

New 'New Localism' or Emperor's New Clothes:

Rees, James; Rose, Nigel

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Voluntary Sector Review

New 'New Localism' or Emperor's New Clothes: diverging local social policies and state-voluntary sector relations in an era of Localism --Manuscript Draft--

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Corresponding Author:	James Rees University of Birmingham Birmingham, UNITED KINGDOM
First Author:	James Rees
Order of Authors:	James Rees Nigel Rose
Abstract:	This paper aims to examine what the policy, practice and academic implications are of England becoming a container of diverse social policies as a result of the implementation of policies of Localism. Through a case study of Greater Manchester (GM) it addresses the implications for the local voluntary sector. GM is a key example of an ambitious local public sector assemblage that is attempting complex, large-scale policy implementation in the context of greater devolution .
Order of Authors Secondary Information:	

New 'New Localism' or Emperor's New Clothes: diverging local social policies and state-voluntary sector relations in an era of Localism

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6 Like its New Labour predecessor, the UK Coalition government has promoted
7 renewed localism in policy-making, democratic deliberation and the delivery of
8 public services (Deas et al., 2012; Clarke and Cochrane, 2013). It introduced
9 the Localism Act in 2012, and has also promoted an economic development
10 agenda partly based on the idea of 'rebalancing' the UK's London-centric
11 economy through new local authority-private sector 'Local Enterprise
12 Partnerships' (LEPs), city deals, and support for combined authorities (CAs) at
13 city-region level (Bentley and Pugalis, 2013). The devolution debate has been
14 given renewed impetus by the fall-out from the tight (55-45%) Scottish
15 Independence referendum in September 2014 which at the time of writing
16 seems set to have far-reaching consequences for potential devolution of
17 powers to combined authorities in England. Indeed, in November 2014 the
18 Government announced that it plans to adopt a radical devolution programme
19 to combined authorities starting with the election of a Mayor of Greater
20 Manchester. This programme will grant powers that go beyond those granted to
21 the Mayor of London and may include control over an integrated health and
22 social care budget dependent on Greater Manchester making a convincing
23 business case.

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52 This paper aims to demonstrate, through a brief overview of the Coalition
53 government's Localism policy agenda, and consideration of the Greater
54 Manchester (GM) city region as a case study area, that localism has important
55 implications for voluntary sector organisations (VSOs). In particular, we suggest
56 that VSOs play a difficult and conflicted role in mediating the tensions and
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1 contradictions created by 'Localist' policies, and may be struggling to meet the
2 expectations placed on them in the context of the Big Society and Localism
3 agendas as well as the apparent retrenchment and withdrawal of the state from
4 welfare provision. In particular, the case study discussion focuses on the
5 implications for VSOs of Greater Manchester's Public Sector Reform (PSR)
6 programme, assuming, that, as is intended, devolution allows for the extension
7 and development of this programme.
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20 **A new 'New Localism'?**

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25 Following its formation in May 2010 the Conservative-Liberal Democrat
26 Coalition government, against the backdrop of the 2007/08 financial crisis,
27 immediately set out an 'austerity' policy agenda based on deficit reduction
28 through major spending cuts which would hit local government particularly hard.
29
30 Two policy ideas developed during opposition – those of Localism and the 'Big
31 Society' – were rapidly rolled out, both aiming in slightly different ways to
32 devolve control of social policy, socio-economic development and civic renewal
33 away from the state to a more local level. These were based on principles of
34 localising power and funding, reducing 'burdens' and regulation, and
35 encouraging diversity of provision and local innovation (Alcock, 2010; Stoker
36 and Taylor-Gooby, 2011). The Localism Bill, introduced in 2010, represented a
37 potentially radical moment for localism: "stripping away much of the regulatory
38 infrastructure governing local authorities and creating a general power of
39 competence for local government, strengthening community accountability
40 through referendums and other devices, and empowering communities to take
41 over state-run services" (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012, p 26).
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1 As a number of commentators have suggested, the combination of spending
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3 cuts, a new and potentially radical localism and the clear rhetorical relaxation of
4
5 central government attitudes to (potentially emergent) pluralism and spatial
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7 differentiation has the potential to allow (or even force) greater innovation and
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9 therefore greater differentiation in social policy characteristics and content
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11 between different places (see for example Deas et al., 2012). As Lowndes and
12
13 Pratchett put it, the
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18 Coalition's 'sink or swim' approach to localism diverges significantly from
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20 that of New Labour... [which was] always hedged by the desire to retain
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22 control over significant public investments, and to *maintain principles of*
23
24 *standardisation and equity over and above those of diversity and local*
25
26 *control*. (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012, p 37, emphasis added).
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33 However, subsequent critics have pointed out that despite the opportunities and
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35 potential inherent within this generally *permissive* overall policy environment
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37 there are some critical barriers to its realisation. For Padley (2013), in order for
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39 decentralisation and community empowerment to be successfully delivered,
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41 they need to be "undergirded by significant levels of social trust [based on]
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43 collaboration and co-production" (p. 351). For others, noting particularly the
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45 context of resource scarcity, there are clear risks in extending (central)
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47 government control into previously autonomous domains in civil society
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49 (Milbourne and Cushman, 2014), and diminishing local government's role as an
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51 arbiter of competing local interests (Ishkanian and Szepter, 2012).
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60 However, in this paper we draw attention to two aspects of the debate we feel
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62 have hindered a fuller interpretation of the consequences of the policy of
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Localism. Firstly, we note that – despite the admittedly variable and halting real progress towards localism in practice – much debate is still presaged on the normative assumption that the national (that is, English) scale is the primary scale for policy-making. If a new era of ‘radical localism’ comes to pass it will be important to take seriously the development of locally tailored and designed social policy, albeit within the context of a still relatively centralised state and where there is complex multi-level governance. In taking policy-creation and implementation at the GM level seriously in this paper, we begin to redress the balance. Secondly, we argue that the role, demands of, and requirements placed on the voluntary sector have tended to be downplayed or even ignored by researchers interested in issues of spatial governance on the one hand or social policy on the other. This is despite the fact that the voluntary sector plays a significant role in both developing, negotiating and dealing with the consequences of social policies developed at a variety of scales. We therefore aim to address this neglect by considering the impact of localism on the voluntary sector, while paying heed to the wider context in which the sustainability of the sector – given multiple resource constraints – is in doubt.

Thus overall our broad concern is to address what the conceptual, policy, and practice implications are if England is to become a container of diverse social policies applying to a range of spatial scales (e.g. city region, local authority, neighbourhood). We explore this by focussing on GM and in particular the implications for the local voluntary sector. We aim to show that GM is an exemplary case study: it demonstrates how an ambitious local public sector assemblage is attempting complex, large-scale policy implementation in the context of greater devolution to the city-regional scale. The case study draws particularly on the experience of one of the authors in his employment in a

1 Manchester voluntary sector infrastructure body, an organisation which is
2 closely involved in mediating the implementation of PSR. Thus it is essentially
3 rooted in 'participant observation' of the process: attending numerous
4 presentations and meetings concerning various elements of the PSR
5 programme, taking part in cost benefit analysis training, and organising a
6 number of workshops for VSOs about PSR. The case study is underpinned by
7 in-depth personal experience and dialogue with other local actors. Both authors
8 have also attended 'high level' GM meetings and read a wide range of
9 associated documents, some of which are referenced in the article.
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23 **Public Service Reform in Greater Manchester**

24 25 26 27 *The development of local social policy in GM*

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32 Greater Manchester (GM) contains 2.68 million people and comprises the ten
33 boroughs of Manchester, Rochdale, Oldham, Wigan, Salford, Stockport,
34 Trafford, Tameside, Bury, and Bolton. Collectively they have maintained a
35 semblance of metropolitan governance through the Association of Greater
36 Manchester Authorities (AGMA) and more recently achieved, in 2011, the status
37 of Combined Authority, joined by four others in 2014. The context of austerity
38 has increased pressures on the 10 local authorities to seek economies of scale
39 by centralising functions and collaborating in commissioning public services. To
40 some extent, and with much diminished resources, AGMA and its associated
41 agencies have taken over the strategic role formerly done on a regional basis
42 by North West Development Agency (abolished in 2011) and now negotiate
43 directly with central government.
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1 Because GM has already received extensive coverage for its insistently
2 entrepreneurial governance reforms (see Harding et al., 2010; Rees and Lord,
3 2013), we focus here on the potentially radical and transformational approach to
4 the delivery and management of welfare services. Crucially, GM has taken a
5 single-minded and distinctive approach to what it sees as the mounting crisis in
6 welfare services: massive increase in need at the same time as decreasing
7 resources. The approach is spearheaded by New Economy, a sort of think-tank
8 cum quasi-executive agency for Greater Manchester, alongside senior officers
9 for the 10 LAs that make up AGMA together with other public sector agencies
10 such as GM Police, the Crime Commissioner and the newly reformed local
11 NHS.
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28 Greater Manchester is also one of the 4 areas of the UK selected to trial Whole
29 Place Community Budgets alongside Essex, West Chester and 'London Tri-
30 Borough'. Community Budgets is described as a partnership between these
31 areas and national government in co-producing more efficient welfare services
32 through pooling budgets between public authorities and using tools such as
33 'customer journey mapping' and 'cost-benefit analysis'. They are an explicit
34 attempt to produce local solutions, but within an ideological framework set by
35 national government.
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50 At its heart, GM's proposed solution to dealing with diminishing resources is to
51 increase the efficiency of welfare services, and to stem future demand. Part of
52 its diagnosis is that there is a systemic problem in the way that services
53 approach social problems (MIER, 2009). The benefits from an innovation in one
54 part of the system should accrue to other parts of the system, but there is no
55 effective feedback loop of innovation and each of the public authorities continue
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1 to plan and operate in isolation. Thus the remedy is to implement a joined-up
2 approach to the needs analysis, planning and commissioning of new services
3 for the area.
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8 So far there is little that departs from the script generated by a decade or so of
9 academic, think tank and Government-sponsored research around public
10 service system reform. Governmental initiatives have identified the need for a
11 joined up approach not least the Total Place Initiative begun by New Labour,
12 which aimed to identify and quantify the public funding streams going into an
13 area and how they might be combined and used in ways that generated savings
14 in the longer term. Other examples include Civil Service generated concepts
15 such as 'save to gain', the early action/intervention philosophy underpinning the
16 Allen Report and the subsequent Early Intervention Foundation (Allen, 2011), as
17 well as the theory of change that underpins social impact bonds (SIBs).
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34 However, there are some important nuances and developments in the way that
35 GM is pursuing public services and welfare reform. The approach is based on
36 an economic model of efficiency with cost-benefit analysis (CBA) at its heart.
37 The model was developed by New Economy's economists and agreed with
38 twelve government departments. Initially, four 'problem areas' were identified as
39 the focus for Public Services Reform (PSR):
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- 52 1) *Troubled Families*: Reducing the cost to the public purse of a number of
53 families that are high users of public services.
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- 55 2) *Health and Social Care*: Integrated working that increases resilience and
56 promotes independence.
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- 58 3) *Transforming Justice*: Reducing levels of crime by focusing on services
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for priority and prolific offenders.

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- 4) *Early Years*: Increasing the number of children who arrive at school ready to learn.

For each problem area a new delivery model (NDM) has been created based around a number of targeted and evidence-based interventions, which it is hoped will bring about ‘transformational change’ within a small number of years. The predicted savings arising from the interventions will be used to develop a business plan (investible proposition) to raise investment from central government to fund the transitional costs. As well as paying back the investment the business plan will enable welfare services (at least those within the aegis of the ‘family’ of Greater Manchester public bodies) to deliver better services with less money.

PSR involves using money differently, investing in tried and tested ways of working, which deliver a return on investment, which in turn can then be re-used. (MCC, 2013, p 2)

The most advanced of the PSR streams is Troubled Families due to central government investment (HM Government, 2014). The focus of the programme is a “defined cohort” of the “most troubled” individuals or families who are high cost to local public bodies. Each individual family who is referred to the programme is allocated a key worker who makes an assessment and offers a range of Tier 1 “interventions” (assertive outreach, parenting team, family intervention project, families first) which are carefully “sequenced” (delivered at the right time in the right order) and supported by a number of Tier 2 interventions (In Manchester many of these are spot purchased from VSOs to

1 make sure they are available at the point they are needed) – see Figure 1 for
2 illustration of the model.
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6 Fundamental to the approach is the seamless referral to services,
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8 through improved sequencing and prioritisation of cases. (MCC, 2013, p
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15 Figure 1 here.
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20 The programme is evaluated by the use of randomised control trials (RCTs), in
21 which one area of GM operating ‘business as usual’ (BAU) services is
22 compared to the NDM being operated in another location within GM. The
23 Greater Manchester Troubled Families Impact and Evidence Toolkit (AGMA,
24 2014) is employed, again based on a CBA model, to demonstrate the financial
25 “evidence of [financial] savings” accrued by the programme.
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37 This article does not aim to assess the Troubled Families Programme in GM,
38 but to focus on the participation – or rather, barriers to – of VSOs as
39 stakeholders in reform and the implications of such potentially radical changes
40 to the nature of welfare provision.
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49 *The implications of PSR for the voluntary sector* 50 51 52 53

54 In our opinion, there are several problematic areas in the Troubled Families
55 approach that militate against the involvement of VSOs and this article
56 concentrates on three: the appearance of ‘central planning’ at a GM Level; the
57 privileging of certain forms of evidence over others in the design and evaluation
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1 of policy success; and shortcomings in the theory of change underpinning the
2 model. None of these are new problems in VSO involvement – either at the
3 local level or more nationally – but they have been brought together in a specific
4 way within the Troubled Families Programme such that we believe it may have
5 significant implications for the future involvement of VSOs in GM's approach to
6 PSR.
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15 i) 'Central Planning' at a GM Level 16 17 18 19

20 The Troubled Families approach was developed at Greater Manchester level by
21 the public sector, primarily local authorities, led by the PSR team based within
22 New Economy. This small team, within a very short period, and with little public
23 or VSO scrutiny and involvement designed a radically new approach to key
24 problems using a technocratic, centralised planning model. As a result the
25 language used in the planning is jargonised and difficult to understand for
26 many, if not most VSOs.
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40 Many smaller VSOs are relatively isolated and lack networks of influence that
41 extend beyond their local borough – those that do tend to be national
42 organisations with local branches. Equally, there are only a small number of
43 VSOs that operate specifically at the Greater Manchester scale, and whose
44 footprint therefore matches that of the GM institutions. Local VSOs and
45 infrastructure bodies, principally Councils for Voluntary Service (CVSs) have
46 been slow to understand and react to the shift of power and decision-making to
47 the GM level, and their capacity to react and influence has been exacerbated by
48 spending cutbacks and reduced capacity. In the case of PSR the scale of the
49 crisis facing public bodies was used by the PSR team to explain why there had
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1 been so little involvement or consultation. However this is in a context where
2 democratic involvement at GM level from civil society organisations has been
3 relatively under-developed.
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8 ii) Privileged forms of evidence
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12 The Tier 1 interventions within the Troubled Families Programme are chosen on
13 the basis of an evidence hierarchy. At the top of the hierarchy is *randomised*
14 *control trials carried out in the UK less than a year ago*. This type of evidence is
15 estimated to have a data error of 2 per cent, which feeds into the predicted
16 fiscal impact (money saved to the state) using cost benefit analysis. At the
17 bottom of the hierarchy is *uncorroborated expert judgement more than 5 years*
18 *old* which is essentially useless as it has an estimated data error of 40 per cent.
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20 New Economy run a cost benefit analysis network and regular training sessions
21 to enable both VSOs and statutory bodies to estimate the fiscal impact of their
22 services.
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40 Leaving aside the contentious idea of an evidence hierarchy there is, and likely
41 will continue to be, a central problem for VSOs in the theoretical construct of an
42 'intervention', a tightly defined set of practices codified in a manual, backed up
43 by a set of professional standards, which is transferable and reproducible. Many
44 VSOs do not describe the work they do as interventions and find it difficult to
45 parcel up their services in this way. They tend to constantly tailor the work they
46 do to fit the particular context of the individual they are helping (for example
47 adopting an ethos of person-centredness), as well as attempting to modify the
48 external service environment for the benefit of the client (for example adopting a
49 model of creating seamless or wrap-around services). There are parallels, too,
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1 with the observations of inflexible or excessive audit and performance targets
2 re-shaping organisations' activities (Power, 1999).
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6 Secondly, even where the services that a VSO provides can be parcelled up
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8 into interventions, few if any VSOs have the resources, time or expertise to
9
10 carry out RCTs. Where monitoring and evaluation is carried out it tends to be
11
12 relatively unsophisticated and rely on user feedback, case studies and small
13
14 numbers of clients. The standard being used is simply too difficult for VSOs to
15
16 meet so all but the largest are unable to participate. The evidence that they can
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18 provide which shows high levels of impact and success, is invariably dismissed
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20 as it does not rate highly in the evidence hierarchy. New 'evidence-based'
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22 interventions are preferred to existing working models. 'What works' is restricted
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24 to specified interventions which are accompanied by 'high quality' research
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26 evidence. Although it is beyond the scope of this article, the use of RCTs in
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28 social contexts – where environmental influences are difficult to control – has
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30 also drawn criticism, and attention has been drawn to problems involved in rigid
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32 adherence to evidence hierarchies (Nutley et al., 2012).
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42 iii) Theory of Change 43 44 45

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47 The theory of change underpinning the PSR model, as defined in the NDM for
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49 the Troubled Families Programme, in common with other pathway models,
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51 resembles an industrial process. This is not to suggest that key workers
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53 involved in the programme treat their clients as if they were objects, rather, it is
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55 a metaphor of the theoretical model. A 'troubled family' enters at one end as a
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57 set of needs; each of the needs is defined and separated; and an appropriate
58
59 intervention is found to solve each need. The process is made more efficient
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1 through prioritisation, sequencing and isolating the pre-defined symptoms of
2 those most in need. The 'troubled family' is de-contextualised, in particular from
3 communities of geography and identity. The model could apply anywhere, in
4 any community and is not a locally-based solution.
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10 It is difficult to see how local VSOs who work within a particular geographical
11 community or with a particular community of interest fit within the model, instead
12 they are viewed in an instrumental manner as external points of referral. Their
13 holistic models of work, based often on a deep and rich understanding of the
14 environment and identity of a troubled family or individual, and on a recognition
15 of the structural and systemic inequalities that they face, is at odds with the
16 decontextualized, problem-based, 'industrial process' model of the Troubled
17 Families Programme. Some of the solutions may achieve similar ends, for
18 example, if a person has debt problems then these need to be resolved.
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20 However, local VSOs often place emphasis on linking the person back into their
21 communities, an approach that depends on highly localised knowledge and
22 networks, ultimately resulting in more sustainable solutions. The models of
23 change are conceptually and practically different.
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47 **Discussion and conclusion**

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52 A central point of this paper is that there is no one version of localism. Indeed,
53 this arguably hints at the Coalition's underpinning motivation for pursuing
54 localist policies: weakening mechanisms for national redistribution and spatial
55 justice (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012). But the Coalition vision of localism is
56 overlaid on already-existing forms that have strong forward momentum. We
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1 argue that GM is the foremost example of this and we characterise its approach
2 as *city-regional localism* in which civic entrepreneurs have been able to develop
3 their own forms of local solutions in the generally permissive Coalition policy
4 environment. The most recent announcement of the intention to create a Mayor
5 of Greater Manchester and to devolve a raft of powers to the city-region further
6 reinforces the trend toward city-regional localism and demonstrates, we believe,
7 the potential for further divergence in real social policies between metropolitan
8 areas. If it comes to pass it will, in effect, be the proof of the localist pudding.
9
10 Senior leaders and officers within GM hope it will be the platform for extending
11 and developing the GM Public Services Reform Model, particularly as the
12 decentralisation of health and welfare spending will depend on a business case
13 underpinned by the various technocratic models described above.
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30 However, as the example of the Troubled Families programme – crucially, a
31 nationally-developed and funded package which has been tweaked and
32 redesigned through the highly specific policy-making apparatus at the GM level
33 – shows, there are real dilemmas and barriers facing the voluntary and
34 community sector, with significant consequences for the nature and quality of
35 services that can be delivered. This matters because the voluntary sector is
36 both being recruited as part of the reform efforts, and at the same time its
37 functions and existing contributions to social welfare are being taken for granted
38 by city-regional policy-makers, chief among them New Economy, AGMA and
39 their close partners. At the same time, the expertise for which the sector is
40 being sought is being undermined by the nature of the reforms. Troubled
41 Families is a flagship programme intended to demonstrate the potential for
42 increased efficiency of statutory services, likely to be at the core of GM's
43 argument to devolve further powers over health and welfare spending.
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1 We have demonstrated that VSOs in Manchester had little involvement in the
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3 design and planning phase, in general do not understand the model, feel
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5 alienated by the technocratic language and criteria, and only have a peripheral
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7 role in delivery. Rather than supporting the work of local VSOs, building on what
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9 they do, and valuing the service evidence that they produce, the Troubled
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11 Families Programme is a centrally planned, problem-based, key-worker model.
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13 Like the rest of the PSR, it is underpinned by mechanistic logics of cost-benefit
14
15 analysis and narrow, measurement-based forms of research-quality evidence.
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17 Within the discourse created by this technocratic policy approach, VSOs and
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19 the community are considered to be part of an external environment, as
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21 subjects to be manipulated rather than as potential partners to be worked with –
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23 as envisaged in the concept of co-production (Padley, 2013). These tensions,
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25 added to more general pressures such as the workforce implications of the
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27 more widespread adoption of spot contracting, raise pressing questions about
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29 the ability of VSOs in the area to contribute to the longer-term maintenance of
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31 effective services that create meaningful outcomes for clients and citizens more
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33 broadly.
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44 Infrastructure bodies, principally local councils for voluntary service (CVSs)
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46 traditionally act as the mediators between the state and VSOs, but even staff
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48 within CVSs have found the models and language associated with PSR difficult
49
50 to understand and have struggled to involve VSOs in an approach where the
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52 pattern of services was pre-determined and invariably excluded existing working
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54 services. There are limited exceptions for organisations able to provide
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56 evidence of their effectiveness in the forms required but this applies to few local
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58 providers. Large VSOs may have the capacity to benefit from the PSR
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programme: their scale of operation allows them to collect and wield evidence and bid for large contracts, and some may be willing to align with the PSR approach. To some extent a city-regional localism may help them by simplifying their relationship with a streamlined governance body (compared to having to maintain relationships with officers and politicians in all ten boroughs). In contrast, it is difficult to see how small and medium-sized VSOs working in health and social services – traditionally a crucial part of the local service landscape – can engage successfully. Many of these organisations focus on the needs of communities at a hyper-local level, and are unwilling or unable to bridge to higher scales, in this case to the city-region. They are portrayed as old-fashioned and insufficiently innovative, while at the same time the assumption is that they will be able to respond as required to fill gaps left by retreating public services.

Devolution of powers and finance to GM has been lauded as the solution to the fiscal and social problems besetting the city-region, and its example has allowed the Coalition to position itself as serious about localism and devolution. GM is often portrayed, particularly in Westminster and Whitehall, as a path-breaker that other urban areas should follow. In GM, the clear signs are that what has been developing is an elite, entrepreneurial, technocratic, and insufficiently democratic version of *city regional localism*. This is hardly the Big Society-esque vision of creative, locally-developed, autonomous solutions situated in inclusive, harmonious arrangements of civil society, a slimmed down state and private sector contributions, envisioned in the policy formulation of Localism. The authors' previous research suggests that other major English cities do indeed imitate and adapt developments in GM, albeit refracted through their own specific local political configurations, political-cultural traditions and

1 local government-civil society relationships. We suggest therefore that policy-
2 makers, practitioners and scholars in spatial governance, social policy, and
3 voluntary sector studies, need to be alert to the implications of different forms of
4 localism, and carry out grounded research into its manifestations in different
5 places.
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


Figure 1: Taken from the Greater Manchester Troubled Families Model, Source: http://www.manchester.gov.uk/manchesterpartnership/downloads/file/228/troubled_families_programme_presentation, accessed 9.11.14

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