POMPEY IN THE CONTIO*

Huius oratio ut semper gravis et grata in contionibus fuit

(Cic. Sest. 107)

his speech was serious and pleasing, as it always is in such assemblies.¹

Cicero’s praise of Pompey’s eloquence in the contio as generally impressive should be read as part of his glorification of his most prominent supporter in the attempts to recall Cicero from exile. Yet, it points to an aspect of Pompey’s political profile that is often overlooked, namely his oratorical performances and their effect on his audience and his political career. His speeches delivered in the senate, the courts and the popular assemblies (the contiones) are often mentioned in passing only. However, they provide an important means to understanding Pompey’s political strategy and his career as a top politician. His speeches delivered in the contio, in particular, provide a coherent picture of a man consciously nurturing a relationship with the popular audience in order to build and maintain a political career for himself. In this article, I aim to analyse Pompey’s oratorical performances in the contio with a view to establishing the effect of his oratory on his audience and its implications for his political career.²

Pompey’s oratorical skills are only rarely discussed in the ancient sources and modern scholarship, partly as a result of the meagre and scattered nature of the evidence.³ Indeed, we have no secure verbatim quotations from Pompey’s speeches. Yet a close reading of passages mentioning his eloquence, or descriptions of specific performances in the contio in particular, can help us judge the effect of his

* I should like to thank the Carlsberg Foundation, Denmark, for generously supporting a research project on Roman oratory and political career from which this article originates. I am also grateful to audiences at Zaragoza and Glasgow for useful feedback on oral versions, and to Erich Gruen, Catherine Steel, Annelies Cazemier and the anonymous referee for the journal for valuable comments on drafts of the article.

¹ Translation from R.A. Kaster, Cicero. Speech on behalf of Publius Sestius (Oxford, 2006). Cicero’s comment refers to a contio on 9 or 10 July 57 B.C.


³ The topic is discussed briefly by G. Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World (Princeton, NJ, 1972), 282, who is unenthusiastic about Pompey’s oratorical skills; and by E.S. Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 1974), 62, who is more positive.
oratory and thereby form an opinion on the role of oratory in his political career. In the following discussion, general testimonia to Pompey’s oratory and evidence of specific occasions in which he spoke in the contio will be analysed in order to build up a picture of his oratorical abilities and their possible impact on his audience. I shall not discuss all of Pompey’s public speeches (which are listed in the Appendix) but focus on the performances that help to form a picture of his oratory and its reception in the popular assemblies.

I intend to show that Pompey’s contional performances were characterized by his skill in self-praise, his exploitation of popular sentiments and his knowledge of his dependence on the people’s favour in the contio. When speaking, his expressions were often politically vague, from choice rather than lack of ability, and his whole career illustrates his preference for and mastering of a non-commital tactic. Only when it was expedient, or he was provoked, did he express himself directly – sometimes even harshly. Pompey advanced his career less through purely oratorical skills, and more through his popularity with the people (whom he nurtured in the contio), stemming from his military achievements, and through his shrewd political talent for knowing when to speak and what to say, and, in particular, when not to speak and what not to say.

TESTIMONIA TO POMPEY’S ORATORY

General testimonia to Pompey’s oratory are few and often intermingled with descriptions of his character or comparisons with his colleague and rival M. Licinius Crassus. These testimonia single out Pompey’s ambition as the driving force behind his career, cast his speeches as particularly eloquent when depicting his own military exploits and emphasize his reliance on his auctoritas, but they also criticize his resorting to ghost-writing and rhetorical exercises beyond his early career. Cicero, in his history of the Roman orators, the Brutus from 46 B.C., is the first to assess Pompey’s talents:

Meus autem aequalis Cn. Pompeius vir ad omnia summa natus maiorem dicendi gloriam habuisset, nisi eum maioris gloriae cupiditas ab bellicas laudes abstraxisset. Erat oratione satis ample, rem prudenter videbat; actio vero eiusmod habebat et in voce magnum splendorem et in motu summam dignitatem. (Cic. Brut. 239)

My contemporary, Gnaeus Pompeius, a man destined to excellence in all fields, would have reached a greater reputation for eloquence if ambition for even greater glory had not diverted him towards the prizes of a military career. His manner of speaking was sufficiently ample and he had a good judgement in perceiving the question at hand; but his delivery was mainly impressive through his fine voice and the great dignity of his bearing.

Cicero’s evaluation covers the main elements incorporated in most descriptions of Pompey: first, Pompey’s insatiable ambition for power and glory, which made him pursue a military career and try to outshine any possible rival; and, secondly,
the perception that Pompey’s oratory was built mainly on his understanding of the political game and his natural and towering dignitas rather than on brilliant oratorical skills. Cicero’s description is not overly positive in terms of Pompey’s speaking powers when compared to the description of other orators in the Brutus.

Cicero’s conclusions are often repeated in the other ancient sources. Authors such as Caesar, Sallust, Lucan, Seneca, Plutarch and Dio describe Pompey’s ambition as overpowering all other considerations, and some detail how Pompey exuded a natural auctoritas and dignitas, but Seneca also explains how shyness made Pompey blush when speaking in public. This timidity, combined with Pompey’s tendency never to relay his thoughts and wishes openly and not to commit to any particular viewpoint, may have detracted from his natural dignitas and given the impression of a less accomplished speaker. Valerius Maximus certainly argues that Pompey’s tactic of keeping a straight face in spite of the accusations hurled at him allowed him to become an object of ridicule, despite his great auctoritas. Valerius presents this observation as a general trait of Pompey’s public appearance, and exemplifies it with his (possible) defence of Manlius Crispus in 69 or 68 B.C., where, apparently, the prosecutor, Cn. Piso, countered Pompey’s towering auctoritas with the accusation that Pompey intended to start a civil war. How far we can rely on the dating of the court case or the precise exchanges between Piso and Pompey is uncertain. Nevertheless, this example illustrates Valerius’ general point about Pompey as the object of public ridicule in spite of, or exactly as a means to counter, his great auctoritas, and therefore serves to highlight the possibility that Pompey’s non-committal tactic could have negative repercussions.

Velleius Paterculus, too, picks up on Pompey’s ambition. In his almost panegyric presentation of Pompey, he lists Pompey’s exceptional purity (innocentia) of life, his uprightness of character (sanctitate praecipuus), his moderate oratorical talent (eloquentia medius), his military skills as a general, his loyalty in friendships and his almost faultless character except his unwillingness to see anybody his equal.

6 Sall. Hist. 2.17; Vel. Pat. 2.29.2; Val. Max. 6.2.4; Plut. Vit. Pomp. 2.1; Plut. Vit. Crass. 7.4. Cf. Plut. Vit. Pomp. 1.4 where Pompey is described as possessing πιθανότητος λόγου – persuasiveness with H. Heftner, Plutarch und der Aufstieg des Pompeius. Ein historischer Kommentar zu Plutarchs Pompeiusvita Teil I: Kap. 1–43 (Frankfurt am Main, 1995), 68
8 Cic. Att. 4.1.7, 4.9.1; Cic. Fam. 1.1.3, 1.2.3, 1.5b.2, 8.1.3, 8.4.4; Cic. Q Fr. 2.2.3, 3.6.4; Val. Max. 6.2.4; Cass. Dio 36.24.5.
9 Val. Max. 6.2.4. See also Val. Max. 1.6.12 with the comment of D. Wardle, Valerius Maximus: Memorable Deeds and Sayings. Book I (Oxford, 1998), 207: ‘No human being is credited with influence (auctoritas) more than Pompey.’
10 For the question of Pompey’s possible defence and the identity of Cn. Piso, see E.S. Gruen, ‘Pompey and the Pisones’ (Californian Studies in) Classical Antiquity 1 (1968), 155–70, at 160–62. See also Helvius Mancia’s attack on Pompey in 55 B.C. (Val. Max. 6.2.8), with the discussion of this incident in C.E.W. Steel, Cicero, Rhetoric, and Empire (Oxford, 2001), 146–7.
Velleius’ evaluation of Pompey’s oratorical skills as only moderate sticks out as a not very positive feature in his otherwise extremely flattering portrait. The source for Velleius’ portrait of Pompey is unknown, but it has been suggested that the information derives from one or more panegyrists or biographers of Pompey whose works are now lost. We know that various authors wrote praising accounts of Pompey’s military achievements, and they may also have included the element of oratory, which Velleius could then have picked up.

Contrast Tacitus’ positive impression of Pompey’s oratorical skills. In his Dialogus de oratoribus, the interlocutor Maternus argues that in the Republic eloquence was considered a necessity for success in the popular assemblies, the senate and the law courts. He illustrates this view with a few examples of Republican orators, including Pompey. It is noteworthy how positively Maternus regards Pompey’s oratory, in contrast with Cicero’s and Velleius’ judgements:

Perhaps you have had in your hands those ancient records, which are still kept in the libraries of collections and which are just now being compiled by Mucianus; and they have already been arranged and edited in eleven volumes, I believe, of Records and three volumes of Letters. From these it can be understood that Cn. Pompeius and M. Crassus were powerful not only through manly virtues and military means, but also through their talented oratory; that the Lentuli and the Metelli and the Luculli and the Curios and the great group of all other leading men devoted effort and care to these studies, and that in their day no one achieved great influence without some degree of eloquence.

Here, we see the traditional pairing of Pompey and Crassus, which seems to have been a feature even in their own day and was later underlined further by Plutarch. This passage follows immediately upon a section about the necessity of oratory

12 Vel. Pat. 2.29.3–4.
13 Manius Otacilius Pitholaus, Pompey’s teacher of rhetoric, wrote about Pompey in the Social War. Cic. Flacc. 28; Suet. Rhet. 3 with R.A. Kaster, C. Suetonius Tranquillus: De Grammaticis et Rhetoribus (Oxford, 1995), comm. ad loc. Posidonius wrote about Pompey’s exploits: Strab. 11.1.6. Theophanes even received Roman citizenship, as did his hometown, Mytilene, from Pompey as a thank you for his panegyric of Pompey: Cic. Arch. 24; Val. Max. 8.14.3; Vel. Pat. 2.18.1; Plut. Vit. Pomp. 42; cf. Strabo 11.5.1, 13.2.3. See Hefner (n. 6), 53–8 for a discussion of Theophanes’ work on Pompey and, especially, Theophanes’ work as a source for Plutarch. Later authors of the imperial age often used Pompey as a historical example; we have already seen the evaluation of Pompey’s ambition presented by Lucan, Seneca, Plutarch and Dio. We may detect a shift in the presentation of Pompey before and after his death, possibly inspired by Cicero’s brief obituary note (Cic. Att. 11.6.5), which sets up a dichotomy between Pompey’s destructive political ambition and his admirable personal morality. See also Griffin (n. 7), 189–90 on Seneca’s presentation.
for political success in the Republic, and it is particularly curious that Tacitus, or, strictly speaking, Maternus, has chosen Pompey and Crassus to exemplify this idea when, for example, Cicero or Caesar would have been much more obvious choices. Did Tacitus simply want to insert a reference to Mucianus’ collections of ancient records to add credibility to his viewpoint? Did he indeed find Pompey and Crassus the best examples of oratorical skill by contrast to Cicero? Or was it because Pompey and Crassus were more known for their military achievements and therefore, in Tacitus’ view, better illustrated the notion that oratorical talent must have played a part in their political success also? The latter possibility seems more likely: if even Pompey and Crassus could be presented as good orators, then Tacitus’ (or, strictly, Maternus’) argument about the centrality of oratory becomes inescapable. If so, their prominence here is not surprising, but perhaps, for the same reason, gives us little indication of their real levels of oratorical skill. Plutarch, in his comparison between the two politicians, also emphasizes how they were considered similarly gifted in terms of dignity, persuasiveness of speech and winning grace of appearance. This suggests that Pompey and Crassus could have been considered accomplished speakers, at least by posterity, but much more certainly that the long-term rivals were endowed with the same level of eloquence, which again made them useful exempla for Tacitus in his Dialogus.

Quintilian gives us a further clue to Pompey’s eloquence. In a chapter on the necessity of speaking according to the circumstances, he relates that there is a kind of oratory that becomes great men only, namely the speech given by generals in their hour of triumph. Pompey’s example is put forward as particularly illustrative of this kind of oratory because he was extraordinarily eloquent in the description of his own exploits (abunde disertus rerum suarum narrator). Rather than praising Pompey’s eloquence in general, this passage seems to suggest that he was never more articulate than when praising his own victories. Indeed, other sources attest to Pompey’s boasts of his military achievements as a substantial part of his public performances. We shall see examples of this in the analysis of Pompey’s contional performances in the next section.

We know very little of Pompey’s rhetorical education or training, apart from the name of his teacher in rhetoric, Manius Otacilius Pitholaus. Quintilian and Suetonius allow us glimpses into Pompey’s attempts to strengthen his performances through the help of ghost-writers and rhetorical exercises. In his treatment of deliberative oratory, Quintilian has a curious note on Ampius Balbus, whom

---


Mucianus himself was a very accomplished orator: Tac. Hist. 2.5.1, 2.76–8 with R. Ash, Tacitus: Histories. Book II (Cambridge, 2007), 283–4. Or was the point rather that Plutarch emphasised how rare this information was by referring to these collections, as argued by Geiger (n. 15), 219?

18 Quint. 11.1.36.
19 Plin. NH 7.99; Oros. 6.6.4; Plut. Vit. Pomp. 54.1; the speech put in Pompey’s mouth by Cass. Dio 36.25–6 reflects this self-praise too. Cf. Val. Max. 8.14.3 on Pompey’s citizenship to Theophanes, who had chronicled his military successes. On the difficulties inherent in praising oneself, see R.K. Gibson, ‘Pliny and the art of (in)offensive self-praise’, Arethusa 36 (2003), 235–54, whose conclusion could be said to fit Pompey’s case too, even if the context was different: ‘Praise of the self is a key mechanism for exercising control in advance over the reception of your deeds by society’ (254).
20 Suet. Rhet. 3 with Kaster (n. 13) comm. ad loc.
Pompey defended in 55 B.C. Under the topic of impersonation (prosopopoeia), Quintilian explains the difficulty of the task: the speaker has to be able on one occasion to impersonate Caesar, while at other times to act as Cicero or Cato. Yet it is a truly essential skill for an orator because many Greek and Latin orators composed speeches to be delivered by others, adapting the words to suit the position and character of the speaker. To exemplify his point, Quintilian argues that Cicero cannot have thought in the same way or assumed the same character when writing speeches for Pompey, Titus Ampius or others:

An eodem modo cogitauit aut eandem personam induit Cicero cum scriberet Cn. Pompeio et cum T. Ampio ceterisue, ac non unius cuiusque eorum fortunam, dignitatem, res gestas intiusus omnium quibus uocem dabat etiam imaginem expressit, ut melius quidem sed tamen ipse dicere uidetur? (Quint. 3.8.49–50)

Do you think that Cicero thought in the same way or assumed the same character when he wrote for Gnaeus Pompeius and when he wrote for Titus Ampius or the rest? Taking into consideration the fortune, dignity and achievements of each individual did he not rather reproduce the character of all those whom he gave a voice so that even if they spoke better than usual they nevertheless seemed to speak as themselves?

The writing of speeches for others to deliver was common in Greece, where such ghost-writers or logographers often made a living from this service. As far as we know, the phenomenon was much less common in Rome, but Suetonius records that L. Aelius Stilo wrote speeches for all the nobiles in the 90s B.C., including Q. Servilius Caepio, C. Aurelius Cotta, Q. Caeceilius Metellus and Q. Pompeius Rufus. The fact that allegations of delivering a speech written by somebody else could be used to criticize an orator suggests that the Romans looked down upon such activity. Indeed, Aelius’ customers appear to have tried to conceal his ghost-writing on their behalf. Kennedy suggests that the Romans distrusted such activity because it was commercial, lacking in ethos or simply because it was Greek. In any case, Cicero’s speech-writing on behalf of Pompey and Ampius Balbus was not unique, as we know of other such instances. The dishonour of delivering speeches written by somebody else and the resulting attempts to hide such instances is likely to

---

21 Suet. Gram. 3 with Cic. Brut. 169, 205–7, providing the names of Stilo’s customers. See Kaster (n. 13), 75–7 for comment on this passage. For the whole question of speech-writing on behalf of others, see G. Kennedy, ‘The rhetoric of advocacy in Greece and Rome’, AJPR 89 (1968), 419–36, at 427–8, n. 12 and, shorter, Kennedy (n. 3), 12–13 with n. 14.
23 Kaster (n. 13), 75–6.
24 Kennedy (n. 21), 427–8, n. 12.
25 Cicero wrote a funeral speech to be delivered by the father of Serranus (Cie. Q Fr. 3.6.5, November 54 B.C.), and one for Cato’s sister Porcia to be delivered by her son Domitius or by Brutus (Cic. Att. 13.48.2; 13.37.3, August 45 B.C.). D.R. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero: Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem et M. Brutum (Cambridge, 1980), comm. ad loc. argues that Serranus, the son of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, was adopted by an Attilius Serranus, probably the adoptive father of Sex. Attilius Serranus Gaviusus, the tribune of 57 B.C. Shackleton Bailey thinks that the father speaking was Domitius and not Serranus, who may have been dead already. When Atticus encouraged Cicero to compose a speech for Brutus shortly after the murder of Caesar, Cicero declined on the grounds that Brutus, as most poets or orators, would prefer his own version (Cie. Att. 14.20.3). As F. Pina Polo, Contra Arma Verbis: Der Redner vor dem Volk in der späten römischen Republik (Stuttgart, 1996), 27, notes, Cicero’s reason for not writing a speech for Brutus was not ethical, which supports the impression that writing speeches for others was not an uncommon activity.
have led to the scarcity of evidence. Quintilian’s report is, however, evidence of Cicero acting as Pompey’s and Ampius Balbus’ speech-writer. This passage does not prove that Cicero wrote a speech for Ampius to be delivered at his trial in 55 B.C.; it could just as well have been for another occasion. But the link between Pompey and Pompey’s loyal supporter as two named recipients of Cicero’s oratorical help is noteworthy and probably not accidental. It is, in fact, most likely that such acts of speech-writing took place during the latter half of the 50s B.C., when Cicero had to subordinate himself to Pompey’s wishes. Furthermore, this passage suggests that Pompey wanted to strengthen his own oratorical performances with Cicero’s well-known brilliance; was he perhaps less confident in his own abilities or did he simply want to make his own speeches as powerful as possible?

Another clue to Pompey’s attempts to fortify his performances is provided by Suetonius. He informs us in his work on the grammarians and rhetoricians that ‘certain historians’ report that Pompey, on the very eve of civil war, renewed his habit of declamation practices so as to better confront the tribune Curio’s eloquent support of Caesar. Pompey was not the only active politician to take up rhetorical exercises: Cicero taught the future consuls Hirtius and Pansa after Caesar’s murder; Marcus Antonius received help with his speeches in the autumn of 44 B.C.; and Cicero himself continually kept up his practising. Yet, while exercises in declamation were common for young men under education, rhetorical exercises by adult orators were unusual, hence Suetonius’ need to comment on this. Pompey may have felt an extra urge to polish his oratory in this crucial political situation. As with Cicero’s speech-writing for Pompey, the declamation exercises could be taken as Pompey’s recognition of the need for expert help at critical moments precisely because his own oratorical talents were lacking the necessary edge, but also simply as a sign of him wanting to strengthen his oratory as much as possible.

So far, we have considered general testimonies to Pompey’s oratorical skills, which give a picture of a politician at home when describing his own military victories. These victories, and his continued advertisement of them, secured him the dignitas and auctoritas that again made his speeches more persuasive and weighty, even if they were not following the rhetorical handbooks or did not stand out for oratorical brilliance. Shyness and reluctance to commit to specific political causes may have worked against him, but could equally well have helped him retain a persona of military grandeur without contamination from mundane political issues and quarrels. When speaking, he at times boosted his performance with Cicero’s ghost-writing or declamation practices. This suggests a lack of self-confidence, if not necessarily a lack of actual skill, in his oratorical talents.

---

26 See Tac. Ann. 13.3 for an example of such dishonour in imperial times: Nero delivering the funeral oration, written by Seneca, over Claudius.
29 Kennedy (n. 3), 312–22.
The question is whether these general statements concur with what we know of specific occasions at which Pompey spoke, especially in the contio. In this section, we shall see exemplified the testimonia regarding Pompey’s skill in speaking of his own accomplishments and exploitation of his popularity with the people. His non-committal strategy will also be highlighted and shown to have been expressed in both words and action. Yet Pompey’s speeches in the contio also show a man able to speak clearly and strongly, even to a hostile audience.

The first public speech by Pompey recorded in our sources is that delivered to the people in 71 B.C., when he was consul-elect. This instance illustrates his ability to perform well in front of a supportive audience. His election to the consulship was a testament to his great military victories and political acumen in exploiting these victories to gain the consulship before the normal age and without any previous political magistracy.30 Discontent with Sulla’s curtailing of the tribunes’ powers and the corruption of the all-senatorial court juries were burning political issues, which Pompey knew how to exploit. Cicero reports that Pompey raised the issue of the tribunes’ power in the senate, followed by a contio where he declared that he would restore their powers. This was generally well received by the people, but when he declared that he would tackle the problem of the corruption of the courts, the people broke out in shouts of approval.31 There is no doubt that Pompey’s first speech in the popular assembly was a great success, and Sallust says that his intention with this speech was to ingratiate himself with the people, so that he could use the resultant popularity as a political instrument in the future.32 The question is whether this popularity was due to Pompey’s oratorical skills as such or rather the fact that he was a successful general promoting a popular political view. Persuasion partly consists, of course, in addressing the concerns of the audience and as far as possible making it appear that one is sympathetic and willing to help. On the other hand, it was by now generally recognized, in the senate also (see Catulus’ reply to Pompey as reported by Cicero), that something had to be done regarding the tribunician powers and the courts.33 Pompey’s promise to the people was therefore both popular and politically safe. It would not have needed a very skilled orator to put this message across in a successful way, and Cicero does not report anything on Pompey’s performance to suggest that it stood out for its oratorical qualities.


32 Sall. Hist. 4.42 with McGushin (n. 31), comm. ad loc. See also R.J. Evans, Questioning Reputations. Essays on Nine Roman Republican Politicians (Pretoria, 2003), 58–60.

33 See further Gruen (n. 3), 25–8, 34–5.
Similarly popular was Pompey’s public announcement of his discharge of military imperium just before commencing his consulship on the first of January 70 B.C. This leads Plutarch to conclude that Pompey’s consular colleague, Crassus, had more influence in the senate, while Pompey was the darling of the people, his popularity reaching a climax at his laying down his military imperium as a kind of spectacle offered to the people. He certainly knew how to bank on his fame, and, as Quintilian remarked, he was no more eloquent than when boasting of his own accomplishments.

Pompey is likely to have continued to sing his own praises at public assemblies in the following years. His command against the pirates in 67 B.C. may also have been secured partly through an address in the contio and certainly through his popularity with the people. The violent opposition to the bill in the senate was countered by Caesar alone, Plutarch tells us, because he wanted to boost his own credentials with the people by backing a popular cause. Sallust and Dio furthermore inform us that Pompey himself, Gabinius and Lutatius Catulus (cos. 78 B.C.) spoke, the second in favour, the third against the bill. That both Sallust and Dio revised and sometimes even invented speeches to fit their stylistic and narrative aims is generally accepted, but at times speeches recorded in their works seem to reflect to some degree main points of those speeches, their effect or the character of the speaker. Indeed, the speech put into Pompey’s mouth by Dio echoes Pompey’s well-known tendency to feign reluctance of further tasks while clearly wishing this command. He is said to have argued that he had already fought a number of wars successfully on behalf of the Roman people and that there were many other good candidates for the job. His summary of his victories can be seen as yet another articulate self-advertisement of the kind that we know he was

34 Plut. Vit. Pomp. 21.4, 22.3. It is unclear from Plutarch’s account whether this announcement was made at the same time as the promise of tribunician reform or in a separate speech. F. Pina Polo, Las Contiones Civiles y Militares en Roma (Zaragoza, 1989), does not list Pompey’s announcement in his Appendices, thereby suggesting that it was made together with the promise of tribunician reform.
35 Plut. Vit. Pomp. 25.4. Plutarch may have transposed Caesar’s backing of the Manilian proposal to the same year as the Gabinius proposal: Gruen (n. 3), 80, n. 142; Seager (n. 30), 33, n. 49; O.D. Watkins, ‘Cæsar solus? Senatorial support for the Lex Gabinia’, Historia 36 (1987), 120–1. Furthermore, Plutarch’s wording suggests that the opposition to the bill was only among high-ranking senators, opening up the possibility that Caesar’s support was joined by other low-ranking senators. Senators speaking against were, among others, the consul C. Calpurnius Piso and the consular Q. Hortensius Hortalus (Plut. Vit. Pomp. 25; Cic. Leg. Man. 52) but we know nothing of the content of their speeches. Tan (n. 2), 183, argues that Gabinius took his bill to the senate rather than the contio ‘in order to preempt claims of popularis demagoguery or exploitation of Pompey’s popularity’. But it was exactly Pompey’s popularity with the people that made the bill an attractive one to support for Caesar and other junior senators.
36 Sall. Hist. 5.16–20 (with McGushin [n. 5], comm. ad loc.); Cass. Dio 36.25–36a. See Gruen (n. 3), 65–6 for a discussion of the individuals behind the opposition to Pompey’s command and the command against Mithridates the following year.
so good at producing. If Pompey spoke on this occasion, the argumentation and style proposed by Dio is in character, and the ploy in feigning reluctance implies a speech of some care and effectiveness. The bill was passed in the end. Whether or not Pompey spoke at this event, his previous cultivation of popular support in past contiones helped him secure this command.

Pompey famously managed to subdue the pirates and, afterwards, to defeat Mithridates, and his remarkable military successes were praised in literature and oratory. In return for immortalizing his deeds, Pompey bestowed the citizenship on the historian Theophanes and his hometown of Mytilene, and made sure to publicize his gift and therefore his military exploits in a speech given in a military assembly in 62 B.C. Speaking of his own successes was, as we now know, one of Pompey’s specialities.

But Pompey’s eloquence was to be tested for the first time at his first public speeches upon his return from the East. Cicero refers to a first speech in a contio, the content of which he had already explained to Atticus in a previous letter. Then he reports from a contio in circus Flaminian in early 61 B.C., giving us further indications of Pompey’s evasive tactic:

I have already given you a description of Pompey’s first public speech – of no comfort to the poor or interest to the rascals; on the other hand the rich were not pleased and the honest men were not impressed. So – a frost. Then an irresponsible Tribune, Fufius, egged on by Consul Piso, called Pompey out to address the Assembly. This took place in the Flaminian Circus, on market day just where the holiday crowds was gathered. Fufius asked him whether he thought it right for a jury to be selected by a Praetor to serve under the same Praetor’s presidency, that being the procedure determined by the Senate in the Clodius sacrilege case. (2) Pompey then replied, very much en bon aristocrate, that in all matters he held and had always held the Senate’s authority in the highest respect – at considerable length too.

After six years away from the political game at Rome, Pompey may have been somewhat out of touch with the current issues, yet Cicero’s judgement is damning and suggests that Pompey’s first performances suffered from a lack of political awareness and insight and perhaps also from an eloquence gone rusty after years away from the political scene. Pompey was still highly popular with the people but his fellow senators were less ready to acknowledge his successes and grant him inclusion in the influential senatorial circles. When asked for an opinion on the technicalities of the trial against Clodius, Pompey’s answer signals a reluctance to...
speak on a controversial matter in which he would only risk alienating potential political allies. Cicero’s letter continues with a description of a subsequent meeting in the senate, where Pompey is again asked about his views on the Clodius case and again provides a vague answer, just to be surpassed by Crassus’ articulate and well-received praise of Cicero’s consulship of 63 B.C.\(^42\)

Pompey’s performances were, in Cicero’s opinion, unsuccessful in conveying a returning general in touch with urgent political matters and the concerns of the interested parties. Cicero was, however, not an objective witness.\(^43\) His negative judgement is coloured by his disappointment in Pompey’s performance: he had wanted Pompey to take a clear stance on the issue of Clodius’ trial and furthermore to take up the role as conservative senator defending the interests of the *res publica* as had Cicero in 63 B.C. This disappointment had deeper roots. Cicero’s long-standing admiration for Pompey had taken a hit from Pompey’s lack of appreciation of Cicero’s actions in 63 B.C. in their exchange of letters in 62 B.C. and from Pompey’s political behaviour since his return from the East.\(^44\) This mixture of personal unease about Pompey’s stance towards himself and a more general anxiety about Pompey’s willingness to work with people not considered *boni* by Cicero makes the latter a dangerous witness. However, Cicero cannot have altogether distorted the picture of Pompey in his first public performances: the ambiguity in Pompey’s answers is in character with his tendency to hide his true intentions, and his lack of commitment to either side of the question did nothing to further a decision. Cicero may have been alone in this judgement. Indeed, Pompey’s tactic of avoiding a firm stance on the issue may have been the right stand to take in order not to offend anybody, except Cicero. That Pompey spoke *multis verbis* yet still managed not to say much in favour of either side again underlines his skill in dodging the controversial issues when expedient.\(^45\) The question remains whether this skill is to be considered an oratorical or a political skill.

In contrast with Pompey’s lack of commitment regarding current political issues, he was characteristically outspoken about his exploits in the East. When he was finally allowed a triumph for his Eastern victories in September 61 B.C., it surpassed all previous triumphs in its lavish display of spoils and placards advertising the extraordinary number of peoples and areas subdued.\(^46\) Pliny alerts us to the fact that Pompey also spoke at this occasion, when he declared in a *contio*, speaking of his achievements, that he had found Asia the remotest of the provinces but made it into a central dominion of his country.\(^47\) As always, he spoke with gravity and fluency when describing his own accomplishments.

---


\(^{45}\) Tan (n. 2), 167, 183, and Lintott (n. 43), 155–7, both argue, from different angles, that Pompey’s answer was a signal of his support of the senate and of his unwillingness to go down the *populares* route.


Two other snippets from speeches held at contiones of uncertain dates underline this trait further. Plutarch reports that Pompey had told the people (in a contio, we must assume) that he had received every office earlier than he had expected, and laid it down more quickly than others had expected, adding that his disbanding of the armies was a continuous testimony to the truth of his words. In a similar vein, Orosius explains that Pompeius himself told the contio about the war in the East in which he had fought against 22 kings. Both of these fragments could be argued to stem from the speech held in connection with his triumph, but they could also belong to earlier speeches delivered shortly after his return to Rome. Strong opposition to Pompey among some senatorial quarters had created a sense of trepidation as to his actions upon return. Crassus and Cato, in particular, had somewhat provocatively warned against Pompey coming back as a new Sulla, but Pompey instead announced the dismissal of his army upon his return to Italy, signalling his willingness to step down from his high position and exert his influence through the traditional channels. Pompey’s words as reported in Plutarch could be argued to stem from such an announcement, and it would again have required some oratorical ability to counter the claims of Crassus, Cato and their sympathizers. The snippets from Plutarch and Orosius underline, in any case, not only the trend of Pompey’s oratorical skill at times of self-aggrandisement but also the trend of our sources to record such catching ‘sound bites’ rather than full speeches. The triumph of 61 B.C. was an important moment in Pompey’s career, as it was his chance to boost his general popularity among the people and a moment to forget the mundane worries of political life and, in particular, his problems of getting a strong footing within the political elite. As on previous occasions, it was not through an oratorical performance in the senate or the courts that he bolstered his claim to influence and recognition, but rather in a speech to the adoring people in the contio, speaking of his main asset of military victories.

Further possible ‘sound bites’ from Pompey’s mouth may have survived, which suggests that Pompey could speak clearly, even brusquely, when expedient or necessary. Later sources such as Plutarch, Appian and Dio detail how Caesar, as consul in 59 B.C., called upon Pompey and Crassus in a contio to speak in favour of his agrarian bill. Appian simply tells us that Caesar asked their opinion and that Pompey and Crassus said they approved. Plutarch is slightly more elaborate, apparently quoting Pompey’s reply to Caesar’s question of whether he would protect the law against any opposition: “‘Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Πομπήϊος, ἀφίξομαι, πρὸς τοὺς ἀπειλοῦντας τὰ ξίφη μετὰ ξίφους καὶ θυρεὸν κομίζω.” (“Yes, indeed,” said Pompey, “I will come, bringing, against those who threaten swords, both swords and shields.”) Dio gives the fullest account, seemingly quoting and
paraphrasing a whole speech of Pompey’s ending with a declaration similar to that quoted in Plutarch: ‘ἄν τις τολμήσῃ ξίφος ἀνελέσθαι, καὶ ἐγώ τὴν ἄσπιδα ἀναλήψομαι.’ (‘If any one dares to raise a sword, I also will snatch up my shield.’) 55

How far we can trust the details of these accounts is uncertain, as both Plutarch and Dio could have made up Pompey’s words. Yet the similarity of message and tone in Pompey’s words suggests that either Dio drew on Plutarch or both authors drew on a common source, directly or indirectly, which may have reported Pompey’s words. Indeed, the catchiness of the saying could have secured its safe transmission in the sources, even if adapted in the translation from Latin to Greek.

A similar view may be taken about Pompey’s memorable saying in the senate in the lead up to the civil war, reported in Plutarch: ‘“Ὅπου γὰρ ἄν, ἐφη, τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐγὼ κρούσω τῷ ποδὶ τὴν γῆν, ἀναδύσονται καὶ πεζικαὶ καὶ ἱππικαὶ δυνάμεις.”’ (‘“For,” said he, “in whatever part of Italy I stamp upon the ground, there will spring up armies of foot and horse.”’). 56

These possible quotations of Pompey may seem unusually open-mouthed for a man who was an expert in shielding his opinion from the public. However, Caelius Rufus, in a letter to Cicero, quotes a probably genuine remark of Pompey’s in one of the senatorial debates on Caesar’s Gallic command, which suggests that Pompey was perfectly capable of making such belligerent public statements: ‘quid si filius meus fustem mihi impingere volet?’ (‘And supposing my son chooses to take his stick to me?’). 57 This remark was an assertion of Pompey’s auctoritas against that of Caesar. It caused quite a stir in the senate and beyond for its indication of his limited patience with Caesar and thus potential for civil war, but probably also for its curt style – two reasons for Cicero not to report it to Cicero in Cilicia but even to quote it. In light of this citation, it seems not impossible that Pompey could have spoken in a similarly forceful way in the contio on Caesar’s agrarian bill. When it was expedient, he could speak in a direct and unambiguous way.

Pompey’s belligerent statements should perhaps be seen against the people’s negative attitude to Pompey – if we are to trust Cicero. Cicero reports how Pompey’s contional and oratorical authority was dealt a blow in 59 b.C. when his coalition with Caesar and Crassus had become unpopular:

Itaque ille noster amicus, insolens infamiae, semper in laude versatus, circumfluens gloria, deformatus corpore, fractus animo quo se conferat nescit. progressum praecipitem, instantem reditum videt. bonos inimicos habet, improbos ipsos non amicos. ac vide mollitatem animi: non tenui lacrimas cum illum ad VIII Kal. Sext. vidi de edictis Bibuli contionantem.
qui antea solitus esset iactare se magnificentissime illo in loco summo cum amore populi, cunctis faventibus, ut ille tum humilis, ut demissus erat, ut ipse etiam sibi, non is solum qui aderant, displicebat! o spectaculum uni Crasso iucundum, ceteris non itum!

(Cic. Att. 2.21.3; Rome, after 25 July 59 B.C.)

So there is our poor friend [Pompey], unused to disrepute, his whole career disfigured in a blaze of admiration and glory, now physically disfigured and broken in spirit, at his wit’s end for what to do. He sees the precipice if he goes on and the stigma of a turncoat if he turns back. The honest men are his enemies, the rascals themselves are not his friends. See how soft-hearted I am. I could not keep back my tears when I saw him addressing a public meeting on 25 July about Bibulus’ edicts. How magnificently he used to posture on that platform in other days, surrounded by an adoring people, every man wishing him well! How humble and abject he was then, what a sorry figure he cut in his own eyes, to say nothing of his audience! What a sight! Only Crassus could enjoy it, not so others.58

Gone were Pompey’s natural dignitas and gravitas when speaking, if we are to believe Cicero, and he may not have been very winning or persuasive in his addresses. The coalition between him, Caesar and Crassus had not helped increase his popularity, as it was seen to be against tradition and fair play. The fact that Caesar now took most legislative bills directly to the contio without prior senatorial consultation was viewed by Cicero as an affront to the senate’s authority. We must therefore take Cicero’s judgement of the overall unpopularity of the coalition, and Pompey’s unpopularity in particular, with a grain of salt. Nevertheless, Pompey’s problems of penetrating the senatorial elite after his return from the East were a low point in his career, and Cicero may be right in his view that Pompey was not used to unpopularity and was less effective in his oratorical addresses when speaking in adverse situations. It had certainly been easier to captivate an adoring audience with tales of his own successes. His brusque expressions in support of Caesar’s agrarian bill may be read as those of a politician frustrated with the delay in securing his veterans their promised land, with the unpopularity of his coalition with Caesar and Crassus, with their opposition, and, in particular, with his own unpopularity.

Cicero’s negative description of Pompey in the contio in 59 B.C. is contrasted with a more positive evaluation of his speech in a contio in the summer of 57 B.C.: Huius oratio ut semper gravis et grata in contionibus fuit (‘his speech was serious and pleasing, as it always is in such assemblies’).59 The change in Cicero’s judgement of Pompey’s contional speaking powers is related to the change in the latter’s political stance and, especially, his support of Cicero’s recall from exile. Yet it may also suggest a fluctuation in Pompey’s popularity with the people and, as a result, his ability to perform persuasively in the contio. Pompey himself was keenly aware of his dependence on the good will of the people. In February 56 B.C., Cicero tells Quintus that Pompey worries that the contional audience is alienated, the nobility hostile to him, the senate ill-disposed and the young men critical of

58 Transl. Shackleton Bailey (n. 41). For the unpopularity, in Cicero’s mind, of the coalition of Pompey, Caesar and Crassus, see also Cic. Att. 2.18.1, 2.19.2–3, 2.20.3–4 with Morstein-Marx (n. 2), 147, n. 147, and Lintott (n. 43), 170–1.

59 Cic. Sest. 107 with transl. by Kaster (n. 1). See also Cic. Red. pop. 16; Cic. Pis. 80 for praise of Pompey’s performance.
him. We know, moreover, that the consul of 56 B.C., Cn. Lentulus Marcellinus, and Clodius on several occasions tried to incite the contio against Pompey.

Fluctuations in Pompey’s popularity were exploited for political purposes, which illustrates, first, how important was Pompey’s relationship with the people for his political influence (real and perceived) and, second, how others knew this too and took it into account in their political activities. We have evidence of a public meeting during Milo’s trial de vi in 56 B.C. where Clodius’ gangs tried to shout down Pompey’s speech, so as to make him unable to deliver his defence and connect with the people. However, Pompey refused to be shouted down and spoke through the clamour and even acquired silence at times owing to his auctoritas. Pompey was, in other words, capable of speaking to a hostile audience intent on quelling him, and that at a time when he worried about the people being alienated, as we saw above. He could perhaps have found strength in the view that Clodius’ gangs did not represent the real populus, or else he was simply made of tougher material than that suggested by Cicero’s judgements of a faint-hearted Pompey in front of an antagonistic audience.

Further insights into Pompey’s ability in exploiting vague expressions as a tactical move may be found in Cicero’s paraphrase of his speech in the senate on 1 January 57 B.C. where Cicero’s exile was, again, debated. Cicero relates:

Hunc nemo erat quin verissime sentire diceret. Sed post eum rogatus Cn. Pompeius, adpro-bata laudataque Cottae sententia, dixit sese oti mei causa, ut omni populari concitatione defungerer, censere ut ad senatus auctoritatem populi quoque Romani beneficium erga me adiungeretur. Cum omnes certatim aliusque alio gravius atque ornatius de mea salute dixisset fieretque sine ulla varietate discessio … (Cic. Sest. 74)

Everyone thought that this was the plainest truth; but when Gnaeus Pompeius was called upon for his opinion after Cotta, he said that though he could approve and praise Cotta’s view, he himself judged that for the sake of my tranquillity, to be certain that I would be rid of harassment from ‘popular’ quarters, the Roman people’s beneficence toward me ought to be joined to the senate’s authority. When all had spoken for my restoration, with each speaker trying to outbid the last in terms of solemn honor, and unanimous support had been expressed in a vote …

To this, Kaster remarks that Pompey’s speech is full of euphemisms: for example, the phrase that Cicero needs tranquillity (otium) and not that he actually needed protection from being killed, or his talk of the people’s beneficium towards Cicero being joined to senatorial authority rather than saying directly that the senatorial decree recalling Cicero ought to be accompanied by a law ratified by the people. Kaster concludes: ‘Whether the brief turn owes more to Pompey’s idiom or to C[icero]’s, it is plump, grave, and complacent.’64 If these are indeed words chosen

---

60 Cic. Q Fr. 2.3.4.
61 Lentulus Marcellinus: Val. Max. 6.2.6; Plut. Vit. Pomp. 51.5–6 (Cass. Dio 39.30.1–2 places this discussion in the senate). Clodius: Cic. Q Fr. 2.3.2; Plut. Vit. Pomp. 48.7; Cass. Dio 39.19.1. See Morstein-Marx (n. 2), 122, 134, and Tan (n. 2), 167–8, for further discussion and context.
62 Cic. Q Fr. 2.3.2. Morstein-Marx (n. 2), 169 n. 40 argues that the ‘setting was either one of the three required contiones (aquisitiones) before the vote in a trial before the People (judicium populi) or a public meeting preceding a trial in the quaestio de vi ...’
63 Transl. Kaster (n. 1). See also Cic. Red. sen. 5; Cic. Dom. 69; Cic. Pis. 34 for Pompey’s speech.
64 Kaster (n. 1) comm. ad Cic. Sest. 74.
by Pompey, Cicero’s praise of his eloquence may be thought to reflect Cicero’s need to publicize his gratitude to Pompey post eventum rather than an objective evaluation of the latter’s oratory. If so, Pompey’s choice of words may again be regarded as unaccomplished in terms of style and vague in terms of meaning, intended to blur rather than clarify his stance on the past events and his own position within them. Yet this may have been precisely Pompey’s intention.

Another convenient way of avoiding taking sides in public was to let others sound opinion in the senate before coming out in the open, as when Pompey had one of the tribunes of 56 B.C., P. Rutilius Lupus, raise the question of the Campanian land in the senate in December 57. This tactic proved self-defeating, however, in that the senators refused to discuss the matter unless Pompey was personally present.\(^65\) This may, however, have been exactly his aim, because this decision of the senate reinforced his importance and standing, again proving his tactic of disengagement to be an effective way of directing attention towards himself.

Nevertheless, as with his belligerent remarks and open confrontation of Clodius’ gangs, Pompey could speak lucidly when expedient. His previous support of Milo ended abruptly with Milo’s murder of Clodius on via Appia in early 52 B.C.\(^66\) Milo was no longer needed to keep a check on Clodius and could be dispensed with. The three tribunes Q. Pompeius Rufus, C. Sallustius Crispus and T. Munatius Plancus brought Pompey to a contio and asked him there whether he had heard anything about Milo plotting to murder him. On this occasion, Pompey answered clearly that he had indeed heard of such plans and had made inquiries of Milo regarding this matter.\(^67\) Pompey’s statement incriminated Milo, with intent, for Pompey seems to have understood that the unstable situation could lead to a strengthening of his own position. As he had been called upon to tackle the pirates and Mithridates in the 60s B.C., so he could be seen as the most capable senator to lead the way out of the turmoil created by the political violence of Clodius and Milo. Indeed, Pompey was made sole consul for 52 B.C. and Milo was unsurprisingly convicted of Clodius’ murder in the subsequent trial. This train of events indicates that Pompey’s political acumen was sharper than ever before, that he could give a straightforward answer if useful and that he knew how to exploit opportunities to address the people.

CONCLUSION

This examination of instances of Pompey’s oratorical performances in the contio leaves an impression of a man who built his career on his military successes and made sure to remind his audience of them, especially in his early political career. He cannot have been without talent, because he spoke on many occasions in the senate, at contiones and in the courts (see Appendix for details). For political purposes, he seems to have preferred a non-oratorical route, if possible, by having other people speak on his behalf – as, for example, did Cicero, Caesar and many junior

\(^{65}\) Cic. Q Fr. 2.1.1 (shortly before 15 December 57 B.C.). Another example of this tactic was Pompey’s movements in the issue of the reinstatement of Ptolemy XII Auletes to the throne in Egypt: Cic. Rab. post. 6; Cic. Fam. 1.1 (13 January 56 B.C.), 1.2 (15 January 56 B.C.), 1.5b (shortly after 9 February 56 B.C.), 1.7.3 (June–July 56 B.C.); Q Fr. 2.2.3 (17 January 56 B.C.).

\(^{66}\) Gruen (n. 3), 338 suggests even earlier.

\(^{67}\) Cic. Mil. 65–6; Asc. Mil. 51C.
magistrates. Obviously, he could not address a Roman audience when away on commands or other public service abroad. Indeed, the shyness reported by Seneca may have played a part, too. This, in combination with his tactic of shielding his personal opinion from the public eye when politically expedient, may have been aimed at protecting his reputation as a successful general untainted by tedious political quarrels and direct confrontations. But it also enabled him to test the waters without risking any later consequences, and it ensured maximum attention when he actually spoke. This may explain the strong effect his more open and belligerent expressions had on his immediate audience and subsequent tradition, and hence their transmission in our sources.

Pompey’s conscious attention to self-presentation opens up the wider question of how far the image we get of Pompey is one dictated by the sources or one dictated by himself. In the end, we cannot know for certain, but it seems likely that he himself did what he could to display a persona that he deemed effective for achieving his political aims and securing his long-term reputation. His promotion of an image of himself as a victorious general loved by the people was prominent in his early political career especially. He played on his general popularity with the people in addressing them relatively often; of his known public oratorical performances approximately half are in the contiones. His tactic of not showing his cards could be understood to aim at preserving this particular image. We may also consider the possibility that Pompey nurtured the image of a victorious general instead of an accomplished speaker in an attempt to fit into the traditional Roman ideology of military virtus as the most proper route to glory and opposed to a more recent embrace of Greek appreciation of eloquence as a glorious activity, exemplified and promoted by Cicero, among others.

On top of Pompeian self-fashioning, the sources added their rhetorical embellishment. The study of Bell underlines how far those sources can differ, and for what reasons, when it comes to the short but momentous event of Pompey’s death in Egypt. Cicero himself tried to influence the future interpretation of newly deceased figures such as Catiline, Cato Minor, Crassus, Pompey and Caesar by evaluating their actions and legacy shortly after their deaths and therefore perhaps before anybody else put their interpretation in writing. His success in influencing...

---


69 See the Appendix for a list of Pompey’s public speeches. Tan’s study (n. 2) confirms the general impression that contiones were used more often than not to advocate views and profile individuals popular with the people.

70 Cicero’s promotion of glory obtained through civil actions such as oratory: Cic. Arch. 21–4; Cic. Off. 1.74, 1.77–8. (He could also argue the opposite when expedient: Cic. Mur. 19–22.) Cicero’s criticism of generals pursuing glory for their own sake and against the interests of the state: Cic. Tusc. 1.89–90, 3.3–4, 5.49–50; Cic. Fin. 5.69; Cic. Off. 1.26, 2.43, 3.36, 3.83.


the tradition of Cato in particular suggests that he also coloured the later reception of Pompey. The later writers had their own purpose for depicting Pompey in a specific manner. Their various agendas determined their selection of evidence and the presentation thereof, which, in turn, has influenced the overall picture of Pompey formed by modern scholars. Some aspects shine through more clearly than others: Pompey’s oratorical ability when praising his own military victories; his reluctance to speak at public occasions when avoidable and vagueness of expression when a speech was unavoidable; his willingness to speak forcefully and straightforwardly when expedient (or when frustrated); and his attempts to bolster his oratory through declamation exercises and, perhaps, ghost-writing. Pompey probably avoided advertising the last aspect, but certainly built his political persona on the first two. In terms of oratory, only the first aspect, of self-praise, and the third aspect, of straightforward expressions, could be said to cast light on Pompey’s oratorical qualities.

Pompey does not fit the bill of Cicero’s bonus orator who masters and displays all styles and techniques for the benefit of the res publica. His tactic of avoiding public performances, whether out of timidity, conscious deliberation or, perhaps more likely, both, provided him with fewer occasions for public display of oratorical talent and skill. His choice of absence does not automatically mean that he was not an accomplished speaker, but his lack of senatorial experience before his consulship meant that he had a lot of catching up to do, on the oratorical side also, when entering the senate in 70 B.C. Furthermore, Cicero’s services in the form of speeches delivered and written on his behalf, as well as Pompey’s decision to take up declamation exercises just before the civil war, suggests that he wanted to hone his skills and make the best possible address when called upon. Velleius’ judgement of Pompey as eloquentia medius seems not entirely unfounded.

Of course, oratorical performance was not the only way to move the political agenda in Rome or forward a political career. Indeed, descent from famous generals or senators provided a powerful claim to political influence. But Pompey’s descent

Off. 1.76, 2.20, 2.60; Cic. Phil. 5.43–4. Caesar: Cic. Div. 1.119, 2.23–4, 2.52, 2.99; Cic. Off. 1.26, 1.43, 2.23–8, 3.83–5.


Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Birmingham, on 12 Jan 2017 at 12:02:51, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0009838811000024
from a victorious, yet hated, general, Pompeius Strabo, made any references to ancestry a dead end, and Pompey wisely decided not to adopt his father’s cognomen, instead waiting for his own exploits to be crowned by the name Magnus.74 Patronage from a politically dominant figure or family could also help pave the way, and in his early career Pompey certainly exploited his connections to Sulla and, through marriages to Aemilia and Mucia, the Metelli. His divorce from Mucia upon his return from the East and his unsuccessful marriage proposal to Cato’s niece show that he erroneously thought that he was now the one to bestow patronage rather than benefitting from it. His need for political connections was only met when a politically savvy Caesar approached Pompey and Crassus separately to form an alliance. Here, Pompey’s popularity with the people, re-emphasized at his triumph in 61 B.C. and based entirely on his military victories, must have made the crucial difference to Caesar’s decision to take Pompey on board. Wealth was another factor, and his inheritance of large areas of land in Picenum must have bolstered his personal fortune considerably. Influence in the local towns in Picenum mattered too, as they could soon vote and would form the powerbase of his later military commands.75

Finally, Pompey’s political shrewdness must be taken into consideration. He often managed to network with the right people at the right time, although his towering status as a returning general made him less attractive to the conservative and arrogant nobles among whom he most wished to be accepted. Yet he knew when not to speak, or not to speak his mind, thereby forcing people to pay him and his words attention when it mattered. Furthermore, his well-developed sense of speaking in deliberately vague terms compelled his audience to think hard about the most likely, or most beneficial, interpretation of his words. In such situations, his behaviour and its effect appear almost regal. The effect was broken only when Pompey spoke in near violent terms. He seems to have been most confident and eloquent when speaking in the contio, both popular and military, addressing the adoring city populace or his loyal soldiers, but could also deliver his message to a hostile audience. Being eloquens was not a hindrance to a political career based on an extraordinary military ability, the resultant popularity and a cunning sense for politics behind the scenes.

Wolfson College, Oxford

HENRIETTE VAN DER BLOM
henriette.vanderblom@classics.ox.ac.uk

74 See M. Gelzer, ‘Cn. Pompeius Strabo und der Aufstieg seines Sohnes Magnus’, Abhandlungen der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 14 (Berlin, 1941), for Pompey’s family background and his father’s influence on his early career.
75 See Gelzer (n. 74), 15–17, 22–3.
APPENDIX: POMPEY’S PUBLIC SPEECHES

List of specific occasions where Pompey spoke in public:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Topic discussed</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>71 B.C., Dec.</td>
<td>contio</td>
<td>Pompey promises to return tribuniciam powers and tackle the corruption of the courts</td>
<td>Cic. Verr. 1.44–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71 B.C., Dec.</td>
<td>contio</td>
<td>Pompey solicits his discharge from military service, almost as a spectacle</td>
<td>Plut. Vit. Pomp. 22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 B.C. end</td>
<td>public meeting in the Forum (perhaps technically a contio)</td>
<td>Pompey and Crassus are publicly reconciled</td>
<td>App. BC 1.121; Plut. Vit. Pomp. 23.1–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>769/68 B.C.</td>
<td>court</td>
<td>Pompey defends a Manilius Crispus</td>
<td>Val. Max. 6.2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67 B.C.</td>
<td>contio</td>
<td>Dio reports a speech of Pompey’s in the contio where he appears reluctant to take the Gabinian command against the pirates. Possibly a literary invention</td>
<td>Cass. Dio 36.25–36a; Plut. Vit. Pomp. 25.5–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62 B.C.</td>
<td>military contio</td>
<td>Pompey confers Roman citizenship on Theophanes of Mytilene</td>
<td>Cic. Arch. 24; Val. Max. 8.14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62/61 B.C.</td>
<td>contio</td>
<td>Pompey’s first public speech after his return from the East. Pina Polo suggests that the speech of unknown date reported in Plutarch may belong to this meeting</td>
<td>Cic. Att. 1.14.1 Pina Polo (n. 34) App. A, no. 275, who appends Plut. Vit Pomp. 54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 B.C., Feb.¹</td>
<td>contio and senate</td>
<td>Pompey’s first public speeches after his return from the East</td>
<td>Cic. Att. 1.14.1–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 B.C., 28 Sept.²</td>
<td>contio</td>
<td>Pompey presents his achievements in connection with his triumph</td>
<td>Plin. HN 7.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 B.C., various dates</td>
<td>senate</td>
<td>Pompey praises Cicero’s consulship in several speeches</td>
<td>Cic. Att. 1.19.7 (March 60 n.c.), 1.20.2 (May 60 n.c.), 2.1.6 (June 60 n.c.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59 B.C.</td>
<td>contio</td>
<td>Pompey (and Crassus) supports Caesar’s agrarian bill. Quotations of speech possibly literary inventions</td>
<td>App. BC 2.10; Plut. Vit. Pomp. 47.4–5; Cass. Dio 38.4–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59 B.C., summer</td>
<td>contio</td>
<td>Pompey discusses consul Bibulus’ edicts</td>
<td>Cic. Att. 2.21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58 B.C., 1 June</td>
<td>senate</td>
<td>Senate meeting on the return of Cicero from exile. Pompey in favour but resolution vetoed</td>
<td>Cic. Sest. 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58 B.C., Aug/Oct.¹</td>
<td>colony of Capua</td>
<td>Pompey publicly attacks Clodius’ law on Cicero’s exile</td>
<td>Cic. Red. sen. 29; Cic. Pis. 25; Cic. Mil. 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57 B.C., January</td>
<td>senate</td>
<td>Senate meeting on the return of Cicero. Pompey speaks in favour</td>
<td>Cic. Red. sen. 5; Cic. Dom. 69; Cic. Sest. 74; Cic. Pis. 34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
57 B.C., c. 9 July
Contio following senate meeting decreeing the return of Cicero from exile. Pompey speaks in favour

56 B.C., Feb.
Court (in contiones) and senate meeting

56 B.C., contio
Pompey called to speak at contio by consul Cn. Lentulus Marcellinus on the question of his possible candidacy for the consulship of 55 B.C.

56 B.C., autumn
Pompey speaks in defence of L. Cornelius Balbus

55 B.C., Oct. court
Pompey speaks in defence of L. Scribonius Libo

55 B.C.
Pompey speaks in defence of T. Ampius Balbus

54 B.C., autumn
Pompey gives testimony on behalf of M. Aemilius Scaurus prosecuted de repetundis

54 B.C., letter
Pompey either speaks at an informal assembly of the populace outside the pomerium or writes a letter in defence of A. Gabinius in connection with the latter's trial de repetundis

52 B.C., Jan. contio
Pompey speaks of planned plot of Milo to murder him

51 B.C.
Various senate meetings on Caesar’s Gallic command: Pompey speaks vaguely at first, then more forcefully

49 B.C., Feb.
Italian towns

48 B.C., not delivered
Pompey had prepared a speech in Greek to deliver to Ptolemy, which he reread in the boat going to Alexandria, moments before he was murdered

1 Dating according to Shackleton Bailey’s dating of Cicero’s letter, but Pina Polo (n. 34) App. A, no. 276 argues for January.

2 Pina Polo (n. 34) App. A, no. 277 dates Pompey’s speech to January 61 rather than at the triumph in September.

3 For dating, see Kaster (n. 1), 398 with n. 18. R.G.M. Nisbet, M. Tulli Ciceronis in Calpurnium Pisonem oratio (Oxford, 1961), xiii, places this event in spring 57 B.C. without explicit arguments for this dating.

4 Pina Polo (n. 34) App. A, no. 307 dates this meeting to August 57 B.C., but Kaster (n. 1), 363, 400 argues convincingly for 9 July.

5 For discussion of the form of Pompey’s testimony, see M. Siani-Davies, Marcus Tullius Cicero: Pro Rabirio Postumo (Oxford, 2001), 194.