Attention Bias in Test Anxiety: The Impact of a Test-threat Congruent Situation, Presentation Time, and Approach-avoidance Temperament

David W. Putwain\textsuperscript{1}, Wendy Symes\textsuperscript{2}, Elaine Coxon\textsuperscript{1}, and Diahann Gallard\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{1}School of Education, Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, UK.
\textsuperscript{2}Department of Education and Social Justice, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK.
Abstract

Previous studies have shown that test anxiety is related to attention bias. It is not clear, however, whether a congruent test-threat manipulation is required to elicit this bias or whether the bias is a result of automatic or conscious processes. In the present study we used a mood induction procedure to examine attention bias in test anxious persons using a dot-probe task and incorporated approach-avoidance temperament as a possible moderator. Results showed that the mood induction procedure was not effective in manipulating state anxiety. In the absence of an effective test-threat manipulation, high test anxious persons showed attention bias towards supraliminal threat stimuli. Attention bias was only shown to subliminal threat stimuli in high test anxious persons with a strong approach temperament. This suggests that the mechanism for attention bias to threat stimuli in high test anxious persons is a result of both automatic and conscious processes.

Keywords: Test anxiety, attention bias, approach-avoidance temperament,
**Introduction**

Attention bias refers to greater allocation of information processing resources to one type of stimuli relative to another (Macleod & Mathews, 1988; McLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). Many studies have shown that persons with clinical or high trait anxiety show a bias towards threat stimuli, relative to neutral stimuli, and relative to individuals with low anxiety (e.g., Abend et al., 2017; Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010). There is a small body of evidence to show that an attention bias may also be present in individuals with high test anxiety (Dong, De Beuckelaer, Yu, & Zhou, 2017; Jastrowski, Mano, Gibler, & Beckmann, 2018; Putwain, Langdale, Woods, & Nicholson, 2012; Vasey, El-Hag, & Daleiden, 1996; Zhang, Dong, & Zhou, 2018). Within this nascent body of work, however, it is not clear whether a congruent test-threat condition is required to produce the attention bias, whether attention bias to test-threat stimuli is a result of automatic or conscious processes, and whether, in test anxious persons, attention bias is towards or away from threat. The present study used a dot-probe task to assess attention bias under test-threat (writing about one’s last examination) and test-neutral (writing about one’s journey to college) conditions. To differentiate between automatic or conscious processes we used subliminal (indicative of automatic processing) and supraliminal (indicative of conscious processing) presentation of stimuli. Finally, approach-avoidance temperament was included as a moderator to examine the possibility that attention bias may be amplified in individuals with a stronger avoidance temperament.

**Test Anxiety**

Test anxiety is a situational-specific form of trait anxiety referring to enduring differences in the tendency to appraise evaluative situations as threatening (Spielberger & Vagg, 1995; Szafranski, Barrera & Norton, 2012). Persons with high test anxiety will typically experience negative self-related worry cognitions (e.g., ‘If I fail this exam, my
whole life will be a failure’) and elevated autonomic activity (e.g., increased heart-rate) in situations where one’s performance will be evaluated, such as academic tests and examinations (Zeidner, 2007, 2014). According to Attentional Control theory (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2011; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007) worrisome cognitions interfere with working memory processes (e.g., updating and shifting) and hence could be detrimental to examination performance. Meta-analyses have confirmed a negative relationship between the cognitive (worry) aspect of test anxiety and educational achievement (e.g., Chappell et al., 2005; von der Embse, Jester, Roy, & Post, 2018). Furthermore, working memory capacity is adversely impacted by worry (Putwain, Shah & Lewis, 2014) and has been shown to mediate relations between worry and test performance (Owens, Stevenson, & Hadwin, 2012; Owens, Stevenson, Norgate, & Hadwin, 2008). The focus of attentional resources in test anxious persons on worrisome cognitions at the expense of the task at hand suggests the likely role of an influential cognitive mechanism (also see Keogh & French, 2001; Schutz, Davis, & Schwanenflugel, 2002).

In England, where this study was conducted, compulsory standardised National Curriculum Tests (NCTs) are taken by students aged 11 years in their final year of primary school, and Compulsory secondary school exit examinations (General Certificate of Secondary Education: GCSE exams) are taken by students aged 16 years (see Shackleton, 2014). In addition, Certificate of Secondary Education: Advanced Level examinations (A Level) are taken by those students, aged 18 years, following an academic route at the end of upper secondary education. GCSE areand A Level results are used partly by individual students, to meet requirements for future employment, education, and training, and partly for accountability purposes. The result of these tests and examinations are mainly used for accountability purposes by the school inspectorate to judge school and teacher effectiveness and, in some schools, teacher performance related pay. NCTs are used solely for
Schools are heavily incentivised to maximise student test and examination performance through the use of sanctions (which include school closure and replacement of school management) and ranking schools in a particular locality by student performance in tests and examinations (referred to colloquially, using a sporting analogy, as school ‘league tables’) (see Perryman, Ball, Maguire, & Braun, 2011; Roberts & Abreu, 2016). These are not concerns unique to England; a recent survey reported that student performance data was used in teacher evaluations widely across the twenty-three countries studied (OECD, 2013).

In England, however, there has been increasing concern from teachers, parents, charities, and psychologists that the pressures resulting from the accountability by high-stakes testing policies on children and young people have become dangerously high. There is serious concern about their contribution to poor wellbeing (Cowburn & Blow, 2017), and exacerbation of poor mental health (Rodway et al., 2016). There is an increasing urgency to understand the causes and conditions that give rise to high levels of test anxiety and to develop and evaluate evidence-based interventions and treatments for test anxiety. One relatively under-studied cause of test anxiety is information processing biases such as attention bias; the focus of the present study. This is a fruitful line of research, partly as interventions designed to reverse such biases (attentional bias modification) have shown promising results (e.g., Hayes, Hirsch & Mathews, 2010; See, MacLeod & Bridle, 2009) and partly as they are relatively straightforward to implement. Before such interventions are developed for test anxiety, however, it is first necessary to build the evidence base that test anxiety may be underpinned by information processing biases.

**Attention Bias**

A robust finding in the literature is that highly anxious persons show an information-processing bias towards the processing of threat stimuli over neutral stimuli (e.g., Abend et
al., 2017; Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010). Such a bias may manifest as the allocation of attention resources to differing or competing sources of stimuli. For instance, when experimentally presented with two stimuli simultaneously, such as one threat word (e.g. cancer) and one neutral word (e.g. chair), highly anxious persons respond more quickly to a probe spatially replacing the threat word (compared with a probe replacing the neutral word) than non-anxious persons (these types of tasks are referred to in the literature as ‘dot-probe’ tasks). This phenomenon of attention bias has been demonstrated in over 172 studies revealing an average effect size of $d = .45$ (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Furthermore, a similar magnitude of attention bias is reliably detected in a variety of clinical anxiety disorders and also in non-clinical persons reporting elevated trait vulnerability to anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007).

Attention bias, therefore, represents a core component of elevated anxiety (Cisler & Koster, 2010). Experimental tasks, using modified dot-probe tasks, where probes always follow the location of a threat word, have provided reliable evidence that attention bias can play a causal role in anxiety and worry vulnerability (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002; MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy & Holker, 2002). Furthermore, attention bias modification studies where the probe replaces the prior location of the neutral word have shown that it is possible to reduce anxiety by reducing attention bias to threat stimuli (e.g., Hayes, Hirsch & Mathews, 2010; See, MacLeod, & Bridle, 2009) providing further evidence for the causal role of attention bias.

**Attention Bias and Test Anxiety**

In comparison to the general anxiety literature, few studies have specifically examined attention bias in test anxiety. As we noted earlier, test anxiety is conceptualised as a situation-specific form of trait anxiety (Spielberger & Vagg, 1995). Whereas a person high in (general) trait anxiety might be expected to respond to a variety of
threat situations with elevated state anxiety, persons high in test anxiety would only respond with elevated state anxiety to performance-evaluative situations. Nonetheless, we would expect the same attention processing mechanisms that underpin trait anxiety (e.g., heightened vigilance for threat) to underpin test anxiety. The worries experienced by highly test anxious persons and the interfering nature of these cognitions on information processing (e.g., Keogh & French, 2001; Schutz et al., 2002) is indicative of vigilance towards, and/or disengagement from, threat stimuli. Furthermore, attention bias to threat has also been shown in mathematics anxiety (Rubinsten, Eidlin, Wohl, & Akibli, 2015) providing evidence that attention bias can be shown in a situation-specific trait; like test anxiety, mathematics anxiety is a situation-specific trait anxiety.

Vasey et al. (1996) used a dot-probe task to assess attention bias to emotionally threatening words comprised of social (including evaluative threat) and physical threats in middle school students aged 11-14 years. Results showed that high test anxious students showed a bias towards threat stimuli. Putwain et al., (2011) used a dot-probe task to measure attention bias in undergraduates to test-threat word stimuli (relative to neutral stimuli) in test-threat and test-neutral conditions. Attention bias was shown to test-threat stimuli under the corresponding test-threat condition, but not under the test-neutral condition.

Also using a dot-probe task, Jastrowski et al., (2018) and Zhang et al. (2018) found that undergraduate students showed an attention bias to pictorial and verbal stimuli, respectively.

Zhang et al. (2018) also found brain activity consistent with a shift of attention to the processing of threat stimuli, when participants were presented with threat stimuli, although this was not sustained over the course of the 288 trials. Dong et al. (2017) used a novel eye-tracking approach to study how undergraduates orientate to test-threat pictorial stimuli. Over the course of 48 pairs of stimuli (threat and neutral pictures presented for 3s), high test
anxious persons initially focused on attended to the threat stimuli before avoiding attending away from threat stimuli as the trials progressed. Relatedly, attention bias to general academic threat stimuli was shown in a dot-probe task by high school-anxious students aged 12-15 years that was magnified when students felt rejected (Scrimin, Moscardino, Altoè & Mason, 2017). These findings provide evidence that high test anxious persons show an attention bias. The findings of Dong et al. (2018) and Zhang et al. (2018), however, call into question whether attention bias in test anxiety is towards or away from threat.

Attention bias to threat stimuli could occur within anxious individuals during early (automatic) and/or late (strategic) stages of information processing. For instance, attention bias to threat for high anxious persons is shown when stimulus presentations are subliminal (e.g., 100ms presentation times or 50ms presentation time, followed by a 450ms mask made up of a nonsense word) which implies an early or automatic stage of information processing that is effortless, unintentional, and free of conscious control (Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995; Mogg, Bradley, De Bono, & Painter, 1997). Highly anxious persons can also show attention bias towards, and sometimes away from, threat when stimulus presentations are supraliminal (e.g., 500ms presentation times) which implies late or strategic stage of information processing that is effortful, intentional, and conscious (Cooper & Langton, 2006; Dalgleish et al., 2003) either alone or in conjunction with automatic processes (see Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988).

In the general anxiety literature there are theories that account for attention bias in early and late-stage information processing. In the test anxiety literature, the only theory to account for biased information processing is the self-referent executive processing model (Zeidner & Matthews, 2005). This model proposes vigilance for threat (an automatic process) as a contributory factor to the maintenance of test anxiety. Somewhat paradoxically, of the
studies conducted on test anxiety to date, none have examined the automated stage of processing. Accordingly, in the present study we include varying stimuli presentation times in a dot-probe task to differentiate the stage of processing; subliminal presentation to ascertain whether attention bias is automatic and supraliminal to establish whether attention bias is at least in part strategic. There is also inconsistency in the literature over whether a congruent test threat situation is required to elicit attention bias. Some studies have shown that attention bias to threat stimuli is only shown when state anxiety is increased from baseline (e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Putwain et al., 2012) whereas other studies have shown that elevated state anxiety is not required for highly trait anxious persons to show an attention bias to threat stimuli (e.g., Abend et al., 2017; Vasey et al., 1996). A mood induction procedure, based on the autobiographical emotional memory task (e.g., Allen, Schaefer & Falcon, 2014; Schaefer & Philippot, 2005), was used in the present study as a means to establish whether a congruent threat situation was required to elicit attention bias in high test anxious persons. Specifically, we asked participants to either write about their journey to college (test-neutral) or their last examination (test-threat).

This mood induction procedure was chosen in part for theoretical, and in part for practical reasons. Since test anxiety is known to negatively impact on working memory performance (e.g., Owens et al., 2008, 2012; Putwain et al., 2014) it is possible that high levels of test anxiety could also interfere with performance on the dot-probe task. It would therefore be beneficial to induce test anxiety using a less cognitively demanding task than an IQ-type test used in previous research (e.g., Putwain et al., 2011). From a practical perspective, we intended to use group testing of participants and host all instructions, materials and data collection online. The presentation and instructions for the mood induction were straightforward to present in this fashion and link anonymously with dot-probe and questionnaire data. Although several test providers offer online versions of IQ and ability
type tests, this would require switching from our research webpage to the test provider webpage and participants providing identifying details to link responses.

**Approach-avoidance Temperament**

As we noted above, evidence from two studies (Dong et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018) questions the findings from earlier studies (Putwain et al., 2011; Vasey et al., 2006) that whether high test anxiety involves attention bias away from threat. One basic individual difference variable that might impact on anxious persons’ processing of threat stimuli is approach-avoidance temperament. Approach temperament is defined as sensitivity towards real or imagined positive stimuli, such as reward, and avoidance temperament as sensitivity towards real or imagined negative stimuli, such as threat (Elliot & Thrash, 2010). Approach-avoidance temperament integrates trait (e.g., neuroticism and extroversion), affective dispositions (positive and negative emotionality), and motivational (e.g., behavioural activation and inhibition), approaches to personality within a unified framework (Elliot & Thrash, 2002). Elliot and Thrash (2010) propose that approach temperament focuses attention on positive, and avoidance temperament on negative, stimuli increasing the amount of positive or negative information being processed and subsequently influencing one’s affective state (also see Briki, 2018; Elliot & Sheldon, 1997).

It is likely that, to some degree, test anxiety and a tendency towards avoidance temperament would co-occur (e.g., Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Putwain & Symes, 2012). Test anxiety, however, is a multi-causal phenomenon (Zeidner & Matthews, 2005); an individual could still become highly test anxious due to poor competence beliefs, poor coping strategies, metacognitive beliefs that exacerbate worry, self-handicapping, and emotion regulation strategies, independently of their avoidance temperament. Some individuals could, therefore, still become highly test anxious even with a low avoidance temperament. It is likely that highly test anxious persons who differ in their
approach-avoidance temperament would also differ in their attention bias (see Spielberg, Heller, Silton, Stewart, Miller, 2011). Specifically, the attention bias towards threat in highly test anxious persons with a strong avoidance temperament (i.e., those with a tendency to focus on and process negative stimuli) would be greater than highly test anxious persons with a weaker avoidance temperament or a stronger approach temperament (i.e., those with a tendency to focus on and process positive stimuli). In short, approach-avoidance temperament might moderate the relation between test anxiety and attention bias.

**Aim of the Present Study**

The aim of the present study was threefold. First, it was to examine whether a congruent test-threat condition is required to demonstrate an attention bias towards threat using a mood induction procedure. Second, it was to establish whether attention bias to threat in high test anxious persons occurred during automatic or strategic stages of information processing using subliminal and supraliminal presentation of stimuli. Third, it was to examine whether approach-avoidance temperament moderated the relation between test anxiety and attention bias. Attention bias represents a core cognitive mechanism underpinning anxiety (Abend et al., 2017; Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010) and worrisome cognitions have been shown to be the component of test anxiety most strongly related to information processing interference (e.g., Keogh & French, 2001; Schutz, & Schwanenflugel, 2002; von der Embse et al. 2018). Following previous studies (e.g., Putwain et al., 2011), we chose to focus solely on the cognitive (worry) component of test anxiety.

The following three hypotheses were tested:

**H1**: High test anxious persons will show an attention bias to test-threat stimuli relative to test-neutral stimuli. This bias will be stronger under a congruent threat condition.

**H2**: Attention bias to threat in high test anxious persons will be observable at both early (sub-threshold) and late stages of processing.
H3: Attention bias to threat in high test anxious persons will be stronger for those with an avoidance temperament.

**Method**

**Design**

The study used a mixed design with two between-participants IVs and one within-participants IV. The two between-participants IVs were test-threat vs. test-neutral conditions and high vs. low exam-related test anxiety. The test-threat vs. test-neutral condition was manipulated by randomly allocating participants to a writing task where they were asked to describe either their last examination (test-threat) or journey to college (test-neutral). Test anxiety was quasi-manipulated into low and high groups using a median split. The within-participants IV was a measurement of state anxiety taken before and after the writing task.

**Participants**

There were 186 participants (male = 44, female = 142), drawn from three English 6th Form Colleges, who were all in their first year of studying for a General Certificate of Education: Advanced Level in Psychology along with two other subjects. 6th Form is a tier of upper secondary education (ages 16-19 years) where students typically study university entrance qualifications in academic subjects or vocational equivalents. The mean age of participants was 16.4 years (SD = .57) and the ethnic heritage was as follows: Asian = 27, Black = 17, White = 124, other = 14, and mixed heritage = 4.

**Measures**

**Test Anxiety.** Test anxiety was measured using the 6-item worry scale from the Revised Test Anxiety Scale (Hagtvet & Benson, 1997). Participants responded to items (e.g., ‘During exams I find myself thinking about the consequences of failing’) on a four-point scale (1 = almost never, 4 = always). Items were adapted from the original to refer to ‘exams’ rather than ‘tests’ in keeping with the parlance of the English educational system. This
measure has shown construct validity, predictive validity, and internal consistency in previous studies (e.g., Putwain & Aveyard, 2018; Putwain & Symes, 2011). In the present study the internal consistency was good (Cronbach’s α = .74).

**State anxiety.** State anxiety was measured using the 6-item short adaption of the state anxiety scale from the State-trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI: Marteau & Bekker, 1992). Participants responded to items (e.g., ‘I feel calm’) on a four-point scale (1 = not at all, 4 = very much). This measure has been widely used in a range of clinical, health, and experimental settings where it has shown good construct validity, predictive validity, and internal consistency (e.g., Bayrampour, McDonald, Fung, & Tough, 2014; Tluczek, Henriques, & Brown, 2009). The internal consistency was good (Cronbach’s α pre-writing task = .78, post-writing task = .77).

**Attention bias.** Attention bias was measured using a dot-probe task that included 24 word pairs, each of which was presented four times: twice subliminally and twice supraliminally. Each word pair consisted of a test-threat word (e.g., failure) and a test-neutral word (e.g., television), matched by number of syllables, with one word presented above the other (see appendix for list of threat and neutral words). In the subliminal condition, the word pair was shown for 100ms and in the supraliminal condition each word pair was shown for 500ms. 40 test-threat words were initially identified from previous studies (Putwain et al., 2011; Vasey et al., 1996) and then rated by four experts on a five-point scale in terms of how threatening someone with test anxiety would find them, resulting in 24 threat-relevant words selected for inclusion in the dot-probe task. Prior to the presentation of each word pair, a fixation cue (+++ ) appeared in the centre of the screen for 500ms, before being replaced by the word pair.

After 100ms (subliminal trials) or 500ms (supraliminal trials), the word pair was removed and the probe (an arrow pointing left or right) appeared in the space where one of
the words had been. Participants were instructed to press the A key on their keyboard if the arrow was pointing left (<), and the L key if it was pointing right (>). Participant reaction times and accuracy were recorded. Once the participants had pressed either the A or L key, the probe would disappear, and that would end one trial. The fixation cue would then appear again for 500ms, before the next word pair was presented and so on, with participants completing 96 trials in total. The fixation cue, word pairs and probe were all presented in black in Arial, font size 12, on a white screen. The trials were presented in the same order for all participants. For half of the word pairs, the test-threat word was on the top, and the probe replaced the test-threat word in half of the trials, and the test-neutral word for the other half. In addition, on half of the trials the probe pointed left, and on the other half it pointed right. Participants completed three practice trials before the main trials began.

Approach-avoidance Temperament. Approach-avoidance temperament was measured by the twelve-item questionnaire developed by Elliot and Thrash (2010). This scale contains six items intended to measure avoidance (e.g., ‘I react strongly to bad experiences’) and six items intended to measure approach (e.g., ‘Thinking about the things I want really energises me’). Participants responded to items on a five-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 3 = neither, 5 = strongly agree). The construct validity and internal consistency of data collected using this measure have been reported in numerous studies (e.g., Elliot & Thrash, 2010; Gocłowska, Aldhobaiban, Elliot, Murayama, Kobeisy, Abdelaziz, 2017). A higher order factor structure was used in the present study in order to model a single score for approach-avoidance temperament. Approach and avoidance were represented as first order factors and approach-avoidance temperament as the second order factor. The scores of avoidance items were reversed, such that a higher score on the second order factor for approach-avoidance temperament corresponds to a greater approach temperament and a
lower score to a greater avoidance temperament. The internal consistency of the combined scale was good (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .78$).

**Procedure**

Data were collected at three different sites, one for each of the three participating 6th Form Colleges. At each 6th Form College, participants were tested in groups ranging from 7 to 25 in a quiet classroom fitted with multiple PCs. Each participant was seated at their own PC approximately one metre either side of the next participant to avoid visual distraction. All instructions, tasks, and measures, were hosted on a website. A brief introduction to the study was provided by the researcher and, if consent was provided, participants were randomly allocated a URL that linked to either the test-threat or test-neutral condition. First, participants completed the six-item state anxiety measure before being prompted to write about their last examination (test-threat condition) or journey to college (test-neutral condition) and completing the six-item state anxiety measure again. There was a lower limit of 200 characters including spaces (no upper limit) for the writing task and participants were prompted to continue writing if they attempted to move to the next webpage before completing 200 characters.

Participants were then prompted to undertake the dot-probe task and finally to complete the measures for test anxiety and approach-avoidance temperament and demographic information. Instructions for the test-threat and test-neutral writing tasks, and the dot-probe task are replicated in the appendix. The test-related worry measure was completed after the writing and dot-probe tasks to avoid priming highly test-anxious participants and potentially confounding the writing tasks. Ethical permission was provided from the institutional ethics committee at which the first, third and fourth authors were based (Reference: 16/TPL/006). Gatekeeper consent was provided by the Principal of the
participating colleges and individual consent provided by participants by clicking on an ‘agree to participate’ button on the instruction page of the project website.

**Results**

**Manipulation Check**

A manipulation check was conducted using a 2x2x2 mixed ANOVA with one within-participants factor (before vs. after the writing task) and two between-participants factors (threat vs. neutral condition; high vs. low worry) and state anxiety as the dependent variable. There was a main effect for worry, \(F(1,182) = 7.29, p = .008, \eta_p^2 = .04\), whereby state anxiety was higher for participants who were high in worry (\(M = 11.37, SE = .31\)) compared with those who were low in worry (\(M = 10.19, SE = .32\)). All other main effects and interactions were not statistically significant (\(p_s >.05\)). Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. A possible reason for the failure of the test-threat condition to induce state anxiety is that whilst there were a number of references to feeling anxious before \((n = 92)\) and during \((n = 49)\) their last exam, the majority of participants ended their accounts with details of the positive emotions \((n = 70)\) such as relief \((n = 30)\) and happiness \((n = 13)\). It is possible that this positively influenced their perceptions of state anxiety. Fewer students reported feeling anxious after they had finished their exam \((n = 33)\).

[Table 1 about here]

**Attention bias**

During a data screening procedure, individual responses < 20ms and >2000 ms were removed, incorrect responses were removed, and 17 participants who had fewer than 80% valid trials \((n = 17)\) were removed (i.e. any participant with more than 20% of trials incorrect or outside of the indicated time window was removed from all the analyses). An attention bias index was calculated by subtracting the reaction time to test-neutral stimuli from the reaction time to threat-threat stimuli; a positive score would indicate a bias away from threat
(i.e., towards the prior location of the neutral word) and a negative score would indicate a
bias towards threat (i.e., towards the prior location of the threat word). Descriptive statistics
are reported in Table 1 (standardised factor loadings are reported from the measurement
model described below).

Table 2 here

Data were analysed in a latent interaction structural equation model using the Latent Moderated Structural Equations (LMS) approach (Klein & Moosbrugger, 2000). First, a
measurement model was built to assess the measurement properties of the latent constructs
and to estimate latent bivariate correlations. The measurement model included six latent
indicators for Worry and a higher order latent factor for Approach-avoidance temperament
built from two lower order factors of avoidance and approach (six indicators each). Attention
bias index (for subliminal and supraliminal attention bias), gender (0 = male, 1 = female) and
age were included as manifest variables. Indicators for Worry, Approach-avoidance
temperament, and attention bias index scores were z-transformed prior to analysis. Model fit
was assessed using the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and the Tucker–Lewis
index (TLI). A good fitting model is indicated by RMSEA and SRMR indices of <.08 and
<.06, respectively, and CFI and TLI indices of >.95 (Marsh, Hau, & Grayson 2005). The
measurement model, and all subsequent analyses were estimated using maximum likelihood
using the Mplus v.8 software (Muthén & Muthén, 2017).

Table 3 about here

By these criteria, the measurement model showed a good fit to the data: $\chi^2(175) = 182.71 \ p < .001$, RMSEA = .042, SRMR = .039, CFI = .964, and TLI = .955. Latent bivariate
correlations are reported in Table 3. The latent interaction structural equation modelling
followed the two-stage approach of Maslowsky, Jager, and Hemken (2015). First, a model of
the latent constructs that did not contain the interaction term between worry and approach-avoidance, was built to assess model fit (Model 1). Second, a model including the interaction term (Model 2) was tested and the relative advantage over Model 1 assessed by means of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), sample-size adjusted Bayesian information criterion (aBIC), the log likelihood ratio test, and the change in the proportion of variance ($\Delta R^2$), explained in attention bias.

[Tables 4 and 5 about here]

Model 1 regressed subliminal and supraliminal attention bias on Worry, Approach-avoidance temperament, gender and age, and showed a good fit to the data: $\chi^2(161) = 195.45$, $p = .002$, RMSEA = .042, SRMR = .039, CFI = .964, and TLI = .955. The fit of Model was not significantly different, $\chi^2(14) = 12.74$, $p > .05$, from that of the measurement model. Model 2, including the latent interaction term, showed a reduction in AIC ($\Delta = 3.54$) and aBIC ($\Delta = 3.51$), indicative of a better fitting model (Hix-Small, Duncan, Duncan, & Okut, 2004). Furthermore, the log-likelihood ratio test suggested a statistically significant improvement for Model 2 over Model 1 ($D = 18.97$, $p < .001$) and a greater proportion of variance was explained for subliminal attention bias (subliminal: $\Delta R^2 = .052$, supraliminal: $\Delta R^2 = .006$). Standardised ($\beta$s) and unstandardised regression coefficients ($B$s) are reported in Tables 4 and 5.

For subliminal attention bias, a statistically significant interaction term was reported between Worry and Approach-avoidance temperament ($\beta = -.22$, $p = .03$), which was probed with simple slopes at ±1SD (please note that the Mplus software only provides estimates for unstandardised regression coefficients for simple slopes). A positive trend was shown between Worry and subliminal attention bias at low (-1SD) Approach-avoidance ($B = .47$, $p = .26$), which became negative at mean Approach-avoidance ($B = -.20$, $p = .39$). At high (+1SD) Approach-avoidance the negative trend became stronger and statistically significant
(B = -.87, p = .03). Simple slopes are graphed in Figure 1. At high (+1SD) Worry, those with a greater approach tendency (i.e., +1SD Approach-avoidance) showed subliminal attention bias towards threat whereas those with a greater avoidance tendency (i.e. -1SD Approach-avoidance) showed subliminal attention bias away from threat. For supraliminal stimuli, Worry was associated with greater attention bias towards threat (β = -.19, p = .01) but did not interact with Approach-avoidance.

[Figure 1 here]

**Discussion**

The aim of the study was threefold. First, to examine whether attention bias to test-threat stimuli in highly test anxious persons was only shown in a congruent test-threat condition. Second, to examine whether attention bias to threat in high test anxious persons occurred during automatic or strategic stages of information processing. Third, to examine whether Approach-avoidance temperament moderated relations between test anxiety and attention bias. Results showed that the mood induction procedure was not effective in manipulating state anxiety. Approach-avoidance temperament moderated relations between Worry and subliminal, but not supraliminal attention bias. Unexpectedly, high test anxious persons with a greater approach temperament showed a stronger subliminal attention bias towards threat. In contrast, high test anxious persons with a greater avoidance temperament showed a stronger subliminal attention bias away from threat. High test anxious persons showed a supraliminal attention bias towards threat irrespective of their approach-avoidance temperament.

The first aim of our study was to resolve a point of inconsistency arising from the nascent body of studies conducted thus far into test anxiety; namely whether attention bias is only present in a congruent test-threat condition. The results of our study cannot speak conclusively to this aim as the mood induction procedure was not effective in increasing state
anxiety for high test anxious persons. As a result the study was deprived of a congruent test-threat condition. Essentially, irrespective of which condition participants were allocated to, they were both low threat in respect of tests or examinations. This, perhaps, is not such a surprising finding. Studies have shown that writing about one’s worries before a test can reduce anxiety (e.g., Donnelly & Murray, 1991; Graf, Gaudiano, & Geller, 2008) and boost the performance of highly math and test anxious students (e.g., Park, Ramirez, & Beilock, 2014; Ramirez & Beilock, 2011). Although our writing tasks did not occur directly before a test (notwithstanding the possibility that some participants might have viewed the dot-probe activity in test-like terms) it is possible that writing about a pressured examination in the past had a similar effect to prevent the development of state anxiety.

Nonetheless, we felt it was important to report these findings. This was partly inspired by the file drawer controversy (e.g., Franco, Malhotra, Simonovits, 2014) and we felt somewhat obliged to report this statistically non-significant finding where perhaps previously we would have been less inclined to do so. This was also partly for the benefit of research colleagues who may also be searching for effective ways of artificially creating test-threat congruent situations for laboratory research. In respect of the latter point, we would advise that the mood induction procedure employed for this study was not effective for creating the evaluative threat required for a test anxious congruent threat condition in samples of students from upper secondary education (aged 16-19 years). As we highlighted above, it is possible that writing about an examination from the past may help to reduce worries. It is notable in this respect that participants tended to finish their recollections with mainly positive deactivating emotions such as relief (see Pekrun, 2018; Weiner, 2010) rather than anxiety.

However, a somewhat tentative conclusion would be that attention bias towards supraliminal threat can be shown without a corresponding test-threat condition. In this respect, our findings do offer some support for H1 and are in line with some previous studies.
examining attention bias in test anxiety (e.g., Zhang et al., 2018; Vasey et al., 1996) and general trait anxiety (e.g., Abend et al., 2017; Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Mogg, Bradley, De Bono, & Painter, 1997). It might be tempting to speculate that supraliminal attention bias towards threat in high test anxious persons would increase in size with a corresponding test-threat condition. A test of that hypothesis would require an effective alternative to the mood induction procedure used in the present study. Finding a laboratory task that is capable of mirroring the evaluative threat found in naturalistic tests and examinations is not easy and, ethical and practical issues notwithstanding, the ego-threat instructions employed with undergraduates by Putwain et al. (2011) could be a plausible option.

The second aim of the study was to establish whether the mechanism underpinning attention bias in test anxiety was automatic or strategic. An attention bias shown to the subliminal presentation would imply a fast, early, automatic process (e.g., vigilance) whereas an attention bias shown to the supraliminal presentation would imply late, strategic processes (e.g., difficulty disengaging from threat) were involved (although this does not completely rule out the presence of automatic processes). The results of our study showed an attention bias to threat in high test anxious persons was present for the supraliminal presentation of test-threat stimuli but not for the subliminal presentation of test-threat stimuli. This offers partial support for $H2$ and is in line with previous studies showing that persons high in (general) trait anxiety show attention bias to supraliminal (e.g., 500ms presentation times) threat stimuli (e.g., Cooper & Langton, 2006; Dalgleish et al., 2003; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988).

The third aim of the study was to establish whether attention bias towards threat stimuli in high test anxious persons was moderated by approach-avoidance temperament; weaker for those with an approach tendency and greater for those with an avoidance tendency. Results did not support $H3$. Rather than showing a stronger attention bias towards
threat, persons high in cognitive test anxiety with an avoidance temperament showed a stronger attention bias away from subliminal threat stimuli. This was an unexpected finding as persons high in avoidance temperament should show an orientation to, and a greater processing of, negative information. A possible explanation may lie in the tendency for persons to down-regulate negative emotion by moving attention away from threat stimuli when anxiety becomes overwhelming.

For instance, studies have shown that clinically anxious and high trait anxious persons show an attention bias away from threat when using longer stimulus presentations of 1250ms (e.g., Koster, Verschuere, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2005; Pflugshaupt, Mosimann, von Wartburg, Schmitt, Nyffeler, & Muri, 2005). It is possible that a similar mechanism is at work in the present study; highly test anxious persons with a strong avoidance temperament move attention away from subliminal threat to evade an excess of anxiety. Those highly test anxious persons with a lower avoidance, or stronger approach, temperament do not experience an excess of anxiety and do not need to move attention away from threat stimuli to down regulate negative emotions.

Although unrelated to our hypotheses, a curious finding emerged for low test anxious persons; those with a high avoidance temperament showed an attention bias towards threat whereas those with an approach tendency showed an attention bias away from threat. Thus, under certain conditions low test anxious persons may be vigilant for threat. Although speculatory, this may be related to ‘defensive anxiety’. These persons are not truly low anxious persons but characterised by a repressive coping style (Weinberger, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1979) and show physiological, behavioural, and attentional responses that are more commonly associated with high anxious persons despite scoring low on self-report anxiety scales (e.g., Derakshan & Eysenck, 2001). Furthermore, previous studies have shown that female participants report higher test anxiety, particularly for the affective-physiological
component, than male students (e.g., Putwain, 2007; Putwain & Daly, 2014). Although the data in our study showed this trend, it was not statistically significant. This is likely an artefact of measuring the worry component of test anxiety (where gender differences are usually smaller) and the relatively small number of male participants thus making it harder to detect small differences.

Our research findings are noteworthy in a number of ways. Firstly, they add to the growing body of evidence that suggests that threat-relevant manipulation is may not always be required for attention bias to be found (e.g. Abend et al., 2017; Vasey et al., 1996), especially when threat is presented supraliminal. This has important implications for researchers in the field, as this means they can attempt to measure attention bias can be measured in students with test anxiety, without necessarily needing complicated or time-consuming mood induction procedures. Secondly, the fact that students with test anxiety appeared to display attention bias even when they were not state anxious, indicates that attention bias is likely to be a key featurestable characteristic of test anxiety, as with other anxieties (Bar-Haim et al. 2007). Thirdly, it need not only be test anxious students with a bias towards threat who benefit from such training, given that attention bias modification has been found to be successful at reducing anxiety, even with individuals who do not show an attention bias towards threat (Mogg et al., 2017). Finally, the novel incorporation of approach-avoidance temperament, with its moderating effect on the relationship between worry and attention bias, suggests that this is a characteristic that other researchers may wish to include when examining attention bias in other anxious populations. Indeed, it is recognised that attention bias in anxious individuals can be characterised as a bias away from threat, as well as a bias towards threat (Cisler & Koster, 2010), and approach-avoidance temperament measure may help illuminate the mechanisms operating behind these different types of attention bias.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research

The main limitation of our study was, as noted above, that the mood induction procedure was not effective. We believe that this was possibly a result of writing about a previous examination and recalling deactivating emotions such as relief. Future studies should set out to test $H1$ as it is still not clear whether an attention bias to threat is larger under a test-threat congruent condition and whether automatic processes (e.g., vigilance for threat) theorised by Zeinder and Mathews (2005) in addition to, or instead of, the conscious processes are elicited under test-threat conditions. One option, if using the same mood induction procedure, would be to ask participants to recall how they felt before taking their last exam (i.e., so not to recall deactivating emotions) or write about an upcoming examination. However, since not all participants may actually have experienced an examination, such an approach may not be effective. An alternative, highlighted above, would be to adopt the ego-threat instruction used by Putwain et al. (2011) for use with adolescent participants. This approach, however, uses IQ-type cognitive ability tests and so may not be practical for group testing. Whichever approach is used, we recommend that future studies incorporate post-experimental focus groups with participants to elicit feedback about their utility of the mood induction procedure as well as other aspects of the study.

The second limitation to highlight is whether the dot-probe task itself is the best method by which to measure attention bias in test anxiety. As we note earlier, performance on the dot-probe task may be compromised by the cognitive-interfering nature of test anxiety. Building on Dong et al. (2017) who used an eye-tracking approach to measure attention bias, future studies should consider alternate ways to measure attention bias. Possibilities that have been used with trait anxiety and clinical anxiety include the simplification of the dot-probe task by removing two separate competing stimuli for attention in the attention cueing paradigm design (Fox, Russo, Bowles & Duton, 2001). Here a participant is required to
respond to a probe presented to one side of a computer screen (as in the dot-probe task), however in this task, the probe is preceded by only a single stimulus cue designed to elicit positive, neutral or negative emotions. This allows for a single cue to attention without interference from a secondary cue. Fox et al. (2001) established greater attention disengagement difficulties with students with self-reported high state anxiety using this task.

A further paradigm which has been suggested is the use of visual search (Hansen & Hansen 1988). Unlike the dot probe and spatial cueing tasks, where the stimulus of interest for the research is secondary to the participants’ task of responding to a probe, the visual search task requires participants to actively attend and respond to the content of the words. Participants are given a target word (i.e. test) and then see a display of words which may or may not contain this target. The participants’ task is to indicate if the target is present. Attention bias is measured by the speed to find the target; participants who have high anxiety will find threat words faster (Treisman et al, 1980). We recommend that different methods of measuring attention bias should be used comparatively within a single study to establish their relative merits.

**Educational Implications**

The tendency of highly test anxious persons to direct greater allocation to threat stimuli may leave fewer cognitive resources available for goal directed behaviours such as preparing and taking an examination (see Derakshan & Eysenck, 2011; Eysenck et al., 2007). As a result working memory functions, including updating, shifting, and inhibition, may all be compromised, causing interference with learning and examination performance (e.g., Owens et al., 2008). Interventions are required not only to reduce the distressing experience of test anxiety itself, but also the negative educational consequences of test anxiety.

Interventions designed to reduce test anxiety typically employ combinations of behavioural (e.g., muscle relaxation) and cognitive (e.g., cognitive restructuring) approaches with study-
skills training. Meta-analyses have shown these approaches are effective in reducing test anxiety (Ergene, 2003; von der Embse et al., 2018). Fewer studies have investigated the dual effects of intervention on both test anxiety and educational achievement (Keogh, Bond, & Flaxman, 2006; Vagg & Spielberger, 1995) and equivocal findings reported thus far; test anxiety can be reduced with no concurrent change in achievement and vice versa.

Findings from the attention bias literature suggest that one way to reduce test anxiety would be to train students to attend to neutral or positive stimuli rather than threat stimuli. These training approaches, typically referred to as cognitive bias modification (CBM), modify dot-probe presentations such that the threat stimuli are paired with neutral or positive stimuli and the probe always replaces the neutral or threat-positive stimuli. CBM has been shown to be effective in reducing clinical anxiety (Amir, Beard, Burns & Bomyea, 2009; Hayes et al., 2010) and responses to natural stressors in high trait anxious persons (See et al., 2009). CBM has also been successfully used in an educational context to reduce interfering thoughts and examination stress (Dandeneau & Baldwin, 2009; Dandeneau, Baldwin & Pruessner, 2007). We are only aware of one study to date to examine a CBM intervention for test anxiety, showing CBM to be equally effective as a cognitive behavioural therapy over a two-year period (de Hullu, Sportel, Nauta, de Jong, 2017). These highly promising findings suggest considerable potential for CBM as an cost-effective intervention for test anxiety.

Furthermore, by strengthening attention control, CBM may be more likely to negate the interfering effects on learning and examination performance, resulting from comprised working memory function, than other approaches to intervention.

Given the negative relations between test anxiety and educational achievement (Hembree, 1988; von der Embse et al., 2018) and wellbeing (Cowburn & Blow, 2017; Rodway et al., 2016), and that high-stakes tests are used in many countries and education
systems throughout the world, there is a need for interventions to either reduce test anxiety or inculcate students against its performance-interfering effects (Ergene, 2003). Interventions specifically designed for school-aged populations, however, are scarce (von der Embse, Barterian, & Segool, 2013). Findings from the attention bias literature suggest that one way to reduce test anxiety would be to train students to attend to neutral or positive stimuli rather than threat stimuli. These training approaches, typically referred to as cognitive bias modification (CBM), modify dot-probe presentations such that the threat is paired with neutral or positive stimuli and the probe always replaces the neutral or threat stimuli.

CBM has been shown to be effective in reducing clinical anxiety (Amir, Beard, Burns & Bomyea, 2009; Hayes et al., 2010) and responses to natural stressors in high trait anxious persons (See et al., 2009). CBM has also been successfully used in an educational context to reduce interfering thoughts and examination stress (Dandeneau & Baldwin, 2009; Dandeneau, Baldwin & Pruessner, 2007). We are only aware of one study to date to examine a CBM intervention for test anxiety, showing CBM to be equally effective as a cognitive behavioural therapy over a two-year period (de Hullu, Sportel, Nauta, de Jong, 2017). These highly promising findings suggest considerable potential for CBM as a cost-effective intervention for test anxiety.

In addition to psychological interventions, there are relatively straightforward ways that teachers and other school practitioners can help students manage test anxiety (e.g., Nyroos, Jonsson, Korhonen, & Eklöf, 2015). Students can be shown how to control physical reactions to test anxiety through deep breathing, how to identify and challenge irrational thoughts (e.g., catastrophizing) that contribute to anxiety, and how to build confidence through effective test-preparation and test-taking strategies. Effective forms of test preparation can utilise principles of cognitive psychology to enhance the encoding and retrieval of information that is to be tested (e.g., elaboration, rehearsal, and active learning) in
order to buffer students against the interfering effects of anxiety on working memory. Test
preparation can also be incorporated into cycles of self-regulated learning (planning,
monitoring, and evaluation) in order to help students overcome beliefs of low or uncertain
control that can underpin anxiety.

Conclusion

Limited by the ineffective mood induction procedure our study was not able to
examine attention bias in a test-threat congruent situation. However, it does partly answer the
question of whether a test-threat congruent situation is required. It would seem that it does
not, for supraliminal stimuli (that imply conscious processes), since attention bias towards
threat was shown by high test anxious persons in the absence of an effective threat
manipulation. For subliminal stimuli (that imply automatic processes) an attention bias
towards threat in the absence of an effective threat manipulation was only shown, somewhat
paradoxically, for those participants with a strong approach tendency. It would be useful for
future research to establish if this attention bias is larger under a test-threat condition. One of
the challenges is to establish an effective method for artificially manipulating the level of
test-threat to mimic that of a real-life examination.

References

Association between attention bias to threat and anxiety symptoms in children and
adolescents. Depression and Anxiety, 35(3), 229–238.doi: 0.1002/da.22706

autobiographical memories disrupts working memory. Acta Psychologica 151, 237-
243.doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2014.07.003


Mogg, K., & Bradley, B. P. (1999). Some methodological issues in assessing attention biases for threatening faces in anxiety: A replication study using a modified version of the


See, J., MacLeod, C., & Bridle, R. (2009). The reduction of anxiety vulnerability through the modification of attention bias: A real-world study with a home-based cognitive
modification procedure. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 118*(1), 65-75. doi: 10.1037/a0014377


Table 1
*Pre- and Post-writing Task State Anxiety for Test-threat and Test-neutral Conditions in High and Low Exam Worry Participants.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-writing Task</th>
<th>Post-writing Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test-threat Condition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Exam Worry</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>10.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Exam worry</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>10.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
<td>11.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test-neutral Condition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Exam Worry</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>10.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Exam worry</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>9.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>11.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Worry, Approach-avoidance, Gender, Age, and Attention Bias.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Skewness</th>
<th>Kurtosis</th>
<th>Factor Loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worry</td>
<td>6-24</td>
<td>14.90</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>.49 - .69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach-avoidance</td>
<td>20-60</td>
<td>37.43</td>
<td>6.99</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>.52 - .80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subliminal Attention Bias</td>
<td>20 – 2000ms</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supraliminal Attention Bias</td>
<td>20 – 2000ms</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3
Latent Bivariate Correlations for Worry, Approach-avoidance, Gender, Age, and Attention Bias.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1.</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
<th>4.</th>
<th>5.</th>
<th>6.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Worry</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.49**</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Approach-avoidance</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.20*</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Gender</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Age</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Subliminal Attention Bias</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Supraliminal Attention Bias</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
Table 4  
*Standardised (β) and Unstandardised (B) Regression Coefficients from Model 1 (no Interaction Term) and Model 2 (with Interaction Term) for Subliminal Stimuli.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>β</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worry</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach-avoidance</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worry × Approach-avoidance</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.67*</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>-.22*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5
*Standardised (β) and Unstandardised (B) Regression Coefficients from Model 1 (no Interaction Term) and Model 2 (with Interaction Term) for Supraliminal Stimuli.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worry</td>
<td>-.46*</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>-.23*</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.47*</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>-.19*</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.46*</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>-.23*</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.47*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach-avoidance</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.37</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worry × Approach-avoidance</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05.
Figure 1. The model implied interaction between worry and approach-avoidance on subliminal attention bias probed at (±1 SD).
Appendix

Instructions for the Test-threat Condition

Please write about the last exam that you took. You should include information about the exam itself, such as what subject it was for, how long it lasted, the types of questions asked (e.g. multiple choice or essay questions) and how important you felt that exam was for you personally. You should also write about how you felt before, during and after the exam. For example, what emotions did you experience, and why’

Instructions for the Test-neutral Condition

Please write about your typical journey to college. You should include basic information about your journey such as which form of transport you take (e.g. car, bus, walk etc.), how long it takes, how much it costs (if anything) and who you travel with. You should also write about the route you take, for example any interesting buildings that you pass on your way, or why you go the way that you do.”

Instructions for the Dot-probe Task

You will now take part in an attention task. You will see three crosses on the screen (+++), followed by two words, one on top of the other. The words will disappear and an arrow will replace one of them. The arrow will point left (<) or right (>). If the arrow points left press the A key. If the arrow points right press the L key. We are recording how quickly and accurately you press the correct key. Please pay attention and try to be as accurate as you can. You will now do 3 practice trials.

Threat Word Stimuli used in the Dot-probe Task

Examination, evaluated, incompetent, underachieve, incapable, overloaded, disappoint, rejection, unable, disastrous, failure, pressure, assessed, mistake, grading, disgrace, loser, fail, stress, test, wrong, shame, score, and timed.

Neutral Word Stimuli used in the Dot-probe Task

Electricity, personality, supermarket, helicopter, television, animation, elephant, agreement, broadcaster, radio, picture, cupboard, carpet, forest, toaster, rabbit, music, tree, grass, cup, oil, cloud, hair, and washed.