The decolonial subject and the problem of non-Western authenticity

Marco Vieira

Department of Political Science and International Studies (POLISI), University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom

Abstract

It is argued in this article that some decolonising strategies in the study of global politics are precluded by the problem of non-Western authenticity. I question the idea of an identifiable non-Western geo-cultural context that could significantly reconstitute what already is a post-Western subject. I claim that in most cases the asymmetrical encounter between the colonised and the coloniser has fundamentally and extensively redefined human subjectivity in a way that largely negates decolonial emancipatory projects. This is the result of the all-encompassing penetration of Western coloniality (in its political, economic and cultural representations) into the spaces of pre-colonial or uncolonised forms of subjectivity. I draw from Frantz Fanon’s and Jacques Lacan’s theories to argue that attempts to recover non-Western forms of self-identification are useful albeit illusory psychological mechanisms to stabilise hybrid postcolonial subjectivities rather than an actual restoration of non-colonial and purified forms of existing in the world. I suggest that an effective anticolonial politics of resistance will necessarily entail the understanding of post-Western subjectivity in terms of psychological ‘hybridity’ rather than decolonial ‘authenticity’.

Keywords: authenticity, postcolonial psychology, post-western subjectivity, decolonial thought

Emancipate yourself from mental slavery, none but ourselves can free our minds


Introduction

The above quote from Marcus Garvey, Jamaican national hero, commemorated by Bob Marley in ‘Redemption Song’, touches at the core of this article’s question, that is: what does it really mean to decolonise subjectivity; or, in Marley’s words: escape mental slavery? I argue that intellectual work focused on psychological and epistemic decolonisation, particularly in the field of international relations (IR), while appropriately producing an important critical reaction to the colonial silences in dominant theories, concepts and approaches derived from Western thought, institutions and political practices, has nonetheless inadvertently assumed an authentic and analytically detached non-Western alterity.
In recent years, a growing number of scholars have put forth the claim that the academic discipline of IR needs a non-Western focus more in line with shifts in power from the purportedly hegemonic role of the United States and Europe to non-Western rising powers, particularly in Asia. In particular, postcolonial/decolonial authors have offered a radical critique of the totalising nature of Western modernity and argued the need to delink away from lingering epistemological colonialism through the restoration of ‘subaltern’ knowledge. Scholars have denounced the racist origins of IR and its unabated contemporary racial bias. They have also argued for reconnecting with non-Western ways of ‘being in the world’ and have suggested pluriversality to replace Western universality as an innovative ontology to de-centre world order. By making room in IR for non-Western agency, these critical perspectives have significantly contributed toward the democratisation of knowledge production about world politics beyond Eurocentrism.

John Hobson and Alina Sajed have rightly identified a problem they call Eurofetishism in critical IR theory. They argue that, while highlighting power asymmetries between the West and the non-West, these perspectives tend also to ‘construct two complementary, entwined binary conceptions of non-Western and Western agency [...which] are problematic because they become mere caricatures of what is otherwise a far more complicated set of subjectivities’. What is more, the West itself is in this light treated as having a coherent and unified subjectivity and mode of totalising control, which reinforces the logic of separation the authors wish to overcome. They claim that West and non-West ‘[do not] exist in pure form but are amalgams that comprise Western and non-Western elements’. Hobson and Sajed’s work has undoubtedly contributed to a more nuanced understanding of postcolonial/post-Western subjectivity and agency. However, although these authors have taken a giant step in this direction, they still uncritically conflate the condition of the marginalised with an absolute ontology of ‘non-Western’ agency. The point is, if these agents of resistance are indeed an amalgam of Western and non-Western elements, why then would the authors call them ‘non-Western’? They provide what I believe is an unpersuasive answer by saying that ‘we separate them out only for heuristic purposes in order to pinpoint moments of agency, even if in the final analysis they are fundamentally relational in nature’. Yet, by using ‘non-Western’ as the locus of enunciation, they still reify, even if for heuristic purposes, the binary they intend to deconstruct.

As an alternative, I argue in this paper that the binary distinction between an authentic non-Western subject placed in opposition to and separated from a dominant Western counterpart – which is largely assumed in the non-Western IR literature in general, and in decolonial scholarship in particular – needs to be adequately problematised. I contend that the Western determinants of postcolonial subjectivity cannot be analytically separated in this way given that they are constitutive of these subjects and deeply embedded in their collective and embodied consciousness. In this sense, attempts to decolonise (or emancipate) one’s subjectivity as a way of recovering or reconstituting an authentic non-Western subject are, while undoubtedly well intentioned, in need of further critical scrutiny.

I draw from the work of Frantz Fanon and Jacques Lacan to suggest that there is a subtle yet extremely important difference between an understanding of ‘decolonisation of being’ as the necessary psychological practice of re-signifying the erased subject of coloniality, which can assume many hybrid configurations, and the attempt that I challenge here to find these modes of signification in
purified conceptualisations of non-Western ways of being in the world. Unlike some decolonial positions, I claim that much closer analytical focus should be given to the ambivalent aspects of post-Western subjects that would defy authentic representations of non-Western subjectivity and anticolonial relationality. I argue that the focus of analytical attention should be on the hybrid elements of post-Western subjectivity, which preclude any meaningful sense of authenticity based on either the construction or the restoration of a supposedly immaculate non-Western other.

This article proceeds in three steps. I first examine the concept (and political project) of (de)coloniality, which originated in Latin America in the 1990s. The second section I focus on some key ideas such as border thinking and de-linking associated with the postcolonial condition/subjectivity. I then critically examine a range of authors who propose strategies and possibilities to decolonise the study of world politics. The focus is again on key concepts such as anticolonial solidarity and pluriversality. This is followed by an attempt to articulate a new politics of anticolonialism focused on hybridity, rather than authenticity, as the core constitutive element of post-Western subjectivity. Finally, I examine scholarly engagements that have tried to explain the subjectivities and anti-colonial politics of two epoch-making postcolonial leaders, Toussaint L'Ouverture and Simon Bolivar, as a way of highlighting elements of post-Western hybridity in two historically distinctive contexts of the European colonial project in the Caribbean and Latin America.

It is important to note at this stage that the empirical focus here is on Latin America where the system of Western coloniality has more fundamentally penetrated and shaped postcolonial subjectivities. I don't claim that the anti-colonial revolutionaries examined in this article should be used to draw generalisations applicable to other postcolonial peoples and contexts. I accept that largely unaltered forms of non-Western subjectivity, even in Latin America, (co-)exist and that they are constantly drawn upon in relational as well as oppositional ways. My argument relates to the lack of theorisation, in contemporary critical postcolonial and decolonial scholarship, of post-Western subjectivities, as I attempt to move beyond binary enunciations, heuristic or otherwise, of Western and non-Western subjectivities.

Post-Western subjectivity and the problem of decolonial authenticity

In this section, I critically engage with the modernity/(de)coloniality epistemic project, which originated in Latin America in the early 2000s, to substantiate an understanding of post-Western subjectivity based on contradictory and conflicting experiences that have ultimately construed a hybrid post-Western subject. This means that traumatic elements of existential and cultural dislocation have co-existed in unstable relation and merged with what has been assimilated as desirable signifiers relating to the core values of modernity. This is consistent with the position taken by Latin American decolonial scholars, who have argued that the psychological dispositions of colonised subjects are anchored in historically situated processes of establishing and expanding a colonial hierarchy of power.10

In his account of the colonial history of what is now known as Latin America,11 Anibal Quijano historicises the affective outlook of the former colonised peoples as a product of Western colonialism. According to him, ‘there was produced a new mental category to codify the relations between conquering and conquered populations: the
idea of “race”, as biologically structural and hierarchical differences between the dominant and the dominated. Quijano articulates a powerful account of historical processes whereby the codification of racial differences between the Spanish and Portuguese ‘conquistadors’ and local populations produced a matrix of power that still today classifies relations and dictates agency. More specifically, Quijano’s theoretical notion of coloniality, as the key organising principle of global order, is premised on a dual intellectual movement;

1. On the one hand, it reveals the intricate, all-encompassing and long-standing patterns of power related to colonialism that define culture, subjectivity and politics beyond the formal boundaries of colonial administrations.

2. On the other, it invites decolonial scholars to formulate alternative intellectual and political strategies to undo the damage inflicted by coloniality by affirming other modes of knowledge and uncolonised forms of (inter-)subjectivity.

I argue that the paradox of Quijano’s enunciation in that his insightful first movement fundamentally challenges the possibility of the second. In other words, the system of (post-)coloniality, which defines the first movement, has created a hybrid post-Western consciousness that makes attempts to decolonise subjectivity, as proposed in the second movement, empirically unworkable. Maria Lugones, for example, posits that, by disrupting pre-colonial socioeconomic patterns, cultural specificities and cosmological systems, the European colonisers fundamentally rearticulated local self-understandings. Given this, the postcolonial subject is the discursive reflexion of opposed, yet unstably connected, Western/non-Western identity markers. In this regard, Vivienne Jabri argues that,

So powerful is the legacy of colonial rule that the subject of the postcolonial condition is always already somehow predetermined, somehow stamped, indeed inscribed by the colonial experience. Viewing the international from the vantage point of the non-West is hence to do so through a lens that is already prescribed and shaped by coloniality and the desire to resist its continued economic, social, political and epistemological domination.

Catherine E. Walsh contends that decoloniality ‘seeks to make visible, open up, and advance radically distinctive perspectives and positionalities that displace Western rationality as the only framework and possibility of existence’. Walsh’s normative call for the ‘displacement’ of Western rationality through advancing ‘other’ ‘distinctive’ positionalities clearly illustrates what seems to me unpersuasive ontological and political claims, epitomised by the aforementioned second analytical movement, about the possibility of decolonial ‘liberation’ through rescuing non-colonised forms of subjectivity. She quotes the Zapatistas as an example of decolonial ethics and political imaginary related to the movement’s upholding of Indigenous cosmologies. It appears, however, an incomplete interpretation, isolated from what is clearly a case of amalgamation between Western Marxist and Amerindian epistemologies. An understanding of Zapatism as a post-Western movement of resistance against similarly hybrid forms of structural oppression would, in my view, more suitably characterise anti-colonial agency in this context.

In this sense, while engaging in a very pertinent critique of Eurocentrism, several strands of the decolonial project have largely fallen into the ontological trap of seeking alternative, separated constructions of non-Western subjectivity that are either
unrepresentative of wider global political processes or that simply misconceive complex post-Western subjects as capable of consciously retrieving an authentic non-Western subject which has lain buried under the wounds inflicted by the global system of coloniality. In my view, the problem is that the political aim of achieving independent consciousness, hence liberation/emancipation, cannot be dissociated from deeply ingrained Western markers of subjectivity. In other words, the necessary move asserted by postcolonial/decolonial scholars to overcome a sense of alienation and self-imposed inferiority is not dependent upon retrieving a realisable and authentic non-Western subject. Although I wholeheartedly accept the claim that post-Western subjectivity is constrained by structural conditions of Western epistemological/ontological supremacy, I seek to highlight here the dynamic and varied manifestations of subjectivity that reveal and defy oversimplified representations of an authentic West and non-West.21

Undeniably, postcolonial subjects conceive their place in modernity largely as peripheral and that they belong also to other, albeit intertwined, cultural and racial formations. However, and this is the crucial critical contribution of the present argument, how they psychologically absorb and respond to this condition greatly varies – from demanding inclusion within Western modernity to more radical positions ranging from border thinking to radicalised another thinking, whereas others, as noted in the example of some creole elites in Latin America, try to very closely mimic Western civilisational models, primarily the United States and Europe.22

Enrique Dussel has coined the notion of transmodernity to suggest an ecumenical geopolitical order whereby the exteriority of the racially excluded and silenced is incorporated in a non-Eurocentric, or pluricentric, conception of universality that acknowledges the expropriative practices of European modernity while still allowing it ‘a seat at the table’ in rebuilding an ethics of equality.23 Referring to Dussel’s notion of transmodernity, Maldonado-Torres asserts that it comprises ‘a dialogue between humans and those considered sub-humans and the formulation of a decolonial and critical cosmopolitanism’.24 In a crucial insight, Maldonado-Torres recognises that the task of decolonisation is an intermediate step towards complex and inclusive transmodernity ‘beyond the pitfalls of modernity/coloniality’25 rather than an end in itself. It does not mean, however, that practices of anti-colonial resistance cease to exist. Their permanence is derived from manifold forms of accommodation, which can be either diametrically opposite the Western other such as in the case of still culturally preserved Indigenous communities, or complex (and often unstable) amalgamations between West and non-West co-constitutive elements.

In the following section, my account of post-Western subjectivity takes this point further by offering a psychological interpretation of the decolonial practice of actively asserting a variety of non-Western identity constructions. I argue that this relates to subjects’ efforts to establish an illusory sense of existential self-coherence while coping with the psychologically destructive effects of coloniality. I develop a critical examination of Walter Mignolo’s notion of border thinking, particularly the claim that local histories, emerging from the cracks of Western modernity, offer the possibility of delinking away from it. I then engage with a group of IR scholars who have argued in favour of the necessity of fostering decolonial thinking as a way of challenging Eurocentric interpretations of the origins and development of the modern world.26 I use Lacan’s theory of the subject and the work of authors who have focused on the psychic drivers of (de)colonisation to mount a critique of decolonial scholarship based on what I claim is its reification of an authentic non-Western subject. In this respect, I pay
particular attention to Robbie Shilliam's theorisation of anticolonial affective relationality.

Re-conceptualising the post-Western subject: border thinking, hybridity and ontological (in)security

In his seminal articulation of the concept, Mignolo contends that border thinking is ‘at the intersection of local histories enacting global designs and local histories dealing with them’. His emphasis on delinking assumes a view of modernity/coloniality that envisages colonial difference as a dialogical battlefield between two interconnected, albeit largely opposing modes of ‘being in the world’. Mignolo’s border thinking implies a non-Western/subaltern way of producing knowledge from within (but also in relation to) the dominant structures of Western modernity/coloniality and their desire for homogeneity and hegemonic control. Mignolo’s proposed concept usefully helps to understand processes of anti-colonial agency based on how diverse projects and local histories are mobilised through the ‘cracks’ of Western modernity. However, notwithstanding Mignolo’s assertion that he thinks from dichotomous concepts rather than ordering the world into dichotomies, the following both seem implicit in his articulation:

1) the unproblematised ontological coherence and wholesale rejection of Western modernity/coloniality, where only domination is worth examining and no ambiguity is allowed into it and;
2) the location of decolonial resistance in representations of non-Western ethnic, racial and cultural formations.

In the intellectual project led by Mignolo and others, ‘resistance’ against Western modernity/coloniality has been the movement’s defining political appeal. It can take various forms, from simply (re-)existing through offering other imaginaries, visions and knowledges that emerge from the fissures of domination to more active forms of insurgency against what is perceived as ‘the colonial matrix of power’. However, the common denominator among these possibilities is the identification of a ‘dark side’ of modernity as a common and coherent structural enemy that needs to be countered and eventually overcome. In this sense, resistance and (re-)existence are always understood as intrinsically linked, hence the need to de-link, but also in opposition to and separated from rather than unstably co-constituted by Western modernity. Interestingly, and despite his significant, albeit more limited, impact than Mignolo’s on Latin America’s modernity/coloniality project, Dussel’s notion of transmodernity avoids such ontological and ethical separation by conceding room to modern and post-modern contributions in building a new and more inclusive cosmopolitan ethics of emancipation.

In Local Histories/Global Designs, Mignolo suggests an alleged condition of ethnic/racial exteriority of subjugated actors as necessary conduits of authentic decolonial thinking and, consequently, liberation. He analytically favours ethnically demarcated populations, such as African diasporas in the Caribbean and Amerindian communities in the Andes, as appropriate examples in critical border thinking and exteriority and associates creole elites with either reproducing the logic of coloniality, following political decolonisation, or as mere political conduits of these ‘authentic’
peoples’ viewpoints and liberation struggles. Thus in order to legitimate critical consciousness, border thinking requires not only subaltern positionality, which would allow for the inclusion of the creole European ‘native’, but mainly the racially/ethnically embodiment of self-determining and authentic non-Western beings.32

In the next section, I argue that two creole leaders, Simon Bolivar and Toussaint L’Overture, are interesting and distinctive examples of border thinking displacement. However, rather than depicting them in terms of fixed ethnic/racial particularities, I focus on these racialised and subaltern positionalities as symbolic representations of their colonised selves and how they have been articulated as psychologically necessary, albeit illusory, constituents of their hybrid subjectivities.

In The Black Pacific, Robbie Shilliam adopts a similar position based on the possibility of promoting what Mignolo before him defined as an ‘epistemology of exteriority’. Both scholars refer to the emergence of alternative epistemological standpoints located inside yet thinking from outside Western modernity. They however differ, inasmuch as Shilliam, unlike Mignolo, concedes ontological existence to the colonised beyond what he sees as the reductive role of an always ‘resisting’, ‘victimised’ or ‘silenced’ subject.33 In other words, for him, non-Western subjects ‘exist’ (rather than ‘resist’) alongside, and often despite, their colonial oppressors. Shilliam claims that the rehabilitation or reinvention of decolonial subjectivity can be constructed through deep horizontal affective relations of solidarity by tapping into and reinscribing uncolonised histories.34 So, his approach is centred on retrieving and revitalising non-Western knowledge and forms of relationality ‘in ways otherwise to the colonial science of gaze’.35

Shilliam offers an interesting and original theoretical pathway to decolonial emancipation/liberation from, and the re-constitution of, a new decolonised subjectivity through the unveiling of distinctive non-Western deep relational ‘affective practices’ that are constitutive of human subjectivity in relation to but also independent from the conventional modern Western subject. In another text, Shilliam clearly sums up the focus of his decolonial project when he states that,

I am [...] concerned with promoting an orientation to theorising [the human] condition that takes its task to be a journey of rediscovering the relationality of the situated self: the appreciation of one’s starting geo-cultural context significantly influences the kind of knowledge produced along the journey.36

I advance below the outline of an alternative standpoint, which I believe is more suitable for tackling the condition of post-Western existence, which combines forms of horizontal and vertical/hierarchical relationality. It is not aimed as a critique of Shilliam’s useful theoretical articulation but rather is an exposition of another possibility emerging from the colonial encounter. In my view, Shilliam’s otherwise persuasive claims do not adequately capture the core elements of the creole elites’ subjectivities, in the sense that they deny the possibility of a meaningful ‘rediscovering of one’s starting geo-cultural context’ disarticulated from (or in spite of) Western socio-economic, cultural and psychological influences. More importantly to the argument put here, looming in the background of his idea of ‘deep relations’ is the rather tricky issue of the reification of decolonial difference in terms of retrieving an authentic self that ‘exists underneath the wounds of coloniality’ (my emphasis).37 He persuasively argues that ‘colonial science seeks to segregate peoples from their lands, their pasts, their ancestors, spirits and agencies’.38 Yet, in the process of recovering pre-colonial
cosmologies/epistemologies, decolonial science, even if inadvertently, engages in the largely similar task of erasing any vestiges of Western/European contamination from what is supposedly ‘indigenous and African retentions of various kinds’. Shilliam further points to a foundational condition of untainted existence when he explains his notion of ‘deep relations’: ‘why “deep”? Because the domains that are being bound back together reach to the seedbed of creation’.40

Indeed, Frantz Fanon’s and W. E. B. Du Bois’s insight of the ‘white mask’ and ‘double consciousness’ of colonised peoples, respectively, tells us that Shilliam’s ontology of material/spiritual relationality will inescapably need to be expanded to also include the European/Western elements that are also formative of their subjectivities. In the same vein, non-Western markers of European modernity need to be taken seriously in a truly co-constituted and relational approach to subjectivity formation. The imperialist expansion and consolidation of European modes of political organisation in the form of modern nation states and pervasive Western cultural and economic influence have established far-reaching global patterns of Western/non-Western intersubjective relations. These relations have been conceptualised by some scholars as based on ambivalence, ontological insecurity, stigmatisation and feelings of inferiority by post-Western subjects.41 In After Defeat, Ayse Zarakol cogently demonstrates how the expansion of European international society towards the then newly incorporated non-Western empires of Turkey, Russia and Japan left a long-lasting stigmatising effect and sense of ontological insecurity. Their newly acquired ‘modern’ status was in fact the outcome of a highly conflictual and still unresolved process of self-understanding as marginal participants/inferiors in the Western-dominated international order.

As I have argued elsewhere, to a certain extent stirred by Zarakol’s earlier insight in After Defeat, this historically situated moment in the development of post-Western/colonial subjectivity can be understood in terms of a ‘mirror image’ original encounter between the colonised’s ‘ego’ and the coloniser’s ‘alter’. Through the encounter, the postcolonial subject introjected European colonial attitudes whereby the colonised is not seen as an individual autonomous and functional entity but rather is represented as a collective uncivilised mass. Ashis Nandy, for example, contends that, in nineteenth-century colonial India, psychological subservience was underpinned by myths and fantasies grounded in the inferior/superior polarities of colonial representations of ‘effeminate’ Indians and ‘manly’ British colonisers.42 Through a Lacanian-focused framework, I have conceived postcolonial ontological security in terms of psychological defences set out against the sense of inferiority resulting from these colonial binaries forced upon colonised peoples. It is achieved through repeated, albeit failed, attempts to emulate the civilisational, cultural and behavioural standards of the coloniser other.43 In the view put in this article, this can be understood as the basic psychological mechanism leading to the unstable constitution of varied forms of post-Western subjectivity.

A Lacanian approach offers added value to my argument through its unique focus on the affective power of human beings’ desire for particular identities.44 In Lacanian theory, human beings are driven by an anxious longing for an always elusive sense of wholeness; in other words, ontological security. In an early stage of psychic development, they find existential meaning through an imaginary identification with a projected mirror-image of a superior other.45 Following from this idea, one could argue that postcolonial subjects have engaged in practices of imitation or mimicry of their projected colonisers’ others according to what they have considered the desired yet not fully achievable standards of Western modernity. Therefore, for the newly independent
postcolonial subject, the original desire for individualised self-coherence, hence ontological security, was only achievable through (imperfectly) replicating an idealised mirror reflection of their colonial masters. This original desire/rejection of an idealised other in the postcolonial subjects’ psychic structures has been historically reproduced, and has deeply influenced the particular belief systems and foreign policy positions of postcolonial states. The psychological effects of the coloniser on the colonised through mimicry have established different, and often opposing, types of postcolonial agency, such as, for example, either full assimilation or violent resistance to Western actors, institutions and discourses.

In *Black Skin, White Masks*, Frantz Fanon argues that the subjectivity of the colonised is constructed through a politics of white assimilation leading to the fragmentation of the colonial subject. For him, the colonised subject must wear a white mask the imposition of which produces a deep sense of self-doubt, humiliation and, ultimately, ontological insecurity/anxiety. Continually perceived as the shadow of the white coloniser, the colonial subject accepts and internalises a sense of inferiority. The question that drove most of Fanon’s work was how to overcome this condition. The answer for him was through embracing and asserting Blackness as the master signifier that provides ontological security to the otherwise incomplete and fragmented subjectivity of the colonised. According to Peter Hudis, Fanon acknowledged the narrative of Black authenticity in the negritude movement as a necessary myth rather than an actual identifiable non-Western cultural formation. He has argued that,

> [Fanon] accepts a temporary ‘regression’ from rationality [...] to help provide the black subject with the confidence and self-assurance needed to take on a racist world. But he does so while not taking literally negritude’s claims of having discovered an ‘authentic’ black essence or genuine African culture. He knows the latter is a myth [...] Nothing is easier than to fall into a fixed particular – even as one argues against fixation. Black pride can readily become posed as an end-in-itself, just as can having pride in being a proletarian – even though the aim of human emancipation is to make both the proletariat and ‘blackness’ superfluous.

Fanon understood that the final goal of any anticolonial struggle is to establish a genuine intersubjective empathy between colonised and coloniser based on a new humanism of equality. Indeed, in following Lacan’s theory of the subject, the psychological healing of the colonial wound would require rescuing pre-colonial symbolic signifiers that are needed to restructure a stable, albeit imagined, sense of postcolonial ontological security. Yet in fact these processes of postcolonial self-identification are necessary fantasies that work to psychologically ameliorate the anxiety generated by the subject’s permanent desire to fill up with meaning their existential lack, generated by their stigmatised position in the system of Western (post-)coloniality. For Lacan the fulfilment of a whole and authentic ‘self’ is always a desired, albeit impossible, project.

The main problem in the decolonial project as developed by Shiliam and others is that they confound the therapeutic function of blackness as articulated by Fanon with the misguided possibility of truly rediscovering what Hudis names a ‘fixed particular’, as if to retrieve an authentic non-Western subject whose consciousness/subjectivity has not been compromised by (or can be purified from) Western colonial domination. In his theoretical development of the notion of hybridity, Homi Bhabha points to the political relationship and intersubjective processes of co-constitution between the West and the (post)colonial subject that ‘open up hybrid sites and objectives’. Bhabha claims that
postcolonial meaning and subjectivity are dynamically produced in the space ‘in-between’ the West and the non-West, such that the political subject is ‘neither the one nor the other’. The case of what is today Latin America is illustrative in this respect. In the former Spanish and Portuguese colonies, white people of distinct backgrounds, black people with varied cultural orientations and mixed race peoples of all sorts often acknowledge that ‘they belong in the West and are not part of it entirely, or at least that they occupy a problematic position’.

In the understanding set forth in this article, West and non-West are symbolic constructions derived from varied encounters that have shaped subjectivity in situated, conflicted and changeable ways. Hence, to retrieve any pre-colonial or non-colonised culture or cosmological sense of being in the world in order to decolonise subjectivity is articulated here as an imagined rather than a real psychological device for imbuing postcolonial subjects with a stable and coherent self-identification.

**Examining hybrid postcolonial revolutionaries: Toussaint L’Ouverture and Simon Bolivar.**

The process of the colonisation of the Americas is ideal for a reflection on the constitution of post-Western subjectivity. The empires set out by Europeans in what is today known as Latin America and the Caribbean from the late 15th century were significantly different from the model of colonisation established in Asia and Africa. The settler colonies in the American territories were inhabited by large European populations who had complex relations with their colonial masters as well as with Indigenous peoples and the enslaved African, and mixed-race populations. The ‘colonial wounds’ of creole elites are distinctively different from the significantly more dehumanising modes that shaped African and Indigenous populations’ forms of relationality with the coloniser other. Scholarly attempts to rescue pre-colonial subjectivities are more easily identifiable with the latter as a strategy of decolonial liberation. I contend, however, that even then, as noted in the previous discussion on Frantz Fanon, that strategy indicates a psychological healing tool rather than an actual re-establishment of an authentic non-Western subject.

The ambiguous/hybrid subjectivity of the colonised subject in the Americas, whose ruling creole local elites largely maintained a sense of belonging and pride in relation to their European heritage and intellectual make-up, poses a robust empirical challenge to decolonial conceptualisations that focus on dichotomous relations between Western and non-Western subjects. Unlike Afro-descendants, whose critical/double consciousness emerged from not being considered ‘human’, creole elites’ resentment resulted from not being considered European enough.

Next I empirically focus on two imminent figures of the anticolonial movement in the Americas during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: Toussaint L’Ouverture and Simon Bolivar. The aim is to exemplify the complex hybrid subjectivities of leading postcolonial individuals. I argue that, notwithstanding crucial differences in their subject formation, these creole revolutionaries were simultaneously and ambiguously zealous about their non-European particularities yet fully devoted to European Enlightenment ideas that for them represented the path from backwardness to civilisation. Based on the previous discussion, I explain their ambiguous subjectivities in Lacanian terms as attempts to create a coherent fantasy in order to assert their conflicted self-identities.
Toussaint L'Ouverture: the 'black Jacobin'\textsuperscript{55}

Toussaint L'Ouverture was the son of a slave and born a slave himself who was freed in 1776 and rose to become the charismatic leader of a successful slave revolt in the French colony of Saint-Domingue. The Haitian war of independence was the only anticolonial insurrection led by self-liberated slaves that ended, in 1804, with the establishment of independent nationhood. Haiti was only the second country to achieve independence from colonial rule in the Americas, following the United States in 1776. Its political and symbolic effects were felt throughout the European colonial system.

Gurminder Bhambra argues that the Haitian revolution was one of the most crucial moments in the formation of the modern world. Yet, it has been either totally neglected within the social sciences literature or interpreted as a minor consequence of the American and French Revolutions, which occurred around the same time.\textsuperscript{56} In a recent article on the Haitian revolution, Shilliam takes on what he calls the Eurocentric trope which, in his words ‘claims the Haitian revolutionaries as workmen for the universality that was conceived and authored by the French Revolution and European Enlightenment thought’.\textsuperscript{57} He is equally critical of what he calls the creole trope that assumes that colonial rule in the plantation economies of the Caribbean ‘created radical ruptures with past identities and practices’.\textsuperscript{58} ‘Through the articulation of an African trope he contends that, rather than ‘blank bodies’, the enslaved peoples of Saint-Domingue remained connected to their former cosmologies and practices.\textsuperscript{59} In this respect, the term ‘black Jacobin’ interestingly conveys Shilliam’s pertinent critique of Eurocentric and creole interpretations that portray Toussaint L'Ouverture, and other Haitian liberators, as leading characters in the expansion of French revolutionary ideals into the Caribbean.

However, Shilliam’s decolonial strategy to counter Western-centred modes of thinking about the Haitian revolution involves the similarly questionable aim of neatly separating ‘the complex and rich landscape of African and indigenous retentions’\textsuperscript{60} as if those hadn’t been deeply transformed by the colonial encounter. The hybrid condition of Louverture’s postcolonial self-understanding is eloquently described by C. L. R. James when he states that,

> At the height of the war Toussaint strove to maintain the French connections necessary to Haiti in its long and difficult climb to civilisation [...] His allegiance to the French Revolution and all it opened up to mankind in general and the people of San Domingo in particular, this has made him what he was.\textsuperscript{61}

I would agree with Shilliam that L'Overture’s African retentions have been deliberately erased by authors who have examined his personality and motivations through the application of the colonial logic of racial hierarchies and exclusions.\textsuperscript{62} Nevertheless, the question remains whether his separate focus on either European, creole or African tropes is conducive to the proper understanding of these key leaders’ complex, multi-layered and intertwined subjectivities which drove their political agency. In 	extit{Conscripts of Modernity, The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment}, David Scott engages with C. L. R. James' 	extit{Black Jacobins} to offer a critique of postcolonial scholarship. According to him, some postcolonial authors have narrated anticolonial resistance as romanticised allegories of vindication and redemption when it was a ‘tragedy’ of
conflicted and unresolved allegiances.  To a certain extent, Scott focuses on the unpredictable psychological process of mimicry and hybrid constitution of postcolonial subjectivity that I also want to draw out here. He argues that,

Touissant is the very embodiment of the historical conflict between the old and the new. That’s why the alternatives with which he was confronted – France with reenslavement or freedom without France – were neither alternatives of his choosing nor alternatives between which he could choose. They were, in short, tragic alternatives. Each involved giving up values that were, for him, fundamental – that is, nonexchangeable and unexpungeable – commitments.

His intellectual effort to recast postcolonial thinking as ‘tragedy’ instead of ‘romance’ is driven by the collapse of anticolonial emancipatory hopes in the wake of growing political disillusion in several postcolonial independent states, also embodied in the enfeebled ‘Bandung spirit’. Resembling Shilliam, he is sceptical of the idea of Western modernity as the main reference of the newly constituted humanity of the emancipated subject, which seems to be the case in James’ representation of L’Ouverture. Scott claims that in engaging with James’ sympathetic representation of L’Overture’s story a generation of anticolonial scholars and political leaders were no longer able ‘to give utopian point to the project of social and political change’. Yet, in contrast with the decolonial project, he is sceptical of the possibility of reinstating non-colonised forms of subjectivity and knowledge practices. Referring to L’Overture, he argues that,

The singular achievement and the utter failure of his political subjectivity are the sides of one and the same coin. They are derived from a single cognitive universe that had produced both the modern Atlantic world of the sugar plantation in which Toussaint found himself a modern slave and the French Revolution that gave him a revolutionary modernist language in which to criticise it.

Philippe Girard’s book *Toussaint L’Overture: A Revolutionary Life* reveals interesting elements of L’Overture’s personal experiences and motivations. He distances himself from James’ classic interpretation of L’Overture as a romantic leader propelled by Enlightenment ideals in his quest for slave liberation in Haiti. Girard’s psychological portrayal of L’Overture is of a pragmatic and conflicted individual who was very keen to rebut slanders made about black peoples at the same time as being reluctant to fully abolish the slave trade in Saint-Domingue. He recounts a story of neither an anti-slavery hero of European Enlightenment nor the representative of a decolonal subject retrieving pre-colonial retentions in the process of forming a postcolonial state. Without denying L’Overture’s capacity to mobilise Haitian anti-slavery fighters by relating to their pre-colonial African heritage, Girard’s contribution is to paint the picture of a hybrid and contradictory personality whose motivation was to be recognised by the slave-owning white planters and the French, as well as by the black populations he strived to liberate.

As I discuss next, in the case of Bolívar the maintenance of internal racial hierarchies, which European descendants sit atop, was more markedly evident than in L’Overture’s example, given the latter’s close identification with and pride in his African origins. This is an interesting difference in terms of understanding border thinking articulations that use both Western and non-Western signifiers to establish a coherent postcolonial subject.
**Simon Bolivar: the ‘anti-imperial imperialist’**

Simon Bolivar is the most revered hero of the Spanish American independence movements of the early nineteenth century. His almost mythical status – as the personification of the Americas’ anticolonial struggles – has inspired and shaped political discourse and practice across the region. The Republic of Bolivar (modern-day Bolivia) was named after its *El Libertador* following hard-fought independence from Spain won in 1825. Bolivar’s inspirational role in the Andean region has deeply influenced more recent political developments in South America. In 1998, Hugo Chavez was elected president of Venezuela ending the dominance of traditional political parties, which had ruled the country for twenty-five years. He took the oath of the presidential office under a newly enacted Bolivarian constitution that renamed Venezuela the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Chavez vigorously promoted regional political cooperation through the establishment of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) to counter US imperialist influence in the region. Chavez’s Bolivarian revolution was inspired by Bolivar’s vision of Pan-American unification and anti-imperialist struggle.

As in the case of L’Overture, however, the commonly idealised portrayal of Bolivar as an authentic and separate subject vis-à-vis the coloniser/imperialist Spanish other misses core elements of ambiguity that shaped Bolivar’s subjectivity and politics. He can be seen instead as an archetypical example of that hybrid or intermediate position between Western and non-Western markers of postcolonial subjectivity. Bolivar was simultaneously the fiercest enemy of the external order of Spanish-led colonially and the supporter and main beneficiary of the internal social and racial hierarchy it had created.

Born in 1783 in Caracas, Bolívar was one of the best examples of the ‘creole ideal type’. Bolivar understood himself as a ‘native’ of the colonised land he inhabited. However, he was not as dominated as the enslaved native and the peoples of African or mixed-race origin such as in the case of L’Ouverture. In fact he was himself a land and slave owner and very much part of the colonial power structure. He was the seventh generation of Bolivars, who relocated to Spanish America in 1589. Upon arrival in the ‘New World’, they received a *encomienda* by the Spanish crown, which meant access to forced Indigenous labour. Two hundred years later, following the premature death of his parents, Bolivar took over the family’s land and accompanying agricultural and mining businesses.

Interestingly, many African slaves and *pardo* populations chose to join royalist troops fighting Bolivar and his patriotic allies. Whereas colonial forces were able to offer manumission in exchange for military service, many in Bolivar’s ranks were slave owners with economic incentives to maintain the *status quo*. The point here is that, even though Bolivar promoted the end of slavery in the Spanish colonies, he was keen to maintain creole privileges following decolonisation. This is vividly conveyed in the following passage when he states that, ‘although all men are born with equal rights to the good of society, ... not all are able to occupy the highest posts’. Bolivar’s case for independence rested on what he perceived as a violation of the pact between the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V and the original European settlers of America whereby the latter would be allowed to rule the colonial territories ‘as a sort of feudal property for themselves and their descendants’.
Although fiercely anti-Spanish, Bolivar was praiseworthy of Britain's empire as well as the US system of government, which, despite the institution of slavery, he saw as the best on earth.\textsuperscript{75} Bolivar was highly sceptical about any 'useable' pre-Hispanic system of social and political governance such as the one proposed by those scholars who sought to recover Aztec and Inca social and political systems.\textsuperscript{76} However, it is worth noting that due to his heroic status as the liberator of Andean territories, Bolivar's Western-inspired republicanism has been accommodated to colonial and pre-colonial Andean cosmologies, such as is the case in present-day Bolivia. In that sense, creole elites' task of co-opting and integrating Amerindian institutions and practices was facilitated by Bolivar's representation as the cosmological 'sun' of justice in the new post-independence period. In this respect Platt argues that,

\begin{quote}
It becomes plausible to see the figure of Bolivar as associated, both with the arrival in 1825 of a new Republican age (in which the promise of the Enlightenment would merge with that of the Holy Spirit), and also as presiding over a liberal renewal of the Andean-Christian solar monarchy that had emerged during the colonial period. The power of the image of Simon Bolivar at all levels of Bolivian society is due, precisely, to this ambiguity. It reflects creole debate on the eve of independence from Spain on the relative virtues of a presidential or a monarchical social order. Bolivar was associated equally with both projects, and could thus be revindicated by all political camps.\textsuperscript{77}
\end{quote}

In light of the above, how can one scrutinise Bolivar's ambivalent/hybrid postcolonial subjectivity? I argued in this section that Bolivar's sense of postcolonial ontological security depended upon maintaining a difficult balance between two symbolic systems of signification. The first was enacted via the identity of his creole ancestry who he envisaged in line with their privileged social and political position as the legitimate 'owners' of the lands colonised by the Spanish. He nonetheless found himself in the 'lacking' space between what was for him valid yet unworkable pre-colonial modes of existence buried under the equally contested Spanish imperial system. In Bolivar's case, this dual identification was translated into the practice of striving to maintain internal racial/social hierarchies within Spanish American territories at the same time as waging war against the colonial rulers.

**Conclusions**

I have argued that in the cases under examination in this article decolonial claims for liberation from colonial domination cannot possibly erase nor overcome what is in fact a variety of subjective positions that amalgamate Western and non-Western identity markers in an unstable relation. I have critically engaged with the work of some influential Latin American decolonial thinkers as well as IR scholars who have argued in favour of retrieving non-Western subjectivities. The focus was on some core concepts, such as Mignolo's notions of \textit{border thinking} and \textit{exteriority} and Shilliam's approach to \textit{anticolonial affective relationality}. I claimed that these authors have often reduced their decolonial theorising to binary reifications of thoroughly negative Western and romanticised positive non-Western cultural retentions.

Ultimately, I claim that the decolonial approaches I have examined in this article – notwithstanding their crucial contribution to the current theorising from the periphery of global politics – are not adequate for understanding hybrid post-Western configurations of subjectivity. In this regard, I have empirically examined the hybrid and
paradoxical status of Latin American creole elites, which combine Indigenous Amerindian with Spanish and European cultural/cosmological sources into a project of breaking with the Enlightenment tradition through reconstituting a self-sufficient post-Western subjectivity. The examination of scholarly work on Toussaint L’Ouverture’s and Simon Bolivar’s psychic drives and political motivations led to the confirmation of the inseparable nature of their Western and non-Western identity markers. Their postcolonial subjectivity is, in this regard, the result of maintaining an unstable balance between imagined representations of who they were as post-Western entities while striving for political liberation still firmly attached to an ever-present modernity/coloniality.

Rather than dismissing the relevance of decolonial thought and practice, my intention in this article has been to recast it as necessary psychological discursive practices for helping to reconstitute an affirmative post-Western subjectivity following the devastating and ongoing impact of coloniality on post-Western forms of existence. The conceptual articulations of border thinking, exteriority and affective relationality are very helpful analytical tools in understanding contestation from within modernity/coloniality. I hope the argument set out here will contribute to what I see as a necessary yet overdue debate on the ontological pitfalls of decolonial scholarly articulations while conflating reified visions of non-Western or non-colonial subjectivities with what is in fact fantasied symbolic constructions aimed at stabilising human subjectivity.

Notes


6 Hobson and Sajed, ‘Navigating Beyond’, p 548.

7 Hobson and Sajed, ‘Navigating Beyond’, p 551.

8 Hobson and Sajed, ‘Navigating Beyond’, p 551.


11 For convenience and also due to its consistency with the idea of post-Western hybridity, I use the notion of ‘Latin America’ in this article even though I am fully aware of the Eurocentric connotations of the term as a hierarchical category of modernity/coloniality.


20 The Zapatista Army of National Liberation is an iconic left-wing militant group based in Chiapas, Mexico. Its supporters are largely rural Indigenous communities but it has over the years acquired an urban and international profile.
21 Hobson and Sajed, ‘Navigating Beyond’, p 552.
29 Mignolo, ‘Local Histories/Global Designs’, p 82-86.
30 For a similar critique, see, Domingues, ‘Global Modernization’, p 114.
43 See Vieira, ‘(Re-)imagining the “Self”’, p 142.
44 I extricate certain insights of Lacanian theory that I find useful in understanding the psychological hang-ups of postcolonial subjectivity. I do accept that there are problems in adopting Lacan in a context not envisaged, and indeed rather ignored, by the author himself. Yet Fanon has also been a core influence on this article’s argument and is fully embedded in the psychoanalytic tradition of the West, including of a Lacanian persuasion, hence an example of hybrid epistemology.
46 For a thorough engagement with the notion of postcolonial ontological security in light of Lacanian theory, see Vieira, ‘(Re-)imagining the “Self”’, p 142.
48 Hudis, 'Frantz Fanon', p 44.
50 Bhabha, 'The Location of Culture', p 25.
51 Bhabha, 'The Location of Culture', p 25.
52 Domingues, 'Global Modernization', p 122.
54 Domingues, 'Global Modernization', p 115.
64 Scott, Conscripts of Modernity, p 133.
65 Scott, Conscripts of Modernity, p. 30.
66 Scott, Conscripts of Modernity, p. 155.
74 Simon, 'The Ideology of Creole Revolution', p 98.

Notes on contributor

Marco Vieira is Associate Professor (senior lecturer), Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom. His recent work includes, '(Re-)imagining the “Self” of Ontological Security: The Case of Brazil’s Ambivalent Postcolonial Subjectivity', published in Millennium: Journal of International Studies (2018), and ‘Understanding Resilience in International Relations: the Non-Aligned Movement and ontological security', published in International Studies Review (2016).

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