The Security Apparatus and the British Left, 1950s–2000s (Part I)

Abstract

This paper (Part I and Part II forthcoming) takes its inspiration from the ongoing Undercover Policing Inquiry into past undercover police operations in the United Kingdom, but takes a wider perspective and employs a longer historical trajectory to explore the political terrain underpinning the domestic activities of the Security Service and Special Branch vis-à-vis predominantly left-wing and/or radical groups during and after the Cold War. The goal is to augment the scholarly understanding of the role of intelligence gathering in order to defend the State against groups and individuals deemed to pose a threat to national security and/or public order. Part I presented here explores the histories, possibilities and dilemmas of undercover policing of, and intelligence gathering among, political groups and the evergreen communist and ‘far and wide left’ threats that were historically perceived as menacing the United Kingdom.

Keywords: security; intelligence; police; political violence; subversion; protest.

In July 2015, the Undercover Policing Inquiry set out its terms of reference for the investigation of undercover policing units that have operated in England and Wales since 1968, with a particular focus on the now-disbanded Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) and National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU). These two elite units utilized a clandestine approach typical of systems of ‘high policing’ 1 that secretly observe and disrupt (often left-wing) political groups considered to pose a threat of public disorder, political violence and/or subversion. The Inquiry reports to the Home Office and is expected to last until at least mid-2018. The Inquiry seeks to undertake an assessment of creditable and discreditable conduct 2 by managers and operatives and to uncover various elements, such as these units’ contribution to crime prevention and detection; the scope of undercover policing operations and their effect on the public; the government’s awareness of undercover operations; the regulation, authorization and oversight of undercover policing; and undercover police officers’ 3
selection, training, management and care. Police requested selected hearings to be heard in secret to protect covert deployments and the identities of the undercover officers.

Amid media debates, scandals and speculations about the activities of the SDS and the NPOIU between 1968 and 2011, there is a lack of discussion on the political terrain within which these particular units, and also the security apparatus as a whole, operated during that period, while predominantly but not exclusively targeting left-wing and/or radical political groups. In exploring the roles of both the Security Service and Special Branch (as a partner or adjunct of the Security Service), this paper, which is divided into two parts (Part I here and Part II forthcoming), takes a holistic and historical view of ‘political’ surveillance and policing. The relationship between the Security Service and the police goes back to the foundation of the former in 1909, when the first director general of the Security Service, Vernon Kell, was tasked with investigating German espionage and, in order to do so, made a nationwide tour of all police forces and drew on the experience of William Melville, a former head of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB). The relationship between the Security Service and the MPSB remained secret for over fifty years and only became public in Lord Denning’s 1963 report on the ‘Profumo Affair.’ In the 1960s, police forces outside the city of London started developing their own Special Branches, too, in order to respond to Cold-War-related threats from espionage and subversion, which formed the main focus of the work of the Security Service during that period. The relationship between the Security Service and Special Branches was codified in 1984, when a set of Home Office guidelines for chief constables spelled out the relationship between the two and their roles.

Special Branches would therefore continue to police their own local areas and to maintain public order but would also operate as a medium between the Security Service and the overall police service. In this respect, Special Branch’s role was to assist the Security Service by collecting information that could support national security intelligence work. By inquiring into the role of the Security Service and its relationship with Special Branch – and necessarily the SDS, an undercover police unit located within the MPSB – this paper seeks to shed new light on the subject. Here, it is important to note that the undercover operations of the NPIOU differed considerably from those of the SDS, insofar as the former’s appear to have had a predominantly (if not sole) police public order focus and no close relationship with
the Security Service.

Methodologically, Parts I and II of this paper bring together a range of diverse sources that can help provide a history that is certainly not conclusive yet offers a series of original and well-focused snapshots, presented in chronological order, of the security activities conducted against various British left-wing and/or radical political groups between the 1950s and the 2000s. These sources include the following: historical documents released by the MPSB and the Home Office\textsuperscript{10} that have never before been analyzed holistically and/or published in a scholarly article; academic and non-academic literatures across the orthodox and critical spectra; reports from various bodies and organizations; and open source material, all of which help in analyzing the political context in which Special Branch and the Security Service operated during and after the Cold War, in order to understand the ‘enemies’ that the British State deemed worth monitoring and defeating.

To start with, Part I of this paper considers the specific evolution of undercover policing of political groups involved in protest and the often tense relationship between security and liberty. Subsequently, it zooms out to explore the communist and ‘far and wide left’ threat that concerned government, the Security Service and Special Branch during the Cold War and that created an anti-Cold-War intelligence mentality that would continue well after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Part II of the paper (forthcoming) then explores some of the left-wing and/or radical protest groups that the security apparatus monitored in order to neutralize real and perceived political and criminal threats to the State and society. Lastly, it discusses a more recent target of police activities, namely the Radical Environmentalist and Animal Rights (REAR) movement, and the amorphous and elusive threat that its more militant fringe has posed to society. Overall, the paper cannot touch on all of the left-wing and/or radical groups that utilized means threatening national security and/or public order in pursuance of communist, Trotskyist, anarchist, pacifist, anti-capitalist, environmentalist and animal rights causes, among many others. Instead, the paper seeks to present selected examples, in largely chronological order, of the mutable and polymorphous ‘enemies’ standing on the left of the political spectrum that the security apparatus faced between the 1950s and the 2000s, and the ways in which their real and perceived threats expressed themselves and were countered by the State.
Undercover Policing of Political Groups: Histories, Possibilities and Dilemmas

From its foundation as the Special Irish Branch in 1883 and until it was subsumed within the Counter Terrorism Command (CTC/SO15) in 2006, the Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB/SO12) dealt with several groups and individuals posing a threat of public disorder, political violence and/or subversion, such as Irish republicans; anarchists; Bolsheviks; suffragettes; fascists; Zionist extremists; Arab, Middle Eastern and Islamist terrorists; environmental and animal rights extremists; foreign spies; British traitors; and many others. Before moving to the CTC eleven years ago, the MPSB was divided into two Operational Command Units that dealt with, on the one hand, counterterrorism and counter-extremism and, on the other hand, security at international ports and nationwide protection of public figures and prominent foreign visitors who did not fall within the remit of the Royal Protection Command (SO14) or the Diplomatic Protection Group (SO16). The MPSB worked through seven squads holding different responsibilities: ‘A’ Squad – close protection; ‘B’ Squad – Irish republican terrorism; ‘C’ Squad – domestic extremism; ‘D’ Squad – naturalization enquiries; ‘E’ Squad – international terrorism; ‘P’ Squad – policing at ports; and ‘S’ Squad – the SDS, support for covert operations including surveillance, communications, prison liaison, European liaison and others.

The SDS played a key role within the MPSB and, later, the CTC until the unit was disbanded in 2008. The SDS operated within the ‘S’ Squad and liaised with the Security Service. The public interest driving its activities was the management of “potentially dangerous public order issues” and the enhancement of the police’s understanding of organizations that engage in politically motivated criminality. It started with just twelve members in 1968 and recruited over a hundred officers from the MPSB over the following forty years. During that period, SDS officers infiltrated “several hundred [about 460] activist groups, including almost every activist group assessed to be capable of causing potential public order issues, as well as a number of terrorist groups.” These groups were originally left-wing extremists, but later encompassed the far right, Irish terrorists and animal rights extremists too. Around 1996 or 1997, the unit shifted its operational focus away from public disorder and mass demonstrations alone to include long-term activities gathering intelligence on individuals with less interest in demonstrations, although this may have been the case also for some operations at earlier points in the SDS’s history. A CTC report
compiled in 2009 argues that this shift led the SDS to operate with increasing tactical latitude, targeting peripheral subjects and focusing on long-term, future-oriented strategic intelligence on extremist, subversive and other groups of potential interest to the police, the Security Service and the government.

This operational move encapsulates the fault lines that separate law enforcement operations from intelligence gathering activities, insofar as “intelligence is all about the future and is designed to enable action in the face of continuing doubt.” Intelligence therefore inhabits the vast world of the unpredictable that stretches beyond the mere collection of “the communications of adversaries or of the guilty.” The SDS’s objectives encompassed a stronger focus on understanding “where a target organisation would be in five years and who would be leading or directing them,” a goal that the unit successfully achieved by “engine[ring] their field officers into key positions within target groups.” Short-term, ‘here-and-now’ tactical intelligence, which had constituted the original objective of the unit, became secondary to the long-term goal of assessing targeted organizations. But while some of the organizations targeted throughout the SDS’s forty years of existence were largely peaceful, other organizations not only engaged in minor public order offences but also “did participate in significant criminality ranging from offences of criminal damage to the planting of incendiary devices and a range of terrorist activity.”

The unit maintained a flexible approach to undercover officers committing low-level crimes, holding important positions in the targeted groups, becoming involved in meetings and activities and going along with activists in order to maintain cover. At least twenty-six officers were arrested over a total of fifty-three occasions and, on nine of these occasions, used their undercover identities in court. Frederick Forsyth’s bestselling novel *The Day of the Jackal* offered inspiration for the controversial use of dead children’s identities as a way to create ‘legends’ (covert identities). Out of the approximately 146 officers that served in the SDS, there is a record of at least 106 covert identities being employed: at least forty-two of these identities used the details of a deceased child while forty-five other identities used a fictitious identity whose provenance is yet to be established. The NPOIU borrowed and utilized this technique, the revelation of which would later spark public outrage among target groups and their sympathizers and which would help make the case for the Undercover Policing Inquiry. Whether other covert units of the British police, or the intelligence agencies, ever used the same practice is unclear, although the Secret
Intelligence Service is believed not to utilize dead children’s identities “for fear of legal action by angry relatives if the operation should go wrong and be publicly exposed.”

The activities of the SDS have received both praise and criticism. The independent investigation into the SDS, called ‘Operation Herne,’ found that the unit’s clandestine activities had included exaggerations as to “the involvement of SDS officers and the value of their intelligence [, … which] would not be the only occasion where members of a unit embellished their importance and success in order to secure finance.” At the same time, ‘Operation Herne’ praised the unit for a series of “brave and innovative operations that […] had been] undertaken and some hugely courageous and good covert operatives who [had] provided a valuable service in keeping the communities of London and further afield safe over many years.”

A similar unit, the NPOIU, emerged in 1999 within the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). Funded by the Home Office and overseen by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Public Order Sub-Committee and ACPO’s Terrorism and Allied Matters, the NPOIU incorporated the Animal Rights National Index (ARNI), which had originally been set up in 1986 in order to monitor the activities of violent animal rights groups. The NPOIU’s establishment saw the direct involvement of some of the United Kingdom’s most prominent police officers of that era (some of whom had also had responsibility for the SDS): Commanders of the MPSB Barry Moss and Roger Pearce; Assistant Commissioner for Special Operations of the MPSB David Veness; Assistant Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police Tim Hollis; and Assistant Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Paul Blewitt. Some police forces wanted the NPOIU to include within its remit travelers and main sports events, which were instead covered by the Northern Intelligence Unit and the Southern Intelligence Unit. Eventually, the NPOIU established itself in a secret location in London and gathered, analyzed and disseminated intelligence on animal rights and environmental extremist activities and other political extremist and/or protest activities involving a serious threat of criminality and public disorder. This was a period when animal rights and environmental groups had started “innovative tactics to frustrate authorities,” while some of their members operated “in cell like structures in a quasi-terrorist mode to keep secret their movements and intentions.”

Officers were initially selected from the MPSB, and many were seconded from the ‘C’ Squad, and via a process that assessed their knowledge of domestic
extremism, operational experience and capacity to handle informants.\textsuperscript{40} They inserted themselves within target groups, attending meetings, sometimes offering transport to/from events and reporting the affiliates of protest groups. Occasionally, they committed low-level offences, such as aggravated trespass, breaches of the peace, assaults on police officers, criminal damage and so on.\textsuperscript{41} The unit essentially operated as a “national response to public protest generating violence and civil disruption […] and] was deployed to gather coordinated intelligence rather than evidence which could be used to support criminal prosecutions.”\textsuperscript{42} It also provided operational support to police forces needing such intelligence and acted both as a coordination point for Special Branch units\textsuperscript{43} in the country and as a contact point between the United Kingdom and other European police forces.\textsuperscript{44} The Northern Intelligence Unit and the Southern Intelligence Unit acted as satellite units of the NPOIU.\textsuperscript{45}

At the time of the NPOIU’s establishment, intelligence-led policing sourced its information from informants, communities, activist magazines, newspapers and the Internet. The official sources for public order intelligence were the data systems of individual forces, the MPS Public Order Intelligence System, Special Branches, the Northern and Southern Intelligence Units and the National Criminal Intelligence Services.\textsuperscript{46} The NPOIU maintained very close links to the ACPO, the National Crime Intelligence Service, local public order intelligence units, the European Liaison Section and Special Branch in a process of mutual exchange, control, verification and/or analysis of intelligence.\textsuperscript{47} The unit also provided intelligence to the Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) to help assess the threat from anti-nuclear, anti-arms and animal rights groups that fell within its operational remit. The MDP’s intelligence was collated with intelligence received from the Security Service (Irish-related terrorism and international terrorism), the MPSB (Irish-related terrorism in Great Britain) and the Defence Intelligence Staff (Irish-related terrorism in Northern Ireland) to inform the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Counter Extremism Advisory Group’s (CEAG’s) assessment of the threat from terrorism to Security Service and MOD establishments in the country. The MOD CEAG provided a monthly terrorist assessment of the threat to establishments, individuals and events based on a six-tier level system of threat. The MOD CEAG also set the now-defunct BIKINI state on non-specific threats to be displayed at the entrance of government buildings and military establishments.\textsuperscript{48}

The NPOIU has received intense scrutiny for a series of convictions where the lack of surviving records made it difficult to ascertain whether undercover officers
had undertaken direct action in the activities leading to the activists’ arrest. \textsuperscript{49} Material generated through deployments was not revealed to investigators and prosecutors during the criminal proceedings. Moreover, undercover officers knew that some elements of the prosecution cases presented by police witnesses were false. The lack of communication between various actors in the criminal justice system became particularly evident in the collapse of the trial against environmental activists charged with conspiracy to commit aggravated trespass when attempting to shut down the Ratcliffe-on-Soar Power Station in Nottinghamshire in 2009. This case highlights a failure to distribute the authorization of former NPOIU officer Mark Kennedy and the transcript of his audio recording to the relevant police officers and to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). This failure also led to a lack of proper disclosure to the defense and resulted in the CPS charging the activists without knowledge of the existence of an undercover officer. \textsuperscript{50} In the case of the SDS, its complete secrecy (partly to protect officers’ safety and the effectiveness of undercover tactics), \textsuperscript{51} an intelligence-oriented doctrine and a policy of non-disclosure within the unit deprived “the trial process of the proper opportunity to consider the importance of an undercover deployment connected to activists who were arrested and prosecuted […] and constituted] a serious procedural irregularity in the process designed to ensure a fair trial.” \textsuperscript{52}

These assessments speak to the heart of the evergreen threat that undercover policing and intelligence gathering pose to fair and open trials, \textsuperscript{53} civil liberties and just prosecutions. \textsuperscript{54} A recent small-scale study conducted among British activists, who had faced disruptive and deterrent physical surveillance and other intelligence gathering tactics, highlights the issue of “maintaining security within decentralised groups [in which] people do not usually become involved in political protest with the express intention, from the outset, of breaking the law.” \textsuperscript{55} In the groups under study, revelations about Mark Kennedy’s true identity contributed to a decline in environmental direct action, decreased the bonds of trust within the groups and tightened circles of activists, who eventually isolated themselves from the public. But while infiltration is often considered a matter of fact \textsuperscript{56} and paranoia is an ever-present feature during the life course of politically active groups, \textsuperscript{57} activists continue to organize in traditional ways that do not effectively respond to ongoing shifts of state security and to the novel methods of surveillance and disruption allowed by modern technologies. \textsuperscript{58}
A recent ethnographic study exploring the secret world of covert police investigations identified a “tendency of officers to request the most intrusive means [, often entailing surveillance, which] speaks to the proverbial sense of mission […] a residue of which is an exaggerated preference for fervent policing tactics.” Unlike routine investigative work, undercover policing is secret, unpredictable, less accountable and inclined to error. But the relationship between investigative work and undercover policing is not dichotomous: police work *per se* is bound to a degree of secrecy and to some restrictions of information that “will always deny complete accountability or complete transparency.” However, it is true that the use of covert tactics by law enforcement agencies “raises sensitive legal concerns about how the role of the police in society should be distinguished from that of intelligence agencies.” Jacqueline Ross aptly notes that

In most modern European democracies, infiltration did not gain ground as an accepted investigative tactic until recently; suffering from myriad associations with totalitarianism, it was reintroduced into Europe in the 1970s to assist in fighting domestic terrorism, and was later adapted to the war against drugs. It was only in the 1990s that Germany, France, and Italy enacted legislation designed to legalize a tactic that occupied an ambiguous role at the margins of accepted investigative activity.

The blurred lines between both (a) preventative and repressive police functions and (b) intelligence pursuit and collection make the case for the ‘necessary’ but ‘evil’ nature of undercover policing. Undercover policing can certainly represent the embodiment of the ‘noble lie,’ particularly when considered through the ethical lens of liability that postulates that “those who engage in wrongdoing make themselves morally liable to preventative activities” and that goes as far as to concede that “sometimes it will be useful for covert police to deceive or manipulate those who are uninvolved in any criminal wrongdoing.” But even when the infringement of rights of an innocent party is on balance justified (e.g. a small intrusion resulting in a great security benefit), it still produces a complaint that must be morally addressed. Moreover, the absence of safeguards typical of overt justice processes and the threats to the due process model that are inherent in covert tactics have ramifications for how undercover policing is theorized and operationalized in different jurisdictions.
In Germany, the ‘evil’ nature of undercover policing relates to the fact that it compromises the targets’ rights, jeopardizes constitutionally mandated separations between different powers of the executive, endangers the integrity of the police and problematizes the limits of the exercise of governmental power. In the United States, undercover policing is not legally or morally particularly problematic but becomes dangerous when it is abused, for example if used to entrap someone or if control and accountability are lacking.\(^{70}\)

In the United Kingdom, research demonstrates that undercover officers can “become engrossed in, and occasionally sympathetic to, the lives of those they are investigating.”\(^{71}\) The inability to share details of their work can also encourage police officers to lie to people far and wide. Officers working in the SDS and the NPOIU carried out long-term deployments, usually lasting about five years. On leaving the field, they built stories that could avert the risk of activists maintaining contact with them, by pretending to move abroad to take up a new job, flee from the police or start a new life.\(^{72}\) Peripheral members within the targeted groups, who posed no real threat to society and who may have developed genuine friendships with undercover officers, were also on the receiving end of this deception and ‘collateral intrusion.’\(^{73}\)

Undercover activities therefore represent a double-edged sword that helps maintain the sociopolitical status quo and defend the State from its ‘enemies’, while negating the British philosophical principle of ‘policing by consent’ and displaying the irony of requiring secrecy “to defend the transparent democracy we all hope to live in.”\(^{74}\) Here, there are important tensions between the “limited secrecy and deception [that] can be legitimate to police work […] and the] crucial moral questions […] of possible harm, unfairness, and [the] undermining of trust.”\(^{75}\) These tensions find particular salience in the dichotomous relationship between pragmatic versus idealistic views of State action. On the one hand, a typically orthodox security-oriented position is encapsulated by the late George Kennedy Young, a former deputy director of the Secret Intelligence Service, who argued that “acts of government are not choices between good and bad. They are between two evils – the lesser of the two evils. Someone is always going to get hurt by a decision of government […] and] absolute morality, absolute ethics just does not exist in affairs of the state.”\(^{76}\) On the other hand, ethical perspectives propose that ‘just intelligence principles’\(^{77}\) should underpin intelligence collection – a proposition that the security apparatus might find oxymoronic.\(^{78}\) These principles maintain that “harm is only justified when there is a
threat of sufficient proportion, recognized by those whose responsibility it is to protect the people, used against those who are justified targets and conducted with the intention of protection and self-defence.”

The ambiguities and the grey areas of the covert world do not only emerge from the inherently political and historically contingent definition of subversion, terrorism and extremism and from the ethical dilemmas associated with secret operations. They also emerge from the increasingly close relationship between state intelligence and corporate security. They demonstrate the “growing value of information as capital in power relations” and are exemplified by the increasing partnerships between the public and the private sectors around security (e.g. in cybersecurity or in surveillance). Western States have often aligned their own interests with corporate interests, resulting in close cooperation between law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies and corporations to collect intelligence on, and disrupt the activities of, activists who seek to undermine the foundations of capitalist society. This alignment of interests results from the loss of monopoly over policing that the public police used to hold in the nineteenth century. Throughout the twentieth century, the police had to face public demands for increased police presence; the liberalizing powers of the Police Act 1994, which introduced private security; and the commodification of policing activities as a result of both state financial constraints and the changing face of social demographics and public spaces. As a consequence, today’s policing is operationalized via a networked plural provision that functions within a ‘nodal governance’, insofar as

Governance is not performed simply by institutions of the state, nor shaped solely by thinking originating from the state sphere. Today, ways of imagining and realizing security governance in the business sector as well as the ‘third sector’ (e.g. community groupings, non-governmental organizations) shape and influence the thinking of state institutions and vice versa.

The commodification of both policing and the police role in defending the status quo speaks of a conservative culture whereby the police are expected to preserve law and order and to represent the dominant social morality. In this sense, the activities of the police (and the security services too) are never truly politically neutral or
independent. While the police may not intentionally be involved in partisan politics, their activities impact on a plethora of groups and individuals who are the focus of law enforcement whether by reason of class, ethnicity or gender or other types of inequalities. Insofar as they regulate subversive groups and maintain order during demonstrations or industrial disputes, “some police tasks are avowedly concerned with the control of behavior which is explicitly political in motivation and intended impact.” Revelations that British police infiltrated and disrupted left-wing and/or radical political groups have sparked outrage among a section of the public; however, they are not a novelty in the policing landscape. British security authorities have for a long time used undercover officers, wiretaps and provocation – and these are well exemplified by Special Branch’s engineering of the ‘Walsall bomb plot’ in 1982 as part of a wider plan to discredit anarchists. Acts of state repression, collusion and deception later reached a peak, during ‘The Troubles’ (1968–1998) in Northern Ireland, which is yet to be surpassed on the British mainland.

Surveillance, manipulation and dirty tricks have indeed been employed in every liberal country in Europe and North America. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, American society faced threats of vocal and aggressive dissent that resulted in the police using planted informers to garner intelligence on the membership, motivations and goals of several target groups. At that time, “police infiltration [was] much more common than the public generally assume[d].” This statement, dated 1970, could not be any truer given the public revelations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)’s COunter INTElligence PROgram (COINTELPRO). Via a series of controversial covert operations carried out between 1956 and 1971, COINTELPRO extended its gaze well beyond the strict realm of criminality and “did not refrain from engaging in snitch-jacketing, encouraging gang warfare, fabricating evidence, stealing membership lists and, more broadly, employing improper and illegal means.” Notwithstanding a charter forbidding it from monitoring American citizens in the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also became involved in domestic counterintelligence operations against anti-war groups. Known as ‘CHAOS’, these operations ran between 1967 and 1974 and were conducted in cooperation with the FBI and on direct orders from President Lyndon Johnson and his successor President Richard Nixon. The CIA allegedly had sources on the material support that radical anti-war groups protesting against the Vietnam War were giving to Soviet intelligence services and assisted the FBI in
running counterintelligence operations. ‘CHAOS’ entailed the investigation and clearance of 7000 American anti-war protesters and intensive surveillance of “several hundred suspected of channeling East bloc resources into the most radical groups operating in the United States.”

The anti-Vietnam-War movements in the United States were eventually cleared of foreign influence and, between 1972 and 1974, ‘CHAOS’ turned its focus from the anti-war movement to tackling international terrorism. And yet, a news report published in the *New York Times* in 1974 tapped into public anxieties about surveillance, when ‘CHAOS’ was presented as a “massive illegal domestic intelligence operation […] against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups.” At that time, the SDS had been operating for just six years, in a political climate in which the communist and the ‘far and wide left’ threat was already a long-standing concern for government. The next section explores this threat and the ways in which worries about betrayals, infiltrations and subversions gripped the British security apparatus during and after the Cold War, eventually providing a historical understanding of the ‘enemies’ that the British State was seeking to neutralize throughout that period.

**The Evergreen Communist and ‘Far and Wide Left’ Threats**

Counterintelligence and security activities targeting people closely associated or sympathizing with communism and the Soviet Union were part and parcel of everyday life during the Cold War (1945–1991). Nonetheless, Soviet espionage certainly predates this period, having taken place on British soil since at least the 1920s. Soviet espionage found its highest manifestation in the betrayal of Secret Intelligence Service officer Kim Philby and resulted in a long-lasting effect on the confidence of the security apparatus and an evergreen paranoia that still haunts the memory of the late Roger Hollis, director general of the Security Service between 1956 and 1965 and alleged to have been a Soviet agent. Soviet intelligence activities in the United Kingdom were organized around a threefold strategy: using legal residents who enjoyed diplomatic status in the Russian Embassy; embedding illegal residents who would operate as sleeper agents with false identities, under non-official cover (also known as ‘illegals’); and utilizing a secret group in the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB).
Several cases of espionage marked British history between the 1930s and the late 1960s. Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, Anthony Blunt and John Cairncross were part of the ‘Cambridge Spy Ring,’ while James Klugmann played the role of talent-spotter and mentor, and between them they operated between the 1930s and the early 1950s. Gordon Lonsdale, Harry Houghton, Ethel Gee, Morris Cohen and Lona Cohen formed part of the ‘Portland Spy Ring,’ an illegal program that operated between the late 1950s and 1961. The 1960s saw the conviction of twelve British people, including the notable cases of John Vassall and George Blake, for passing secrets to the Soviet Union. In 1963, the infamous ‘Profumo Affair,’ involving Secretary of State for War John Profumo, the young model Christine Keeler and Soviet intelligence officer Yevgeny Ivanov, became one of the most significant political scandals of that decade.

Concerns about Soviet infiltration pervaded security circles until at least 1971, when ‘Operation FOOT’ led to a mass expulsion of 105 Soviet intelligence officers working under diplomatic cover in the country. The operation halved the number of hostile Russian intelligence personnel operating in London and “enhanced the Service’s prestige with its foreign friends and allies.” It greatly diminished Soviet intelligence’s firepower but did not entirely dispel its threat. In fact, the Soviet Union continued to target the United Kingdom both directly and via allied intelligence agencies. The Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB) spent much effort targeting the intelligence services, the civil service, the Labour Party and trade unions, requiring the Security Service and Special Branch to work strenuously and efficiently to uncover and apprehend spies and traitors. Two Czechoslovakian defectors, named Josef Frolik and Frantisek August, provided material on the penetration of the Labour Party and the trade unions in the 1960s and 1970s. The late Will Owen and Tom Driberg were two Labour Members of Parliament (MPs) who were at least sympathetic toward, and possibly even passed information to, Czechoslovakian intelligence services. Similarly, the late Jack Jones, former general secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union, passed Labour Party documents to KGB officer Nikolai Berdenikov until 1984. Prominent pro-Soviet trade unionists, and often “honoured guests in Eastern bloc countries,” were Ted Hill, also a secret member of the CPGB, Ernie Roberts, Hugh Scanlon and Richard Briginshaw.

Engineer Michael John Smith passed documents acquired during his work at Thorn-EMI Research Establishment, a List X firm conducting secret research for the
Ministry of Defence, to the KGB between 1975 and 1979 and during his work at General Electric Company’s Hirst Research Centre, another List X company, to the Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (SVR) between 1990 and 1992, when he was eventually arrested. This became “the most important espionage case in Britain still unresolved at the end of the Cold War.” In 1982, Geoffrey Prime was arrested for having passed copies of hundreds of secret documents from Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) to the KGB in the 1970s. One year later, Michael Bettaney, a Security Service officer with a peculiar history of fare dodging, alcoholism and pro-Nazi views, was arrested after delivering secret documents to the KGB in London. In the late 1980s, the Security Service discovered Vaclav Jelinek, an ‘illegal’ of the Statni Bezpecnost (the secret police of the former Czechoslovakia). He had been posing as Dutch hotelier and art-dealer Erwin Van Haarlem and his arrest led to “the last major espionage trial of the Thatcher era and the first of an illegal since Gordon Lonsdale [of the Portland Spy Ring] in 1961.” In the same period, Security Service officers were still untangling the extent of the Cambridge Spy Ring’s espionage case by interviewing people who had been active in the Cambridge University Communist Party and the Cambridge University Socialist Party in the 1930s and 1940s. Nowadays, the Security Service continues to be busy countering the intelligence activities of the SVR.

Historically, communist influences on political parties in the country were a natural target for the Security Service’s activities. Clandestine operations, known as ‘STILL LIFE,’ were particularly effective in ensuring that the Security Service could “have covert access to all CP [Communist Party] offices in Britain and Northern Ireland,” copy thousands of documents and identify “90 per cent of the 35,000 membership of the CPGB” by 1952. Between the 1950s and the 1970s, the Security Service employed around sixty desk officers, plus support staff, to gather information on the Party. Technical surveillance and the use of informants ensured a thorough penetration of the Party, thanks to the activities of the late Peter Wright, a Security Service principal scientist, and his team, which “bugged and burgled [their] way across London at the state’s behest, while pompous bowler-hatted civil servants in Whitehall pretended to look the other way.”

The decreasing support for communism and an era of heated social, racial and class conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s reprioritized some of the work of the counter-subversion section (F Branch) of the Security Service, which shifted its attention to
Trotskyist movements. The Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP), Militant Tendency (MT) and other left-wing groups were therefore scrutinized, and the appointment of John Jones (a former star of F Branch) as director general of the Security Service in 1981 encapsulates this change in strategic direction. The early 1980s represented a period of political concerns about the so-called ‘far and wide left’ that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher believed had infiltrated the civil service, trade unions, universities, the Church and the broadcasting services. Fascinated and mesmerized as she was by the intelligence world, Thatcher required the Security Service to increase its efforts against this target. Against an enemy that was perceived to be so “diffuse, and its communications so widespread,” F Branch needed fewer restrictions on the use of telephone taps and letter intercepts. Therefore, it built a closer relationship with the Post Office, while an enthusiastic John Jones sought to endow it with the technical resources that were available to K Branch, the counter-espionage section. Therefore, “phone tapping became de rigueur in these years in an alarming way and was run by a unit called Tinkerbell Squad,” which targeted junior ministers and MPs such as Neil Kinnock, Bob Cryer and Michael Meacher (all Labour Party).

The clandestine, revolutionary Trotskyist group MT was formed in 1964 as an offshoot of the Revolutionary Socialist League and was inspired by the doctrines of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky. For almost thirty years it proved to be a hostile enemy for the security apparatus. MT sought to infiltrate the Labour Party via parliamentary candidates who would routinely omit to mention their association with the group. MT acted as “a secret [, subversive] organization with a covert strategy designed to undermine the future of Labour as a democratic political party and turn it against the ‘parliamentary road to socialism.’” While it was smaller than the WRP and the International Socialist Group (ISG), MT was more influential. It managed Liverpool City Council in 1983, ran front organizations (e.g. Youth Against Racism) and took control of the Anti-Poll Tax Federation “through a series of dirty tricks, dodgy deals and phony groups claiming voting rights” that illuminated both MT’s ideological lineage connecting it to the CPGB and MT’s antagonistic relationship with the SWP and the anarchist factions. While the infamous riots of London in 1990 exemplify MT’s sociopolitical threat, it is true that this threat would greatly diminish shortly afterwards.

The group left the Labour Party in 1991, rebranding itself Militant Labour and
later, in 1997, the Socialist Party, and was thoroughly penetrated by SDS-officer-turned-whistleblower Peter Black (an alias for Peter Francis). MT abandoned its well-oiled entryist strategy in late 1992 and saw a reduction in numbers to fewer than a thousand. The tensions between the director of F Branch, who wished to make a case for continuing telephone and letter intercepts at the party’s headquarters, and desk officers, such as Annie Machon and Sarah Knight (F2B/4), who recommended discontinuing all communications intercepts, demonstrate the ambiguities that gnaw at security-related decisions in a politically sensitive arena.

Yet Trotskyist groups were unsympathetic to the Eastern bloc and did not have any allegiance to foreign powers, possibly failing to meet the standards for an investigation for subversion. Some of these groups were also not necessarily “building bombs in smoky backrooms, but were instead using legitimate democratic methods to make their case, such as standing in elections, organising demonstrations and ‘educating’ the workers.” Meanwhile, the CPBG splintered into the Democratic Left and the Marxist–Leninist-oriented Communist Party of Britain in 1988. With about a thousand members (many were over sixty-five years of age) and having been penetrated for thirty years by officer M148, the Communist Party was rendered largely ineffective.

In 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended. The following year the Security Service made “a successful transition from a mainly anti-subversive agency to the lead anti-terrorist organization.” However, it still retained an anti-Cold-War mentality, which is encapsulated in former director general Stella Rimington’s recollections of “going around listening to people’s telephones and opening their mail and stuff.” Similarly, the criteria used by the Security Service to record subversives and their sympathizers did not differ too much from the criteria set out by Home Secretary David Maxwell-Fyfe in 1952. Election lists, subscription to left-wing clubs and participation in demonstrations were used as ‘proof’ of membership of, or sympathy toward, subversive groups. Two of the most significant critical voices about the operations of the Security Service are Annie Machon and her former partner David Shayler. They both worked as Security Service officers between 1991 and 1996, before making public revelations of alleged malpractices within the Security Service. In her book *Spies, Lies and Whistleblowers: MI5, MI6 and the Shayler Affair*, Machon suggests that, from 1952,
MI5 and subsequent governments used to argue that all members of certain parties – such as the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) or later the bewildering array of Trotskyists, with names like the International Marxist Group (IMG), Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP) Major and Minor, Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP) and Revolutionary Communist Group (RCG), anarchists and the extreme right – were threats to the security of the state or our democratic system.147

Fears of a communist and ‘far and wide left’ threat to the State and democracy indeed continued throughout and after the Cold War. While security authorities posit that the focus of their investigations was not specific organizations or their members but the penetration and influence of subversives within political groups,148 it is certainly true that real and perceived political views were on occasion equated with security threats.149 The curious Personal Files (PFs) recording as “?communist sympathizer” a schoolboy who had mailed the Communist Party for information on a topic that he was studying at school and a woman whose divorcing husband had accused her of being a communist in a letter to the Security Service are two prime examples.150 Overall, the security apparatus produced about half a million files on communists and their sympathizers, which resulted in just a few prosecutions.151

Cabinet ministers Harriet Harman and Patricia Hewitt were placed under surveillance due to their role as leading members of the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL – today known as Liberty), which was suspected of being a communist front organization.153 Celebrities, people working in the media, prominent politicians and members of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp and groups active in trade unionism and industrial disputes had their own PFs.154 In the 1990s, membership of the Communist Party resulted in individuals having a record citing “member: subversive; communist,” having vetting clearance in the public service of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) withdrawn in secret and, in turn, being quietly moved to a position lacking access to sensitive material.155 Conversely, former members of the Socialist Party were cleared of allegations of subversion.156

At the same time, the Security Service and Special Branch maintained an interest in anarchist activities. The anarchist organization Class War emerged in the
1980s, following an increase in disorder and political violence in the 1960s\textsuperscript{157} and a breakdown of law and order fomented by anti-government groups in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{158} It sought to connect “the inner city rioters of Brixton and Handsworth with the striking miners”\textsuperscript{159} and to overthrow parliamentary democracy.\textsuperscript{160} Drawing inspiration from the anti-capitalist ‘Stop the City’ demonstrations of 1983 and 1984, it launched a series of campaigns called ‘Bash the Rich’ and was aimed at intimidating wealthy people. While the absence of headquarters made phone intercepts impossible, security authorities utilized an alternative tactic to monitor the group. In or around 1988, officer M2589 from the SDS penetrated Class War, where he exerted considerable influence and was most likely able to supply information on the planning of the Poll Tax riots that would hit London in 1990. The termination of the officer’s deployment, and with it the organizational skills that he had brought to Class War, led to the collapse of a group that Machon describes as “a disorganized collection of around 200 anarchist individuals [posing] no real threat to Parliamentary democracy or national security.”\textsuperscript{161} The moribund status of Class War later led to recommendations that the police officer not be replaced and that the Security Service simply maintain a ‘watching brief.’\textsuperscript{162}

The SWP, the WRP and splinter left-wing groups were also thoroughly monitored by the security apparatus, although not without difficulties. The promiscuous lifestyle that members of these groups were undertaking made Security Service officers unwilling to undertake the necessary sacrifices to target them.\textsuperscript{163} The SDS took a more direct route into these groups, adhering to its motto ‘by all means necessary’ in order to honor the demands of intelligence gathering. The *Special Demonstration Squad Tradecraft Manual* provided “informal tacit authority and guidance for officers faced with the prospect of a sexual relationship”\textsuperscript{164} and attested that, in the absence of other options, they “should try to have fleeting, disastrous relationships with individuals who are not important to your sources of information.”\textsuperscript{165} Intimate relationships between undercover police officers and targets or their associates remain laden with moral, legal and operational ambiguities\textsuperscript{166} and endanger concepts and practices of ethical proportionality.\textsuperscript{167} Former commander of the MPSB Roger Pearce posits that the length of deployments and the life that officers were living inevitably led some officers to escalate false friendships into intimate relationships.\textsuperscript{168} Former MPS undercover officer James Bannon,\textsuperscript{169} who infiltrated the hooligan firm the Millwall Bushwackers in the late 1980s, at a time when “many
forces had covert units working against extreme football hooliganism, which used the same methodology of long-term infiltration of the SDS and NPOIU,”\textsuperscript{170} takes a similar stance. He postulates that precluding deep-cover officers from engaging in intimate relationships, as a last resort to gain acceptance and/or gather information on the target group, could be operationally unviable. But others, such as Stephen Bentley, a former undercover officer who infiltrated a drugs gang as part of ‘Operation Julie’ in the mid-1970s,\textsuperscript{171} and a former operative in the MPS’s professional undercover unit (Specialist Operations Ten, or SO10, which is now known as, and part of, Specialist Crime & Operations, or SC&O10) have voiced grave concerns about the tactic.\textsuperscript{172}

As noted elsewhere,\textsuperscript{173} intimate relationships fostered out of necessity, genuine love or passion have characterized both the British context (SDS and NPOIU) and the American context. In the latter context, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officers, who were infiltrating the radical left-wing Weather Underground Organization in the 1970s, and Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers, who were infiltrating Maoist political groups in the 1970s and 1980s, forged intimate relationships with members of their target groups. But it is true that “while many American federal agencies could dismiss agents who had become sexually involved with targets to avoid compromising the agent himself/herself and/or tainting the evidence, different police units had different rules and guidelines.”\textsuperscript{174} In the United Kingdom, in late 2015 the MPS eventually apologized to, and compensated, seven women who had had intimate relationships with SDS and NPOIU officers.\textsuperscript{175}

The Security Service found that recruiting agents within extreme left-wing groups was a difficult task too, due to the risks of publicity and scandal.\textsuperscript{176} The ‘old guard’ trained to defeat the Soviet intelligence services was particularly frustrated at having to devote time and effort to chasing minor groups in an age progressively dominated by computers.\textsuperscript{177} Veterans of ‘D’ Branch (non-terrorist organizations section) considered the SWP and the WRP unworthy of the Security Service’s attention: these groups lacked links with foreign powers\textsuperscript{178} and, therefore, did not pose a direct threat of espionage and subversion. Special Branch maintained an interest in these groups insofar as their aggressive tactics mandated police to prevent public disorder and political violence. The SWP occupied “the revolutionary ground that they contended the CPGB had abandoned,” engaged in “increasingly militant union action between 1972 and 1974” and sought “the return to true proletarian revolt
in authentic Bolshevik style.”179 It was thoroughly penetrated by the SDS.180 And yet, its brand of revolutionary socialism still managed to infiltrate the 1976–1978 Grunwick dispute, turning peaceful demonstrations into disorderly and violent confrontations with the police. This dispute is just one of many occasions in which police took a proactive approach to maintaining the peace by deploying its covert wing, the Special Branch, to monitor meetings, rallies and protest activities. The forthcoming Part II of this paper will explore some of the several left-wing and/or radical protest groups that the security apparatus monitored in order to neutralize real and perceived political and criminal threats to the State and society, with a particular focus on the pacifist, anti-war and anti-apartheid movements, groups involved in industrial disputes and the environmental and animal rights movement.

Notes
2 The Independent Police Complaint Commission ruled that both (1) Detective Inspector Robert Lambert, a former SDS officer and later the Head of the Muslim Contact Unit, and (2) former MPS/Lawrence Review Team acting detective inspector Richard Walton, later to become the head of the MPS Counter Terrorism Command (SO15), had a case to answer for misconduct when (1) arranging a meeting on 14 August 1998 between ADI Richard Walton and N81, an undercover officer operating within one of the groups associated with the family of murdered teenager Stephen Lawrence during the Macpherson Inquiry, which, later in 1999, would deliver an assessment of the MPS as institutionally racist; and (2) attending this meeting. See Independent Police Complaint Commission, Ellison Review – Walton, Lambert and Black: An Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding a Meeting between A/Detective Inspector Richard Walton and an Undercover Officer on 14 August 1998 (London: Independent Police Complaint Commission, 2016).
3 Nowadays, there are different types of officers in covert policing, depending on the nature of their work and their qualifications and experience. They also work to different ends, whether to gather intelligence within organized crime groups or to gather evidence on people suspected of serious criminal activity. The College of Policing recently established new protocols and devised two categories of undercover officers (UCOs): undercover foundation operatives (UCFs), who carry out low-level infiltration, and undercover advanced operatives (UCAs), who undertake higher-level infiltration in a leading role. See College of Policing, Undercover Policing (Ryton-on-Dunsmore: College of Policing, 2016).
The MPSB and Home Office files were made available to various journalists and activists on Freedom of Information Requests (FOIs). These journalists and activists later shared the files to the public via the online resources http://specialbranchfiles.uk and http://undercoverresearch.net (accessed 31 August 2016); and the Guardian’s news aggregator “Undercover Police and Policing”, available at http://www.theguardian.com/uk/undercover-police-and-policing (accessed 31 August 2016).


SO14, alongside the Specialist Protection Command (SO1), merged into the Royalty and Specialist Protection (RaSP) in April 2015.

SO16, alongside the Palaces of Westminster (SO17), merged into the Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection Command (PaDP) in April 2015.


This relationship was not always easy and tensions are well exemplified by the strained encounter between Security Service officer David Shayler and an SDS operative posing as a hostile anarchist in the early 1990s. This event reflects tensions that historically marked the relationship between the Security Service and both Special Branch, particularly over the responsibility for Irish terrorism, and local police over public order maintenance (e.g. when the Security Service sent an agent provocateur to disrupt the strike at Polkemmet Colliery in Scotland in 1984). See Annie Machon, Spies, Lies and Whistleblowers: MI5, MI6 and the Shayler Affair (Sussex: The Book Guild, 2005); Wilson and Adams, Special Branch; Richard Norton-Taylor, “Truth, but not the Whole Truth,” The Guardian (9 November 2001).


Ellison and Adams, Special Branch.


Ellison and Morgan, Review of Possible Miscarriages of Justice.


Ibid., p. 415.

Ellison and Morgan, Review of Possible Miscarriages of Justice, p. 15.

Creedon, Operation Herne Update, p. 8.

Ellison and Morgan, Review of Possible Miscarriages of Justice.


Creedon, Operation Herne Update, p. 12. It is true that specialist police units may “advertise (often limited) success in a continued battle for scarce resources.” See Jerry Ratcliffe and John Sheptycki, “Setting the Strategic Agenda,” in Jerry Ratcliffe, ed., Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence (Annadale, NSW: The Federation Press, 2004), p. 207.


Creedon, Operation Herne Update.


Barry Moss, Roger Pearce and David Veness.


41 Ellison and Morgan, Review of Possible Miscarriages of Justice, p. 22.


47 Ibid.


49 Ellison and Morgan, Review of Possible Miscarriages of Justice.


52 Ellison and Morgan, Review of Possible Miscarriages of Justice, p. 25.


56 Ibid.
This is even truer in terrorist organizations. It is well established that, in the third quarter of the twentieth century, fears of real and imagined covert surveillance and penetration by informers led the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) to abandon many of its planned operations. British security forces capitalized on this paranoia to weaken the activities of the organization. But informants were indeed used extensively and were crucial to the operations of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which in 1976 had taken the lead in security operations in Northern Ireland to become “the prime source of intelligence for all the security forces, far outweighing the importance of much sophisticated electronic intelligence.” Tapping into “the usual diseases – greed, jealousy, anger, lust, envy,” as well as compromising personal lives and particularly financial incentives, insofar as former state recruiters “insist that everyone has a price” and that “money can buy spies,” British security forces managed to penetrate the leadership of the PIRA beyond imagination. See Rory Finegan, “Shadowboxing in the Dark: Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism in Northern Ireland,” Terrorism and Political Violence 28(3) (2016): pp. 497–519; Jon Moran, “Evaluating Special Branch and the Use of Informant Intelligence in Northern Ireland,” Intelligence and National Security 25(1) (2010): 1–23; Michael Kirk-Smith and James Dingley, “Countering Terrorism in Northern Ireland: The Role of Intelligence,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 20(3–4) (2009): pp. 551–73 (p. 557); Grey, The New Spymasters, p. 62 and p. 81. In the murkier world of the unknown and the conspiratorial, the belief that contacts between the Security Service and both former British National Party member Tim Hepple and editor of the anti-fascist Searchlight magazine Gerry Gable are evidence that they were, respectively, an infiltrator within the green anarchist movement and a key figure in a state-run operation are other examples of this paranoia. See Larry O’Hara, At War with the Truth: The True Story of Searchlight Agent Tim Hepple (Camberley: Mina Enterprises, 1993).


Ibid., p. 266.


Ibid., p. 4.

Ibid.


Ross, “The Place of Covert Surveillance in Democratic Societies.”


Clive Bloom, Riot City: Protest and Rebellion in the Capital (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,


Ross Bellaby, “What’s the Harm? The Ethics of Intelligence Collection,” *Intelligence and National Security* 27(1) (2012), pp. 93–117 (p. 117). A vaguely similar approach in the counterterrorism world is the ‘ticking bomb’ principle. It postulates that exceptional state action should be allowed only when there exists a real, imminent and grave threat; strong evidence against one or more people; and a lack of less intrusive, more efficient alternative measures. See Lucia Zedner, “Terrorism, the Ticking Bomb and Criminal Justice Values,” *Criminal Justice Matters* 73(1) (2008), pp. 18–19.

Bellaby, “What’s the Harm?”


Partnerships between the security apparatus and private investigators to gather information on political groups active in protest are well known. In the mid-1980s, it started becoming public knowledge that companies, such as Contingency Services in Colchester, were conducting deniable ‘dirty work’ that the Home Office did not want the Security Service and Special Branch to undertake. Contingency Services allegedly gathered information on the following groups and numerous individuals operating within them: the NUM; CND; the Anti-Nuclear Campaign; Friends of the Earth; the Welsh Anti-Nuclear Alliance; the Town and Country Planning Association; the Cornish Anti-Nuclear Alliance; the East Anglian Alliance; the East Anglia Trade Union Campaign; the Stop Sizewell B Association; the European Group for Ecological Action; the Suffolk Preservation Society; the Socialist Environmental Resources Association; the Council for the Protection of Rural England; the Ecology Party; and Greenpeace. See Clive Bloom, *Thatcher’s Secret War: Subversion, Coercion, Secrecy and Government, 1974–90* (Stroud: The History Press, 2015).


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 8.


Ibid., p. 181.
99 Ibid., p. 179.
102 The United States was also a primary target of Soviet espionage and has been since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Russian Federation in 1991. A notable example of these persisting intelligence activities on American soil is the Illegals Program, which was disbanded in 2010 and which inspired the successful TV series The Americans. During the Cold War, the United States also waged a relentless ‘war of intelligence’ against the Soviet Union, and some of the CIA’s most innovative techniques were devised in Moscow. A notable example is the use of ‘deep cover’ case officers who could maintain contact with one of the CIA’s most valuable sources within the Soviet military design bureau, Adolf Tolkachev, between 1979 and 1985, while escaping surveillance from the KGB (Tolkachev was eventually compromised by a disgruntled former CIA trainee, Edward Howard). David Hoffman, The Billion Dollar Spy: A True Story of Cold War Espionage and Betrayal (New York, NY: Doubleday, 2015).
105 Wilson and Adams, Special Branch.
108 Corera, The Art of Betrayal.
109 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm.
110 Corera, The Art of Betrayal.
111 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 574
112 Ibid.
113 Wright, Spycatcher.
114 Ibid.
116 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm.
118 Ibid.
120 Prime was also arrested and charged for child sexual abuse. See Bloom, Thatcher’s Secret War.
121 Wilson and Adams, Special Branch.
122 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 728.


Machon, *Spies, Lies and Whistleblowers*.

Wright, *Spycatcher*.

Ibid., p. 54.


Bloom, *Thatcher’s Secret War*.

Ibid.

Wright, *Spycatcher*.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Bloom, *Thatcher’s Secret War*, p. 22.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Bloom, *Thatcher’s Secret War*.

Ibid.


Machon, *Spies, Lies and Whistleblowers*.

Ibid., p. 34.

Ibid.


These revelations led Shayler to be prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act 1989 for passing secret documents to the British newspaper the *Mail on Sunday*.

Machon, *Spies, Lies and Whistleblowers*.

Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm*.

Machon, *Spies, Lies and Whistleblowers*.

Ibid.

Nathan, “Liability to Deception and Manipulation.”


Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Wright, *Spycatcher*. 
Prompted by the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee to review the legislative framework on undercover policing, the College of Policing recently set out standards and guidelines, inter alia regulating this aspect of operational conduct and prohibiting sexual relationships with targets or other individuals, even as a tactic of deployment. While operational necessity or the sexual temptations of long-term deployments may well trump these guidelines, the College of Policing leaves open the door to “the minimum conduct necessary to mitigate the threat [, for example to the undercover officer’s or someone else’s life].” See College of Policing, Undercover Policing. Nathan, “Liability to Deception and Manipulation.”


Ellison and Morgan, Review of Possible Miscarriages of Justice, p. 49.


Bonino and Kaoullas, “Preventing Political Violence in Britain.”

Ibid., p. 820.


In more recent times, agents have been widely employed to penetrate Islamist circles. Five notable examples of top-level former agents who went public with their stories – the former three breaking all relationships with security authorities and the latter two starting new careers as internationally renowned experts in violent radicalization – are Omar Nasiri, who had become an informant for the French, British and Belgian intelligence services, infiltrating the Armed Islamic Group and al-Qaeda in Europe, North Africa and Afghanistan between the mid-1990s and 2000; Morten Storm, who had penetrated al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and had helped the CIA eliminate its leader Anwar al-Awlaki in 2011; the late Aukai Collins, who had infiltrated Islamist extremist circles for the FBI in Phoenix (United States); Aimen Dean, who had helped the Royal Canadian Mounted Police foil the 2006 Ontario terrorism plot. In the United Kingdom, Rêda Hassaine, ‘Kamal’ and ‘Muhamed’, three informants working for the Security Service, penetrated, respectively: the radical Finsbury Park Mosque in London in the 1990s; the now-proscribed al-Muhajiroun network in the 2010s, contributing to the prosecution of several leaders and their supporters; and a group of Islamic State supporters attempting to go to Syria in 2015. In France, ‘Asim’ helped foil a major terrorist attack in Barcelona in 2008. In the United States, informants routinely cooperate with law enforcement and intelligence agencies to disrupt terrorist groups, generate prosecutions and prevent attacks. See Stefano Bonino, “In Conversation with Morten Storm: A Double Agent’s Journey into the Global Jihad,” Perspectives on Terrorism 10(1) (2016), pp. 53–64; Stefano Bonino, “In Conversation with Mubin Shaikh: From Salafi Jihadist to Undercover Agent Inside the ‘Toronto 18’ Terrorist Group,” Perspectives on Terrorism 10(2) (2016), pp. 61–72; Morten Storm, Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, Agent Storm: My Life Inside al-Qaeda and the CIA (New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2014); Anne Speckhard and Mubin Shaikh, Undercover Jihadi: Inside the Toronto 18, Al Qaeda Inspired, Homegrown Terrorism in the West (McLean, VA: Advances Press, 2014); Aukai Collins, My Jihad: The True Story of an American Mujahid’s Amazing Journey from Usama bin Laden’s Training Camps to Counterterrorism with the FBI and CIA (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2002); BBC News, “The Spy Who Came in from Al-Qaeda,” BBC News (3 March 2015), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31700894 (accessed 30 September 2016); Ian Black, “Al-Qaeda Fighter Turned Mi6 Spy Urges Effort to ‘Confuse’ Islamic State,” The Guardian (5 June 2015),
In this respect, it is true that recent technological advances have changed the face of traditional human-based intelligence gathering. Indeed, as former director of the Secret Intelligence Service Richard Dearlove put it in 2008, the technological element of intelligence gathering has helped it cope with problems in recruiting sources. Yet, human sources remain an important tool in the arsenal of law enforcement and intelligence agencies, insofar as they can generate quick and easy information that electronic surveillance or satellites images may take months to produce. Human sources do of course pose real operational challenges, which should not be underestimated. Among the challenges posed by human sources are their potential criminal activities and the associated ethical questions inherent in handling these individuals; their credibility; and the various strategies that should be utilized to protect sources from the counterintelligence and security teams of the targeted terrorist groups (e.g. the PIRA used to torture their own people to extract information and to murder informants) and to avoid the loss of an agent deterring others from cooperating. See Kirk-Smith and Dingley, “Countering Terrorism in Northern Ireland;” Moran, “Evaluating Special Branch and the Use of Informant Intelligence in Northern Ireland”; Grey, The New Spymasters.

Wright, Spycatcher.


Lewis and Evans, Undercover.