceland, we address this issue to show how pre-modern territorialisation shaped state territorialities, and how state periodization arises from political order imbricating with the materialities of territory. The originality of the work is threefold. First is to show how territory as a material category resists or reinterprets political ordering through longitudinal examination of a single case. Second is to reconceptualise state periodization as an evolutionary material-political, as much as socio-economic, process. Third is to establish empirically the unacknowledged tensions between the state’s use of territory to order ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ affairs. We analyse the implications of a material conception of territory for state periodization and for wider understandings of contemporary statecraft. The state is revealed as a site of multiple territorialities in space, and territorial multiplicities over time.

Key words: Territory, political technology, ‘material territory’, state periodization, modern geopolitical imagination

Introduction
There is renewed interest in human geography in the state as a relational form. Recent studies have proposed novel perspectives on the state as object (Meehan et al. 2013), foregrounded improvisation in bringing the state into being (Jeffrey 2012), and examined the mundane spatialities by which ‘the state effect’ is realised (Mitchell 1991; Painter 2006). Much of this work builds upon post-structural accounts that excavate the historical roots and spatial foundations of statecraft (Foucault 1991, 2007; Lefebvre 2009).
In explaining the state’s apparent stability, geographers have drawn attention to the territorial rationalities underpinning its presence. Thus Hannah (2000), Murphy (2002) and Hakli (2008) focus upon the institutions that embed state territory domestically, while Moisio and Paasi (2013a) emphasise the geoeconomic imperatives of state space. Another approach, developed by Brenner and Elden (2009), is to historicize territory as a technology comprising discursive and calculative techniques of spatial management that evolve through time. As Elden (2010a, 2013a) demonstrates, this approach is fecund with analytical possibilities.

Here we seek to contribute to this aspect of the state debate in geography. Building on Brenner and Elden’s contributions on territory, and work on the state as a socionatural relation (Bridge 2013a, Parenti 2015) whereby nature is rendered inseparable from political processes, we identify substantive new areas for research. First is to progress understanding of how territory’s materialities imbricate with state strategies of spatial control. Following the post-human turn in geography, we contend these materialities resist or reinterpret these strategies, limiting territory’s governability. Secondly, struggles between territory as political ordering and what we term ‘material territory’ require reconceptualising state periodization (Brenner 2009) as an evolutionary material-political as much as socio-economic process. Thirdly, a material territory has consequences for statecraft when it is used to orchestrate ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ policy domains. For while territory affords opportunities for political ordering, we contend its protean qualities can also disrupt or unravel state presence. This paper’s contribution to geography is to thus to connect literatures on territory-state relations and post-human understandings of territory with work on state periodization. We show state periodization matters to these debates as it charts how the material-political struggles over territory become encoded over time as pre-modern and modern state architectures.

The empirical case examined is Iceland, a country overlooked by scholars interested in the state’s territorial production (though see Ingimundarson 1999, 2015). Thus while research exists on landscape’s role in shaping Icelandic national identity, much less consideration has been given to
territory as a political technology. We show how Icelandic state presence emerged from particular
pre-modern local, colonial and latterly national configurations of political order with territory’s
materialities. In the process, attempts to impose territorial meaning domestically have, we argue, also
been foundational rationalisations for Iceland’s projection globally. Since becoming a republic in
1944, territory’s constitutive relation with the state has embroiled Iceland in the “modern geopolitical
imagination” (Agnew 2003, 3).

Material territory emerges as a fissile political quantity, with fixities and mobilities that alternately
support and undermine state presence. By analysing the push-back of territory’s materialities against
statecraft in ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ affairs, we demonstrate its capacity for political mobilisation and
its limits as a political technology. This has proved highly problematic for Icelandic foreign policy:
for while territory has furnished the state with domestic presence, this quality has not always been
compatible with building scaled relations beyond the state.

The argument proceeds as follows. First we examine the growing literature on the territory-state
relation in geography, as a basis for exploring the role of material territory in the emergence of states.
We then analyse the co-evolution of material territory with pre-modern and modern state forms
through four periodization episodes, identifying how this co-evolutionary process has been mediated
by local and at-a-distance political relations and practices, and by material territory’s unruliness
perforating human attempts to impose political order. While latterly state territorialities have been
fundamental to stabilising Icelandic presence, this has not been unproblematic, with political tensions
arising from using territory to order the ‘domestic’ and the ‘foreign’. The conclusions consider the
implications of the case study for wider understandings of state periodization, and for examining
territory more generally in contemporary statecraft.

**Territory and the state**

A growing body of scholarship confirms territory’s importance in reifying the state (Agnew 2013;
Moisio and Paasi 2013b; Murphy 2013; Paasi 1996). However, the means by which state and territory
imbricate is unclear. Paasi (2004, 275; emphasis added) perceptively frames the underlying conundrum by noting that “territory…refer[s] to classifying and controlling things and ideas in material and metaphysical spaces…it is located in the fuzzy area that brings patterns of nature and culture together”.

Three approaches to this conundrum are evident in the academic literature. From the perspective of territory as a state strategy, Brenner and Elden (2009) explore Lefebvre’s work to show territory’s importance to state evolution. Elden (2010a and b) develops this argument through historical examination of territory as a “political technology”: that is, a suite of “techniques for measuring and controlling” the world (Elden 2010a, 799). Conceptualising territory in this way as a “technology of state formation” (Strandsbjerg 2015, 4) compliments earlier work on the state as a relational and material entity (Abrams 1988; Mitchell 1991). This corpus highlights ‘the state’ as an ensemble of political relations, objects and things in continual flux, identifying creative tensions that require political ordering to reify “the state as an effect” (Mitchell 1991, 94). These orderings range from mundane practices requiring work and effort (Painter 2006, 2010) to highly formalised “state projects” (Jessop 1990, 9). Crucially Elden confirms the pervasive role of territory as political strategy in anchoring these disparate activities, thereby enabling state control to be rooted in the everyday.

A second strand of research meanwhile conceptualises the state as a socio-natural relation, where technologies are used less to exercise state power over space than to render nature as resources for capitalist accumulation (Bridge 2013a). As Parenti (2015, 830) reflects, “the modern state delivers non-human nature to [capitalist] accumulation…through its place-based property regimes; its production of infrastructure; and its scientific and intellectual practices that make bio-physical reality economically…accessible”. As well as facilitating resource exploitation, this enables nature to be framed territorially as ‘the environment’; in doing so, the state and environment become inextricably intertwined.
A third tranche of work is now emerging that seeks to explore territory and the state from a post-human/more-than-natural’ perspective. This advances nature as constituted from diverse materialities, with quasi-agential properties (Bakker and Bridge 2006; Whitehead et al. 2007; Bennett 2010). It follows that territory as land, sea, and air may resist or facilitate mobilisation as state technology, as nature continually unsettles political calibration for human-defined ends. Although the resulting tensions between territory as political technology and as a material and relational entity are now being examined (eg. Squire 2015; Boyce 2016 and the burgeoning work on elemental geographies (Jackson and Fannin 2011), the broader longitudinal effect on state development has not been considered. We posit the concept of a ‘material territory’ as a means of addressing this gap.

Unlike the portrayal of the state as a socio-natural relation, material territory foregrounds nature’s mutabilities as continually challenging state imaginaries and practices of spatial power. It thus encompasses the ceaseless interplay over time between political strategies to stabilise the geographical spaces of the state and the ructions and reinventions of these strategies prompted by territory’s physical, visceral and place-based specificities. The concept thus critiques reductionist ontologies of territory as space over which political power is unconditionally exercised, asserting instead its historical emergence from human and post-human multiplicities. From this viewpoint, alongside capital accumulation, it is inevitable that a ‘material territory’ is a significant driver of statecraft and of state periodization, defined by Brenner (2009, 134) as “how the various phases of [state] development are to be understood and differentiated from one another”.

This raises questions of how a material territory might figure in periodization. In particular, how do distinctive “architectures of state scalar organization” (Brenner 2009, 134) arise from material territory mediating/being mediated by political ordering at different times and in different spaces?

This requires analysis both of territorial fixities – attempts to order politically its materialities and mutabilities – as well as its mobilities (its circulations, material flows andimaginations), and how these play out in ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ domains. Instructive here is recent work by Brighenti (2014, 16) who observes how “the making of a territory entails the imagination and creation of a
relational programme between living beings, the script of an encounter, a project which comes to be inscribed into or projected onto specific materials”.

In conjunction with post-human reevaluations of territory, this helps identify the state as a “relational programme” that orchestrates over time materialities and imaginations of territory domestically and internationally for political effect, while recognising the concomitant and unpredictable effects of material territory in reworking this programme. In turn, this suggests limits to governability of territory not just in the domestic sphere, but also as discourses and practices of statecraft and diplomacy. For as Sassen (2013, 23) observes, “Territory takes on more formats than that of the national”, because its historical-geographical and material qualities exceed ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ domains. Moreover territory is one expression of polymorphous sociospatial relations that transcend place, scale and networks: each is constitutive of and expressive of the other (Clark and Jones 2008, 2013; Jessop et al. 2008).

Material territory then encompasses more than building the domestic state. Its significance as concept and practice is to interpenetrate domestic and foreign affairs to grant states seeming permanence in time and space (Murphy 2002, 2013). Here it is useful to consider how politicians and diplomats engage with the “modern geopolitical imagination”, that depicts “The world [as] actively spatialized...[to] provide the geographical framing within which political elites and mass publics act in the world in pursuit of their own identities and interests” (Agnew 2003, 3). From this perspective, territory furnishes the physical and symbolic capital for these elites to underwrite state presence through actions such as international border control, financial regulation, and resource management. Importantly relations with hegemonic states are negotiated in this geopolitical imagination, and “reactions to hegemony can entail [state] strategies that...reconfigure the institutional as well as the ideational dynamics that define territories” (Kadercan 2015, 154). Territory’s multiscaled sociospatialites thus pose elites with as many challenges as opportunities, arising not only because of its unpredictable materialities, but because territorial projections impact ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ domains differently. Most clearly, domestic state presence coheres around territorial fixities (eg.
codifications of territory through legal means or economic calculation), while for elites involved in
foreign affairs territorial mobilities are needed to “adjust to a world politics in constant evolution and
not just of their making” (Agnew 2010, 571).

Consequently we argue that by scrutinizing over time how territory as political ordering aligns with
the fixities and mobilities of a material territory, new insights can be derived into the relational state,
and into state periodization. Until recently, periodization was taken as shorthand for state chronology.
However following Brenner’s (2009, 124) pioneering work, geographers have begun to explore
periodization as more complex patterning of “how and why…state spatial forms evolve…and how
and why they vary across contexts and scales”. Yet so far these explorations have been confined to
political economy studies. While valuable, these overlook the equally important periodizations by and
through which materialities of territory have been ordered, and reordered, state political strategies of
territorial measurement and control over time, which is our aim here.

Excavating how these (re)ordering struggles evolve thus requires longitudinal analysis of territory’s
material-political relations, from pre-modern primitive accumulation generative of domestic/local pre-
modern territorial associations; through transition to sovereign authority over territories, and evolution
of political technologies in response to ruptures, breaks and crises arising from material territory; to
the accommodations struck between these materialities and the discourses and practices of the modern
state in ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ affairs. These analyses need to be sensitive to territorial fixities and
mobilities over time. From this perspective, state periodization can be reconceptualised as
intersections and accommodations between political power strategies for measuring, calculating and
reifying space with the mutabilities of material territory.

We therefore argue a crucial ingredient missing from periodization studies of the modern state is
condensation (Poulantzas 1978) of these material-relation struggles of territory, and how these fashion
the ‘domestic’ and the ‘foreign’. Here we seek to excavate these tensions empirically to demonstrate
the “imaginative and practical work…entailed” (Brighenti 2014, 14) in reconciling material territory
with realising the state as a political form. We begin by setting out how we applied this theoretical
approach to the Icelandic case.

**Methodology**

As Elden (2015, 101) reflects, “power-place relations at different scales [are] important to track the
emergence of…state territory”, a point that resonates with Brenner’s (2009, 135) assessment that “the
challenge of state periodization involves determining the degree to which the dominant scales of
institutional reorganization within a given territory have been qualitatively reshuffled” over time.
Tracking Icelandic state periodization longitudinally thus obliged us to use bespoke methodologies for
data collection and analysis, as follows.

Initially, six months’ archival research was undertaken to determine primitive/pre-modern territorial
associations in Iceland, focused on analysing cartographic records and maps held by the British
Library’s Scandinavian section. Analysing these materials enabled tracing of the precursors of
territory from the island’s settlement to the early medieval period. Secondly examination was made of
works on Icelandic history in order to generate a chronology of pre-modern political strategies of
territory, ranging from archival descriptions of land management and historic trading records, to
reports, articles and contemporary legal documents. Translations from Icelandic were made for us by
professional agencies.

Thirdly we conducted detailed empirical scrutiny of modern state-territory relations. Following
Foucault, this was structured around three concepts: “orderings” of territory as pre-modern/state-
based objectives, instituted for particular spatial effect; “technologies” as the practical rationalities
needed to implement these orderings, for example through territorial strategies and latterly public
policies; and “governmentalities” as the techniques (concepts and practices) delivering these
strategies. Contemporary primary research comprised semi-structured interviews conducted during
2010-2013 in English with Icelandic politicians, civil servants, civil society groups and citizens, and
with senior non-Icelandic (American, Danish and Norwegian) diplomats and attachés to provide a
comprehensive range of views on the territorial orderings of the country. This happened to coincide with the country’s negotiations over possible accession to the European Union (EU), furnishing an apposite case study of contemporary periodization. In adopting this threefold approach we recognised the interdependencies between each methodological strand, with archival and historical work tracking pre-modern orderings of space, and material territory informing data collection on modern state orderings.

As Brenner notes, the crucial question in periodization studies is the criteria used for delimitating periods or episodes. Following the argument that territory is both polymorphous (comprised of multiple sociospatialities; Jessop et al. 2008) and polysemous (derived from multiple imaginaries, Paasi 2004), our approach was to examine the fixities and mobilities of ‘material territory’ in terms of change in actions, imaginations and events in the territory-state relation (see Table 1). Specifically we looked for discontinuities in the scales, places and networks that mobilised or engaged with the materialities of Icelandic territory. From this perspective, state periodization emerges as change in “the ensemble of acts aimed at stabilizing a [material] territory” (Brighenti 2014, 17)

Based on this approach, and our reconceptualization of state periodization as evolutionary material-political process, four periodizing episodes were identified: Corporeal/associational/natural bases of territory; At-a-distance spaces of political control and ‘economic territory’; Defining the Icelandic state: spaces, volumes, knowledges; and Volumetric orderings and Iceland in the modern geopolitical imagination. These are used to structure the paper. Our focus on territory as a material-political category provides an underlying and hitherto under-researched variable that cuts across trade, domestic and external drivers of Icelandic history, criteria used for state periodization in earlier studies (Aðils 1915; Þorsteinsson and Jónsson 1991). It also enables forensic examination of how material territory animates periodization episodes both conceptually and practically.

[TABLE 1 HERE]
1: The corporeal/associational/natural bases of Icelandic territory

Mann (1986, 2003) notes how pre-modern territorialisation, as expressed through individual, domestic and community behaviours, began the process of defining the scope and extent of human authority over space. As Elden (2010a) demonstrates, central to this is land as a form of territorialisation, and Waage (2012, 182) specifies three notions of land in early Icelandic literature.

The first is ‘natural’. Settled from c.870 AD, colonists were confronted by the uninhabited island’s immense spaces: their “focus [wa]s not on the land itself, but on the distances, movement, and relocation… independent of human existence”. Settlers thus positioned themselves in relation to nature through corporeal acts to chart Iceland’s environments. This conception has clear resonances with post-human debates on nature’s materialities and mobilities (Adey 2006; Bakker and Bridge 2006).

Waage also identifies land formalised as an economic good in these accounts, through settlers establishing farmsteads to claim ‘rightful’ ownership. In contrast to the ‘natural’ category, this ad nema (‘to take’) notion defined land as property, requiring institutionalisation across space and time through law and inheritance rights. Ad nema land then was instrumental to the eventual emergence of national political economy. Waage’s (2012, 182) third conception is “ad byggja” (‘to build’), the idea that land is an inherently social category “brought into existence by settlement, suggesting the inseparability of an area and its people”. This emphasises the building of a peopled territory, materialised through formation of clans, and defending land rights through physical force. As we show, this construction has conferred an intrinsic sensibility to bundle and control nature in novel ways, particularly over Icelandic designation of natural resources.

By delineating sociospatial organizing of land, we argue these three notions acted as territory’s antecedents (cf. Elden 2010a), encapsulating human attempts to stabilise nature’s unruliness through political ordering: originally via pre-modern institutions of family and the clan. Crucially however, the ‘natural’ category has continually resisted and at times unravelled the cultural impress of ad
nema/ad byggia. As we show, while these material-political coherences have been overwritten by foreign occupation they have proved surprisingly resilient, underwriting primitive accumulation (particularly agriculture and fisheries), and nodes of social-political organizing (community and religious institutions) to configure mobilities and fixities of territory (Lacey 1998).

From its settlement until 1262 Iceland was governed through chieftaincies or godorð, whose irregular domains were based on corporeal and associational rather than spatial boundaries, partly to respond more easily to changing clan allegiances, and the materialities of a harsh subsistence life (Jakobsson 2011). Godorð were loosely organised through the Alþing (national assembly), an annual summer gathering of freemen and chieftains from across the country. Here chieftains elected the ‘Lawspeaker’, with responsibilities inter alia for codifying and adjudicating land disputes. Over time, this began to make land holding a form of political ordering (Bjöck 2002) and in c. 965, the Alþing sanctioned the first spatial division of the country into four quarters with their own courts. The Catholic Church was also crucial in promoting this novel spatial-legal conception of land, with its holdings delimited as bishoprics and parishes after AD1000. Hence the Church and the Alþing began to define land as political (spatial-legal) ordering, rather than through the corporeal or associational means of clans.

The Alþing’s production of a lawbook (landnámabók) in 1117 institutionalised these land rights as the first national register of property ownership. The oral tradition of stories also began to be written down at this time in a distinctive Icelandic language as sagas, reinforcing spatial inscription of human practice onto landscapes (Hoggart 2010). The lineaments of territory as political technology thus arose from a fusion of law-making, religion, geography, and language (Karlsson 2004). In turn, this intermingling of land’s material and political attributes both drove and was consolidated by pre-modern forms of political power and identity, namely the Church, the Alþing, and the godorð. Together, this constituted a putative political identity, the Godaveldisölð (‘chieftain state’) or Commonwealth.
Nonetheless, the Goðaveldisöld was soon overtaken by growing tensions between chieftains over the older corporeal and newer calculative constructions of land, heightening their political rivalries and culminating in clan warfare. Intervention by the Kingdom of Norway followed, within which Iceland was subsumed in c.1260. Subsequent unrest and civil war in Norway led to the Norwegian and Danish Kingdoms being united under the Danish monarchy in 1380. As part of Denmark, a new period began in the material-political relations of Icelandic territory.

2: At-a-distance spaces of political control and ‘economic territory’

For decades, geographic distance rendered the Danish Crown largely ineffective in Iceland, allowing the bishoprics at Skálholt and Hólar to consolidate their power through tithes, building churches, and establishing parishes (Jóhannesson 1974). In this power vacuum other European states (including England) began to exploit Icelandic space, particularly its fisheries. It was only with Danish conversion to Lutheranism that the bishoprics were directly challenged. Danish officials began dissolving monasteries in the 1540s, but faced strong resistance. Following an armed uprising organized by the Bishop of Hólar, in 1551 military forces landed and resistance was quashed (Gunnarsson 1987).

The resulting reordering of Iceland was fundamental and far-reaching. Most clearly, imposition of Dependency status in 1602 deprived the population of any governing role, with the Danish Crown seeking to extract maximum economic value from land at minimum cost (Ringler 2002). As Brenner and Elden (2009, 368-369) note, “...territory...is a broad, historically and geographically specific set of processes, particularly evident at determined moments”. To facilitate the Danish goal to reorder Iceland as economic territory, new extractive technologies were introduced.

First, Iceland was viewed by the Danes solely through the prism of commoditization, with annual quotas set for fish, wool and agricultural goods, exported through specially established coastal entrepôts (Eggertsson 1994). This economic conception of territory was institutionalised through imposing mercantilism and, latterly, a trade monopoly, demonstrating law’s importance in
underwriting territory as political technology, for “… the focus is on the qualities of territory, that is, precisely that which can be measured” (Elden 2013, 13). Indirectly, this imposition of mercantilism gave the pre-modern ad nema conception of land new legitimacy.

‘Economic territory’ was also reordered as agrarian, arising from the at-a-distance calculation of the Danish Crown to maintain a low, easily extracted and sustainable source of revenue (Gunnarsson 1987). The socio-economic consequences were dramatic. As late as 1703, 96 per cent of the population were still tenant farmers (Larusson 1967). This ‘agrarian vocation’ was normalised by statutes requiring virtually all adults to work on farms, while forbidding foreigners to overwinter in the country when fish stocks were abundant. English and Baltic influences in Iceland were thereby abated, enabling Denmark to exploit inshore fisheries; in fact fish, through their winter feeding grounds, determined where coastal settlements were established (Gustafsson 1985).

Iceland was therefore recast as calculative economic space. Mercantilism altered territory at all scales, from the macro-economic structure of the trade monopoly, to establishing entrepôts and charting new sea lanes to Copenhagen, down to the imposition of extractive land management practices (Winkler 1861). Foreign rule brought the first national census and natural resource survey and some improvement in literacy and living standards, with Denmark enjoying seeming complete political-strategic and economic control through technologies of revenue collection, law and cartography.

[FIGURE 1 HERE]

Notwithstanding economic ordering, nature’s materialities challenged mercantilism. Figure 1 vividly conveys the cartographic anxieties and unpredictabilities of territory for the Danish Crown. The physical act of surveying for this document was a formidable undertaking, exacerbated by the featureless terrain of the central Highlands and surveyors’ genuine fear of Iceland’s uninhabited interior (Þóroddsen 1896/2004). Moreover, elemental mobilities such as mudslides, volcanic eruptions (Katla 1755, and Hekla in 1766) and earthquakes continually disrupted the fixities of land management and trading, creating resistances to Copenhagen’s economic calculations.
Territorial mobilities were expressed in other ways, too. Climatic cooling during the 17th and 18th centuries resulted in regular crop failures. However, it was the catastrophic eruption of Laki in 1783-4 resulting in c. 10,000 deaths (almost 20% of Iceland’s population) and the ensuing móðuharðindi (‘famine of the haze’) that rocked the mercantilist Dependency to its foundations (Ringler 2002). Ultimately this threatened the country’s existence, and led to withdrawal of the trade monopoly in 1787. Interestingly recent tephrochronological studies show that only by reverting to the smallscale ad byggia and ad nema land management practices of the first settlers was “the viability of the socioeconomic order” stabilised (Streeter et al. 2012, 3669).

Mann (1986) discusses the role of ideology as a crucial ingredient in state formation, and landscapes acted at this time as focal points for the crystallisation of Icelandic political consciousness and national identity (Hastrup 2008). According to Oslund (2011, 45), the Laki eruption clearly demonstrates this interrelation: “The barren lava fields left behind by the Laki eruption…represented the failures of the Danish state and the administration of the island. While volcanic eruptions were natural occurrences, the responsibility for controlling them and their effects lay with [Danish] people”. Yet equally this episode tellingly reveals the failure of the Danish Crown to appreciate how nature could unravel the fixities of political ordering and identity through the mobilities of eruptions: how lava flows and choking ash clouds could obliterate state infrastructures to expose the frailties of a surficial, rather than a volumetric, calculation of territorial power. Thus material territory appears to have prefigured Icelandic nationalism rather than being shaped by it. Indeed calls for political autonomy focussed initially not on seeking independence, but on clarifying Iceland’s status as part of Denmark: a consequence of the profound interdependencies forged through the material-political relations of territoryiv (Karlsson 2000).

By the 19th century, with the climate worsening, mass emigration to the US and Canada began. The crisis in material and political relations caused by the natural coupled with growing nationalist sentiment among Icelanders was finally acknowledged by the Danish crown in 1845 with
reinstatement of the *Alþing* as an advisory body. Absolutism was abolished in Denmark just three years later, starting a process of wresting sovereignty from Copenhagen’s at-a-distance relations, with the country finally gaining independence in 1918. This ushered in state formation and the first attempts by an Icelandic state to grapple with the material-political relations of territory.

3: Defining the Icelandic state: spaces, volumes, knowledges

In defining state identity and presence, the crucial task for the first governments was to address the legacy of Danish colonialism. Fundamental to this was to recalibrate territorial orderings, technologies and governmentalities to take account of the country’s uneven population distribution and immense spaces and distances; for Iceland was both “too small and too large a territory” (Hartthaler 1999, 57-58). Shaping a new state territory also reflected human attempts to ‘master nature’ in the face of its apparent unpredictability and destructiveness.

State strategies played a crucial role here (Brenner and Elden 2009) and in 1921 Iceland became one of the first European countries to introduce spatial planning in order to map, delimit and attempt to control territory. This calibration of a distinctive state presence around national economic development materialised first as programmes of road building and telegraph communications (particularly around Reykjavik), with state initiatives to stem rural depopulation and outmigration (Lacey 1998). Ordering territory as a modernist project of ‘national planned space’ also required defining the natural through introducing territorial knowledges. For centuries, underground hot springs and geysers had been used for domestic purposes. Yet institutionalisation and dissemination as a territorial practice, geothermal energy, began only in 1930, when a three kilometre pipeline was constructed to Reykjavik to heat two schools, 60 homes, and the main hospital. In 1943, the first district heating company was established. By 1945, an 18 kilometre pipeline ran through the city, servicing over 2,850 homes (Bjornsson 2006).

Crucially, the state codified geothermal energy as a volumetric, rather than a surficial construction of territory (Elden 2013b). This confirmed the state’s assertion of not just the reach, but the height and
depth of its political ambitions: in effect, a physical embedding of political authority nationally (cf.
Elden’s (2013b, 8) argument on how the “depth of [state] power” derives from volumetric calculation
of space). Indicative is how volumetric territory opened up exploitation of other elemental energies by
the state, including hydropower, which facilitated new forms of territorial exploitation, notably the
aluminium smelting sector. This terrestrial recalibration complimented the introduction of marine
diesel engines in the 1900s and sonar in the 1950s that enabled marine volumes to be reconstituted as
abundant demersal fisheries (particularly herring and cod).

New volumetric ordering however ran alongside continuities with pre-modern territorialities’. Thus
following independence the ad nema conception of possessing land was implicitly endorsed through
consolidation of an identity politics based around the emergence of ‘clan-like’ behaviours in banking,
finance and business, and government intervention in farming and fishing (Pálsson and Helgason
1996). Indeed these sectoral interests, emphasising property ownership and corporate control and
exploitation of natural resources, underwrote the building (ad byggja) of the Icelandic state, and their
mobilisation of territorialities continues to inveigle everyday life and politics in a fundamental way.
For example the Independence Party, a conservative grouping that either on its own or in coalition has
been a government party many times since 1944, still draws its popular support and financial backing
from communities dependent on fishing. This bond between territory and domestic political identity is
further cemented through over-representation of rural constituencies in the Alþing.

In building the Icelandic state great reliance was therefore placed on territorial orderings imprinting
political relations onto everyday life to legitimize authority. In effect, state presence has been derived
from spatial extent, volume and verticality of territory (Braun 2004), with ensuing struggles to capture
‘the natural’ using these political technologies playing an integral part in state periodization.

However, this chthonic territory-state relation has not simply underwritten domestic state presence: it
has also driven political identity formation within the modern geopolitical imagination. We examine
this aspect next.
4: Volumetric orderings and Iceland in the modern geopolitical imagination

Danish mercantilism had demonstrated to Icelanders how territory transcends the domestic domain. Unsurprisingly therefore territory as political ordering also became the lodestone for foreign affairs: the means for Iceland to adapt to a world politics in flux (Kadercan 2015). Yet capturing territory to project state presence internationally has proved difficult. Not least, its unruly materialities have proved even less amenable to governing when stretched across the multiple sites, places and actors of the modern geopolitical imagination. Moreover, within this imagination Iceland’s politicians and diplomats have had to negotiate alternate territorial orderings for the country held by dominant powers (particularly the US) intent on casting the island as a site of formal geopolitics. As Agnew (2014, 318) comments “various spatialities of power are at work in the world to condition and limit the operation of territory as…spatial organization”, and Icelandic territory has been refracted through this geopolitical imagination on multiple occasions. Two “state projects” (Jessop 1990, 9), underwritten by geostrategic and maritime territories respectively, demonstrate the consequences for state periodization.

Iceland as geostrategic territory arose from its occupation by the British and latterly the US during World War Two to control transatlantic sea lanes. The post-War period saw deteriorating US-USSR relations, accentuating the country’s importance to the US (Ingimundarson 2004). As the Cold War took hold, in 1949 western European states, Canada and the US instigated a new ordering in the modern geopolitical imagination, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). For Iceland, securing NATO membership as a “state project” offered the country shelter, with membership secured in 1949 in the face of vociferous public opposition.

However, this came at the cost of the island being recast by the US as a space of interdiction in a strategic ocean area, the so-called ‘Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap’: a bulwark of US defence space to prevent Soviet air, sea and submarine transit. Successive US administrations in the 1950s and ‘60s were concerned that a Soviet occupation of Iceland would directly threaten the US (Ingimundarson 1999). Addressing this dilemma required Icelandic territory to be reinscribed at the
US’s behest as a volumetric and vertical geostrategy, governed through military-industrial technologies. First was construction of the Icelandic Sound Surveillance System (ISOSUS), a complex installation of audio detection devices placed on the Atlantic Ocean floor to prosecute anti-Soviet submarine warfare (Woodard 1991). Secondly, the government agreed to major US investment in aerial surveillance systems to deter overflights by Russian bombers. This comprised national radar arrays and major expansion of Keflavik air base to station maritime patrol aircraft, fighter-interceptors and missile batteries, creating the Icelandic Military Air Defence Zone (IMADIZ) (Sigurdsson 2000). Icelandic politicians cannily played on the country’s resulting geopolitical significance to NATO, leveraging Marshall Aid, trade and airline privileges from the US during the 1950s (Ingimundarson 2004).

ISOSUS and IMADIZ became the key geostrategic technologies of Icelandic territory during the Cold War: attempts to render calculable the opacities of oceanic and atmospheric volumes. Yet while reliant on leading-edge industrial military hardware and design, ‘plugging the GIUK gap’ also demonstrated profound historical-geographical continuities. For in essence these technologies were a new instantiation of ad byggia that sought to mobilise these volumes to build a fortified territory. As under the Danish dependency, therefore, Iceland’s occupation by the US wrought a fundamental recharting of territory, but using a geopolitical rather than a geoeconomic compass.

Iceland as maritime territory was progressively defined through confrontations during the 1950s and 1970s with the United Kingdom – the so-called ‘Cod Wars’. Each was characterised by brinkmanship, confirming fisheries as pivotal to domestic interests, and central to a new state project based on a volumetric calculation of the country’s teeming marine resources. Nonetheless the Cod Wars also confirm powerful relationalities exerted by the marine. The state was effectively forced to acknowledge nature’s capacity to remake foreign policy, even to the point where war was considered ‘legitimate’ state behaviour. Hartthaler (1999, 67) refers to the “fisherman’s mentality” among politicians at this time: “a tendency to focus on quick, spontaneous action”, which the author likens to the movement of a shoal of fish. Thus while events were portrayed in the UK as British trawlers battling for their livelihoods, significantly in Iceland they were enacted as the landhelgisstriðin: “the
war for the territorial waters” against a former imperial power (Ingimundarson 2003). First-hand
accounts from trawler skippers and naval officers are certainly warlike and spatial, rife with
contradictory accounts of position, distance and velocities of merchant and military vessels (Platten
2013), records of physical collisions, and the trajectory of shellfire (Welch 2006).

Significantly it was the Icelandic threat to close Keflavik that prompted resolution of this conflict
between the two NATO countries in 1976. Iceland had already announced its intention to extend its
domestic fishing limits to 200 miles in July 1975, which, together with other marine resource rights,
was consolidated as an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by the United Nations in 1982. Politicians
had wagered Iceland’s geopolitical significance for high stakes to project the country globally. By
using coastguard ships and converted trawlers to exert maritime possession during the
landhelgisstríðin, the “border fixity” of island status (Atzili 2012) was overcome, with the EEZ
physically extending Icelandic territory by a massive 760,000 square kilometres\(^{\text{vi}}\). These events
underscore Elden’s (2013a, 14) comment that “what is of particular interest is the quantification of
space and the role of calculative mechanisms in the commanding of territory”. This outcome also
indicates the potential for small states to refigure the modern geopolitical imagination, suggestive of it
as not simply an hegemonic construction, but a more nuanced material-relational assemblage of
transaction and negotiation among international actors.

Enclosing and ‘onshoring’ this maritime volume as fisheries resource occurred in 1990, through
introduction of Individual Transferrable Quotas (ITQ). ITQs assigned to boat owners a percentage of
the annual catch, allowing deepwater fisheries to be reinscribed as a domestic possession, confirming
fluidity of ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ affairs. However, as many trawlers were already in corporate
ownership, ITQs bolstered the financial power of fishing cartels, facilitating business and political
connections and reinforcing an older instantiation of territory – the ‘clan turf’, and the role of the
chieftain (Pálsson and Helgason 1996). Over time these clannish identities became so intertwined
their shared commercial dealings are known publically as ‘the Octopus’ – an appropriate metaphor,
given the recalibration of public life as much by the marine\(^{\text{vii}}\) as by the economic.
Under David Oddsson’s government, state-owned fish processing factories were sold off as part of wider privatisation, while continued buying and selling of fisheries quota fuelled expansion of domestic credit markets. This demonstrated how far ‘the natural’ had penetrated the Icelandic state, for fish had effectively left “the seas and becom[e] enfolded into new chains of legal and financial experience via particular scale-switching practices” of physical landings, investment decisions and spot-market forecasts (Maguire 2015, 141). Nonetheless, the mutabilities of the marine provided uncertain foundations for contemporary political orderings of territory. At the same time, overseas foreign investments by Icelandic companies increased dramatically, off the back of which the Oddsson Government proclaimed the need to adhere to global, rather than territorial, metrics of statecraft.

Oddsson’s resulting deterritorialised model of economic development envisioned scale-spanning networks ‘touching down’ in Reykjavík, and benchmarking of Icelandic GNP with the G-7 countries (Portes et al. 2007). The three national banks were privatised in the late 1990s to facilitate this deterritorialization, enabling further expansion of credit markets. A new entrepreneurial business class, the útrásarvíkingar (literally the ‘outvasion Vikings’) went on spending ‘raids’ internationally, buying up global corporate brands – particularly in Iceland’s former occupying states Denmark and the UK. By October 2008, the debt load of the privatised banks exceeded nine times national GDP. Financial collapse and the country’s near bankruptcy followed (characterised as the kreppa: literally crisis and suffering).

Novel vertical and volumetric technologies and governmentalities of territory have thus underpinned both domestic and foreign affairs in Iceland. Nonetheless, their foundational rationalities have spilled over from centuries-old pre-modern territorialisation – ad byggia (building Icelandic territory – ISOSUS, IMADIZ and EEZ) and ad nema (taking possession of territorial waters through ITQs). As these geostrategic and maritime examples show, the fixities and mobilities of material territory have decisively shaped state periodization, sometimes at catastrophic cost. Hence while massive capital outflows destroyed the Icelandic economy, it could be argued the purging of territory from the state’s spatial registers by the Oddsson Government unravelled the Icelandic polity.
Such tensions and pressures are, we contend, also evident in the country’s entanglement with European Union (EU) accession. This recent episode again demonstrates how ‘material territory’ drives contemporary state periodization (Jones and Clark 2013a). The resulting intersections are briefly examined here.

Following the cataclysm of the káppa, politicians sought for ways to rebuild the Icelandic state. One possibility was to reinstate maritime territory as the fulcrum of foreign policy to secure shelter for the shattered economy through deepening relations with the EU. This was made possible in 2009 when a Social Democrat-Left Green coalition government took office. After difficult talks with its anti-European Left Green partners – and in direct response to continued financial turbulence – the Social Democrats ratified a “state project” (Jessop 1990, 9) to apply for EU membership, and to begin preliminary accession negotiations (‘prenegotiations’) (Clark and Jones 2012). The Coalition Government’s uneasy position on EU membership was bridged through mutual recognition of territory-state relation as decisive to the application. The Coalition Government thus endorsed assertion of ‘Maritime Iceland’ in prenegotiations – a fluid land:sea ordering based on enormously productive fisheries. The centrality of this projection was confirmed in accession documents through Iceland’s depiction as a fish (Figure 2).

[FIGURE 2 HERE]

‘Maritime Iceland’ allowed the relational state to cohere around fisheries, political autonomy, and prosperity, allowing mobilisation by political fractions with radically different beliefs. For opponents of EU membership, it offered the means to slow or to stall discussions with the European Commission, by placing strenuous demands during prenegotiations over fisheries (Jones and Clark 2013b, Jones and Clark 2016). By contrast for EU proponents, if independent management of the EEZ was secured in prenegotiations, ‘Maritime Iceland’ would act as a bridge to European shelter. This political ordering therefore allowed condensation (Poulantzas 1978) of Icelandic state presence in the
modern geopolitical imagination around a common projection that concealed diverse domestic identities.

Running through all Government documentation circulated to the EU was emphasis on Icelandic territory as harsh and uncompromising. So in the Government’s General Position statement to the European Council (Icelandic Government 2010), territory evokes the sensibilities and feelings of the country’s settlers: “Iceland would be the most westerly member state, remotely situated and faced with harsh natural conditions. It would be the only one located in its entirety within the Arctic region. These unique features will shape the negotiations in the months to come” (Icelandic Government 2010, Art. 14). This document also presented national technologies and governmentalties of fisheries as inviolable (“The lifeblood of the Icelandic economy”), and depicted the EEZ as a cultural, as much as an economic resource – a product of the bitter struggles to build Iceland, invoking the spirit of ad byggia land. Implicit throughout this document is the importance of geohistorical specificities of the Cod Wars to underscore territory as an enduring political technology of ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ affairs.

As important as making these territorial claims was the opportunity afforded by prenegotiations to explore how EU membership would reconfigure the orderings, technologies and governmentalties of the state (Clark and Jones 2009). For although vigorously denied by the Coalition Government, prenegotiations formalised new at-a-distance territorial calculations between Reykjavík and Brussels, instituting negotiating benchmarks (new orderings), foregrounding policies such as the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (new technologies), and threatening to disperse powers from fisheries and agricultural cartels to multiple agencies at different levels (new governmentalties). In essence, the Icelandic state as the embodiment of material-political relations of territory would be challenged by EU law, putting in doubt forms of political power and identity embedded in decades-old sectoral corporatism. Certainly, negotiators knew adoption of the CFP and the CAP meant remapping of primary resources (particularly fisheries), while tacitly acknowledging
that “given the historical memory [of the Cod Wars], it would be almost impossible politically to allow foreign vessels to return to Icelandic fishing grounds” (Sigfusson 2004, 5).

Ultimately, prenegotiations proved too divisive and, with the election in 2013 of a right-of-centre Government against EU membership, the application was effectively withdrawn. However talks had already unearthed deep concern over the complex de- and reterritorialisations required by EU membership. More than that, it showed that territory as political technology of the state was increasingly questioned by a knowledgeable enfranchised population, distrustful of previous elite ‘sell-outs’ (particularly over NATO membership and the handling of the káppa), and eminently capable of mobilising alternative territorial imaginaries through written, spoken and social media. The depths of ‘Maritime Iceland’ had been plumbed to reveal a country intensely sceptical of the state’s use of territory as political technology.

Conclusion

This paper has examined material territory as the ceaseless interplay over time between political strategies to stabilise state spaces, and their ruction and reinvention through territory’s physical, visceral and place-based specificities. We have shown how the Icelandic state is a condensation of the ensuing struggles between political technologies of control and the materialities of nature. We have also demonstrated how key moments in elaborating pre-modern territorialities (‘natural’, ad nema, and ad byggja) furnished the preconditions necessary for state formation, confirming territory as “an important type of spatial arrangement through which power is deployed and experienced but which is not limited to the state” (Agnew 2013, 2 emphasis added). Thus material-relational coherences at different scales (family, kinship, clan) have underwritten the state as a relational form, ordering nature through corporeal/associational and legal means to foster sectoral identities that have mobilised ‘the natural’ for political purposes, resulting in strong domestic presence. In turn, the state, from Dependency to independence, has shaped political technologies of territory (eg. spatial planning, volumetric and vertical territories). ‘Modernity’ and ‘progress’ have thus been defined by state attempts to devise new political technologies with which to calculate and capture nature.
The Icelandic case is also instructive for the ways in which territory has been (re)made outside its geographic limits: notably through the economic calculation of mercantilism in Copenhagen, and as ‘US Defence Space’ crafted by the Pentagon. These at-a-distance conceptions of territory have blurred the ‘domestic’ and the ‘foreign’ to provide foundational rationalisations of Iceland’s place globally. Since independence, successive governments have sought to keep the ‘domestic’ and the ‘foreign’ together through territorial orderings that address the interests of domestic constituencies and project state presence into the modern geopolitical imagination. ‘Maritime Iceland’ is one example, constituted from volumes, technologies and liquid and solid spaces, places and things (as diverse as audio detection and radar, to geothermal pipelines and fisheries quota). However contemporary Iceland’s reliance upon sectoral identities to structure domestic order has had major implications for diplomacy, for example closing down the possibilities for stronger bilateral relations (eg. with the UK), and for cultivating shelter with potential external allies (eg. EU accession). The study thus confirms the categorical error of the “domestic/foreign polarity” of the “territorial trap” (Agnew 1994, 65).

Territorial mobilisations have required considerable effort and work by politicians in the face of rival US claims made within the modern geopolitical imagination. From this study, it appears territory’s material-political coherences lose legitimacy, and are more open to challenge, when stretched over scales. The crucial importance of territorial registers in stabilising the state is demonstrated by the dramatic consequences resulting from the Oddsson Government’s abrupt deterritorialisation of Iceland’s domestic and foreign policy domains. Overall therefore, while existing scholarship characterises the country’s post-War development as about ‘sovereignty and fish’, we have shown this misses the underlying cementation provided by territory as political technology

We have also identified territory’s mobilities – and its resulting ungovernability – in terms of the natural continually resisting state calculations. Volcanoes, earthquakes, and famine have reconfigured Iceland politically as much as physically. Similarly, attempts to build Iceland vertically (airspace
through MADUZ) and laterally (through EEZ) have demanded intense state efforts to measure and control land, air and sea. Material territory (from lava flows and ash clouds to shoals of fish) has intervened constantly in state periodization, and its quasi-agency means “Anything is possible – the worst disasters or the most flexible evolutions” (Guattari 2000, 66). The geographies of Iceland’s atmosphere and especially its subsurface are crucial here: for just as “The underground is a very particular spatial context” (Bridge 2013b, 55), so too is ‘underwater’. The Icelandic case demonstrates statecraft grappling with underwater fluidities and mobilities through attempts to seize its ‘buried treasures’ via EEZ, and to assay its depths and potential for military subterfuge through Cold War technologies such as ISOSUS. The Icelandic state has to live with the continued unruliness of material territory and its often shocking consequences – from eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull and Bardarbunga remapping its political economies, to the political-strategic ‘Mackerel War’ with the UK and the EU.

The Icelandic experience thus shows periodization matters to territory-state debates. Not least, by excavating periodization as concept and practice we have demonstrated the importance of pre-modern territorialisation through kinship, clans and the Church as precursive of state territory, and the continuity of these coherences over time. In particular, periodization foregrounds the tensions between the natural and political-strategic facets of territory as central to state formation and change: the resulting patterns of (in)stability drive periodization. Secondly, the spatiotemporalities of particular periodizations reveal the state as coexisting with, and being constituted from, multiple territorial identities (from clannish business behaviours and hegemonic imaginations, to knowledgeable publics; Murphy 2010). In doing so the state is revealed as the site of multiple territorialities in space, and territorial multiplicities over time. Thirdly by zooming in on the imbrication of the state and nature, we have shown how our approach contributes to understanding states as mobile rather than fixed or static formations. In drawing these conclusions, it is of course important to recognise caveats: islands are, after all, a highly specialised form of state-territory interaction. Yet as Mountz (2014, 3) observes, they “are also revealing, offering spatial form, pattern, and logics that are everywhere reproduced”. Overall, our view is that material territory’s role in state periodization warrants further examination in other empirical contexts.
We conclude that periodization of the Icelandic state is founded upon the creative and conflictive
tensions between territory as a political technology of the state, and as quasi-agential in its own right.
Crucially however, as Iceland’s EU imbroglio shows, territory is also created through the collective
practices of people\(^\text{x}\): it is realised and perpetuated in and through their everyday activities, as much as
through the political calculations of politicians. So while territory is central to informing the often
grandiose (de)illusions of diplomacy, it also constitutes one of the principal means of everyday
geopolitical seeing. In doing so, it will remain a significant influence upon state periodization into the
21\(^{\text{st}}\) century.

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End notes

i ‘Elites’ are defined here as actors whose scaled imaginations and practices seek to calibrate, manage and/or
project control over ‘material territory’.

ii While any division of history is ultimately arbitrary, our fourfold periodization coincides broadly with that of
Karlsson’s (2000) history of change in the political-administrative form of Icelandic government

iii Thus Waage (2012) notes ad byggja land has security and military connotations associated with ‘the defence
of the land’ (land-vurn), ‘defenders of the land’ (land-varnarmaður), and ‘the guarding-defence of land’ (land-
gæzla).

iv The sjálfsæðisbaráttta or “the struggle for independence” came later. From 1918 to1944, although Iceland was
sovereign (The Kingdom of Iceland), the Danish Crown retained custody of its foreign affairs. Severing this
connection happened only with British/US occupation of Iceland in 1940-41, and German occupation of
Denmark in 1941, resulting in Iceland becoming a republic in 1944
Ad nema and ad byggja are archaic terms that are not in common usage in Iceland. As we seek to show however, both have powerful resonances within the country’s contemporary statecraft, providing a key to unlock the continuing “allure of territory” (Murphy 2013) for Icelandic politicians and diplomats.

Compared with Iceland’s total land area of c. 100,250 km². This creation of ‘fluid’ territory through territorial calculations has some parallels with China’s manufacture of islands at Johnson South Reef in the south China Sea.

The pervasiveness of ‘Maritime territory’ as the national ‘way of seeing’ and experiencing the country is neatly summarised in Durrenburger’s (1996, 184) description: “political mobilisation, national self-determination, capital investment, wage labour and the hope of a prosperous future all developed together to link fishing, the sea, prosperity, national and individual independence into a single gestalt in terms of which Icelanders now understand their recent past and present”

Recently as a corrective to this ‘deterritorialisation’, politicians have sought to carve out a new territorial inscription for Iceland through assertion of its status as ‘front door’ or ‘gateway’ to the Arctic. This latest instantiation of ad byggja portrays the country as a nexus of transarctic shipping in order to cement ties with China (Ingimundarson 2015).

This was demonstrated again in April 2016 with the ousting of Prime Minister Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson. Media coverage focussed on his use of overseas shell companies to conceal personal tax liabilities, but public opinion seemed as shocked by his attempts to overcome the country’s boundedness for personal gain, and his neglect of Prime Ministerial oversight of domestic territory in favour of ‘the offshore’
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<td>PERIODIZATION</td>
<td>At-a-distance spaces of political control: codifying ‘material territory’ as economic c.AD 1240-1900</td>
<td>At-a-distance political control; attempts to codify ‘material territory’ as ‘natural resources’</td>
<td>Physical distance; volatilities (volcanism, earthquakes, famine)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MODERN STATE</td>
<td>Defining the Icelandic state: spaces, volumes, knowledges: calibrating ‘material territory’ spatially/volumetrically c.AD 1900-1944</td>
<td>Spatial planning; state territorial knowledges (hydropower, geothermal)</td>
<td>Space as ‘too large’; population as ‘too small’</td>
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<td>Volumetric orderings and Iceland in the modern geopolitical imagination: capture of coexistence with ‘material territory’ c.AD1944-</td>
<td>Military-industrial (ISISOS); scientific-technological (EEZ)</td>
<td>Maritime and atmospheric volumes</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: ‘Material territory’ and state periodization in Iceland
Figure 1: Map of Iceland by Abraham Ortelius (1590), dedicated to Frederick II of Denmark. Note the anxieties engendered by the ‘natural’ through its depiction as disruptive (sea monsters, volcanoes, driftwood, pack ice) and unknown/unknowable (little coverage of the central Highlands) [source: Scandinavian Section, British Library].
Figure 2: The Icelandic Government’s logo for EU accession negotiations [source: Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs]