The African State and Special Procedures: Agency, Leverage and Legitimacy

This chapter explores the international politics of the Special Procedures (SP) systems and focuses particularly on the following questions: why, and how, do states engage with these systems – and for what purposes? The engagement of African states with UN Special Procedures and African Union (AU) Special Rapporteurs is given central prominence herein. The chapter challenges the notion of African state ‘weakness’ in the international system through examining how African states interact with both UN and AU systems to maximise agency and political space. Focusing on African engagement and non-engagement with the seven UN and AU thematic mandates which mirror one another – and complemented by interview data collected from UNHRC personnel in Geneva and state officials in Eastern Africa – we argue that some African states have successfully enhanced their voice and room for manoeuvre within international human rights architectures through strategically engaging and disengaging with different parts of different systems and, indeed, through instrumentalising their perceived weaknesses. In doing so, we also reflect on the extent to which the UN and AU systems complement or contradict one another in their approaches to engaging the continent’s political elite. We conclude by arguing for a more systematic exchange between the two systems.

Mandates' (OHCHR) <http://spinternet.ohchr.org/_Layouts/SpecialProceduresInternet/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx> accessed 23 March 2016. We do, nevertheless, explore the 6 Africa mandates in a number of instances. At the time of writing, there were also an additional eight additional thematic AU SP which we do not expressly cover. For a full list of AU mandates, see ACHPR 'Special Mechanisms' (ACHPR) <www.achpr.org/mechanisms/> accessed 23 March 2016. While the seven UN SP mandates explored here are mirrored directly in the AU mandates for human rights defenders and freedom of expression, there are slight differences in framing under other themes: prisons and detention (AU) instead of arbitrary detention (UN); rights of women (AU) instead of violence against, and discrimination against, women (UN); and refugees, asylum seekers and internallydisplaced persons (AU) instead of human rights of migrants (UN) and human rights of internally displaced persons (UN). collected in interviews conducted with State and international actors across eastern Africa by both authors since 2006 2 along with discussions with key respondents in the UN human rights architecture undertaken in Geneva in May 2015. Secondary data derived from media houses, public statements and other sources is also engaged with.
We argue that while African States exhibit 'weakness' in a range of areas, many can and do exercise considerable strength and agency in the international system -sometimes through instrumentalising these very weaknesses and sometimes through strategically engaging or disengaging with parts of the system. We see both forms of behaviour evident among a range of semi-authoritarian African States, whose governments use the UN SP system, in part, to improve their standing within the international community and UN architecture as well as to 'socialise' some internal crises (eg internally displaced persons) and secure international resources to deal with them.
We emphasise, however, the complexity of the picture: many African States engage with the SR systems in good faith, often making an important contribution to their work and outputs. While lack of resources (for UN and AU SP, as well as for African States themselves) limits the effectiveness of the system, of more fundamental significance for its overall future efficacy are the issues of credibility and legitimacy. The somewhat adversarial nature of the UN SP system sits uncomfortably in an African context where defence of State sovereignty above all else often remains the central fulcrum of international relations. 3 The AU SP system is therefore far more deferential and dialogue-based than that of the UN and while greater cooperation between both sets of actors will allow the fostering of greater independence and voice among the former, the latter also have much to learn for their own practice through such an interaction, as this chapter will discuss. 2 Primarily in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. This interview data acts primarily as a complement to the visit request data -the latter being the primary evidence explored in the chapter. Eastern Africa nonetheless represents one of the most significant regions of UN SP and AU SR activity in Africa and includes four of the six States currently the focus of UN SR country mandates (Burundi, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan). Ethiopia is also the home of the African Union and thus accessing diplomats from across the continent has been possible. The interview data therefore provides more than simply a regional perspective on the interactions between the UN SP/AU SR systems and African States. 3 The artificial creation -and questionable domestic legitimacy -of many African States through the colonial/postcolonial experience, coupled with many African governments' inability or unwillingness to extend State control and infrastructure beyond urban areas, has led many scholars to highlight the defence and instrumentalisation of State sovereignty as a central survival strategy for many postcolonial African polities. See In terms of structure, the chapter will first challenge the notion of African State 'weakness' at the international level before exploring how a range of African governments have secured agency through strategically engaging with the UN and AU SR systems.
Section III. will nevertheless caution against an interpretation of African engagement with the systems based wholly in realpolitik, emphasising more constructive forms of interaction as well as highlighting the underestimation of norms of sovereignty and legitimacy by the UN system in its engagement with Africa. The piece concludes by examining the implications of these findings for practitioners in both systems.

II. African agency and Special Procedures
A. The 'African agency' literature The characterisation of African States as 'weak' in the international system is a longstanding trope in Western political science as well as in Western and international policy-making circles. 4 With sometimes more than half of their national budgets funded by North American and European governments, 5 African States are often either ignored in International Relations theory-building altogether or dismissed as passive or dependent objects of a set of power dynamics and norm creations which they play little to no active role in influencing. 6 Often barely able to project their authority beyond their capital cities, let alone beyond their borders, African States have also been the main recipients of the 'failed' or 'fragile' State label developed by World Bank, OECD and academic analysts since the 1990s. 7 Where African agency has been recognised in these various arenas it has tended to be critiqued in sometimes quite pejorative and paternalistic terms; African States not conforming to international standards on governance or human rights, or African States lagging behind the 4 W Brown, 'Africa and International Relations: A Comment on IR Theory, Anarchy and Statehood ' (2006)  international aid flows (financial and military), rendering the complex and politically risky task of raising domestic revenue less necessary. This 'extraversion', as it has been characterised by Jean-François Bayart, has become a particularly rewarding strategy for African States given the post-2001 preoccupation of Western governments -along with that of the UN and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) -with supporting stable and resilient African States in the context of a 'Global War on Terror'. 13 The manner in which such behaviour allows African States to advance more 'positive' activities into the limelight and, thereby, cast more controversial ones into the shadows has been linked by Beswick to Steven David's theory of 'omni-balancing' -an analysis of how leaders in the Third World change alignments in global politics on the basis of rational cost-benefit analyses of their best interests vis-à-vis the overall context of domestic and international political forces. 14 Though rejecting various aspects of the concept when applied to the current, post-Cold War developing world, she nevertheless highlights the core framework of the theory -which focusses on how leaders 'balance' internal and external threats to their hold on power to survive -as valuable for understanding African engagement with the international system. Analysing the case of Rwanda, she demonstrates how the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)-led government aligned with international actors over regional conflict resolution in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during 2009-10 to head off criticism and aid suspensions from the same actors (and their possible alignment with domestic Rwandan opposition groups) over democratic backsliding in the lead-up to elections in that country in August 2010. 15 Similar interpretations have been applied to the behaviour of governments in Ghana and Uganda during the 1990s and those of Ethiopia, Uganda and Chad during the 2000s. 16 Haynes and others have argued that semi-authoritarian regimes in Ghana and Uganda strategically aligned with powerful Western institutions such as the World Bank in the field of economic liberalisation in order to neutralise criticism (and potential aid cuts) from elsewhere in the donor community regarding limited democratisation. 17 More recently, similar patterns have been identified by Fisher,  This literature also underlines the degree to which these strategic alignments also serve to engender mutual dependency between international and African actors -in other words, this is not simply a case of African States 'surviving' within the system but also influencing and modifying it. As Harrison and others have argued, for example, the World Bank and other major donors require 'success stories' to validate their own prescriptionsand thus their international credibility as effective development institutions and thoughtleaders. This provides significant room for manoeuvre among States such as 1990s-2000s Tanzania, Mozambique or Uganda which have implemented their policies and subsequently achieved economic growth. 20 The Bank and others -according to this argument -have invested so much economic and political capital in these States that their fortunes are tied to them to some degree. Prevented from criticising these States' shortcomings in the arenas of transparency, accountability or civil freedoms for fear of undermining their own reputation, therefore, these donors are compelled to modify their universalist discourses to justify the existence of 'successful' States which do not, however, conform to Western political sensitivities. The generation of these symbiotic relationships by seemingly 'weak' African States is perhaps most clearly captured, at present, in the sphere of international peace and security.
The mid-1990s saw the UN and Western States heavily discredited in relation to African conflict, following several failed interventions in war-torn Somalia and the failure to intervene in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. Responding to conflicting international and domestic pressures, these States and institutions rapidly came to throw their support behind regionally-led peacekeeping interventions as a solution, sometimes captured in the Clinton administration's notion of 'African solution to African problems'. 21 Many African States came to support this agenda, partly because of a genuine belief in the need for 'local' solutions to the continent's security problems and partly to secure more comprehensive military assistance and training from Western States through their support for regional initiatives. 22 This led, during the 2000s, to a transformation of peacekeeping on the African continent whereby African States have become major contributors to UN forces (Ethiopia and Rwanda are among the top five global troop contributors to UN missions, Ghana and Nigeria are among the top ten 23 ) and regionally-led missions (under the AU or a sub-regional unit) have increased in number and scope substantially. 24 For the UN and Western States, therefore, African States are now the key 'intermediaries' in the management of peace and conflict on the continent. This has been instrumentalised by a range of States through strategic alignments, as outlined above. 25 It has also, however, been used directly as a quid pro quo by States such as Uganda and Rwanda, which have threatened to withdraw their troops from various missions central to UN and Western concerns in Africa (Somalia and Darfur respectively) unless policy shifts are made by these actors. In 2012, for example, the Ugandan government threatened to pull its troops out of the AU Mission in Somalia Group of Experts be 'withdrawn'. Western donors rapidly distanced themselves from the Group's report (at least as concerned Uganda). 26 Crucially, however, African State agency is identified not only in the re-direction or neutralisation of pressures or criticisms from the outside world but also in the moulding and re-conceptualisation of key norms themselves. Fisher and Anderson, for example, have demonstrated how the governments of Uganda, Ethiopia and Chad have employed savvy diplomacy to persuade governments in Europe and North America to re-frame how they view security threats emanating from parts of the African continent. 27 Beswick, Holmes and others have explored the ways in which the Rwandan government has re-conceptualised the 'peacekeeper' not only as an external conflict management entity but as a service provider and organic part of post-conflict societies, 28 a narrative which has also emerged in Ethiopia in recent years. 29 This 'African agency' literature, therefore, cautions against a simplistic understanding of African States' relationships with, and degree of influence within, the international system.
For while there are clear limits to the 'hard power' most African States can seek to exercise, this does not preclude the securing of influence and agency through other means, particularly through the playing-off of different players against one another, strategic alignment with key actors or agendas and re-framing of 'accepted' norms through individual or collective action.

B. African agency and the SP systems
The above discussion provides valuable context for understanding and exploring how African States engage with the SP system. For many African States, the UN (along, perhaps, with the World Bank and the US -or France 30 ) is an international actor whose influence and significance cannot be ignored. Through its various agencies, the UN provides crucial support in the form of programme and project funding, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping support and resources to help manage refugee and IDP crises. The UN's role as 26 Fisher and Anderson (n 5). Council) or as a global monitor of human rights (via the UNHRC) -is also of great significance for African States, not least because of the impact of its judgments and perspectives on the behaviour of global powers. 31 It would be surprising, then, to not encounter attempts by African States to engage with the SP machinery as a means to further their own interests, whether these be in line with the machinery's own goals or otherwise.
The structure of the SP system also provides considerable room for manoeuvre and the carving-out of agency by African States. The existence of 41 thematic mandates and six African country mandates 32 means that African States have the ability to engage selectively with SR -potentially those whose perspectives or mandates they sympathise with. The existence of a parallel AU SP machinery (appointed via the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights) -involving 14 mandates at present -further expands this space. Finally, SR are not paid a fee for their work and thus rely on the UN/AU for research and administrative assistance with sending -and chasing up -visit invitations, writing reports and other responsibilities. 33 The UN SP branch has historically had only limited resources to support these activities, while its AU equivalent has virtually none. 34 SR must, therefore, be selective themselves in the countries and issues which they focus upon and must rely far more on the goodwill and cooperation of the countries in question to be effective than many other parts of the UN and AU machinery. Indeed, many AU SR are employed by African governments themselves (UN SR are more often employed by universities or independent policy institutes). 35 When reviewing the patterns of engagement by African States with SR from both systems, it becomes clear that some States have simply sought to ignore them entirely.
Eritrea, for example, has consistently ignored visit requests from both thematic SR (UN for 31 There is a vast literature on the UN's role as a normative actor, key texts for this context include A Bellamy, 'The Responsibility to Protect Turns Ten' (2015)  freedom of expression) and the UN Eritrea SR, the latter being forced to rely instead on interviews with external experts and diaspora members in Europe and North Africa in putting together recent reports. 36 This reflects the Asmara regime's broader disengagement from much of the international system since the early 2000s. Ethiopia has been similarly disinterested in engaging with the UN system although -like many African States -has welcomed its actions when they align with its own interests. The appointment of a UN SR for Eritrea in 2012 -Ethiopia's key opponent in the region since war between the two States broke out in 1998 -was strongly supported by officials in Addis Ababa. 37 Others have -usually unsuccessfully -sought to  2005)  States to the international community -access and engagement on one area of concern (IDPs) but stonewalling on another (Darfur and human rights/freedom of expression).
More broadly, though, this latter behaviour forms part of a wider strategy both Chad and Sudan have engaged in since the early 2000s vis-à-vis the international community. With some of the most complex and protracted IDP and refugee crises within and across their borders on the African continent, both States have consistently engaged with the international system as a means to 'socialise' the issue. That is, they have intermittently welcomed or facilitated (albeit under strict oversight) UN, EU and other forms of international actors to assist in providing humanitarian and security assistance to refugees and IDPs as a means to internationalise responsibility for the problem -and to free up space elsewhere in the domestic budget for regime maintenance-focussed purposes. 44 Simultaneously, Chad in particular has instrumentalised international support under this socialisation strategy to augment and enhance the size and resources of its own security forces. 45 DRC has also sought to 'socialise' its own security problems in a similar fashion.
Regional and international intervention against rebel movements in its eastern regions have been cautiously facilitated by Kinshasa as an attempt to transfer responsibility for policing insecurity and human rights abuses here away from the government. This includes the issue of rape as a weapon of war -high on the international agenda with regard to DRC since the mid-2000s and a problem which has led a senior UN official to label the country the 'rape capital of the world'. 46 Significantly, Kinshasa has also engaged with the SR system as a This reflects, for some in Geneva, a perception in some African capitals that AU SR are more malleable and less likely to be critical than their UN counterparts given their limited resources and heavy dependence upon African governments and political structures themselves to maintain legitimacy in their roles. 51 In the case of Ethiopia -together with many other African States -there is also, however, a crucial normative element to decisions 48 Interviews with AU Peace and Security officials, Addis Ababa, 16-19 May 2014.. 49  regarding engaging with the UN or AU around 'African issues', a point which will be developed below.
It is clear, then, that a number of African States have calibrated their engagements with the UN and AU systems skilfully to maximise the space available for securing agency at a range of levels. This has included defensive strategies, aimed at neutralising or re-directing international criticism or censure (often at key moments of difficulty for that State in its broader relationship with the global system) as well as those focussed on instrumentalising the systems more generally for domestic, regional or international political purposes. For those with particularly complex relationships with the UN and Western actors, however, more assertive strategies are apparent -notably in the use of SR systems to move areas of domestic crisis and responsibility into the international sphere; depoliticising and socialising problems which are often the consequence (direct or indirect) of government neglect or worse.

III. Contested perspectives and the SP systems in Africa
At this point, it is vital to acknowledge the diverse range and character of African States and their many different relationships with the international system. The discussion above has largely placed African States into a singular category vis-à-vis their engagement/nonengagement with SR systems, one which has tended to characterise them as cynical and insincere in their approach to international and regional human rights structures. As will have become apparent, however, the strategies above have tended to be employed by particular types of African States -authoritarian or semi-authoritarian polities whose governments have long demonstrated disinterest in protecting citizens from arbitrary and violent attacks on their security and livelihoods. Chad, Sudan, Eritrea, DRC and Zimbabwe are among the continent's longest and worst offenders in this regard while Ethiopia and Rwanda -whose developmental vision has been praised in many quarters -continue to feature heavily among States criticised for not upholding human rights norms. 52 Within the UNHRC itself, as in many other fora, African States do not all share the same approach or agendas. Officials in Geneva note how the Arab Spring 'split' an African 52 While macro-indices rarely capture the nuances of governance and human rights trajectories in individual States, it is nonetheless worth noting that Freedom House's 2015 'Freedom in the World' analysis categorises all seven of these States as 'not free', with Sudan and Eritrea both being awarded the lowest possible scores across the board (civil liberties, political rights and freedom rating): see <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.VW3FH-eXGpg> accessed 23 March 2016. Furthermore, three of the four reports produced by Human Rights Watch since the start of 2015 have (at the time of writing) focussed on one of these seven States. group previously dominated by Egypt and South Africa and that a 'fragmentation' of the group has since occurred, with different States rallying around different causes and concerns, to a degree at least. 53 UNHRC staff identify a number of States which they view as genuinely committed to working with the SR structures to help improve the situations of their own citizens and to engage critically and effectively within the system to promote cross-cutting issues of concern (such as forced marriage or threats posed by groups such as Boko Haram).
Perhaps revealingly, most of these States are among the continent's most democratic -Namibia, Botswana, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Zambia -and many appear to have issued standing invitations (eg Benin, Ghana and Zambia) and accepted visits across mandates and time periods without clear 'ulterior motives' (such as those outlined in section II. B.). 54 It remains somewhat problematic -and incongruent with the sentiments of many African officials 55 -to view commitment to, or subversion of, the UN SP system by African governments as equal to support for, or rejection of, human rights. Many African political leaders cynically appeal to narratives on 'neo-colonial tools of oppression' and 'African solutions to African problems' in order to bat away international criticisms of their human rights or governance records or in an attempt to delegitimise planned humanitarian interventions or legal processes. 56 For instance, the UN's recognition of Alassane Outtarra's election victory in Côte d'Ivoire in December 2010 was painted in this light by incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo (who refused to leave office, eventually being deposed by French The adoption of such stances -however insincere -often resonates within African societies because they draw upon deep, longstanding and sincere feelings of ambivalence in parts of the continent regarding the intentions and goodwill of the (seemingly Westerndominated) international community. At one level this derives from historic experiences of oppression and violence experienced during the colonial era and experiences of instrumentalisation and manipulation by major powers during the Cold War. 59 In specific cases, particular experiences of apparent neglect or betrayal by the international organisations especially have also heavily coloured the perspectives of political elites towards the institution: notably in Rwanda post-1994 and in Eritrea since the mid-2000s. 60 More generally, however, these 'anticolonial' sentiments when applied by African States to issues of international justice arise from a much more fundamental debate within and across African societies and polities regarding the universality and applicability of a range of 'international' norms and approaches in the African context. 61 The absence of notions of community rights and responsibilities from international human rights and charters, for example, is a perennial critique made by AU and ACHPR officials, as well as a range of African States, elites, analysts, CSOs and communities themselves. 62 The focus of much international human rights law on shaming, prosecuting and punishing perpetrators is also argued to fly in the face of 'traditional' African legal mechanisms which focus on reconciliation and 'moving on'. 63 A common critique by regional officials and NGO actors of the ICC process in Kenya during 2013-14, for example, centred around the value of further inflaming tensions by trying leading politicians in the Hague (including the serving president and deputy president) as opposed to promoting more reconciliatory activities. 64 Furthermore, a range of African NGOs and public officials also maintain a narrative which argues that the 'African' approach to pushing leaders for change focusses upon constructive and respectful dialogue, often behind closed doors, rather than on public demonisation or criticism. 65 The extent to which any of these tropes reflect attitudes widely held (currently or previously) within African societies or speak to genuinely historic practices or norms (if, indeed, the 'survival' of such practices can be truly conceived of following centuries of dynamic interactions within and between African societies and other peoples) is a longstanding and rich debate among scholars of anthropology, transitional justice and hybridity -and is not the focus of this piece. 66 It is important, however, to highlight in this study of agency the degree to which Africa's approach to the SP and wider international human rights architectures reflect attempts to reframe debates within the UN around agendas and perspectives presented -notionally or otherwise -as 'African'.
The fact that African SR are appointed by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (emphasis our own) reflects the long-time concern of the AU (and its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity) to challenge and move beyond the perceived individualcentric nature of international human rights law, as well as an effort to promote a different understanding of human rights. 67 Furthermore, with few exceptions, AU SR visits take the form of either informal addons to conference or workshop trips, 'fact-finding missions' or 'promotional visits', the latter being focussed mainly on promoting the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 68 'exchanging views and sharing experiences with major human rights stakeholders', to raise awareness of the African Commission within the government bureaucracy and to encourage closer collaboration between the Commission, State and CSOs. 69 Recommendations are made on the back of such trips although the form of engagement is framed in far more cooperative terms than that of UN SR. Reports of these visits, when written, are also rarely made fully or publicly available in the same manner as those by UN SR, further evidence -arguably -of a more deferential-style relationship between the ACHPR, its SR and African States than that between counterparts in the UN system. 70  The more deferential AU SR approach to engaging States and promotion of modified or separate agendas within the UNHRC and wider UN system by African States should also, then, be understood as part of a wider quest for normative agency. This quest is not simply concerned with avoiding or re-directing critique but in challenging the notion of a universal consensus on the contents of human rights and the attempted negotiation of an alternative or, at least, wider conceptualisation. Whether this is a positive or negative development for African citizens themselves is a different question; either way, though, it forces those who care about the continent to take more seriously how and why African States engage with SR systems.

IV. Conclusion and implications
The purpose of this chapter has been to critically unpack and explore the engagement of  Highlighting how semi-authoritarian and authoritarian African States in particular have engaged with SR to evade international criticism as well as to secure greater influence and political space at the global level, the chapter has also emphasised the normative dimension to these interactions. For while a range of (particularly more democratic) African States seek to engage with the UNHRC and SP systems 'constructively' -that is, in pursuit of their defined objectives -many take a deeply ambivalent view of how 'human rights' are conceptualised within the Council and the mandates it appoints. Hence, the development of the AU SR system and wider engagement of African States with the UN human rights architecture should be understood not simply as reactionary or pragmatic but part of a broader contestation of global human rights norms and governance mechanisms.
In this context, the making of recommendations has not been a clear objective of this analysis. A preliminary consideration of the implications of this study for UNHRC, AU and SP officials, however, leads to a number of conclusions. More comprehensive engagement between UN and AU SR -and the two systems in general -clearly holds significant advantages for both sides, and for the promotion of human rights as understood by both the UNHRC and the ACHPR.
A more systematic exchange between SR would allow for a clearer division of labour vis-à-vis planned visits, target States and crises and undermine State attempts to play SR and systems off against one another. This would also open up greater space for the sharing of resources and expertise between the two sides; at present AU SR must rely on ad hoc assistance from NGOs together with a range of other actors in academia and elsewhere. AU SR also argue that their authority is enhanced through association/joint visits with UN SR whose perceived independence and expertise they also value. 79 Though more extensive coordination and resource exchange would, of course, require greater capacity-building on both sides, this would not only enhance the effectiveness of both systems, it would also provide structural support to African States with a genuine commitment to doing this. At present, as many officials in Geneva note, strong African voices within the AU SP system and UNHRC itself rise and fall with the particular skills and expertise of individual diplomats and personnel. 80 It is important, however, for UN officials to see any greater cooperation or exchange as a mutually-beneficial arrangement. At present, some of the former feel that UN SR are 79  primarily 'opening the doors for regional SR' through their interactions with them. 81 As argued above, however, AU SR tend to be more conscious of how best to secure access to different parts of the continent and of what approaches are most effective in constructively engaging State actors, even in authoritarian settings. More fundamentally, though, AU SR are more clearly able to credibly represent and parse African (State and popular) perspectives on human rights norms at the UN and global level. Where these perspectives challenge those held by officials based in, and appointed by, Geneva this provides an opportunity for open and critical exchange, rather than dismissal by the former as cynical African politicking.
Since, for better or worse, the actual prevention of human rights abuses remains heavily within the purview of States themselves -international mechanisms to ensure that such prevention occurs must therefore remain legitimate in the eyes of States themselves.
The fate of the ICC represents a cautionary tale for supporters of the SP system in this regard. The Court was established with massive African support (with more than half of the continent's polities ratifying, or acceding to, the Rome Statute by late 2003) and a number of governments -including those of South Africa, Kenya and Tanzania -even viewed the institution as a welcome challenge to US hegemony and 'imperialism'. Within a decade, however, the ICC became thoroughly delegitimised within the continent's political elites. The