Cross-Border Collaboration and the Construction of Memory Narratives in Europe

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PART 1

Actors and Practices in Transcultural Transmission and Reception
Cross-border Collaboration and the Construction of Memory Narratives in Europe

Sara Jones

The study of memory is becoming increasingly transnational, both in terms of the scholars who are engaged in it and the subjects which form their focus. Memory is being thought of not only in terms of its location in a specific national or regional context, but also with consideration to how it is situated, constructed and translated within and between different national or regional memory cultures. Scholars have attempted to conceptualize the interplay of national and transnational memories in different ways: as ‘multi-directional,’1 ‘travelling,’2 ‘transcultural,’3 or even ‘global.’4 Central to the study of memory across borders has been the recognition that the national and transnational are not easily separated, but remain ‘deeply entangled.’5

From an empirical perspective, there have also been recent efforts to chart the realms of memory beyond and between nation states. In this context, there appear to be two broad trends: in the first, the national or regional remains the primary unit of analysis, even as authors consider cross-fertilization between different memory cultures or the reception of memory narratives outside of their country of origin.6 In the second, authors examine explicitly

3 Lucy Bond and Jessica Rapson, eds, The Transcultural Turn: Interrogating Memory Between and Beyond Borders (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2014).
6 For example: Erich Langenbacher, Bill Niven and Ruth Wittlinger, eds, Dynamics of Memory and Identity in Contemporary Europe (New York: Berghahn, 2012); De Cesari and Rigney, Transnational Memory; Bond and Rapson, The Transcultural Turn; Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik, eds, Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration (Oxford: OUP, 2014); Małgorzata Pakier and Joanna Wawrzyniak, eds, Memory and Change in Europe: Eastern Perspectives (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2016). For a similar critique,
transnational institutions, such as the European Union. In this regard, scholars have emphasized the complexity of remembering across borders, particularly in Europe, a continent divided by war, genocide and ideology. European institutions and actors appear preoccupied especially by questions of how to remember the right- and left-wing dictatorships of the twentieth century, the place of communism in European memory cultures, and the relationship between remembering the crimes of the Holocaust and the crimes of the gulag.

In the last decade, a number of European institutions have put forward guidelines for developing the kind of negotiated memory that would be necessary for such a divided continent. These include: the European Parliament (EP) Resolution on ‘The Future of Europe Fifty Years After the Second World War’ (2005); Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 1481 (2006); the ‘Prague Declaration on European Conscience and Communism’ (2008); and the EP resolution on ‘European Conscience and Totalitarianism’ (2009). The Action ‘Active European Remembrance’ (part of the ‘Europe for Citizens’ program 2007–2013) aimed to support commemoration of victims of both National Socialist and Stalinist regimes by providing funding to memorialization projects and activities.

However, resolutions and guidelines do not enact themselves, and a transformation of memory cultures does not emerge from nowhere. Collective memory requires actors, both individual and institutional, to construct, transmit and support particular narratives about the past. These actors – for example, politicians, scholars, memorial managers, museum curators, historians, civil society activists and victim groups – have been described by Elisabeth

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7 For example, Elisabeth Kübler, Europäische Erinnerungspolitik: Der Europarat und die Erinnerung an den Holocaust (Bielefeld: transcript, 2012); Laure Neumayer, ‘Integrating the Central European Past into a Common Narrative: The Mobilizations Around the “Crimes of Communism” in the European Parliament,’ Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23 (2015): 344–363. Aline Sierp provides one of the few analyses that attempt to connect the national and transnational; however, she does not analyze collaboration between nation states. See Aline Sierp, History, Memory and Trans-European Identity: Unifying Divisions (New York: Routledge, 2014).


9 See Neumayer, ‘Integrating the Central European Past’ for a detailed process-tracing of the contentious development of these resolutions.
Jelin as ‘memory entrepreneurs,’10 who by virtue of their power, influence, status or dedication to a cause can have an impact on public interpretations and understandings of the past.11 A study of agency and its relationship to structure is thus essential not only for understanding transnational memory politics in Europe and beyond,12 but also the dynamics of memory more broadly. Memory practices are ‘always simultaneously individual and social,’13 and in order to fully comprehend the interaction between the two we need a systematic empirical analysis of institutions, actors and practices that shape discourses about the past at a local, regional, national and transnational level.14

Indeed, memory entrepreneurs have begun to collaborate across borders in increasingly formalized ways. Focusing on Europe alone, the last fifteen years have seen the creation of specific networking initiatives such as the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA, formerly the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research, 1998 – which also includes non-European members), the European Network Remembrance and Solidarity (ENRS, 2005), the European Network of Official Authorities in Charge of the Secret-Police Files (ENOA, 2008) and the Platform of European Memory and Conscience (Platform, 2011). These networks have themselves been the subject of an emerging field of research: initial contributions have considered their ‘epistemic framing’15 or their interaction with the European Commission and other cross-border agencies.16 Jenny Wüstenberg has used network analysis software to map the personal

14 See Sierp and Wüstenberg, ‘Linking the Local and the Transnational,’ 323.
connections between individuals according to their attendance at public events associated with these prominent networks to demonstrate the key influencers in these memory-political initiatives.\textsuperscript{17}

Wüstenberg’s study, which combines an actor-centred approach to transnational memory with an analysis of networks as networks – that is, as a structure of relational ties – provides an important inspiration for the research presented here. Nonetheless, as I will show, it is not only within these named networks that European memory entrepreneurs collaborate across borders. They also work together outside of these structures, for example, through shared exhibitions, collaborative workshops and conferences, information-gathering exercises, and mutual funding arrangements – initiatives that are not captured in Wüstenberg’s methodology. Moreover, Wüstenberg’s focus on prominent individuals qua individuals, whilst undoubtedly important, risks underrepresenting the role of memorial institutions that are frequently represented in collaborative activities not by one, but by several different employees or members. In the networks listed above, for example, it is more commonly the institution, rather than the individual, who is the named participant.

In the present chapter, I use techniques drawn from social network analysis to demonstrate the networks created by and around two institutions in the period 2011–2014: the Stasi Prison Memorial at Berlin-Hohenschönhausen and the Federal Office for the Files of the State Security Service of the Former German Democratic Republic (GDR). The starting date was chosen as it is the year in which the Platform of European Memory and Conscience, of which both institutions are members, was formed. The end date, 31 December 2014, was chosen as a cut-off to allow efficient data collection and management. However, this is not to suggest that transnational co-operation on the part of these institutions is limited to this time-frame (it evidently is not) and it should be acknowledged that the nature of these collaborative activities in terms of partners, foci, funding arrangements and so on changes over time. What is offered in this article is, therefore, a snapshot, but it is one that can function as a starting point for considering the significance of these cross-border collaborations for how we understand the construction of transnational remembering. A longitudinal study tracing shifts over time in the networks created around these institutions would represent an important extension to the work presented here.

I combine an exploration of the structural features of the networks with narrative analysis of the public presentation of the cross-border collaborations of these two significant memory-political institutions in the same timeframe. In

this way I show not only how and with whom the two institutions collaborate, but also what narratives are made available by these collaborations. These are narratives about the co-operative activity itself, but more significantly, about the national and transnational processes of working through the past and, indeed, about the past itself.

In this way, the chapter is also about reception, that is, about how the efforts towards Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung [working through the past] in one national context are received and put to use in another. As will be seen, the narratives attached to cross-border co-operations are a complex interweaving of the national and transnational, as collaborative efforts with partner institutions abroad are used to comment on (and in some cases express discord with) the memorial culture dominant in Germany, in which, as Langenbacher argues, the prominence ‘of Holocaust-centre memory was never in doubt.’ In other cases, these collaborations are used to construct a sense of a common European or indeed Eastern European past. Thus I conceive of reception not as the one-directional movement of memory, of a story about the past being ‘encoded’ in one context and ‘decoded’ in another. Rather, I want to think of reception from the perspective of what has been termed ‘histoires croisées.’ This approach goes beyond looking at the movement of memory narratives in terms of ‘a point of departure and a point of arrival’; rather it considers ‘phenomena of interaction involving a variety of directions and multiple effects.’ That is, it considers its subjects with regard to relationships, or what Werner and Zimmerman describe as ‘intercrossings.’ The researcher looks not only at the ‘component elements’ of these intercrosings, but also at the impact of their interaction.

I thereby develop a new method for analyzing the strategies, interpretations and narratives that determine the public remembrance of contested pasts, which goes beyond a ‘continuous inventory of lieux de mémoire.’ More specifically, I want to introduce the concept of collaboration and collaborative memory into our discussion of how memory is constructed and communicates

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21 Werner and Zimmermann, ‘Beyond Comparison,’ 37 and 39.
across borders. This idea of collaboration directs our attention away from the artifacts of memory and towards the agents. It highlights the ways in which European memory cultures are actively being shaped, not only in the sphere of civil society discussed here, but also in politics and culture. These ‘inter-crossings’ have not previously been the subject of sustained analysis; yet the study of concrete examples of co-operation can show how alliances are forged in transnational memory politics and how such alliances are used to promote specific memory-political goals.

The Case Studies

**Gedenkstätte Berlin-Hohenschönhausen** [Memorial Berlin-Hohenschönhausen] is situated in the former remand prison of the State Security Service (Stasi) in Berlin, which was the largest such facility in the GDR. The Memorial and its Director, Hubertus Knabe, have played a prominent role in debates surrounding the GDR since unification. The site has been criticized for, amongst other things, an over-emotionalized presentation of the past, overemphasis on the brutality of the 1950s, conflating Nazi and Soviet oppression, and engaging in political propaganda directed against the left, particularly against the *Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus* [Party of Democratic Socialism, PDS] and *DIE LINKE*. Its growing prominence in German national memory politics has been accompanied by an increasing involvement in transnational collaborations. As will be discussed, these range from joint exhibitions with European

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partners, such as the Memorial to the Victims of Communism and to the Resistance in Sighetu Marmăției to extensive co-operations with Tunisian activists in the wake of the Arab Spring. As indicated above, Memorial Hohenschönhausen is also a member of the Platform of European Memory and Conscience.

The Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR [Federal Office for the Files of the State Security Service of the Former GDR] – or BStU – was established in 1991 to manage access to the Stasi files for victims, informants (under certain circumstances), media and researchers, according to the Stasi Records Law passed in December of that year. Alongside its involvement in lustration and file access, the BStU also has in its remit political education and remembrance. This includes the running of seminars, workshops and other events, as well as the management of regional and national exhibitions relating to the activities of the Stasi. Most recently, it has – in collaboration with the civil society group Association for Anti-Stalinist Action Normannenstrasse – opened a new large exhibition in the former Stasi headquarters in Berlin. The institution and its commissioners have played a central role in Germany’s efforts to work through the history of the East German dictatorship. Nonetheless, this role is increasingly under question, as its primary function – that is, allowing file access for victims of the Stasi – draws to a close and there are plans for the files to be moved to the Federal Archive. In the period under consideration here, the BStU’s international initiatives included joint exhibitions, conferences, workshops and podium discussions, and visits by foreign officials, heads of archives and other organizations dedicated to working through dictatorial pasts. The BStU is also a member of the Platform and the ENOA, and is an ENRS partner institution.

Social Network Analysis

The methods used in the first part of this paper are drawn from social network analysis. The network perspective guides our attention to the interdependence of actors, relational ties and the impact of network structure on individual action.\(^{26}\) The focus on relationships between actors (broadly defined

to include both individuals and institutions), rather than exclusively on the actors themselves, is essential to study collaboration and its impact. Specifically, network analysis will be used in this paper to develop a map of transnational co-operations involving Hohenschönhausen and/or the BStU. The focus on the network surrounding a single institution – defining the boundary of the network according to the relationships of that single actor – can be described as an ‘egocentric,’ rather than ‘whole network’ approach. This map is used to identify key partnerships across borders and to demonstrate the structure of the network constructed by and through these memory-political institutions.

In order to generate the map, I gathered publicly available documents from each institution covering the period January 2011-December 2014 and detailing the institution’s activities in that timeframe. In the case of Hohenschönhausen, this included the 2011–2012 and 2013–2014 activity reports, press releases available on the institution’s website (48 documents in total) and newspaper articles detailing events hosted by the Memorial (10 documents in total). The activity reports were read in full and passages relevant to transnational collaboration highlighted. Press releases and newspaper articles were selected for analysis, if, in their title, they indicated cross-border co-operation. For the BStU, the corpus included yearly retrospectives (2011–2014), biannual activity reports (2011–2012 and 2013–2014) and press releases available on the website (16 documents in total). Again, the yearly retrospectives and activity reports were read in full and passages relevant to transnational collaboration highlighted. Press releases were selected for analysis, if, in their title, they indicated some form of cross-border co-operation. One limitation of the use of published material for identifying collaborations is that this might not capture every single event or cross-border relationship; that is, not every activity is necessarily reported. However, institutions are most likely to include in press releases, reports and retrospectives those activities that they deem most significant or reflective of their mission and self-understanding. Moreover, as the present research is interested in how memory entrepreneurs shape public discourse

27 See Nick Crossley et al., Social Network Analysis for Ego-Nets (Los Angeles etc.: Sage, 2015).
about the past and the processes of coming to terms with it, it is these publicly reported activities and relationships that are of the most relevance.

From these documents, events that indicated a ‘relational tie,’ that is, collaboration with a non-German partner institution, were identified and the details (participants, type of event, date) were gathered into a separate document for entry into the online influence mapping software Tartan (© 2011 Ntrepid Corporation). Following the observation above about the way in which an institution is frequently represented by several different individuals, where an individual’s affiliation was named in the source documents, I defined the actor by the institution, rather than by the person representing that institution. For each event, both German and non-German participants were recorded. This was important in terms of allowing me to identify not only with whom Hohenschönhausen and the BStU collaborate transnationally, but also with which German actors they collaborate in order to develop these transnational links. In several cases, the individuals were not named; instead the document just indicated the group of entrepreneurs to which they belonged, for example, ‘Tunisian civil society activists.’ In these cases, that designation was used to define the actor.

Once the actors participating in the given event have been identified and the data entered into the program, the software allows the relationships between them to be coded according to the intensity of the interaction. If two actors were both present at a conference, for example, but there was no evidence that they had interacted, I did not create a relationship between them. However, if they had participated on a joint panel or in a smaller workshop, I considered this a ‘1+ meeting.’ On the other hand, co-organization of an exhibition or other event that would require closer and more sustained collaboration was designated a ‘2+ meeting.’ All relationships were assumed to be reciprocal, that is, ‘undirected’ in the terms of social network analysis. Tartan uses data provided by the researcher to create a visualization of the links between the actors and the resulting networks. It also calculates actors’ centrality and influence within the network.

**Results: Memorial Berlin–Hohenschönhausen**

The material gathered relating Hohenschönhausen in the period 2011–2014 documents 75 events involving some form of transnational collaboration, from joint exhibitions to visits by foreign diplomats or heads of other memorial

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30 I would like to thank Mat Mathews at Ntrepid Corporation for providing me with free access to Tartan, and for his invaluable assistance in negotiating the software. Wüstenberg demonstrates the benefits of Tartan for mapping the interactions between individuals involved in existing transnational memory-political networks. See, ‘Vernetztes Gedenken.’
institutions. These 75 events involved 114 stakeholders\textsuperscript{31} from 38 different countries. Collaboration was also recorded with multinational groups such as Amnesty International and Reporters without Borders. I coded 490 relationships between these stakeholders.

*Tartan* uses mathematic algorithms – taking into account the number of collaborative activities and the intensity or frequency of those activities (as defined above) – to calculate ‘degree centrality,’ that is, which actors have the most direct connections to other actors and value of that number with relation to the rest of the network. In this regard, an institution or individual who is involved in one or more collaborations with multiple other actors will have a higher degree centrality than those involved in bilateral collaborations with Hohenschönhausen alone. We can thus infer that the actors at the top of the centrality list are important partners for the Memorial, not necessarily through close one-to-one collaboration, but because they are repeatedly brought in to support larger initiatives\textsuperscript{32}. Table 2.1 indicates the top nine most central actors in the network created by and through Hohenschönhausen in this period (excluding Hohenschönhausen itself).

If we ignore Hohenschönhausen itself (which, given how the data was collected, is unsurprisingly central to all collaborations), the two institutional actors with the highest degree centrality are the *Konrad Adenauer Stiftung* [Konrad Adenauer Foundation, KAS] and the *Auswärtiges Amt* [German Foreign Office]. What is interesting here is that neither of these actors is a named participant in the established networks relating to memory politics, such as the Platform or enoa. Nor do they have memorialization or memory politics as part of their official remit. The KAS – a political foundation affiliated to the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) – is well known for its involvement in and funding of memory-political activities world-wide; however, this is not presented as part of its core mission. On its website, the foundation defines this mission as including ‘democracy promotion,’ but does not state explicitly that this incorporates memory of dictatorship. The Foreign Office is principally concerned with diplomacy and Germany’s image in the world;

\textsuperscript{31} ‘Stakeholder’ is the term used by *Tartan* to refer to the nodes or actors within a given network.

\textsuperscript{32} As Crossley et al. note, centrality measures (and any other ‘whole network’ measures) can be calculated on ego-nets, assuming that there are ties present between alters (i.e., the other actors within the network). However, we must bear in mind that the boundary has been defined according to an alter having a relationship with the ego (principal actor), so we cannot know what relationships it might have with actors beyond the ego-net. Crossley et al., *Social Network Analysis for Ego-Nets*, 82.
this involves, according to its website, promoting ‘intensive exchange with the world in economics, culture, science and technology, environment, issues of development and many other themes,’ but the working through of dictatorship is not named explicitly. These are important examples of how institutions not affiliated with prominent memory networks, and without an obvious interest in memory politics, can nonetheless influence processes of remembrance across borders.

If we turn to the most central non-German actors in the Hohenschönhausen network, we can once again see the importance of looking beyond the prominent European networks and indeed beyond Europe in our analysis of transnational memory. The next two most central institutional actors are the Tunisian government and the Tunisian memorialization project, Contre l’oubli [Against Forgetting], both of which were engaged in a longer term collaboration with Hohenschönhausen between 2011 and 2014. The collaboration included repeated visits to the Hohenschönhausen Memorial by representatives of the Tunisian government and Contre l’oubli, and by representatives of Hohenschönhausen to sites and partners in Tunisia. There was also a collaborative exhibition, a

### Table 2.1 Top nine actors in Hohenschönhausen network (excluding Hohenschönhausen) according to degree centrality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Degree centrality strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Konrad Adenauer Foundation</td>
<td>0.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>German Foreign Office</td>
<td>0.214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tunisian Government</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Contre l’oubli activists</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sven Felix Kellerhoff (journalist)</td>
<td>0.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Christoph Shaefgen (attorney general)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Deutschlandfunk (radio station)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Institute for National Remembrance (Warsaw)</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Warsaw Rising Museum</td>
<td>0.063</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unless otherwise stated, all translations from German are my own.
joint conference, the writing of a master plan for memorialization in Tunisia and the production of a ‘Handbook for Working through the Past.’

An important feature of Tartan is that it allows the user to make a stakeholder ‘invisible’ before modeling the network. Removing Hohenschönhausen from the modeling allows us to see if and how the other actors are connected beyond their relationship with the Memorial, that is, it breaks the network down into the ‘components’ in which all actors are linked by a path that does not go through the central node.\(^{34}\) In this way, one-off bilateral collaborations are removed and we get a clearer picture of the way in which connections between different stakeholders are made by and through Hohenschönhausen.

What is especially interesting in this case is that, despite the removal of the primary institution, the model is still of one significant network. The number of stakeholders in this network is reduced to 63, indicating that a number of collaborations are indeed bilateral between Hohenschönhausen and one other actor;\(^{35}\) however, the fact that the network by and large remains intact, indicates that Hohenschönhausen repeatedly works with the same partners on different projects and that these partners work repeatedly with several other actors. That is, multiple connections and relationships between memory entrepreneurs are created by and through the activities of the Memorial. As we will see this contrasts with the creation of networks around the activities of the BStU.

**Results: BStU**

The material gathered relating to the BStU in the period 2011–2014 documents 81 events involving some form of transnational collaboration. Again, this includes joint exhibitions and workshops, visits by foreign diplomats or the heads of other national archives or memorial sites, and travel by BStU representatives to international conferences. The 81 events involved 116 stakeholders from 39 different countries. I coded 361 relationships between these stakeholders. We can already observe from these figures that the BStU was involved in more collaborative activities, but with fewer actors in each.

Table 2.2 indicates the top nine most (degree) central actors in the network created by and through the BStU in this period (excluding the BStU itself). We can see that the actor with the highest degree centrality is once again a German institution, that is, the German Foreign Office. That this government

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\(^{34}\) For more on ‘components’ and their significance see Crossley et al., *Social Network Analysis for Ego-Nets*, 12–13.

\(^{35}\) Nine other components were identified, but one of these had only three actors and the remaining eight only two, indicating that they represent one-off smaller events involving the Memorial, rather than sustained or significant collaboration.
body plays a central role in the activities of both organizations under study here suggests that – at least when it comes to institutions supported by Federal funds, as is the case with both Hohenschönhausen and the BStU – other state actors might play a more active part than is commonly recognized. As the Foreign Office’s contribution in both cases for the most part takes the form of funding or behind-the-scenes organization, this involvement is also partially hidden.

However, unlike the network formed by and through Memorial Hohenschönhausen, other German actors are less prominent in the BStU network. The actors with the next highest degree centrality are institutions located in Germany, but representing non-German interests. Positions two to five are occupied by the Slovak Institute, Czech Centre, Czech Embassy and Slovak Embassy respectively. Positions six to nine are taken by the Egyptian government, Tunisian civil rights activists, the Tunisian government and Egyptian civil rights activists. It is easier to see how and why these results emerge if we model the network with the BStU made ‘invisible.’ In contrast to the single network created by and through Hohenschönhausen, if the BStU is removed from the modeling, four significant components are produced with twenty-nine, fourteen, nine and nine stakeholders respectively.\textsuperscript{36} What this indicates is that the BStU works with discrete groups of actors in a project-style approach, rather than creating connections between different groups.

\textsuperscript{36} A further twelve components were identified, each with only two actors.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{llll}
\hline
Rank & Actor & Degree centrality strength \\
\hline
1 & German Foreign Office & 0.132  \\
2 & Slovak Institute & 0.114  \\
3 & Czech Centre & 0.114  \\
4 & Slovak Embassy & 0.114  \\
5 & Czech Embassy & 0.114  \\
6 & Egyptian Government & 0.096  \\
7 & Tunisian Civil Rights Activists & 0.088  \\
8 & Tunisian Government & 0.079  \\
9 & Egyptian Civil Rights Activists & 0.079  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Top nine actors in BStU network (excluding BStU) according to degree centrality}
\end{table}
Analysis of the four components highlights this finding and also shows clearly what these ‘projects’ were. The first and largest component I will term the ‘Arab Spring Network,’ as it results from a concerted effort on the part of the BStU (and in a parallel with Hohenschönhausen) to contribute to the process of working through dictatorships in Middle Eastern and North African countries in the wake of the revolutionary movements in that region. Table 2.3 indicates the top five actors in terms of degree centrality.

The collaborations within this component included meetings in Cairo between BStU representatives and Egyptian government and civil society actors, visits by Egyptian, Tunisian and Yemeni activists to the BStU, and participation in a conference in Tunisia with, amongst others, Labó démocratique [Democratic Lab], who were also an important partner for Hohenschönhausen. Interestingly, this network is not only the largest; it also contains the most German institutional actors, including the German Foreign Office, other German government representatives, the kAS, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung [Friedrich Ebert Foundation], Goethe Institut [Goethe Institute], and the radio station Deutschlandfunk.

I describe the second largest component created by and through the BStU as the Czech and Slovak network. It is here that we see the collaboration with the Slovak Institute, Czech Centre, and Slovak and Czech Embassies. The component also includes the Prague Institute for Contemporary History, and Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes, as well as the Institute for National Remembrance in Bratislava. However, these collaborations involve very few German memory entrepreneurs and no institutional ones. This network essentially represents the project Fokus DDR–ČSSR. Alltag und Geheimpolizei in zwei kommunistischen Diktaturen [Focus GDR – CSSR. The Everyday and the Secret Police in Two Communist Dictatorships], which ran as a collaboration between the BStU, Slovak Institute and Czech Centre, with the sponsorship of the Slovak and Czech Embassies in the period September–November 2011.

### Table 2.3 Top five actors in BStU ‘Arab Spring’ component according to degree centrality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Degree centrality strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>German Foreign Office</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Egyptian Government</td>
<td>0.357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tunisian Civil Rights Activists</td>
<td>0.321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tunisian Government</td>
<td>0.286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Egyptian Civil Rights Activists</td>
<td>0.286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The third component within the larger BStU network is dominated by the Institute for National Remembrance (INR) in Warsaw. The connections all run through this institutional actor, except for two additional links made through the Heinrich Böll Stiftung [Heinrich Böll Foundation]. What the shape of this third component suggests – and what is confirmed by reference to the types of event involving this actor – is that this co-operation is essentially an intensive bilateral one between the INR and the BStU. It included a collaborative workshop, visits by the President of the INR, and participation by BStU representatives in workshops organized by the INR. As both the BStU and INR are members of the ENOA, this is an example of how members of an established network might collaborate intensively both within and outside of that network.

The fourth network that emerges when the BStU is removed from the modeling indicates another example of German government actors being directly involved in memory entrepreneurship where one might not expect it. Here the central figure in the network is Joachim Gauck – former BStU Commissioner and Federal President from 2012 to 2017. However, closer examination reveals that this amounts to only two collaborations with multiple participants: the opening of the exhibition *Lernt Polnisch* at the Europa-Universität Viadrina in Frankfurt Oder and a visit by Gauck to the BStU regional branch in Rostock. In both cases, Gauck was accompanied by other heads of state or government representatives of other countries so could be said to be acting in his capacity as Federal President, rather than as a result of his close links with the BStU.

In sum, the network analysis shows that the Hohenschönhausen Memorial has several partners with whom it collaborates frequently on different projects – an approach that creates connections between different actors and a single broad network in and through the Memorial. The BStU, on the other hand, tends to collaborate transnationally on discrete projects each with a more defined set of actors. These co-operations may be more intensive; however, fewer connections are created between the actors taking part in the different projects, resulting in multiple smaller networks. The analysis of degree centrality also indicates the key actors within these networks and, by implication, the key partners of these two memory political institutions. What is striking is that, for both Hohenschönhausen and the BStU, institutions not normally associated with memory entrepreneurship and/or outside of Europe play a central role. This not only highlights the need to look beyond established networks and indeed beyond Europe in our analysis of transnational memory, it also raises several questions. What is the purpose of co-operations with non-European actors with very different experiences of dictatorship? How does this compare with the motivations behind collaboration between European memory entrepreneurs? Is it only German institutions who were so involved in memory
political activities in the wake of the Arab Spring? That is, is there something special about the German case?

Narratives of Memory

In order to answer the questions raised above, we need to turn to qualitative methods to explore how these actors understand and present the cross-border collaborations in which they are involved. In view of the role of such memory entrepreneurs in constructing public narratives about the past and the processes of coming to terms with it, it is particularly the public portrayal that is of interest. In this regard, the same material used to identify the events and participants for entry into *Tartan* can be approached in a different way to explore what these collaborations meant for the actors involved.

The method used to explore these meanings is developed from narrative analysis. Narrative analysis has a long-standing tradition in the humanities and has become increasingly used in the social sciences, also leading to some fruitful cross-over between the two. Social network analysts have also turned to narrative to identify the meanings of relationships and ties for network members, as well as in recognition that networks themselves are narrative constructions. Narrative research is located firmly within a constructivist or postmodern and interpretative paradigm which looks not for a ‘real, essential and objective reality reflected in narratives,’ rather ‘it proposes a subjective and relativist reality, largely invented by narratives.’ In our context, the researcher is not looking for information on the ‘real’ motivations behind cross-border collaborations or for an authentic insight into their purpose; rather she is interested in how the narrators (here the authors of the reports and press releases or those cited in them) give meaning to these co-operative activities.


38 For example, Barbara Czarniawska, *Narratives in Social Science Research* (London/New Delhi: Sage, 2004).

39 For a summary of this research, see Crossley et al., *Social Network Analysis for Ego-Nets*, 104–125.

Narratives are made up of plot elements (events, people, time etc.), but importantly ‘the same set of events can be organized around different plots.’ This is especially significant when the narratives being constructed are not about the self, but about what society is, was and should be. What are being narrated in the documents under consideration here are co-operations between memory entrepreneurs in different national contexts. These are stories about the motivations of these collaborations and their outcomes, but they are also stories about the nature of the past and the processes of coming to terms with it that are located in a national and transnational political context. In this way, these narratives also relate to questions of power: these stories locate institutions, nations and regions in terms of success and failure; they give an account of which approaches to the past work and which do not; and they identify who should be listening to and learning from whom, that is, who the experts of Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung really are. In this sense, they are ‘strategic narratives,’ described by Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle as ‘a communicative tool through which political actors […] attempt to give determined meaning to past, present and future in order to achieve political objectives.’ This is not to say that the narrators in this context are completely free to tell any strategic story, rather that their narratives are shaped and constrained by the political (including memory-political) and social context into which they are launched.

In order to identify the strategic narratives created in the storying of cross-border collaborations, the same documents that were selected for the network analysis through Tartan were subject to a process of discursive analysis in order to identify common patterns in terms of the motivations and positioning of the different actors involved. The documents were coded systematically with regard to narratives produced and the most common ones identified for each institution. Given the need to represent narrative holistically, in the presentation of results only a few examples for each narrative will be provided, which are representative of the corpus as a whole.

**Results: Memorial Berlin-Hohenschönhausen**

Analysis of the 75 cross-border events in which Hohenschönhausen was involved between 2011 and 2014 brought to the fore three key narratives. I will term these: ‘Learning from the Germans,’ ‘Beyond the National/Better Together’ and ‘Learning from Others.’ A single event is often narrated in multiple

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ways; however, as will be seen, these three narratives are generally attached to different kinds of cross-border collaboration with different global or European partners and in the service of different political objectives.

1 Learning from the Germans
I borrow the term ‘learning from the Germans’ in this context from Andrew Beattie. Beattie uses the term to refer to the potential application of the German approach to working through conflicted pasts to the pan-European context. In contrast, here this narrative is most frequently (although not exclusively) constructed in relation to the cross-border co-operations of Hohenschönhausen with non-European actors, especially those collaborations which emerged in the wake of the Arab Spring. In this narrative, the Memorial is presented as representative of a German memorial culture which has developed successful strategies for working through dictatorships: collaborative activity in this account serves the purpose of sharing that expertise with those institutions and national contexts constructed as newcomers to the field.

One prominent example of the use of this narrative is in the collaboration between the Memorial and Tunisian memory entrepreneurs. In October 2011, Knabe visited the former prison of the state security service in Tunis at the invitation of the Tunisian Minister of the Interior Habib Essid. In the press release giving an account of the visit, Knabe is framed as an expert who ‘called on the [Tunisian] authorities to do everything possible to ensure that the files of the state security service are retained.’ The reference specifically to the opening of the Stasi files sets this expertise beyond the competency of the Hohenschönhausen Memorial and its Director (who do not, after all, have responsibility for the Stasi files) and locates it instead in the wider approach to memory of the GDR in Germany. That Knabe presents himself and his institution as representatives of this broader context is also seen in his reported offer to support the Tunisian authorities in the drafting of a law to protect the state security files, alongside his recommendation to turn the prison into a Memorial. In his conversations with human rights activists who are making efforts towards working through the dictatorship in Tunisia, Knabe is reported as stating: ‘in Tunisia there are also numerous efforts to work through the crimes of the past and ensure justice for the victims. Perhaps our experiences can be useful in this regard.’ It is not clear, however, if ‘our’ refers to the Memorial itself, or to Germany.

This rhetoric is repeated in the collaboration with Tunisian memory entrepreneurs in the context of the Contre l’oubli project described above. In a press release of the 6 March 2012, the Memorial is described as standing by experts from Tunisia ‘in an advisory capacity’ and as ‘part of a new project, in which the experiences of Germany in the field of working through the past is passed onto state and social institutions in Tunisia.’ The repetition in these documents of the vocabulary of ‘support,’ ‘advice’ and ‘help’ for the Tunisian colleagues constructs a unidirectional transfer of ideas and expertise from the German side to the (in this view) emerging democratic state. A similar use of language and narrative can be seen, among others, in co-operations with Peru in November 2011 (Hohenschönhausen ‘advises the Peruvian truth commission’ and offers ‘support’ and ‘help’ in the construction of memorials) and Cambodia in January and May 2012 (Hohenschönhausen offers ‘support’ to the memorials at the Toul Sleng prison and the central execution site of the Khmer Rouge). These non-European actors are not constructed as equal partners and the collaborations are not presented as a two-way exchange of expertise.

We must consider that part of this emphasis on a particular way of working through the past is a result of these documents largely serving promotional purposes. However, as seen above, this narrative does not (only) praise the Hohenschönhausen Memorial, but German memorial culture more broadly. Kaja Kaźmierska has recently argued that a dichotomy has been constructed between a ‘Western and “non-Western” approach towards the issues of e.g., collective (national) identity.’ In his tracing of the similarities between German and European memory cultures, Beattie similarly argues that an ‘inaccurate east–west dichotomy legitimizes pressure on the eastern side to conform to a seemingly unquestionable but, in fact, contested western norm.’ Here, however, we see an institution that might find itself on the eastern side of that dichotomy in terms of its memory politics (notably, the equation of Nazi and Soviet dictatorships frequently seen at the site) appropriating an idealized version of a pan-German coming to terms with the past in a way that constructs non-European contexts as not fully developed and in need of assistance.

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46 Beattie, ‘Learning from the Germans,’ 17.
Beyond the National/Better Together
In the second narrative that is constructed around the cross-border collaborations of the Hohenschönhausen Memorial, this sense of German superiority in processes of coming to terms with the past disappears. Instead, the Memorial is located in either a global or a European community of remembrance. There are two slightly different versions of this narrative in the public presentation of cross-border activity. In the first, the Hohenschönhausen Memorial positions itself as part of a global network of institutions and individuals fighting for democracy and human rights. In many cases, these are what I term ‘rhetorical’ collaborations, that is, they construct a link with other protest movements or activists, but do not involve any actual material links with international partners. One example is the involvement of the Memorial on 20 March 2011 in an initiative of the Berlin International Literature Festival to organize worldwide readings from the work of Liu Xiaobo, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize and principal author of Charta 08, which called for democratization in China. The press release notes that ‘more than 115 institutions in 73 cities and 30 countries on all continents took part,’ emphasizing Hohenschönhausen’s place in this international community. Similarly, in articles in Die Tageszeitung and Berliner Zeitung dated 23 August 2012, Knabe is reported as wanting to visit the imprisoned Russian punk band Pussy Riot and as having written an open letter to the Russian Ambassador, Vladimir Grinin, in which he noted that ‘as Director of the Memorial in the former central prison of the Stasi, the respect of basic rights and freedom of expression is also very important to me in today’s context.’ Knabe thereby positions both himself and the Memorial alongside international artists and activists who stand for democracy and freedom from authoritarian rule, but does not suggest explicitly that other nations might learn by the German example.

The second form of this narrative is generally used in reference to co-operations with European partners, which are often more extensive and involve actual contact between memory entrepreneurs from different national contexts. Here the narrative of German success frequently becomes one of a European failure against which the institutions involved in the collaboration are fighting. Notably, it is this narrative that is dominant in the public presentation of Hohenschönhausen’s collaborative activities within the Platform of European Memory and Conscience. In a press release about the founding of the Platform on the 14 October 2011, Knabe is cited as explaining the reason behind the collaboration of the Memorial within the network as the need to understand education about the past as a ‘European task’ in need of ‘European standards,’ which had, he argued, up until now been lacking. The Hohenschönhausen Forum, organized by the Memorial alongside the annual meeting of
the Platform in Berlin on the 7 November 2012, was held under the title ‘Working through Communism as a European Task.’ In the announcement of the program, the event is framed as a step towards rectifying the perceived failure in Europe to deal with the history of communist regimes: ‘as a rule, the perpetrators remain unpunished, the functionaries often occupy important positions in the democratic regime, victims are usually only minimally compensated. Has Europe failed in working through communism?’

Also outside of the official network, the Memorial’s collaborations with other (Central and Eastern) European partners are narrated in a way that constructs common histories. This is seen, for example, in an extended collaboration with the House of Terror in Budapest and its co-founder and Hungarian President, János Áder. On the 11 March 2013, Áder visited the Hohenschönhausen Memorial; in a press release, he is reported as stating ‘how important working through communism is – also beyond national borders.’ This expressed desire for transnational co-operation is soon put into action at a high level. On the 16 June 2014, a press release reports that Gauck, Knabe and Áder have presented a German-Hungarian project which aims to collect in a register the names of all those who were politically persecuted under communism. Again, this initiative is set in the context of a European failure which can only be resolved through European collaboration: ‘despite all commitments to working through the past, nobody has as yet made the effort to record by name those persecuted,’ Knabe adds, ‘we want to change that, not only for Germany, but for the whole of Europe.’

Learning from Others

A third far less prominent, but still important, narrative in the presentation of the cross-border collaborations of the Hohenschönhausen Memorial is one not of European failure, but of German failure. Here the co-operation across borders is used not to suggest that others might learn from the German example, but that German memorial culture might learn from other national contexts. This narrative tends to be interwoven with that of ‘learning from the Germans’ or ‘beyond the national/better together’ described above, but its effect is to criticize what is presented as the dominant approach to the past in Germany by way of reference to other ways of dealing with dictatorship. For example, a press release reports a visit by Knabe to Czech sites of memory on 25 October 2012. On the one hand, Knabe is described as encouraging his Czech partners ‘to create a publicly accessible memorial and not to leave the field open to commercial providers’ – that is, to learn from the German example. On the other hand, Knabe is reported as stating: ‘in contrast to what often happens in Germany, in the Czech Republic, National Socialism and communism are
not seen as opposites, but as two sides of the same coin. [...] In this respect, the Czech Republic, which was a victim of both regimes, is a model for other European states.' Similarly, in a Tagesspiegel article reporting a visit by Knabe to Tunisia dated 20 May 2011, in the context of the transmission of knowledge from Germany to Tunisian partners described above, Knabe is cited as stating: ‘in contrast to what happened in Germany, the Tunisians continued their revolution beyond the collapse of the ruling elite and banned the former ruling party.’ The suggestion of a ‘completed’ revolution in Tunisia resonates with the concept of an ‘unfinished revolution’ in Central and Eastern Europe and clearly implies a need to ban the successor parties to the Socialist Unity Party, which ruled in the GDR, in order to achieve full social renewal.

**Results: BStU**

Analysis of the 81 cross-border events in which BStU was involved between 2011 and 2014 brings to the fore two key narratives. I will term these 'Learning from the Germans/Eastern Europeans' and 'Beyond the National/Better Together,' although they can be seen to serve slightly different purposes to the similar narratives constructed around events involving Hohenschönhausen. A third narrative also emerged from the documents, specifically in co-operations with other national archives and in particular those from non-Central and Eastern European countries. These are framed principally in terms of professional exchange and focus on issues of preservation. Although this does of course have an important political dimension in terms of the role of archives in what we remember, it is less explicitly related to memory politics than the first two narratives and I will not explore it in detail here.

1 **Learning from the Germans/Eastern Europeans**

It is striking that the promotional material surrounding the cross-border collaborations of the BStU also frequently suggests a narrative of these co-operations being motivated by other countries’ desire to ‘learn from the Germans.’ Once again it is frequently in collaborations with non-European countries that this narrative emerges and it is especially prominent in the presentation of co-operations with North African and Middle Eastern countries in the wake of the Arab Spring. The eleventh activity report states that the citizens’ rights activists involved in the Arab Spring are asking themselves similar questions

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48 See, for example, Dora Osborne, ed., *Archive and Memory in German Literature and Visual Culture* (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2015).
to the civil rights movement in the Peaceful Revolution in the GDR, and they want to learn from those experiences and from the work being done today in the Stasi Records Authority (BStU) and its legal framework. In this context too, the language is of ‘support,’ ‘advice’ and ‘help’ for the non-European partners. It is worth reminding ourselves that the network analysis indicates that it is these collaborations which most frequently incorporate the involvement of state-level German actors, such as the Foreign Office, and political foundations, whose remit does not explicitly include memory politics and whose focus is Germany’s image in the world and the promotion of liberal democracy. This is also the case for several of Hohenschönhausen’s collaborations with post-Arab Spring countries (for example, the project _Contre l’oubli_ was set up at the initiative of the German Foreign Office) and indicates that the involvement of actors with different stated motivations within the collaborations may also have an impact on the way in which these co-operations are narrated.

However, in the case of the BStU we see an interesting shift: learning from the Germans also becomes learning from Central and Eastern Europe. For example, the eleventh activity report notes the participation of the BStU in a workshop organized by the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry on the topic of transitional justice. The reader is informed: ‘the workshop was aimed especially at participants from the countries of the “Arab Spring” and served to pass on the experiences of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with regard to successes and failures in the working through of dictatorship.’ In many regards, this narrative appears similar to that of ‘Beyond the National’ in Hohenschönhausen’s collaborations within the Platform and can indeed be seen as a result of co-operations between the BStU and its sister organizations within the ENOA. However, where the narrative constructed around the Platform events was more often one of the failure of Europe as a whole, here we see the idea of Central and Eastern European successes informing the decisions of activists in other post-conflict societies.

Beyond the National/Better Together
The narratives constructed around the cross-border collaborations of the BStU thus appear to be a complex interweaving of the national and transnational, of pride in what are perceived as German achievements and subsuming of these achievements into a story of Central and Eastern European co-operation. Indeed, the BStU promotional material in this period reports considerably more

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49 BStU, _Elfter Tätigkeitsbericht_, 98.
50 Hohenschönhausen, _7. Tätigkeitsbericht_, 81.
51 BStU, _Elfter Tätigkeitsbericht_, 101.
on the activities of the institution within pan-European networks, especially
the ENOA, than in similar documentation relating to Hohenschönhausen. Here
the sense of German superiority in working through difficult pasts disappears
and is replaced by a narrative of mutual support and encouragement, as well
as a focus on what unites the history of these different national contexts. One
example of this phenomenon is the close collaboration of the BStU and the
Polish INR to construct a common exhibition for the ENOA showcasing the his-
tory of the secret police in the different countries represented by the network
members, as well as the different routes to working through the past. Differ-
ences between the national contexts are acknowledged; however, the very fact
of a joint exhibition places the emphasis on commonalities. The language here
is not of ‘learning’ and ‘advice,’ but of ‘co-operation’ and ‘exchange.’

However, it is not only within these large networks that we see this narrative
of a common history, but also with regard to smaller-scale, but more intensive,
collaborations. This is where we see the impact of the different structure of
the BStU’s co-operative activity as described above. The emphasis on close col-
laboration with a smaller number of actors can mean a greater focus on what
more concretely unites the different national histories. For example, in events
developed as part of the close co-operation with the Czech Centre and Slovak
Institute (supported by the Czech and Slovak embassies), the emphasis is on
shared pasts and presents. In the press release for an event on ‘The Czechos-
lovak and East German Opposition,’ the author asks: ‘how did the opposition
movements influence one another? And what is the continued impact of the
common [my emphasis] fight for freedom and democracy in today’s society?’

Similarly, the exhibition Lernt Polnisch developed by the BStU, but presented
in collaboration with a number of Polish partners (including, for example, the
Polish Ambassador in Berlin, the Head of the INR in Poland and former mem-
ers of Solidarność)\(^{52}\) is framed as a study into the influence of the Solidarność
movement on opposition in the GDR.

The effect of this narrative is to create a Central and Eastern European com-
munity of remembrance, bringing together the partners of the ENOA, but also
Central and Eastern European actors outside of this network. It is here that we
can see the combining of the two narratives, as this community of Central and
Eastern Europeans working ‘better together’ is also one from which others out-
side of this community might learn. We see this in the above description of the
workshop organized by the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, where the ‘others’ are
non-European actors. However, it is also seen in interactions within broader
European memory politics. On 14–15 September 2011, the BStU co-organized an

\(^{52}\) BStU, Zwölfter Tätigkeitsbericht, 84.
international conference on the topic of the files of communist secret police services held at the representation of the European Commission in Berlin. The BStU’s co-operation partners were the Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft [South-East Europe Society] and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde [German Society for the Study of Eastern Europe]. According to the eleventh activity report of the BStU, the conference considered ‘the relevance of the approach to the legacy of the secret police in Eastern European societies and if the discussion in Eastern Europe provides impulses for a pan-European discussion about how to deal with the legacies of other twentieth-century dictatorships.’53 The report goes onto list the national contexts from which speakers were drawn, mostly Central and Eastern European, ‘but also [my emphasis] Greece and Spain.’ We can read this as the counterpart to the ‘othering’ of Eastern European approaches to the past, as described by Kaźmierska and Beattie; in this narrative, it is the Western European, alongside the non-European, nations who might turn to Central and Eastern European countries and contexts (including eastern Germany) for inspiration.

Towards a Collaborative Memory

The analysis of the networks created by and through the transnational collaborations of these two organizations indicates that institutions use co-operations across borders to promote their particular approach to working through the past, to forge alliances and groupings and to use these collaborations to construct narratives that are located in the German national context, but also seek to assert a Central and Eastern European way of seeing. Moreover, the new methodology used here, the combination of network and narrative analysis, indicates the importance of looking beyond those institutions most obviously involved in memory activism to consider the complex interaction of state and civil society initiatives. In sum, these co-operations are important not only for comprehending the workings of these institutions, they also indicate something important about memory across borders and about the reception of different pasts at sites of ‘intercrossing’: that is, that both can be understood in terms of collaboration.

Through collaborative activity, memory entrepreneurs create accounts of the past, which are not ‘de-territorialized’ in Levy and Sznaider’s terms.54 Rather,
they are embraced as *territorial* narratives of one national context, which can be used in an effort to create common pasts or even to transform the dominant memory narratives of another. This process is qualitatively different to that described by Erll in her concept of ‘travelling memory’ – these narratives do not ‘move,’ as such, instead they *communicate* across borders, whilst remaining situated in their original context.\(^{55}\) Collaborative memory is also similar to, but distinct from Michael Rothberg’s concept of ‘multidirectional memory.’\(^{56}\) Like Rothberg, I wish to go beyond debates about ‘collective memory as *competitive* memory’ [emphasis in original] and to show that memory is instead ‘subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing.’\(^{57}\) Rothberg’s model also highlights the interweaving of memory narratives and demonstrates how ‘groups do not simply articulate established positions but actually come into being through their dialogical interactions with others.’\(^{58}\) However, with his focus on aesthetic representations of memory, Rothberg does not fully analyze actual collaborative activity between those elites who construct and maintain public narratives about the past. In this sense, Rothberg’s work – while seminal for scholars of transcultural or transnational memory – does not take the actor-centered approach I advocated at the start of this chapter.

Indeed, the concept of ‘collaborative memory’ leads away from the focus on the objects of memory (*or lieux de mémoire*) and focuses our attention on the agents of European and transnational memory cultures. Collaborative memory incorporates acts of memory that are constructed through co-operative action between partners in different national contexts. By this I mean the cross-border events themselves, as well as the public stories about the past and the processes of coming to terms with it that are constructed around these events. Collaborative memory in this sense is emphatically not understood as a normative (that is, necessarily desirable) concept, rather one that can be used to describe and explain empirical phenomena. As seen in the analysis above, collaboration can be used in multiple ways which may not necessarily result in a progressive memory politics. Development of our memory studies conceptual toolbox towards a ‘collaborative memory’ might thus allow us to more fully understand these interactions at a granular level and to explain their impact on broader memory cultures.

\(^{55}\) Erll, ‘Travelling Memory.’
\(^{56}\) Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory*.
\(^{57}\) Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory*, 3.
\(^{58}\) Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory*, 5.
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