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The Soviet Use of the Moscow-Washington Hotline in the Six-Day War

This article examines the role the Moscow-Washington Hotline played in the 1967 Six-Day War, focusing on the Soviet side. We argue that the Soviet Union used the Direct Communication Link much more broadly than had been intended when the Hotline was agreed on in 1963 mainly because Moscow did not assign the Hotline any special diplomatic significance. We also show that the Hotline is a poor channel for crisis negotiations, and its efficacy as a communication tool is compromised if regular diplomatic channels cannot match its speed. Finally, we challenge the existing debate in the historiography of the Six-Day War, arguing for the importance of studying the implications of Soviet behaviour rather than Soviet intentions.

Keywords: Hotline; diplomacy; Middle East; Cold War; Soviet Union

Introduction

Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin and US President Lyndon Johnson met in Glassboro, New Jersey, on 23-25 June 1967 – just two weeks after the Six-Day War, also known as the June War, ended in the defeat of the Soviet-supported Arab states. The June War had been the first occasion when Soviet and American leaders had taken advantage of the Direct Communication Link (DCL), also known as the MOLINK or Hotline, and its use became a recurring topic in their discussions in Glassboro.¹ On one occasion, Johnson praised Kosygin for initiating communication through the MOLINK, claiming that, as a result, they had ‘managed to alleviate the situation’.² Johnson’s statement, as well as the frequency with which Kosygin and Johnson mentioned their Hotline correspondence, is indicative of the fact that both leaders attached great importance to their instantaneous exchange of messages.

However, no scholarly studies to date have examined the role that the Hotline played in either the Six-Day War or any other crisis. Therefore, it is unclear whether or not Kosygin and Johnson's appreciative references to the Hotline's usefulness can be justified. To fill this gap, this article analyses the role the Washington-Moscow Hotline played in superpower communications in the Six-Day War. Given the fact that the Soviet Union initiated most Hotline exchanges, and in light of the continuing debate surrounding the Soviet Union's role in the June 1967 crisis, this article focuses on the Soviet use of the Hotline.³ In our efforts to use records of Hotline exchanges to appraise Soviet conduct, we discuss the following issues: how Soviet use of the Hotline corresponded to the original purpose for which the line had been created; how it related to the traditionalist and revisionist understanding of Soviet behaviour in the historiography of the Six-Day War; and, finally, how its use fitted into the USSR's overall diplomatic communication with the United States in the pre-war period (12 May -4 June 1967) and during the war (5-10 June 1967).

The traditionalist understanding of Soviet intentions in the Six-Day War suggests that Soviet use was in harmony with the original intentions for which the MOLINK was created, as Soviet leaders worked to avert crisis escalation and war. This interpretation would support Kosygin and Johnson's perception that the Hotline had been employed in order to diffuse tensions. Meanwhile the revisionist appraisal of the Soviet role in the June 1967 war as interventionist in nature suggests a contrary interpretation. We evaluate Soviet messages on a traditionalist-revisionist-interpretation scale, and show that some of the messages can clearly be classified as fitting with a traditionalist view, albeit with some revisionist elements, while in others elements predominated that fit with a revisionist view. On this basis, we argue that Soviet use of the Hotline points beyond a traditionalist understanding of the USSR's role in the Six-

Day War. We show that the Soviet leadership used the Hotline more creatively than the original purpose behind its creation would suggest, and viewed it as one of many tools – and not necessarily a unique one – in their diplomatic arsenal. We also show that, notwithstanding its many other advantages, the Hotline was and is a poor channel for crisis negotiations, and that its efficacy as a communication tool is compromised if regular diplomatic channels cannot match its speed.

There are three reasons why findings regarding the role of the Hotline in crisis communication are applicable beyond the Cold War. First, relations between Russia and the West today are deteriorating, which could easily precipitate a crisis in which decision-makers would consider reverting to the Hotline. Because the current Russian leadership has a similar mentality to that of the Communist Russian leaders, and shares the latter's visions for their country's role in history,⁴ conclusions drawn from the Cold War period may hold useful lessons for dealing with Russia in the present. Second, the Hotline continued to be used after 1990 and remains a valued diplomatic instrument today.⁵ Finally, findings regarding the Hotline are likely to be applicable beyond the Soviet/Russian-American context – namely to the eight private and bilateral hotlines developed by other states during and since the Cold War.⁶

The Origins and Purpose of the Moscow-Washington Hotline

It was Professor Thomas Schelling and Jess Gorkin – the editor of *Parade* magazine – who, in 1958, first proposed to American government circles that there should be a direct communication link between the Soviet premier and the American president. In 1960, Gorkin had the chance to raise the issue with both Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev and presidential candidate John F. Kennedy. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev expressed interest, and following Kennedy's election, Secretary of State Dean Rusk recommended that the President propose a direct telephone connection to

Khrushchev during the Vienna summit of June 1961. Although no suggestion was made at the summit, in July 1961 the Berlin crisis refocused attention on the idea in the State Department. After Khrushchev privately reaffirmed his interest, the United States formally proposed a leader-to-leader communication link in April 1962, and a draft treaty covering the link was submitted by the Soviet Union at the Geneva disarmament conference in June. However, negotiations stalled until after the Cuban Missile Crisis had proved the vital need for fast and reliable communications between the two heads of state. The United States officially tabled the Hotline proposal in December 1962, and the agreement, which established a teletype connection between Moscow and Washington, was signed in June 1963. Since then, several upgrade agreements have ensured the regular modernization of the Hotline. In 1971 a satellite circuit replaced the more vulnerable telegraph cables, and in 1984, the facility to send graphic images was added. More recently, email, chat and video transmission capabilities have also been added.⁷

The Hotline was a device intended to reduce anxiety and, with it, the risk of triggering nuclear war in emergency situations, by making rapid and reliable leader-to-leader communication possible. It would give leaders the opportunity to share information, signal urgency, communicate their intentions, propose joint action, engage in negotiations, clear up misunderstandings and explain unforeseen, and potentially fatal, events before a crisis could escalate into war. As a confidential channel, it would allow leaders to discuss their differences in private – away from the public eye and the need to produce inflammatory Cold War rhetoric. The direct involvement of principal decision-makers could facilitate the elimination of bureaucratic red tape and bureaucratically compromised outcomes. A written teletype link was chosen over the originally proposed telephone connection, because the latter could easily have increased

– rather than decreased – the risk of war through hasty decisions, emotional outbursts, awkwardly phrased statements and mistranslations. In contrast, teletype was judged to be a cooler medium that would give decision-makers more time to consider their response and the consequences of their words.⁸ However, as we show in this article, the velocity of transmission brought its own problems, because the DCL, in replacing more traditional diplomatic tools, precluded the spending of time on gathering the sort of valuable information that might have been forthcoming through these slower channels.

Despite the popularity of the Hotline as a subject for online, print-magazine and newspaper stories,⁹ it has garnered much less attention from the academic community. Many studies that mention but are not directly concerned with the Hotline devote only a few pages to it,¹⁰ while the few studies that focus exclusively on it are either descriptive or prescriptive in nature.¹¹ Only four articles take a somewhat more analytical approach, but even these fail to provide a focused inquiry into the Hotline's use, as they either lack a well-defined research question,¹² are short of evidence to support their conclusions,¹³ or focus on the symbolism of the Hotline rather than its use.¹⁴

The lack of analytical research may be explained, in part, by the fact that this is not an easy subject to research, with only the Hotline correspondence created during the Six-Day War being readily accessible to scholars. Just one study of the Six-Day War explicitly considers the role of Hotline messages; and this does so by drawing only on the 8 June exchanges about the sinking of the *USS Liberty*.¹⁵ Ginor and Remez explore the significance of Kosygin's 5 June message; and Wehling discusses Kosygin's first messages on both 5 and 10 June; but both are limited to the context of their research themes – Soviet intentions and value tensions, respectively.¹⁶

Interpretations of the Soviet Role in the Six-Day War

Since its appearance as a major player in the Middle East in 1955, the Soviet Union had viewed the region within the framework of a global rivalry with the United States and had sought to challenge American dominance. It soon established a naval force in the Mediterranean and began supplying arms to its Arab allies – Egypt and Syria in particular. In the mid-1960s, the Soviet leadership worked to prevent Israel from building its own nuclear weapon, which was very close to completion in the spring of 1967, and to ensure the security of its most precious ally, Syria.¹⁷

It was the Soviet Union, on 12 May 1967, that provoked the acute crisis when the Politburo transmitted false information to Egypt about an Israeli troop build-up on the Syrian border and expected Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to ‘take the necessary steps’.¹⁸ On 14 May, Nasser evicted the UN’s troops from the Sinai Peninsula and replaced them with Egyptian forces. On 23 May, Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran and, by doing so, the Gulf of Aqaba – a move that Israel deemed an act of war.¹⁹ Israel started the war on 5 June and was the last to honour the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) cease-fire resolutions accepted on 6, 7, and 9 June. While the Israelis were quick to declare their acceptance of the cease-fire resolutions after their passage, they failed to comply with them until 10 June – after they had occupied the West Bank, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula.

Soviet intentions and behaviour during the June crisis of 1967 are the subject of disagreement among the small number of scholars who explicitly study the role of the Soviet Union in the otherwise substantial literature on the Six-Day War.²⁰ It is impossible to say who is right, as contradictions in Soviet behaviour provide partial (documentary) support for both traditionalist and revisionist accounts.²¹ Additionally, the treatment of sources and the conclusions drawn from them remain problematic

across the literature, and it is unclear whether any (re-)opening of Russian archives in the future could provide scholars with decisive documentary evidence.²² Such material may not exist;²³ or, if available, it may be unreliable, since the Soviet leadership sometimes wrote documents with an eye toward the future or as *ex post* justification.²⁴

The literature explicitly dealing with the role of the Soviets in the Six-Day War is best conceptualised on a scale running between classical traditionalist and revisionist views. Traditionalists insist that the Soviet Union had peaceful intentions throughout the crisis,²⁵ while revisionists argue that the Soviet Union's original intention was to engineer an all-out confrontation and provide limited military support for the Arab states.²⁶ Other views fall between these two extremes: some scholars support a mainly traditionalist argument for peaceful Soviet intentions, but note inconsistencies in Soviet behaviour, which they blame on the Soviets' mistakes and miscalculations, or on reckless behaviour.²⁷ The rest of the literature views Soviet behaviour in a more sinister light. These scholars contend that, while the Soviet Union did not want war, it intentionally created an international crisis to increase Soviet influence in the Arab world, and/or to create tension points around the world for the United States.²⁸

Similar disagreements surround the question of Soviet knowledge of, and support for, Egyptian actions (i.e., Egypt's eviction of UN peacekeepers and the closure of the Straits) and the exact date when the Soviet Union actively started to work for peace. For instance, Ro'i and Morozov, and Govrin, and Popp argue that the Soviet Union had no prior knowledge of, and did not support, Egypt's actions.²⁹ Bar-Zohar and Oren, on the other hand, contend that the USSR supported the removal of UN peacekeepers but not the closing of the Straits.³⁰ Finally, Ginor and Remez assert that the Soviets knew of, and supported, both Egyptian actions.³¹ Concerning Soviet intentions, the traditionalist view holds that the Soviet Union worked for peace from the

moment when the crisis erupted.³² Revisionists, however, whilst agreeing that the Soviet Union started to work for peace on 5 June, in order to prevent a superpower confrontation,³³ contend that it did so only with reluctance, and that it rekindled plans for intervention after Israel started a ground war against Syria on 9 June.³⁴ Other scholars assert that the Soviet Union first reaped the harvest of Nasser's moves early in the crisis, and propose various dates in between as the starting point for Soviet peace efforts.³⁵

The debate concerning the locating of Soviet actions on the traditionalist-revisionist-interpretation scale is important for this article, because each view leads to different expectations regarding the Hotline's use. If, as traditionalists argue, the Soviet Union worked for peace throughout the crisis, we would expect that, at a minimum, the Soviet Union would have used all diplomatic channels of communication with the United States to lessen tensions from 28 May on. Thus, we would hypothesise that the Soviet leadership used the Hotline in accordance with its original purpose as an emergency crisis instrument, and treated it as a rare and precious channel through which urgent and constructive messages could be sent in order to prevent the further aggravation of tensions.

Revisionist accounts lead us to anticipate just the opposite. That is, if the Soviet Union was working toward creating tension, we would expect that the Hotline either remained silent despite the threat of Soviet-American confrontation or was employed in a superficial manner. In other words, a revisionist perspective would hypothesise that during this period the use, or lack thereof, of the Hotline was contradictory to the purpose for which it was created. Hence our analysis, and the remainder of the discussion, focuses on Soviet Hotline messages and situates them at a point on the traditionalist-revisionist scale. By applying this focus, we should be able to answer the

key question of whether Soviet actions were in line with what is now a classically traditionalist view, supported a classically revisionist view, or fell somewhere in between. In the following section, we compare Soviet messages sent during the Six-Day War to the original conceptualisation of the Hotline's purpose by analysing their content, tone, cordiality, and urgency.

The Hotline and Superpower Relations in the Crisis of June 1967

Six-Day War Correspondence via the Hotline

The Six-Day War was the first of 11 known episodes during which either the Soviet or the American side resorted to the use of the Hotline during the Cold War. Premier Kosygin and President Johnson exchanged 19 messages between 5 June and 10 June 1967. One additional message, which was the retransmission of a telegram from US Secretary of State Rusk to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, was sent via the Hotline on 5 June.³⁶ The Soviets initiated the dialogue in all instances except the *Liberty* incident of 8 June. The correspondence entailed short messages, with none exceeding 500 words. In general, the Soviet side was more economical with words, with the average length of their messages being 99 words (in Russian) as opposed to an average length of American messages of 167 words (in English).

Very little is known about the origins of the Soviet messages. However, given the strongly collective nature of the Soviet leadership at the time, and the seriousness of the occasion, it can be safely assumed that most – perhaps all – of the messages were the product of Politburo deliberation. The fact that the Politburo, which was the highest decision-making body in the Soviet Union, was in session throughout the six days of the war also supports such a conclusion. Thus, while the style and length of American messages reflected Johnson's energetic, verbose and outgoing personality, the Soviet

messages were less personal products, even if they fitted well with Premier Kosygin's dour and pragmatic style.³⁷

The Hotline Remains Silent (12 May-4 June 1967)

As revisionists would expect, the Hotline remained silent between 12 May and 4 June despite the continuing deterioration of the situation. Certainly, after 28 May, this silence did not indicate a lack of need for more direct communication between the superpowers to prevent war. However, it was consistent with the generally uncooperative Soviet behaviour of the period: the Soviet Union rejected every opportunity for negotiations,³⁸ and seemed only to work toward preventing the United States from intervening, rather than toward stopping the war.³⁹

During this period, only weak evidence, in the form of Soviet promises to uphold the peace, supports a traditionalist perspective. Only after Nasser's decision to blockade the Straits of Tiran did Kosygin and Johnson exchange messages. However, their 27-28 May 1967 correspondence took place via regular diplomatic channels, and was no more constructive than lower-level diplomatic exchanges had already been. Soviet diplomatic behaviour, including Kosygin's 27 May letter,⁴⁰ was reactive in nature. The American – not the Soviet – side, both in Moscow and Washington, initiated the dialogue for peace (see table 1). The Soviet response was limited to assurances of peaceful Soviet intentions, as was the case on 18 May at a meeting between Soviet Chargé d'Affaires Yuri Chernyakov and US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow in Washington,⁴¹ and at a luncheon between US Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in Moscow the next day.⁴² In the United Nations, Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Fedorenko belittled the seriousness of the Middle Eastern crisis by questioning whether there was any need for the UNSC to meet, and by stalling all efforts to lift the blockade.⁴³

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

As the crisis went on, Soviet behaviour overwhelmingly confirmed the revisionist view of the Hotline's use. The Soviet responses, including Kosygin's 27 May letter to Johnson, became more bellicose in tone – not more cooperative. On 23 May, Gromyko was uncooperative, simply repeating the Soviet commitment to peace, blaming Israel for the tense situation, implying American-Israeli collusion, and criticizing American timidity in restraining Israel.⁴⁴ On 24 May, Embassy employee and KGB officer Boris Sedov threatened US Deputy Undersecretary of State Raymond Garthoff with Soviet entry into the action if the United States intervened militarily.⁴⁵ Kosygin's 27 May letter fits this revisionist pattern, complicity in Israel's actions and warning that Soviet restraint would not continue if the interests of the Arab states were seen to suffer.⁴⁶ He also invoked the possibility of a war that might lead to a 'larger event'.⁴⁷ On 28 May, President Johnson's plea to Kosygin for parallel action, and Secretary Rusk's appeal to Gromyko for joint action, were not answered.⁴⁸ Diplomatic channels between Moscow and Washington remained quiet until 5 June, despite the growing threat of war. Failing to make use of the Hotline in a swiftly deteriorating situation ran contrary to the original purpose behind the creation of this communication device and, thus, validated revisionist interpretations.

Calculated First Use (5 June)

The beginning of the war, at around 9:45⁴⁹ on the morning of 5 June 1967, resulted in the intensification of Soviet-American communication at all levels (see table 1). Both superpowers appear to have decided independently to contact the other side early in the war, but it was the Kremlin that initiated dialogue through the DCL. Invoking the Hotline in a time of crisis was in harmony with the original intent behind the creation of

this communication channel as an emergency instrument, and thus confirms the traditionalist narrative. Nonetheless, we argue that the Soviets' first use of the Hotline falls closer to the revisionist end of our scale because this usage lacked the urgency that an emergency situation should have required⁵⁰ and did not possess the clarity that a meaningful peace initiative would necessitate. Indeed, the Hotline's use in this first message remains an enigma unless it was, as a revisionist view would suggest, a pre-planned initiative to mask other intentions rather than a response to an American action.

The tone of the message contained none of the urgency that an emergency situation would have warranted. Kosygin's inaugural Hotline message did not refer to any possible misunderstanding between the two parties; nor did it supply crucial information that the United States should have been made aware of. In fact, there was nothing in Kosygin's message that would have been too late had it been transmitted with a few hours' delay through regular diplomatic channels. Furthermore, the vagueness of the message causes us to question the extent to which the Soviet Union was ready to work for peace, especially in the short term. Unlike the first American message from Rusk to Gromyko after the outbreak of the Six-Day War,⁵¹ which had suggested concrete steps to be taken, Kosygin's missive contained only a general desire to end the military conflict and a hint that peace should result from American pressure on Israel. It contained no specific references to any role the Soviet Union might intend to play in achieving peace.⁵²

The Soviet public statement, which was issued on the evening of 5 June and used much stronger language, supported the more revisionist interpretation. The statement repeated the general Soviet commitment to peace, and contained the first Soviet reference to the United Nations, demanding that the UN should condemn Israel and take the necessary steps to restore peace. As in the case of Kosygin's Hotline

message, this public address failed to specify the Soviet role in the peace process or to invoke a spirit of cooperation. Instead, the statement repeated Kosygin's subtle threat of independent Soviet action if necessary.⁵³ This was in stark contrast with Rusk's telegram to Gromyko and Johnson's reply to Kosygin via the Hotline on the same day, both of which were constructive and suggested that a solution be sought through negotiations in the UNSC.⁵⁴

Several other factors point to the conclusion that Soviet use of the Hotline on 5 June represented a step already calculated, and the Politburo, which convened at noon on 5 June for an emergency session, only approved a pre-existing plan. Perhaps, as revisionists argue, this use was part of a larger ploy to buy time for the Arab states who, the Politburo believed, could win the war only if it was allowed to be fought to a conclusion.⁵⁵ Kosygin had personally checked the Hotline machine and asked about its operational details before the eruption of the war, saying that the line might be needed soon.⁵⁶ Additionally, the Soviets had received detailed intelligence about the projected start of the war,⁵⁷ which would have made the preparation of a message in advance possible. Drafting written documents some time before their promulgation was common practice in Moscow: for example, the Soviet public statement intended for 23 May 1967 had been drafted and distributed several days ahead of time.⁵⁸ Moreover, government-controlled Soviet media also broadcast reports on 5 June that we know had been written before the fighting began.⁵⁹ Finally, there is evidence that at first Ambassador Fedorenko received no new instructions after the outbreak of the war; and later, during the night of 5-6 June, the new instructions he did receive from Moscow had a wait-and-see tone and did not substantially differ from previous instructions.⁶⁰ Taken together, the above evidence suggests that Moscow was playing for time and, accordingly, that the Hotline message was intended as a diversion.

The pre-drafting of Kosygin's Hotline message would explain what we now see as its historical inconsistencies, and a lack of urgency in its language which was in sharp contrast with both the behaviour of some of the Soviet leadership and the battlefield misfortunes of Soviet allies.⁶¹ Despite the general battle fog,⁶² the Politburo, at the very least, must have been aware of the earliest developments by 15:45, when the Hotline message was sent. At 10:15, the Soviet embassy in Cairo certainly knew that the Egyptian Air Force and the largest Egyptian air base had been destroyed.⁶³ Moreover, the fact that the later Hotline message only referred to the fighting between Israel and Egypt (even though Syria – the apple of Moscow's eye – and Jordan had also been involved, and heavily outgunned, in the fighting for hours by the time the message was sent) also points toward the conclusion that the message was drafted before the war started.⁶⁴

Furthermore, Soviet first contact over the Hotline was an independent initiative, not triggered by Rusk's letter to Gromyko earlier in the day, which serves as additional evidence for the message being pre-planned.⁶⁵ First, Kosygin's Hotline message of 5 June failed to acknowledge or reflect in any way the content of the lower-level American communication. Second, the American Embassy in Moscow received the cable with Rusk's message at 13:25. The trio of Kosygin, Gromyko, and KGB chief Yuri Andropov left the Politburo session at 14:00 to proceed to the Hotline equipment in the basement of the new government communication centre.⁶⁶ This would not have left enough time for U.S. Chargé John Guthrie to relay Rusk's message to the Soviets *and* for the Politburo to draft a reply. It is unclear whether Guthrie delivered the message before or after the first Soviet Hotline message was sent at 15:45; but even if Guthrie met Gromyko before 15:45, the American missive had no effect on the Soviet position. At their meeting, Gromyko used the same language as the Hotline message

and did not respond to Rusk's proposal to work through the UN⁶⁷ – which also suggests a pre-planned and concerted effort on the Soviet side.

Fumbling for Peace (6 June)

It is changes in their behaviour from 6 June onward that seem to suggest an interest in peace by the Soviets and an intention to use the Hotline with the objective that traditionalists have attributed to them. However, the Hotline could only partially fulfil its role in alleviating tensions (or stopping the war), because Soviet responsiveness was seriously hindered by time difference, possible misunderstandings between the Foreign Ministry in Moscow and diplomats in New York and, more importantly, the inability of Soviet diplomatic communication to match the Hotline in speed.⁶⁸

Once again, it was Premier Kosygin who contacted President Johnson on the Hotline. However, this time his message clearly conveyed a sense of alarm and the sort of unmistakable negotiating position that could justify the traditionalist perspective. The Soviet message was curt, even taking into account the directness of the Russian language. Kosygin started his text with expressing his apprehension that 'military activities in the near east continue, moreover their scope is spreading'.⁶⁹ Then he accepted the UNSC as the place for negotiations and clearly stated the Soviet conditions for peace: immediate cease-fire and withdrawal behind the armistice lines. However, the brisk tone and timing of this 6 June message caution against a wholeheartedly traditionalist interpretation. Although the message was not sent until 13:34 (Moscow time), it reached President Johnson at dawn (EST), inconveniencing the President more than Kosygin's 5 June Hotline message, which had been sent two hours later in the day.

Unfortunately, Kosygin's Hotline message and Johnson's rather agitated reply five hours later, in which he vented his frustration, were not helpful in facilitating negotiations. The President expressed 'disappointment that the UN Security Council

lost a full day yesterday' and he 'was puzzled [...] by what has been said in the Soviet press', for 'it does not help to charge the United States as a participant in aggression.'⁷⁰ Finally, he made it clear that free passage through the Strait of Tiran was crucial for the United States. Thus the Johnson-Kosygin exchange on 6 June only echoed the negotiating impasse that Ambassadors Nicolai Fedorenko and Arthur Goldberg had arrived at in New York five hours earlier.⁷¹

The seemingly heavy-handed Soviet approach was rooted in a time difference between the two powers that did not favour the USSR, and in the slow workings of the Soviet diplomatic corps. The decision about the contents of Kosygin's letter had been made during the previous night, presumably at the Politburo session that had ended at 3 am.⁷² Indeed, when American Chargé Guthrie met Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasili Kuznetsov at noon on 6 June – an hour and a half before Kosygin's message was actually transmitted – Kuznetsov referred to Kosygin's message to support a cease-fire and withdrawal formula as if the message had already been sent 'last night', that is the night of 5 June.⁷³ When the impasse became clear in New York at around 22:00 (EST) on 5 June, Ambassador Fedorenko requested a break to consult with his government. However, it was already past 6 a.m. (6 June) in Moscow; the decision about the content of Kosygin's message had already been made; and the Politburo had already retired.⁷⁴ Nonetheless, ten hours passed between the Politburo decision and the sending of Kosygin's message, which seems inexplicable⁷⁵ if we do not allow for the Politburo's inflexibility and the ponderous nature of the Soviet government machinery in general. It may also indicate a misunderstanding between Fedorenko and top decision-makers in Moscow,⁷⁶ which would reinforce traditionalist arguments that attribute inconsistencies in Soviet behaviour to mistakes.

In addition, Johnson's reply reached Moscow too late (at 18:43) to make any difference in the Soviet negotiating position in the UN, as Ambassadors Goldberg and Fedorenko had been meeting since 18:00 (10:00 EST). Thus, it was Goldberg who relayed the contents of Johnson's reply to Fedorenko. The Soviet side could only meaningfully negotiate at the UN on the afternoon of 6 June, after urgency prompted Moscow to ignore some security precautions in its communications with the Soviet mission in New York. Around the same time (or shortly afterwards) Johnson's reply to Kosygin's message was received, and in an 'extraordinary occurrence', Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semyonov called New York on an open line to say that new instructions were being drafted and a meeting with Goldberg should be arranged immediately after receiving them.⁷⁷ These new orders, signed by Gromyko, directed Fedorenko to accept Goldberg's offer of a cease-fire and withdrawal behind the 18 May 1967 borders or, if this was not possible, to agree to a simple cease-fire resolution even in the face of Arab opposition.⁷⁸ After a short negotiation, the parties agreed to a simple cease-fire resolution and promised that the idea of withdrawal would be explored further. Fedorenko confirmed Moscow's approval of the draft at 17:15 EST (1:15 on 7 June in Moscow).⁷⁹

Somewhat extraordinarily, 45 minutes later, Kosygin also contacted Johnson on the Hotline to inform him, curtly, of Soviet acceptance of the agreement. This was well into the night in Moscow; and while transmitting mutually beneficial information would have been an exemplary use of the Hotline, Kosygin only told the President what he already knew.⁸⁰ We can only speculate as to why Kosygin found it important to bring in the Hotline and send this seemingly redundant message. One possible explanation is that he may have mistakenly projected his own communication problems onto the American side. Another is that he intended to emphasise the importance that the Soviet

side attached to the agreement. Both of these alternative explanations support traditionalist expectations of the Hotline's use, but they involve different functions of the device. The former exemplifies the Hotline's information-sharing role, while the latter embodies its symbolic value as a channel of good will and dialogue in times of danger.

Soviet reaction to Johnson's sharply-worded Hotline response, which Moscow received around noon, not only demonstrates a nearly immaculate textbook use of the Hotline, but also played a decidedly more constructive role in lessening tensions. In his reply to Kosygin's first message of 6 June, the President, in addition to setting out the American negotiating position, repeated complaints that the United States had already conveyed through regular diplomatic channels to little effect. President Johnson objected to Soviet media reports about American participation in the war. Knowing that the Sixth Fleet was deliberately being kept far from the war zone in order to avoid its getting drawn into the war, Johnson point blank suggested that Kosygin should check his facts since 'you know where our carriers are'.⁸¹ While Kuznetsov had already told Guthrie that not everything that appeared in *Izvestija* was the official position of the Soviet government,⁸² Johnson's complaint, delivered via the Hotline, was taken more seriously in Moscow. Even though Kosygin personally never believed Nasser's accusations of American participation in the war,⁸³ an enquiry was launched among Soviet ships in the Mediterranean as to whether American planes had participated in the fighting against Egypt. The answer was negative, confirming the American side of the story, and the charges disappeared from Soviet media thereafter.⁸⁴

Kosygin's move would have been more constructive had he also used the Hotline to inform his American counterpart of the results of this enquiry, thereby removing the Americans' uncertainty about Soviet beliefs in this regard, although at the

same time giving up a small bargaining advantage in an otherwise unfavourable situation. However, given the Soviet leadership's failure to disown these beliefs, the Americans continued to exert considerable effort to counter accusations of participation, both in the UN and through the American Embassy in Moscow.⁸⁵ The issue also remained an item in the Kosygin-Johnson Hotline correspondence: President Johnson returned to the subject on 7 June, pointing out the damage the accusations had caused. 'The wholly false reports and invented charges', he wrote, 'resulted in mob action against American embassies and a break in Diplomatic Relations by seven Arab countries'.⁸⁶

Textbook Use (7-9 June)

Between 7 June and 9 June 1967, Soviet leaders may still have privately entertained the idea of military action.⁸⁷ Nonetheless, in line with traditionalist expectations, they used the Hotline for its intended purpose: sharing information, preventing misunderstanding, and lessening tensions. Soviet-American dialogue continued at all levels – at the UN, in Washington and Moscow, and, of course, via the Hotline. The two leaders sent one Hotline message each on 7 June; and five messages were exchanged on 8 June. The Direct Communication Link remained silent on 9 June.

While Ambassador Fedorenko at the UN took the initiatives necessary to end hostilities, refine cease-fire conditions and achieve a withdrawal resolution,⁸⁸ Kosygin's Hotline messages served a different purpose: to convey Soviet thinking. Premier Kosygin's message of 7 June kept President Johnson informed about the Soviet position and expressed a desire to 'take effective measures' toward peace.⁸⁹ To this end, as Kosygin wrote in a more sharply worded Hotline message, the Soviet Union had requested that the UNSC reconvene on 8 June. This request most likely reflected Soviet dismay at advances made on the battlefield by Israel and the latter's failure to comply

with the terms of the cease-fire that had been agreed. Kosygin's message voiced Soviet intentions to work not only for a cease-fire but also for withdrawal. In response, the Americans shared with their Soviet counterparts what they knew and pointed to missing information with regard to compliance with the cease-fire.⁹⁰

Cooperative behaviour was most evident on 8 June in connection with the sinking of the *USS Liberty* in the Mediterranean. Premier Kosygin first learned of the incident via the Hotline after President Johnson initiated a Hotline conversation for the first time.⁹¹ This American move, supplemented with parallel efforts to inform the Soviet side through embassies in Washington and Moscow, impressed the Soviet leadership.⁹² They reciprocated American good will by voluntarily transmitting the information received via the Hotline to Egypt. Moreover, this time Kosygin also informed Johnson of Soviet actions in this regard.⁹³

Nonetheless, and contrary to the intent of the Hotline's creation, the largely cooperative spirit of 7-9 June was punctuated by distrust and competition. Neither Kosygin nor Johnson missed an opportunity to blame the other's allies, or to imply that the other superpower should work harder for peace.⁹⁴ Similarly, in the UN, Fedorenko outmanoeuvred Goldberg by introducing the 7 June resolution to set a deadline for a cease-fire without the customary bilateral consultations, and only apologised the next day in the face of American protest.⁹⁵

Going for Broke (10 June)

On 10 June, Kosygin proved again that the DCL was not above common diplomatic tactics when he issued an ultimatum, further aggravating superpower relations and increasing the chances of (accidental) confrontations between Moscow and Washington.⁹⁶ This use of the Hotline fits with revisionist interpretations. Regardless of whether the Soviet ultimatum was intended as a first step toward (limited) intervention

or as a desperate gamble to protect Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, the high-risk strategy exacerbated the situation instead of lessening tensions. While the Soviet gamble paid off, saving Soviet allies from further destruction and humiliation and resulting in the end of fighting, this outcome was primarily the result of level-headed reaction by American decision-makers.

All things considered, Kosygin's ultimatum was not entirely surprising. First, the Soviet position had already begun hardening the evening before. On the evening of 9 June, the Soviets made a public statement that 'the Socialist states would do everything necessary to help the Arab countries if Israel did not withdraw from the gained territories'.⁹⁷ The USSR was effectively issuing a veiled threat. Second, Soviet behaviour had also hardened before Kosygin's Hotline message: two hours earlier the Soviet Union had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel.⁹⁸ Not only was Kosygin's first Hotline message of 10 June in stark contrast to the cordial language of his messages in connection with the *Liberty* incident two days earlier, but the sharpness of his words surpassed even that of the 9 June public statement, and expressed a position that accords with the revisionist interpretation. In a message that revealed urgency, he talked of 'a very crucial moment that has now arrived', which in the absence of the cessation of hostilities would 'force us [...] to adopt an independent decision' that threatened to bring the superpowers 'into a clash, which may lead to a grave catastrophe'. He finished his message with a direct and not necessarily empty threat: if the U.S. failed to make Israel honour the ceasefire agreement, Kosygin wrote, the Soviet Union would take all necessary actions, 'including military'.⁹⁹

The change in Soviet behaviour which was reflected in the tone and content of Kosygin's message arose from intense arguments within the Soviet leadership about how best to defend Syria from Israeli invasion.¹⁰⁰ This message was followed up with

lower level inquiries, with KGB officer Sedov being instructed to informally sound out Deputy Undersecretary Garthoff about the possible consequences of Soviet intervention. In the event, a lunch meeting between Sedov and Garthoff happened too late to make a difference to the unfolding of developments;¹⁰¹ but this incident reveals a troubling aspect of Hotline diplomacy. The speed of the Hotline deprives decision-makers of information collected through slower channels which may make a valuable input into their decisions. Had the Kosygin-Johnson exchange turned sour in the morning, Sedov's information about American resolve in the event of Soviet intervention would have come too late to make a difference and dampen tempers on the Soviet side.

Nonetheless, Kosygin's message did not irrevocably commit the Soviets to a military solution. Rather, it left the door open for cooperation, as evidenced by the fact that he finished his message by asking for Johnson's views. This helped maintain a dialogue with the United States and resulted in the frantic exchange of six Hotline messages in little more than three hours.¹⁰² Although the correspondence was quite brusque, the U.S. issued no counter threats.¹⁰³ Instead, the American messages attempted to pacify Moscow by revealing that Israel had already accepted the cease-fire, was about to stop fighting, and had no intention of occupying Damascus. The latter was a worrying possibility that had arisen from the Israeli invasion of the Golan Heights on 9 June, and which Kosygin had referred to explicitly in his second message of 10 June.¹⁰⁴ Finally, Kosygin strengthened the atmosphere of cooperation when he responded positively to an American request for help in reaching Syria,¹⁰⁵ where the United States no longer had an embassy. After an additional American appeal in which Johnson asked him to verbally 'confirm that you have employed your means with the Syrians',¹⁰⁶ Kosygin assured the President via the Hotline that 'on my instructions, we have just communicated with Damascus'.¹⁰⁷

As military action wound down and tensions eased, the superpowers worked to re-establish the original purpose of the Hotline as a forum for cooperative communication. In their final messages, both Kosygin and Johnson struck a more friendly tone and expressed a desire for post-war cooperation. In contrast to the vagueness of the 5 June Soviet message, this time Kosygin's message also outlined the details of the Soviet negotiating position for a post-war settlement: Israeli evacuation of the occupied territories and the warring parties' return behind the pre-war border.¹⁰⁸ However, with the conclusion of the acute phase of the crisis, and in accordance with what would be traditionalist expectations with regard to the Hotline's use, it was to be four years before the Moscow-Washington Hotline was once again employed—at the start of another international crisis. Instead, Soviet-American dialogue in general, and, in particular, negotiations over UNSC Resolution 242 establishing the principles meant to guide future negotiations for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, continued through lower-level diplomatic channels.

Conclusion

We can only partially substantiate President Johnson's claim that the MOLINK was used to 'alleviate tensions' in the Six-Day War. The Soviet Union did not use the Hotline before 5 June, when it would have been prudent to do so; and it then used the device between 5 and 10 June for a variety of purposes that fit the interpretations of both the traditionalists and the revisionists. The Hotline gave Moscow the means to transmit important information to their American counterparts, to obscure Soviet intentions, to gain time, to express negotiating positions, to assign responsibility, and to threaten military intervention. Soviet leaders sometimes used one message for several purposes, thus providing evidence for both traditionalist and revisionist interpretations. Nonetheless, most Soviet Hotline messages predominantly support either a traditionalist

interpretation, such as the Soviet response to American messages with regard to the sinking of the *Liberty* on 8 June, or a revisionist interpretation, such as Kosygin's 5 June message. It is important to note that, contrary to our original expectations, uses of the Hotline that fit a traditionalist or a revisionist interpretation do not correspond perfectly to histories of the Soviet role in the Six-Day War as written from a traditionalist or a revisionist point of view. Kosygin's Hotline ultimatum of 10 June was reckless, and therefore supports a revisionist interpretation, regardless of whether the Soviet threat was empty or real. This also suggests that it may be more important to study the *implications* of Soviet behaviour than to decipher Soviet intentions, about which it is difficult to say anything conclusive in the absence of available and reliable Soviet archival material.

Overall, evidence discussed in this article leads to the conclusion that, in the June War of 1967, Moscow viewed the Hotline as one of many diplomatic means it could choose from and did not assign it any special significance. This interpretation is supported by Premier Kosygin's rejection of President Johnson's suggestion of yearly summits in Glassboro: he rejected the idea on the grounds that Johnson could use the Hotline whenever he wanted to talk to him – and not just in crises.¹⁰⁹ Even such a temporary devaluation of the Hotline is troubling, because it undermines the device's symbolic value as a top-level channel of good will in emergencies. This renders the contribution of the Hotline questionable once its other advantage, speed, is lost due to technological developments. In time, communication within both superpowers' diplomatic corps would match the speed of the Hotline. Perhaps Kosygin and Johnson intuitively grasped this problem when they attempted to restore the value of the Hotline through more friendly exchanges as the crisis was winding down on 10 June.

Nevertheless, at the time of the Six-Day War, communication between Moscow and its New York mission still lagged considerably behind events. In fact, miscommunication between Moscow and New York on 6 June suggests that equally swift communication within states' diplomatic corps is essential if the advantages of fast-spaced communication between heads of state are to be reaped. This is particularly problematic for political systems that do not, as the Soviet one did not, reward or encourage individual initiative – a quality that could compensate for the inadequate speed of diplomatic communication.

Recourse to communication through the DCL also raises several additional concerns about the practicality of the Hotline as a diplomatic tool. First, the Soviet Union had to grapple with the disadvantages of geographic distance and time difference. Second, as the Sedov-Garthoff lunch on 10 June demonstrates, some traditional but usually fruitful techniques of information gathering can never match the speed of hotlines, and this may rob decision-makers of vital information. Fast-spaced communication through the MOLINK is problematic not only for the superpowers, but also for their allies, because speedy discussions between the former may deny the latter a right to consultation and consent over matters that directly concern their fate. Finally, hotlines remain inadequate channels for direct negotiations. Instantaneous heads-of-state exchanges are a cumbersome negotiating method as long as they take the form of written communication. Using telephone capabilities and the video link that the Hotline is now equipped with would solve this issue, but it would raise other issues such as the problem of deniability and the danger of miscommunication. Thus, as the Fedorenko and Goldberg negotiations at the UN in 1967 demonstrate, an additional – less high-profile – negotiating channel remains necessary.

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Notes

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32. Govrin, *Israeli-Soviet Relations*; Ro'i and Morozov, *Soviet Union*; Popp, 'Stumbling Decidedly'.
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39. Govrin, *Israeli-Soviet Relations*, 318; Suri, 'American Perceptions of the Soviet Threat before and during the Six Day War', in Ro'i and Morozov, *Soviet Union*,

111. Of its own allies, the Soviet Union restrained only Egypt, but did not ask Cairo to refrain from closing the Gulf – an act that Israel had stated would be a *casus belli* – or to retract the decision once made. Nor did it ask Egypt to rescind its declaration of war on Israel. See Oren, *Six Days*, 117-8; Dumbrell, *President Johnson*, 217, 157; Herbert Druks, *The Uncertain Alliance. The U.S. and Israel from Kennedy to the Peace Process* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 32, 37; Ro'i, 'Soviet Policy', in Ro'i and Morozov, *Soviet Union*, 11, 22; Morozov, 'Outbreak' in Ro'i and Morozov, *Soviet Union*; Anwar Sadat, *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 173; Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats*, 119-120; Wehling, *Irresolute Princes*, 57; Wawro, *Quicksand*, 266; Govrin, *Israeli-Soviet Relations*, 275, 308, 312).
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47. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, doc. 84. Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 150-60; Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats*, 2007, 118-9.

48. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, docs 88, 90; U.S. Department of State, ‘Chronology’.
49. We use Moscow time throughout the article unless otherwise indicated.
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60. Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, 133.
61. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, doc. 156; Vremya, ‘Forty Years’; Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats*, 162. Cf. Wawro, *Quicksand*, 271; Jeremi Suri,

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62. See, for example, Bar-Zohar, *Embassies*, 211; Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats*, 148; Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, 133.
63. Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats*, 158.
64. Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats*, 158. We cannot entirely exclude the possibility that the Soviet Union did not know about the involvement of Jordan and Syria or about their early battlefield losses, and that it had difficulty in keeping up with the evolution of the war. See Bar-Zohar, *Embassies*, 211; Oren, *Six Days*, 251. If this was true, it would accentuate our argument below that quick and reliable means of communication between heads of state without similarly prompt exchanges of information within their diplomatic corps would result in suboptimal use of the DCL.
65. Cf. Dumbrell, *President Johnson*, 159; Suri, ‘American Perceptions’, in Ro’i and Morozov, *Soviet Union*, 113.
66. Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats*, 162; *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, doc. 157, n2.
67. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, doc. 157; U.S. Department of State, ‘Chronology’.
68. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, doc. 245; Memo for W. W. Rostow, The Situation in New York – Tuesday, 6 June, 1:15 p.m., folder Middle East Crisis 12 May-19 June 1967, box 18, NSC Histories, NSF, LBJ Presidential Library.
69. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, doc. 173.
70. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, doc. 175.

71. Telegram, New York to Department of State, 6 June 1967, 3:56 a.m., folder Middle East Crisis 12 May-19 June 1967, vol. 8, box 20, NSC Histories, NSF, LBJ Presidential Library; Bar-Zohar, *Embassies*, 229; Oren, *Six Days*, 202; Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, 134.
72. Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats*, 169-70.
73. Telegram, Moscow to the Secretary of State, 6 June 1967, 8:06 a.m., folder Middle East Crisis 12 May-19 June 1967, vol. 15, box 23, NSC Histories, NSF, LBJ Presidential Library
74. Telegram, New York to Department of State, 6 June 1967, 3:56 a.m.; Bar-Zohar, *Embassies*, 229; Oren, *Six Days*, 235.
75. We can only speculate that the Soviet Union might not have wanted to give the United States a negotiating advantage by transmitting the message from Moscow during the night (late evening in Washington).
76. Oren, *Six Days*, 235; Bar-Zohar, *Embassies*, 221.
77. Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, 134.
78. Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, 134-5; Oren, *Six Days*, 235; Ro'i, 'Soviet Policy', in Ro'i and Morozov, *Soviet Union*, 17.
79. *FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, doc. 181; Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, 135.
80. *FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, doc. 182; cf. Bar-Zohar, *Embassies*, 229.
81. *FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, doc. 175; Johnson, *Lyndon Johnson*, 51, Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats*, 166, Suri, 'American Perceptions' in Ro'i and Morozov, *Soviet Union*, 114.
82. Telegram, Moscow to the Secretary of State, 6 June 1967, 8:06 a.m.

83. Letter, Walt Rostow to the President, 8 June 1967, folder Middle East Crisis 12
May-19 June 1967, vol. 3, box 18, NSC Histories, NSF, LBJ Presidential Library;
Oren, *Six Days*, 251
84. Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats*, 166-7.
85. Letter, Walt Rostow to the President, 8 June 1967; Telegram, Moscow to
Department of State, 10 June 1967, folder Russia, Box 8, Files of the Special
Committee of the NSC, NSF, LBJ Presidential Library; UNSC, '1350th Meeting: 7
June 1967', S/PV.1350 (OR),
<http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/4E9EC148CA7E94B20525672B0057AAC>
2 (accessed 31 January 2013).
86. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, doc. 193.
87. Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats*, 164-78.
88. 'UNSC Resolutions 234, 235',
<http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/1967.shtml> (accessed 12 January
2013).
89. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, doc. 188.
90. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, docs. 193, 213.
91. Dumbrell, *President Johnson*, 160; *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*,
doc. 212.
92. Telegram, Department of State to Moscow, 8 June 1967, 11:36 a.m., folder USSR,
box 8, Files of the Special Committee of the NSC, NSF, LBJ Presidential Library;
FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis, doc. 245).
93. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, doc. 216.
94. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, docs. 188, 193, 209, 213.

95. Telegram, UN Mission to Department of State, 8 June, 9:51 a.m., folder Middle East Crisis 12 May-19 June 1967, vol. 8, box, 20, NSC Histories, NSF, LBJ Presidential Library.
96. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, doc. 243; Wehling, *Irresolute Princes*, 50-61.
97. Ro'i, 'Soviet Policy', in Ro'i and Morozov, *Soviet Union*, 19; Johnson, *Lyndon Johnson*, 51; *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, doc. 241.
98. More traditional accounts of the war explain the Soviet retreat after Kosygin's threatening 10 June message as being the result of a compromise solution in which more belligerent Politburo members dropped demands for Soviet intervention and a possible confrontation with the United States in exchange for a diplomatic break with Israel. See Dumbrell, *President Johnson*, 160; Oren, *Six Days*, 252, 297-8. While there may have been disagreement within the Politburo about the best course of action, events actually happened in reverse order: first the Soviet Union broke off diplomatic relations with Israel; then it sent its threatening Hotline message to Washington. See Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats*, 198-9.
99. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, doc. 243, Wehling, *Irresolute Princes*, 65-6, Suri, 'American Perceptions', in Ro'i and Morozov, *Soviet Union*, 117; Dumbrell, *President Johnson*, 160-2.
100. Govrin, *Israeli-Soviet Relations*; Wehling, *Irresolute Princes*, 50-1.
101. Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats*, 200-1.
102. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, docs. 243, 247, 246, 252, 254, 255.
103. Oren, *Six Days*, 298. Some historians credit the Americans' non-verbal threat to order the Sixth Fleet closer to the conflict zone with making the Soviets back down.

See, for example, Bar-Zohar, *Embassies*, 218; Oren, *Six Days*. In reality, operational orders went out too late to make a difference. Isabelle Ginor and Gideon Remez, 'Too Little, Too Late: The CIA and US Counteraction of the Soviet Initiative in the Six-Day War, 1967', *Intelligence and National Security* 26 no. 2-3 (2011): 306.

104. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, doc. 247.

105. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, doc. 246.

106. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, doc. 252.

107. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, doc. 254.

108. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis*, docs. 254, 255.

109. *FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIV: Soviet Union*, doc. 235.

Table 1. Direct bilateral contacts between Washington and Moscow during the Middle East crisis of 1967 (12 May 1967 – 10 June 1967)*

Date	From	To	Type	Diplomatic Channel
18 May	Rostow	Chernyakov	Meeting	Regular (Washington)
19 May	Thompson	Dobrynin	Meeting	Regular (Moscow)
	Goldberg	Fedorenko	Meeting	Regular (United Nations)
22 May	Johnson	Kosygin	Letter	Regular
23 May	Thompson	Gromyko	Letter	Regular (Moscow)
	Goldberg	Fedorenko	Meeting	Regular (United Nations)
24 May	Garthoff	Sedov (KGB)	Meeting	Informal (Washington)
	Goldberg	Fedorenko	Meeting	Regular (United Nations)
27 May	Chernyakov	Rusk	Phone call	Regular (Washington)
	Kosygin	Johnson	Letter	Regular
28 May	Johnson	Kosygin	Letter	Regular
	Rusk	Gromyko	Letter	Regular
31 May	Fedorenko	Goldberg	Meeting	Regular (United Nations)
3 June	Fedorenko	Goldberg	Meeting	Regular (United Nations)
5 June	Rusk*	Gromyko	Letter	Regular
	Kosygin	Johnson	Letter	Hotline
	Rusk*	Gromyko	Letter	Hotline
	Johnson	Kosygin	Letter	Hotline
	Chernyakov	Meeker	Meeting**	Regular (Washington)
	Goldberg	Fedorenko	Meeting†	Regular (United Nations)
6 June	Goldberg	Fedorenko	Meeting†	Regular (United Nations)
	Gutherie	Kuznetsov	Meeting	Regular (Moscow)
	Kosygin	Johnson	Letter	Hotline
	Johnson	Kosygin	Letter	Hotline
	Goldberg	Fedorenko	Meeting	Regular (United Nations)
	Goldberg	Fedorenko	Meeting	Regular (United Nations)
	Goldberg	Fedorenko	Meeting	Regular (United Nations)
	Kosygin	Johnson	Letter	Hotline
Johnson	Kosygin	Letter	Hotline	
7 June	Kosygin	Johnson	Letter	Hotline
	Johnson	Kosygin	Letter	Hotline
8 June	Kosygin	Johnson	Letter	Hotline
	Rusk ^{††}	Chernyakov	Phone call	Regular (Washington)
	Rusk ^{††}	Chernyakov	Phone call	Regular (Washington)
	U.S. Embassy representative	Foreign Ministry official	?	Regular (Moscow)
	Johnson	Kosygin	Letter	Hotline
	Johnson	Kosygin	Letter	Hotline
Kosygin	Johnson	Letter	Hotline	

Date	From	To	Type	Diplomatic Channel
	Kohler ^{††}	Chernyakov	Phone call	Regular (Washington)
	Fedorenko	Goldberg	Meeting	Regular (United Nations)
	Johnson	Kosygin	Letter	Hotline
	Rusk	Kalugin (KGB)	Meeting	Regular (Washington)
9 June	Guthrie	Fedoseev	Phone call	Moscow
10 June	Kosygin	Johnson	Letter	Hotline
	Johnson	Kosygin	Letter	Hotline
	Kosygin	Johnson	Letter	Hotline
	Johnson	Kosygin	Letter	Hotline
	Kosygin	Johnson	Letter	Hotline
	Johnson	Kosygin	Letter	Hotline
	Sedov (KGB)	Garthoff	Meeting	Informal (Washington)

*same message sent via two channels

** the meeting was about the Outer Space Treaty

† multiple meetings on the same day; the exact number of meetings on 5 June is uncertain

†† Records in the LBJ Library indicate two calls from Rusk and one from Kohler. Cf. 'Chronology' [1967] which indicates two calls by Kohler and none by Rusk.

Source: LBJ Library holdings; *FRUS* 2004; Ginor and Remez 2007; 'Chronology' 1967